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A bstract
In 1899 Sigm und Freud published The Interpretation of Dreams, 
introducing the world to a method of analysis which claimed to expose 
the hidden m eaning not only of dreams, but of many other m ental 
products besides, including literature. The European literature of the 
years leading up to the Dreams book seems to offer particu larly  
handsome repayment of Freudian analysis. Manifestoes of aestheticism 
like Pater's 'Conclusion' to The Renaissance read like assertions of the 
pleasure principle over the reality principle; Oscar W ilde's The Picture of 
Dorian Gray can fairly effortlessly be construed as an account of the ego's 
relations w ith the superego; Stevenson's The Strange Case of Doctor 
jekyll and Mr Hyde can with similar ease be read as a parable about the 
fragility of the ego and the wickedness of the id; the dark mental region 
"dow n there" from which Symbolist poets claimed to obtain their 
imagery might plausibly be identified with the Freudian unconscious; 
The Brothers Karamazov, with its extended treatm ent of the them e of 
parricide, looks like a transparent enough expression of Dostoevsky's 
Oedipus complex; and in the dark philosophy of Nietzsche one finds 
ideas strikingly similar to such Freudian "discoveries" as repression and 
the theory of instincts.
"A pplications of analysis," Freud once w rote, "are alw ays 
confirmations of it as well" [SE, 22: 146]. According to that proposition, 
the above writings, by yielding so readily to Freud's theories, act as 
evidence of the scientific validity of his approach. But perhaps Freud's 
analytical template fits the literature of his near-contemporaries a little
too snugly. Perhaps it is precisely because they are F reud 's near­
contemporaries that these writers illustrate his theories so well. Perhaps, 
in other words, w hat we are looking at here is not a vindication of 
Freudian theory, but a damning demonstration of its rootedness in the 
European culture of Freud's age.
This suspicion is strengthened when we consider that in each of 
the cases mentioned above, the themes which are so amenable to a 
Freudian reading had perfectly good cultural and historical reasons to be 
there. The them e of parricide, for exam ple, has dem onstrable 
connections with the revolutionary political atm osphere of the late 
nineteenth century. The aesthete's emphasis on individual pleasure can 
also be read historically, as a retaliation against a moral order bent on 
imposing a culture of unpleasure. If social conditions were capable of 
producing these quasi-Freudian tropes in the literature of Freud's time, 
could the same forces have had a hand in shaping the corresponding 
concepts in Freud?
My first chapter explores these m atters in relation to that most 
representative of fin-de-siecle writers, Oscar Wilde, paying particular 
attention to his most Freudian work, The Picture of Dorian Gray.
My second chapter broadens the inquiry: it considers, against their 
historical background, the writings of a range of Wilde's contemporaries: 
Pater, Fluysmans, Nietzsche, the Symbolists, and so on.
In Chapter Three, I use the work of such writers to demonstrate the 
culturally-inspired nature of a central concept of Freud's, the Oedipus 
complex.
In Chapter Four, I dispute Freud 's Oedipal reading of The 
Brothers Karamazov by considering the thoroughness w ith which that 
work historicises its central theme of parricide.
By looking beyond the suspicious ease with which Freud can 
explain these writers, we discover a deeper process by which these writers 
can explain Freud: they raise ideas uncannily close to his, but place them 
squarely in their historical context, and thereby issue a hefty challenge to 
the scientific pretensions of psychoanalysis.
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PREFACE
In 1975, while reviewing a book about psychiatry, Sir Peter Medawar wrote:
The opinion is steadily gaining ground that doctrinaire psychoanalytic theory is 
the most stupendous intellectual confidence trick of the twentieth century: and 
a terminal product as well - something akin to a zeppelin in the history of 
ideas, a vast structure of radically unsound design with no posterity. [Quoted 
by Sulloway, 1979: 499]
\
Medawar's verdict is one of the most aggressively worded - and most often quoted - 
contributions to the ongoing debate about the scientific validity of Freud's ideas - a 
debate that has been referred to, aptly, as "the Freud Wars". To one degree or another, 
these wars have been going on ever since Freud published the founding work of 
psychoanalysis, The Interpretation o f  Dreams, in 1900. As early as 1909, for 
instance, the sexologist Albert Moll complained that psychoanalysis "involves so 
many arbitrary interpretations, that it is impossible to speak of truth in any strict sense 
of the term" [quoted by Sulloway, 1979: 471].
More recently, psychoanalysis has been subjected to vigorous critiques by such
\
writers as Ernest Gellner - who despairingly concluded that within the terms 
established by psychoanalysis "no retrieval of empirical content is possible, when the 
links between theory and fact are so loose" [Gellner, 1993: 221] - and Frederick 
Crews, who has called psychoanalysis "the paradigmatic pseudoscience of our epoch - 
one that deserves to be addressed not in the thrifty spirit of 'What can we salvage from 
Freud?' but rather with principled attention to its faulty logic, its manufacturing of its 
own evidence, and its facile explanation of adult behavior by reference to 
unobservable and arbitrarily posited childhood fantasy" [Crews et. al., 1997: 9]. As 
Crews himself points out, though, "there is nothing especially original in my 
apprehension of Freud and psychoanalysis. I have done little more than synopsize the
work of herculean scholars like Henri Ellenberger, Frank Sulloway, and Malcolm 
lyiacmillan and of persistent philosophical inquirers like Adolf Grunbaum and Frank 
Cioffi" [ibid.: 9].
It is important to note that these revisionist Freud scholars did not necessarily 
embark on their projects out of a priori hostility towards Freud. Frank Sulloway, for 
example, in his 1979 book Freud: Biologist o f  the Mind, writes of Freud's "scientific 
greatness", of the "timeless quality of his insights", and of "his brilliant legacy to 
mankind" - even though Sulloway's own research suggests that psychoanalysis was in 
certain important respects scientifically flawed [Sulloway, 1979: 499, 500, 503].1 
After meticulously demonstrating Freud's heavy reliance on biological theories of his 
contemporaries - some of which are now considered to have been entirely erroneous - 
Sulloway offers the following conclusion:
Acceptance of Freud's historical debt to biology requires a rather uncongenial 
conclusion for most psychoanalytic practitioners, namely, that Freud's theories 
reflect the faulty logic of outmoded nineteenth-century biological assumptions, 
particularly those of a psychophysicalist, Lamarckian, and biogenetic nature.... 
Plausible enough as they may have seemed to Freud, such assumptions were 
nevertheless wrong; and much that is wrong with orthodox psychoanalysis 
may be traced directly back to them. [497-498]
Sulloway thus delivers findings which contradict "the traditional account of 
Freud's achievements", which
has acquired its mythological proportions at the expense of historical context. 
Indeed, historical 'decontextualisation' is a prerequisite for good myths, which 
invariably seek to deny history. This denial process has followed two main
*For an analysis o f the contradictions between Sulloway's enthusiastic endorsements of psychoanalysis 
^nd his subversive findings about it, see Crews, 1986: 97-111.
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tendencies in psychoanalytic history - namely, the extreme reluctance of Freud 
and his followers to acknowledge the biological roots of psychoanalysis, thus 
transforming Freud into a crypto-biologist; and the creation and elaboration of 
the 'myth of the hero' in the psychoanalytic movement. [445]
Sulloway's book, then, has the effect of correcting this myth, by supplying abundant 
evidence of the historical contingency of Freud's theories. Sulloway's Freud is 
"anything but isolated from the intellectual currents of his age" [496].
When Sulloway speaks of intellectual currents, he means currents in scientific 
- and especially biological - thought. But his work has been supplemented by other 
researchers who have considered the ways in which Freud reproduced aspects of the 
cultural and literary Zeitgeist. Carl Schorske, for example, in his 1981 study Fin-de- 
siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture, endeavours to read Freud as a man of his period - 
"a period of historical transition imperious in its demand for what Heinz Kohut has 
called 'a reshuffling of the self" [Schorske, 1981: 209]. Schorske poses another 
challenge to the historically decontextualising myth, by finding in psychoanalysis the 
same sensitivity to its historical moment that one finds in creative Viennese artists like 
Musil, Hoffmansthal and Schnitzler.2
But the cultural conditions in fin-de-siecle Vienna were by no means unique to 
that city. Freud's city simply reflected - in a particularly intense way - trends 
characteristic of the whole of fin-de-siecle Europe. As Schorske himself puts it, 
"during the last five years of the nineteenth century, Austria-Hungary seemed to be 
serving, as one of its poets observed, as 'a little world in which the big one holds its 
tryouts' - tryouts for Europe's social and political disintegration. The Habsburg 
Empire was pulling apart at the seams internally as Europe was internationally:
"Tor similar approaches to Freud, see: Franz Kuna's essay 'Vienna and Prague, 1890 - 1928' in 
Bradbury, M. and McFarlane, J. (eds) Modernism 1890-1930 (Penguin Books: Harmondsworth, 1987); 
Janik and Toulmin's Wittgenstein's Vienna (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1973); and Billa 
Zanuso's The Young Freud: The Origins o f Psychoanalysis in Late Nineteenth-Century Viennese 
Culture (Basil Blackwell: New York, 1986).
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I n t r o d u c t io n
A Matter of Evidence: The Curious Case of 
the Forgotten Psychiatrist
What did Sigmund Freud have in common with Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Oscar Wilde?
Surprisingly enough, this provocative question comes up in a 
work of Freud's own, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. Originally 
published in 1901, the Psychopathology went through twelve further 
editions in Freud's lifetime - to "almost every one" of which, James 
Strachey tells us, Freud added fresh material [Strachey, 1966: vii].1 In 1907 
Freud inserted a chapter - which constitutes the third chapter of the final 
text - called 'The Forgetting of Names and Sets of Words.' In 1910, he 
added to this chapter, among other things, an account of a case reported 
to him by his Hungarian colleague Sändor Ferenczi. In its entirety, the 
case reads as follows:
'A lady, who had heard something about psycho-analysis, could 
not recall the name of the psychiatrist Jung.^
The following names came to her mind instead: K1—  (a 
name), Wilde, Nietzsche, Hauptmann.
T did not tell her the name and invited her to give free 
associations to each name in turn.
'Starting from K1—  she immediately thought of Frau K1— , and 
of how she was a prim and affected person, but looked very well
1 James Strachey was the General Editor of the Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, henceforth SE.
for her age. "She's not ageing." As a common characterization of 
W ilde and Nietzsche she nam ed "insanity". Then she said 
chaffingly: "You Freudians will go on looking for the causes of 
insanity till you're insane yourselves." Then: "I can't bear Wilde 
and Nietzsche. I don't understand them. I hear they were both 
homosexuals; Wilde had dealings with young people." (In spite of 
having uttered the correct name - in Hungarian, it is true - in this 
sentence, she was still unable to recall it.)
'Starting from Hauptmann, first "Halbe"* and then "Jugend" 
occurred to her; and it was then for the first time, after I had 
draw n her attention to the word "Jugend", that she realised she 
had been in search of the name Jung.
'This lady had lost her husband when she was thirty-nine and 
had no prospect of marrying again. Thus she had certainly reason 
enough to avoid recalling anything that reminded her of youth or 
age. It is striking that the ideas screening the missing name were 
associated entirely with its content and that associations w ith its 
sound were absent.'
^ ['Ju n g '  is also the German for 'young'.]
* [Hauptmann and Halbe were both celebrated German dramatists. One of 
Halbe's best-known plays was Jugend ('Youth').]
[Freud, 1966: 26-27 - italics, and footnotes, in original.]
For the reader's convenience, Freud italicises the portions of the 
w om an's free associations that seem to him significant.2 This has the 
unintended consequence of drawing our attention to the stupendous
2Even though the case is given to us in quotation marks, as if it were a verbatim reprinting 
of Ferenczi's account, for the sake of convenience I will refer to the reading as though it 
were authored by Freud himself. Certainly it is authorised by Freud: it is an impeccable 
implementation of his theories and methods, and he presents it to us, with his full 
approval, in a book that bears his name alone.
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quantity of material which Freud deems insignificant, dispensable. The 
italicised words are as isolated as the specks of glitter in a gold-panner's 
dish of sludge. Unlike a gold-panner, though, Freud seems to possess no 
objective standard telling him w hat to keep and w hat to throw away. 
From a scientific point of view, as W ittgenstein said, the "procedure of 
free association ... is queer, because Freud never shows how we know 
where to stop - where is the right solution.... The reason why he calls one 
sort of analysis the right one, does not seem to be a matter of evidence" 
[Wittgenstein, 1973: 77].
But from Freud 's point of view the procedure was far from 
arbitrary. Fie knew precisely where to stop: at the point where the free 
associations agreed with - and thereby vindicated - his theories of the 
mind. ("Applications of analysis," as Freud frankly wrote, late in his 
career, "are always confirmations of it as well" [SE, 22: 146].) In this 
particular case, the hypothesis being applied and confirmed is one which 
Freud has framed, also in italics, at the conclusion of the book's first 
chapter. "By the side of simple cases where proper names are forgotten 
there is a type of forgetting which is motivated by repression" [Freud, 
1966: 7].
W hen the beam  of this hypothesis is trained  on the free 
associations of the Jung woman, certain words - the w ords that Freud 
puts into italics - take on a glitter of significance. And there is no doubt 
that the repression hypothesis proves viable in this case: it provides us 
with a plausible account of why this lady has forgotten the name 'Jung' 
and w hy she should have thought of these particu lar nam es in 
connection with it. There is indeed something about the forgotten name 
that the lady's conscious mind might conceivably find repulsive; and 
each of the names that come to her mind instead can also, ultimately, be 
connected with the unpleasant topic of youth.
3
But the mere fact that Freud's interpretation proceeds according to 
certain theoretical precepts does not answer W ittgenstein's objection that 
it is not a matter of evidence. It only raises the wider question of whether 
those theoretical precepts are a matter of evidence. When Freud answers 
that question w ith the claim that the evidence for his theories lies in 
their effectiveness as a mode of interpretation - application is vindication 
- we have a right to be unimpressed. For as we shall see in a moment, it 
is possible to interpret the woman's free associations in at least one other 
way. Indeed it seems fair to say that the ways in which the wom an's 
associations - or any phenomenon - can be interpreted are innumerable, 
perhaps infinite. One could interpret the w om an's associations as a 
message from aliens who have commandeered her mind. One could 
argue that the wom an has forgotten the name, and has rem embered 
these other names instead, because she has a bad memory, or because she 
is an ignoramus. Since more than one interpretation of the material is 
possible, it follows that the mere fact that an interpretation can be made is 
not enough to establish that it is the right interpretation. One is therefore 
not entitled to say that one's hypotheses have been proved scientifically 
correct simply because they are capable of yielding an interpretation. If 
we are to believe that a Freudian interpretation is anything more than an 
interpretation, one interpretation among m any, we m ust have some 
prior reason to believe in the rules of psychoanalysis - some hard 
evidence of their validity which lies outside the closed circuit of self­
endorsement formed when a theory produces a passable interpretation.
Freud himself demonstrates an awareness of this principle when, 
during Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905), he alludes to a 
conception of scientific proof considerably m ore stringent than the 
notion that application is vindication. The psychoanalytical theory of 
jokes, Freud explains,
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has been arrived at by inference; and if from an inference of this 
kind one is led, not to a familiar region, but on the contrary, to one 
that is alien and new to one's thought, one calls the inference a 
'h y p o th es is ' and rightly refuses to regard the relation of the 
hypothesis to the material from which it was inferred as a 'proof 
of it. It can only be regarded as 'proved' if it is reached by another 
path as well and if it can be shown to be the nodal point of still 
other connections. [Freud, 1991c: 236 - emphasis added.] 3
If, in other words, one sees a man with a beard and then infers that all 
men have beards, one cannot prove one's hypothesis correct simply by 
pointing back to the man with the beard. The hypothesis is proved only 
if it can be substantiated via "other paths" as well - that is, by the 
observation of other men.
Of course the theory of repression has proved infinitely more 
durable than the proposition that all men have beards. A Freudian 
m ight argue that durability , in this context, is the same thing as 
substantiation. If, after a hundred years or so of exposure to data, the 
theory of repression has yet to encounter one case which has conclusively 
disproved it, then surely it must be considered scientifically valid by now. 
But here we m ust take note of a critical point. The hypothesis that all 
m en have beards seeks confirm ation - and u ltim ately  suffers 
disconfirmation - from objects: men with beards and men without them. 
The thesis of repression, on the other hand, derives confirmation not 
from objects but interpretations of mental artefacts (dreams, stories, slips,
3Freud qualifies this brief outbreak of empirical rigour by adding: "But proof of this sort is 
not to be had, in view of the fact that our knowledge of unconscious processes has scarcely 
begun. In the realization that we are standing on ground that has never before been 
trodden, we are thus content, from our point of observation, to take one single, short and 
uncertain step forward into the unexplored region" [Freud, 1991c: 2361-
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free associations) conducted by Freud himself according to his own rules. 
In view of this circumstance, it is hardly surprising or impressive that 
books like The Psychopathology of Everyday Life are full of 
interpretations which confirm Freudian doctrine. They are Freudian 
interpretations, and could scarcely be expected to do anything but bear out 
Freudian theory.
We can bring this discussion back to particulars by returning to the 
case of the 'Jung7 wom an. Let us suspend, for a m om ent, any 
preconception we might have that the technique Freud uses to decode 
her free associations is scientifically valid. Let us instead examine the 
intrinsic merits and demerits of his interpretation. Is Freud's reading so 
thorough, so exhaustive, that it puts all other in terpretations in the 
shade? Is it, combined with countless other readings like it, enough to 
compel a belief in the rules of psychoanalysis?
As I have noted, the quality of the Jung reading which leaps to the 
eye is something which one is inclined to think of as a grave defect: 
namely, the fact that it engages with only a tiny fraction of the material at 
hand. The bulk of the w om an's associations, the m aterial that Freud 
leaves in roman type, cannot be directly illum inated by the theory of 
repression. That is not to say, of course, that this material is inconsistent 
w ith Freud's hypothesis. On the contrary, Freud always insisted that 
repressed thoughts can only resurface in a veiled form, in the company of 
a certain amount of screening material only loosely connected with the 
unconscious idea. W hat this doctrine means in practical terms, as the 
Jung case clearly shows us, is that a Freudian interpretation will at best be 
a matter of some of the evidence. That handful of italicised w ords 
resonates with hidden meaning, but the rest is silence. To put it another 
way, Freud's hypothesis enables him to see m uch more in the text than 
meets the naked eye, but it also requires him to see a great deal less.
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This is most conspicuously so in the case of the names Nietzsche 
and Wilde. Free-associating on these names, the woman offers some five 
or six observations. Only the last of these - the observation that Wilde 
"had dealings with young people" - strikes Freud as significant. To the 
hypothesis-free eye, however, this looks like one of the least meaningful 
of the wom an's reflections. Before she comes to it, she makes several 
remarks which, although they refuse to be illuminated by the repression 
hypothesis, nevertheless seem to harbour some provocative insinuations 
about the relationship between Jung, Wilde and Nietzsche. Let us 
consider these other remarks, and see if they suggest any alternative 
interpretations of the case.
The woman begins by naming 'insanity' as a characteristic of both 
Nietzsche and Wilde. She is off the m ark there, of course: in truth, 
Nietzsche was the lone madm an of the pair. Her belief that both men 
were homosexual is likewise only half right: the author of The Gay 
Science w as straight. One might suppose that these errors are beside the 
point, since we are in a realm in which mere facts matter far less than the 
w om an's impressions and beliefs. But that would be to overlook the 
possibility that the w om an's carelessness with these facts might tell us 
something im portant about her mind. The woman thinks Wilde was 
insane, even though he wasn't. Is it possible that she assumes he was 
insane because he was homosexual? In other words, are we dealing with 
a lady for whom  hom osexuality and insanity are not particularly  
distinguishable phenomena? Perhaps she even considers these things 
synonymous: all homosexuals are no doubt insane; and lunatics may as 
well be sexual perverts into the bargain.
"I can't bear Nietzsche and Wilde," the woman declares. When 
one takes into account everything she says about Nietzsche and Wilde, 
one begins to suspect that it is this hostile attitude to them, rather than
7
her belief that both men were "insane", which fundam entally unites 
these names in her mind, and which fuels her free associations. It is 
because they were insane and homosexual - and also because "I don 't 
understand them" - that the woman cannot bear Nietzsche and Wilde.
The qualities, or supposed qualities, for which the wom an hates 
Nietzsche and W ilde can be reduced to an essential idea: that of 
decadence, or subversion. Homosexuality, insanity and unintelligibility 
are dangerously subversive things - or are so, at any rate, by the bourgeois 
Victorian standards which this woman seems to possess to the point of 
caricature. But if the grounds on which she finds Wilde and Nietzsche 
subversive are spurious, there was one arena in which both men were 
genuinely and wilfully subversive, even perverse: in their w ritings. 
While one doubts that the Jung woman read deeply enough into their 
oeuvres to find this out for herself, it is not at all unlikely that she had 
vaguely got wind of their amoral gist, and had thereby gathered that to 
detest these writers because she did not understand them was to take a 
short-cut to the scandalised attitude at which she would have inevitably 
arrived by understanding them fully.
According to Freud, the w om an's allegation that "W ilde had 
dealings with young people" is the only one of her remarks about Wilde 
and Nietzsche worthy of our attention, since it is the only one which can 
be connected with the supposedly repressed idea. It will be noticed, 
however, that this rem ark does not concern Nietzsche at all. Freud 
seems content to suppose that the name 'Nietzsche' stands at one remove 
from the repressed idea. In other words, it has nothing in itself to do 
with the repressed idea of youth, but is connected to it only via its link 
with the name of Wilde. Although Freud will inform us, later in the 
P s y c h o p a t h o l o g y , th a t "no th ing  in the m ind is a rb itra ry  or 
undeterm ined" [242], his account of what happens in the m ind of the
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Jung woman fails to specify why the appearance of Nietzsche's name is 
not arbitrary: what has determined that Nietzsche's name in particular 
should have come up here, instead of Lord Alfred Douglas's, say, or 
Rimbaud's? On the other hand, if we postulate that the w om an's 
associations proceed not from the idea of youth  but from that of 
decadence, the appearance of Nietzsche's name looks far from accidental, 
for it has a firm primary link with this idea.
So does the name 'H auptm ann'. The constraints of the repression 
hypothesis oblige Freud to dismiss the appearance of H auptm ann 's 
name, like Nietzsche's, as somewhat arbitrary, since it is connected to the 
repressed idea only via the name of Halbe, who wrote Youth. But if we 
suppose that the w om an's thoughts are governed by the them e of 
subversion, then we can see quite clearly why Gerhart H auptm ann might 
belong in its own right in the company of W ilde and Nietzsche. 
H auptm ann 's 1892 play Die Weher [The Weavers], for which he would 
receive the 1912 Nobel Prize, was the work which "thrust [him] into the 
arena of world opinion" [Maurer, 1982: 46]. On its first appearance in 
1892, the play, which deals with the 1844 revolt of oppressed Silesian 
textile workers, became the subject of what has been called "the most 
spectacular political censorship trial in the history of German literature" 
[Manfred Brauneck, quoted by Maurer, 1982: 46]. The right wing saw it 
"as a thinly disguised attack on contemporary social conditions; worse 
still, as a dangerous incitement to revolution.... [I]t was translated into 
Russian by Lenin's sister and had an impact not only on Russian 
literature but on the Russian Revolution itself" [Maurer, 1982: 46-47]. In 
light of these facts, one sees why Hauptmann, in the mind of a bourgeois 
snob who is offended by things like insanity, hom osexuality and 
unintelligibility, might rank as a figurehead of fin-de-siecle decadence.
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The plot thickens, as it were, w hen we consider the w om an's 
comment that "You Freudians will go on looking for the causes of 
insanity till you 're insane yourselves." At this point the w om an's free 
associations become considerably freer than Freud would have liked: for 
she is now suggesting that insanity - the quality she has named as the first 
"common characteristic" of Wilde and Nietzsche - is also a characteristic, 
albeit an incipient one, of "you Freudians." If we are correct in thinking 
that the wom an takes W ilde's and Nietzsche's "insanity" as a kind of 
emblem of their hateful decadence, then it seems that the wom an is now 
associating Freudianism itself with the decadent theme. This becomes all 
the more im portant when one rem embers that the designation "you 
Freudians" applies not only to her analyst Ferenczi, but also to the man 
whose name she is trying to recall - Jung .4 I have already surmised that it 
is the idea of subversion, or decadence, which generates the substitute 
names and her free associations on them. Now we have independent 
confirmation, as it were, that the name which forms the kernel of all the 
w om an's thoughts - the forgotten name - is indeed associated in her 
mind with decadent practices.
In summary, I am proposing that the wom an's thought processes 
worked in the following way. She is unable for some reason or another 
to remember the name Jung. All she can remember about him is that he 
is a Freudian. The names she thinks of instead therefore proceed from 
the idea of "Freudianism". Judging by the names she associates with it, 
the wom an's idea of Freudianism is unflattering. She associates it w ith 
three literary men whose writings (and personal lives) violated Victorian
4On this fundamental point Freud's account is less than crystal clear. Although we are 
told that the lady "had heard something about psycho-analysis", we are then informed 
that the name she cannot recall is that of "the psychiatrist Jung". This seems a somewhat 
disingenuous way of referring to a man who by 1910, when Freud added this case to the 
book, was the second-most eminent psychoanalyst in the world - the "crown prince", as 
Freud himself once put it, to Freud's king [Webster, 1995: 372].
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Standards of propriety, and whom she therefore finds repugnant. She 
also thinks of a certain Fraud K1— , a Dorian Gray-like wom an whose 
"prim and affected" facade conceals an ugly carnal truth. These substitute 
nam es, together w ith her free associations on them , compel the 
conclusion that the wom an finds Jung, and Freudians in general, 
threatening and unpalatable.
If we are to accept Freud 's suggestion that application of an 
hypothesis amounts to vindication of it, then our hypothesis m ust be 
proclaimed correct. But since Freud's completely different hypothesis can 
be proclaimed correct on the same grounds, it appears we were right to 
suspect that this standard of proof was too slack.
If neither interpretation can be called definitive, then, what can we 
say about their com parative merits? It seems fair to say that my 
interpretation has engaged with more of the available m aterial than 
Freud's does. The subversion hypothesis can account for the appearance 
of all four of the "screen" names and can explain all of the w om an's 
associations; Freud's reading, by contrast, places two of the four substitute 
names at one remove from the forgotten name, and dismisses the bulk of 
the free associations as inessential. Moreover, Freud's reading takes a 
curiously one-dimensional view of the name "Jung." Although we are 
told that "the ideas screening the missing name were associated entirely 
with its content and that associations with its sound were absent", this is 
not strictly true. It is not the content of the name "Jung" which spawns 
the lady's ideas; it is the content of the w ord "young", a w ord which 
Jung's name raises purely by virtue of its sound. One therefore wonders 
why Freud bothers to tell us that the lady "had heard something about 
psycho-analysis" - for as far as Freud's reading is concerned, Jung might as 
well be an architect or a wrestler as a psychoanalyst. All that m atters is 
that his name is a homonym for the traumatic word jung.
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But while Freud's interpretation is somewhat economical in its 
use of the data, it has a spectacular advantage which might be said to 
compensate for that. It provides us with an explanation of why the lady 
forgot the name in the first place, by showing us the m echanisms of 
repression and resistance in action. My reading fails to furnish any such 
explanation: it does not identify a motive for the forgetting. Of course 
forgetting does not have to have a motive - even Freud him self 
theoretically left room for accidental forgetting. ("By the side of simple 
cases where proper names are forgotten there is a type of forgetting which 
is motivated by repression" [Freud, 1966: 7].5) The subversion hypothesis 
m ust be content to assume that this case of forgetting was accidental, 
undeterm ined.
In other words, this case of forgetting can be approached in two 
different ways. One can either construct a novel and am bitious 
theoretical explanation of it, or else one can attend to all of the data - but 
one cannot do both. In the course of the following chapters, we will find 
Freud faced by this kind of choice time and time again: and seldom will 
we find him taking the second path.
If the 'Jung' woman considered Freud's theories beyond the pale, she was 
not alone. The public belief that psychoanalysis was improper or even 
perverse was painfully familiar to Freud - even his own wife called his 
researches a "form of pornography" [quoted by Gay, 1988: 61]. Freud's
^This allusion to the possibility of accidental forgetting is hard to square with the dictum 
that “nothing in the mind is arbitrary or undetermined" [ibid.: 242]. In practice, Freud 
tended to adhere to the second of these principles, behaving as though mental accidents 
did not occur. It is hard to think of a single moment in his work where he points to a non- 
Freudian slip, or a meaningless dream, or a cigar that is just a cigar. Indeed Freud's rules 
of interpretation would seem effectively to preclude the possibility of mental accident, 
since they are so flexible that there is probably no phenomenon which they could not 
eventually identify as unconsciously determined.
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Standard reply to such charges was that his work, far from being 
disreputable, warranted the reverence due to a science. In the 'Prefatory 
Remarks' to his 1905 case-history of 'Dora', for example, Freud took pains 
to stress that although he would shortly be heard discussing such matters 
as fellatio and masturbation with his teen-aged patient, any relish he took 
in these conversations was purely scientific. "Am I, then, to defend 
myself upon this score as well?" Freud sighs:
...[I]t would be the mark of a singular and perverse prurience to 
suppose that conversations of this kind are a good means of 
exciting or of gratifying sexual desires. For the rest, I feel inclined 
to express my opinion on this subject in a few borrowed words: 'It 
is deplorable to have to make room for protestations of this sort in 
a scientific work; but let no one reproach me on this account but 
rather accuse the spirit of the age ....' [Freud, 1990b: 37-38 - the 
"borrowed words" come from one R. Schmidt.]
By using somebody else's words to carry the scientific defence, 
Freud reinforces the im pression that his endeavours have objective 
legitimacy. But there is a sense in which this response does not 
adequately defend the honour of psychoanalysis. To understand what 
that sense is, we must first appreciate that there are two entirely different 
intellectual planes on which one can find psychoanalysis disreputable. 
One is the epitome of Victorian narrow-m indedness: Freud speaks of 
fellatio and m astu rbation , and therefore by defin ition  he is a 
pornographer. We can afford to ignore this jejune judgement. But there 
were more solid grounds on which a contemporary might have found 
Freud's new "science" suspect: not merely because it dealt with sexual 
subject matter, but because its manner of dealing with it exhibited none
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of the rigour or responsibility associated with the scientific method. To 
impugn Freud's efforts in this second way implies the grave charge that 
he is not a scientist. In order to quash that charge, Freud m ust do 
something far more elaborate than simply claim that he is so a scientist.
W hen the Jung w om an com pares Freud w ith  W ilde and 
Nietzsche, her remarks at first seem to occupy the more modest of these 
intellectual planes. To place Freud among the ranks of the insane or the 
sexually perverted simply because he was bold enough to study them is 
absurd, and we can happily, echoing Freud, blame such thinking on the 
"spirit of the age". But by likening Freud to a philosopher and a poet, the 
woman also touches, no doubt by accident, on a substantial query about 
the epistemological status of psychoanalysis which remains valid to this 
day. As Freud himself freely admitted, many of his insights had been 
anticipated by philosophers and poets - and yet "by choosing," as one 
w riter puts it, "to present his revolutionary innovations as standard 
pieces of scientific theory, on a par with the molecular theory of gases or 
the germ theory of disease, he made the largest possible claim for their 
objective truth" [Quinton, 1972: 73]. Did Freud support this large claim 
with an appropriately abundant quantity of hard evidence? Or have his 
observations been proved no more objectively true than the creative 
whims of a Nietzsche or a Wilde?
The possibility that Freud was more creative writer than scientist began 
to dog him even before the advent of psychoanalysis. In 1895, he 
published the Studies on Hysteria, co-authored by Josef Breuer. In it, 
Freud admitted that it was
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Strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories 
and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science. I 
must console myself with the reflection that the nature of my 
subject is evidently responsible for this, rather than any preference 
of my own. [Breuer and Freud, 1956: 160]
But the nature of Freud's subject was not as neatly separable from 
his personal preferences as he makes out. The following year, he would 
confess to his friend Wilhelm Fliess that "as a young man my only 
longing was for philosophical knowledge, and now that I am changing 
over from medicine to psychology I am in the process of fulfilling this 
wish" [E. Freud, 1961: 241]. In other words, Freud's decision to become a 
psychologist had been in the first place a function of his philosophical 
bent. Moreover, the way in which Freud approached his m aterial was 
peculiarly philosophical. "[I]n the nineteenth century," as Philip Rieff 
explains, "science was entirely identified with the 'physical' m ethod [of 
psychology]; 'dialectical' explanations were consigned to religion and 
philosophy" [Rieff, 1959: 16]. Since Freud's approach was distinctly of the 
second kind, he could hardly blame the short-storyish quality of his 
publications entirely on "the nature of my subject". Indeed he admits as 
m uch during the same discussion in the Studies on Hysteria, when he 
points out that his m ethod eschews the "local diagnoses and electro­
prognosis" dictated by his neuropathological training, and involves 
instead "a detailed description of m ental processes such as we are 
accustomed to find in the works of imaginative writers ... [together] w ith 
the use of a few psychological formulas" [Breuer and Freud, 1956: 160- 
161].
There is something else we are accustomed to find in the works of 
imaginative writers: imagination. Their narratives, in general, are m ade
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up: they are not objectively true. This defining property of fiction was 
present in Freud's early work, as even the most sympathetic accounts of 
his life tell us. In 1896, Freud formulated his seduction theory, which 
confidently proposed that the key to form ation of neuroses lay in the 
patient's having been sexually molested as a young child, usually by its 
father. The following year Freud abandoned the theory, having decided 
that it was overly improbable and insufficiently supported by the data - 
that it was, in short, a fictional narrative.6 Others had perceived this 
fictionality before Freud did. The em inent neurologist Richard von 
Krafft-Ebing, who was present at the lecture at which Freud unveiled the 
theory, immediately dismissed Freud's brainchild as a "a scientific fairy 
tale". This was, as Peter Gay says,
the very metaphor that would touch Freud at his most sensitive 
spot. Freud, the great man was insisting, was guilty of perpetrating 
mere literature. [Gay, 1978: 53]
We should not suppose that this spot became any less sensitive 
after Freud scrapped the seduction theory, and replaced it with the range 
of theses - child sexuality, the determinacy of unconscious wishes, the 
O edipus complex - that he grouped under the name psychoanalysis. 
Freud's m ature theories were not noticeably more grounded in rigorous 
empiricism than his "fairy-tale" had been, and the cries that Freud was a 
mere philosopher did not abate.
So to m ention Freudianism in the same breath as the names of 
W ilde and N ietzsche was to press on w hat rem ained, in 1910, an 
exquisitely "sensitive spot" for Freud. Indeed, it was to press on it w ith
6Earlier still, Freud had made another contribution to “science" which he subsequently 
came to recognise as fictional: a paper identifying cocaine as an unconditionally beneficial 
drug [see Webster, 1995:45-48].
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cruel precision - for Nietzsche was the very philosopher to whom Freud 
was most commonly likened. Again and again Freud was obliged to deny 
that psychoanalysis had been influenced by Nietzsche. In 1908, for 
example, he had to reassure even the Viennese Psychoanalytical Society 
on this point. The minutes of April 1 record that:
Professor Freud stresses above all his peculiar relation to 
philosophy, the abstractions of which were so uncongenial that he 
decided to give up the study of philosophy. Of Nietzsche, too, he is 
ignorant; an occasional attempt to read him foundered upon an 
excess of interest. Despite the much-noted similarities he could 
still assure us, he said, that Nietzsche's thoughts had had 
absolutely no influence upon his own works....7 [quoted by Weber, 
1984: 41]
Freud's writings contain several such strange equivocations on the 
subject of Nietzsche. As Derrida wryly says, when discussing the free 
associations of the 'Jung' woman, "Nietzsche is also a name that Freud 
would have very much liked to forget" [Derrida, 1984: 31n]. Freud was no 
doubt telling the truth when he insisted that his theories had not derived 
directly from the remarkably similar ideas of Nietzsche. But that is not 
the end of the matter. It is only the beginning of it. It leaves us with a 
large question: why, if Freud did not obtain his theories straight from 
Nietzsche, were their works so full of similar ideas? There is the 
possibility that Nietzsche was a brilliant amateur scientist who was able
7Peter Gay reports that Freud “read [Nietzschel as a young student and spent good money 
on his collected works in early 1900, the year of Nietzsche's death. He hoped, he told his 
friend Fliess, 'to find the words for much that remains mute in me.' Yet Freud treated 
Nietzsche's writings as texts to be resited far more than to be studied. It is symptomatic 
that after reporting the purchase of Nietzsche's works, he immediately added that he 
had not yet opened them: 'For the time being too indolent'" [Gay, 1988: 45].
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to discover universal psychological truths without systematically 
studying so much as one patient. This is the explanation favoured by 
Freud, who in the Autobiographical Study calls Nietzsche a "philosopher 
whose guesses and intuitions often agree in the most astonishing way 
with the laborious findings of psychoanalysis" [1950c: 109-110] (Nietzsche, 
it will be noticed, agrees with Freud, even though Freud came after him.)
There is a second and far more interesting possibility, which takes 
note of the fact that although Nietzsche came first, he did not come first 
by much. Nietzsche was born in 1844, Freud in 1856. The fact that 
Nietzsche died young tends to obscure the fact that he and Freud were 
more or less contemporaries. But once we recall that they were, we can 
see that the similarities between their ideas might be explained as a 
function of the historical climate they shared. The forgotten psychiatrist 
himself, Carl Jung, would advance this very argument in 1933, well after 
his acrimonious split from Freud.
The historical conditions which preceded Freud and formed his 
groundwork made a phenomenon like himself necessary, and it is 
precisely his main thesis, that is, the doctrine of the repression of 
sexuality, which is most clearly conditioned in this historical sense. 
Freud stands like his greater, philosophical, contemporary, 
Nietzsche, at the end of the Victorian era which, on the continent, 
never received such an appropriate epithet, despite the fact that it 
was just as characteristic in Germanic and Protestant countries 
generally, as among Anglo-Saxons.8 The Victorian era was a 
period of repression, a convulsive attempt to keep artificially alive 
by moralisings, anaemic ideals framed in a bourgeois
8This broad definition of "Victorianism", which acknowledges that the repressive social 
conditions characteristic of Victorian Britain also prevailed beyond its borders, is one I 
shall be employing throughout this thesis.
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respectability.... If Freud is viewed in this retrospective way, as an 
exponent of the ressentiment of the incoming century against the 
nineteenth, with its illusions, its hypocrisy, its half-ignorance, its 
false, overwrought feelings, its shallow morality, its artificial, 
sapless morality, and its lamentable taste, he can be viewed in my 
opinion much more correctly than when the attempt is made to 
mark him out as the herald of new ways and new truths. He is a 
great destroyer who breaks the chains of the past. [Jung, 1983: 49-50, 
51]
It is my view that Jung's verdict is profoundly correct, and can be 
proved so by a consideration of the remarkable extent to which Freud's 
ideas were also present in the literature of his 'decadent' contemporaries. 
That is the task to which this thesis will be devoted. The effect will be to 
historicise the doctrines of psychoanalysis: to show that Freud mistook 
certain socially-conditioned peculiarities of the Victorian mind for 
permanent structural features of human psychology.
Oscar Wilde, the other creative writer mentioned by the Jung 
woman, is the perfect figure with whom to begin this project. Wilde was 
born in 1854, only two years before Freud, and it is not hard to see how 
his work and life reflected the atmosphere of crumbling Victorianism 
that Jung describes. In response to Victorian hypocrisies Wilde 
developed a creed of amoral individualism whose Nietzschean quality 
was perceived by, among others, his contemporaries Bernard Shaw and 
Andre Gide [Shaw, 1969: 63; Gide, 1969: 33]. Thomas Mann, in a late essay 
on Nietzsche, was another who found it fruitful to compare Nietzsche 
and Wilde. "Not for nothing have I coupled the names of Nietzsche and 
Wilde - they belong together as rebels," Mann says [Mann, 1969: 171].
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More importantly, he detects striking similarities in the substance of their 
ideas:
When Wilde declares: Tor, try as we may, we cannot get behind 
the appearance of things to reality. And the terrible reason may be 
that there is no reality in things apart from their experiences'...; 
when he calls truth something so personal that the same truth can 
never be recognised by two different minds; when he says: 'Every 
impulse that we strive to strangle broods in the mind and poisons 
us.... The only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it'... we 
cannot help seeing that all these quotations might have come from 
Nietzsche. [Mann, 1969: 169]
There is another thinker from whom such insights might have 
come, indeed did come: Sigmund Freud. On the difficulty of penetrating 
beyond one's impressions to reality, consider Freud's proposition that 
objects can only ever be apprehended through the selfish filter of the id, 
so that "[ojnly for the rarest and best adjusted mind does it seem possible 
to preserve the picture of external reality, as it is perceived, against the 
distortion to which it is normally subjected in its passage through the 
psychical individuality of the percipient" [Freud, 1966: 229]. On the 
poisonous character of instinct, consider Freud's dictum that "in a 
neurosis the ego ... suppresses a piece of the id (of instinctual life)" [SE, 19: 
183]. And on the related proposition that the only way to get rid of a 
temptation is to yield to it, consider Freud's teaching that "temptations do 
but increase under constant privation, whereas they subside, at any rate 
temporarily, if they are sometimes gratified" [1949a: 109].
The connections between Freud and Nietzsche are well- 
documented. So are the connections between Nietzsche and Wilde. But
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as far as I know, no sustained attention has been devoted to the 
proliferation of Freudian ideas in the work of Wilde. But such an 
investigation is worth conducting, for it will provide us w ith a sharp 
dem onstration, every bit as sharp as a com parison of Freud w ith 
Nietzsche, of the historically-specific nature of Freud's ideas. Moreover, 
W ilde's work provides a convenient avenue through which we can 
approach the larger issue of Freud's proximity to the whole literature of 
the decadence.9 "It is interesting," Freud wrote to Wilhelm Fliess in 1897,
that the [scientific] literature is now turning so m uch to the 
psychology of children. Today I received another book on the 
subject.... So one always remains a child of his age, even in what 
one deems one's very own. [Masson, 1985: 277]
An inspection of Freudian themes in the work of Wilde, to which I shall 
now turn, will begin to show us that literature can prove Freud a child of 
his age in a far deeper way than he feared.
9On the use of the term "decadent" to designate that movement in literature of which 
Wilde's writings were a part, see my discussion at the beginning of Chapter Two, page 95.
O ne
"A new Hedonism": Freud, Wilde, and 
The Picture of Dorian Gray
After turning up in the early Psychopathology, Oscar W ilde's name 
occurs only once more in the Standard Edition of Freud's works. In his 
1919 essay on 'The Uncanny', Freud writes:
Even a real ghost, as in Oscar Wilde's Canterville Ghost, loses all 
power of arousing at any rate an uncanny horror in us as soon as 
the author begins to amuse himself at its expense and allows 
liberties to be taken with it. Thus we see how independent 
emotional effects can be of the actual subject-matter in the world 
of fiction. [1950g: 407]
Freud has nothing especially Freudian to tell us about Wilde here. 
While his essay as a whole seeks to establish the unconscious basis of 
uncanny phenomena, Freud does not consider W ilde's story uncanny - 
and so W ilde is, in th is context at least, beyond the reach of 
psychoanalytic theory. Freud can offer only observation untainted by 
speculation. Despite or because of this, he is able to say several 
indisputably valid things about Wilde: that he was a writer of fiction; that 
his principal goal, perhaps even his only goal, was the attainm ent of 
effects; and that the effect he was most interested in attaining was 
amusement, of himself and thereby of his audience.
In a word, Wilde was funny. On the face of it, this is not a very 
profound revelation. But it is a truth which specialist commentators on 
Wilde do not always recognise. In the case of T he  Canterville Ghost', the 
point that Wilde is a humorist is not hard to grasp; no critic has ever 
mistaken it for a serious ghost story. But when it comes to W ilde's main 
business, the deconstruction of the morals of his age, many critics become 
blind to Wilde's humour, and read him as a would-be moral philosopher 
who m ust be scolded for his lack of intellectual rigour. Graham Hough, 
for example, complains that "Wildean aestheticism was little more than 
a series of attitudes and undigested notions, held together for the time by 
what must once have been a brilliant and attractive personality" [Hough, 
1961: 203]. Precisely, Wilde would no doubt have answered. W hat else 
bu t the author's personality could be expected to hold together a 
philosophy which maintained that "A truth ceases to be true w hen more 
than one person believes in it"; and that "In all im portant m atters, style, 
not sincerity, is the essential"; and that "Consistency is the last refuge of 
the unimaginative" [Wilde, 1988: 1205 and Schmidgall, 1994: 17]? In 'De 
Profundis', Wilde defined himself, aptly, as an artist "the quality of 
whose work depends on the intensification of personality" [Hart-Davis, 
1986: 154]. If you do not think that Wilde's personality, at those moments 
in his writings when this intensification is achieved, remains b rillian t 
and attractive, then there is little point in reading his work at all.
When misread as a philosopher, Wilde is bound to come across as 
a poor person 's Nietzsche. That is evidently w hat Thomas M ann 
thought of him; when crediting Wilde for the Nietzschean quality of his 
insights, Mann felt obliged to qualify his praise by adding: "Of course 
there is som ething alm ost sacrilegious about the jux taposition  of 
Nietzsche and Wilde, for the latter was a dandy, the German philosopher 
a kind of saint of immoralism" [Mann, 1969: 170]. This is less a comment
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on the respective merits of Wilde and Nietzsche than it is a statement of 
M ann's somewhat arbitrary preference for philosophy over art as a mode 
of immoralism. It would be absurd to condemn Nietzsche on the ground 
that he raises few belly laughs; it seems equally silly to condemn Wilde 
for his lack of intellectual weight. Wilde assaulted the morality of his age 
using techniques fundam entally incomparable to N ietzsche's, but the 
assault was in the end perhaps just as effective. He "m ade dying 
Victorianism laugh at itself," said Richard Le Gallienne, "and it may be 
said to have died of the laughter" [quoted by Schmidgall, 1994: 7].
A far more telling criticism of Wilde is that he was erratic where it 
m attered, in the quality of his art. One is sometimes obliged to read 
Wilde, particularly the early Wilde, as Freud reads a dream, sifting the 
unsatisfactory whole for its valuable verbal parts. 'The Canterville 
Ghost', as it happens, is a welcome exception to this principle - it is one of 
the few pieces in his oeuvre in which a distinctively W ildean effect is 
achieved by the work as a whole, rather than at the merely local level of 
the one-liner. W ilde's last play, The Importance of Being Earnest, is 
another such success - it is generally hailed as the work in which Wilde 
finally found a form appropriate to his content. Bernard Shaw disagreed 
with that general verdict - "Clever as it was," he wrote, "it was his first 
really heartless play" [Shaw, 1969: 95] - but in doing so he put his finger 
on precisely the quality that made others think of Earnest as an advance. 
By lacking a heart, it delivered at the formal level the anarchic assault on 
convention that W ilde's epigrams had always threatened. Before, their 
amoral message had been stifled by the conventional, m elodram atic 
narratives in which they had been embedded. But with Earnest, as W. H. 
A uden said, W ilde m anaged to "subordinate every other dram atic
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element to dialogue for its own sake and create a verbal universe in 
which the characters are determined by the kinds of things they say, and 
the plot is nothing but a succession of opportunities to say them" [Auden, 
1969: 136].
More often than not, though, Wilde was unable to sustain the 
aesthetic voltage for the duration of an entire work. This was a 
shortcoming to which he privately confessed. "It bores me so much, 
writing!" Wilde told Gide. "Would you like to know the great drama of 
my life? - It's that I've put my genius into my life; I've put only my talent 
into my works" [Gide, 1969: 34n]. It follows that the best moments in 
Wilde's works come when he raids his life, steals his own table-talk, and 
unceremoniously places it into the mouths of his dramatis personae. As 
the cliche goes, Wilde was his own best character. His next-best characters 
were those who functioned as stand-ins for himself1 - Lord Henry in The 
Picture of Dorian Gray, Lord Darlington in Lady Windemere's Fan, or 
Jack in The Importance of Being Earnest. The hon mot was Wilde's ideal 
medium. To recognise this is not to denigrate him as an artist; it is 
simply to predicate our assessment of his work on a proper 
understanding of what kind of artist he was.
But if Wilde's favourite medium was a frivolous one, his 
favourite target was impressively substantial. The bulk of his humour 
deals, more or less directly, with the morality of his age.
It is absurd to divide people into good and bad. People are either
charming or tedious. [Wilde, 1980: 11]
1One salient exception to this rule is the formidable Lady Bracknell, whose philosophies 
are wholly antithetical to Wilde's.
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Morality is simply the attitude we adopt towards people whom we 
personally dislike. [1983b: 207]
A man who moralises is usually a hypocrite, and a woman who 
moralises is invariably plain. [1980: 63]
Wickedness is a myth invented by good people to account for the 
curious attractiveness of others. [1988: 1205]
The first three lines are spoken by characters in W ilde's plays; the 
final one comes from a series of epigrams published under W ilde's own 
name. That distinction is, as I have argued, far less im portant than it is 
in the case of most writers. Whether uttered in W ilde's own name or 
through the thin disguise of a character, each joke carries the profoundly 
subversive message that the moral codes which were so central to 
Victorian society were an utter fiction. This seems to be a serious point. 
Those who dismiss Wilde as an intellectual lightweight would no doubt 
maintain that it is only a serious point if it is argued in a serious way. 
But in certain respects Wilde's frivolous tone was perfectly suited to his 
subversive m essage. A ren 't his argum ents in favour of m oral 
irresponsibility enhanced by the flippancy with which he states them? 
Isn 't a disintegrative, anarchic, individualist ethic more appropriately 
conveyed by a verbal shard than by a cogently argued essay? As we shall 
see in the next chapter, Wilde was certainly not the only writer of his age 
to utter a subversive message in a fragmentary verbal form.2
2//A style of decadence," wrote Paul Bourget, "is one in which the unity of the book is 
decomposed to give place to the independence of the page, in which the page is 
decomposed to give place to the independence of the phrase, and the phrase to give place 
to the independence of the word [quoted by Chamberlin, 1985: 284].
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Moreover, the nature of the truths Wilde sought to expose made 
an oblique approach alm ost m andatory. Nietzsche himself, whom  
nobody would accuse of lacking intellectual substance, favoured the 
aphorism as a weapon against morality, and defended his method thus:
I approach deep problems like cold baths: quickly into them and 
quickly out again. That one does not get to the depths that way, 
not deep enough down, is the superstition of those afraid of the 
water, the enemies of cold water.... And to ask this incidentally: 
does a matter necessarily remain ununderstood and unfathom ed 
merely because it has been touched only in flight, glanced at, in a 
flash? Is it absolutely imperative that one settles down on it? that 
one has brooded over it as over an egg? Diu noctuque incubando, 
as Newton said of himself? At least there are truths that are 
singularly shy and ticklish and cannot be caught except suddenly - 
that must be surprised or left alone. [Nietzsche, 1989: 197]
If even Nietzsche felt compelled to get out of the bath quickly, 
imagine the degree of nimbleness required of Wilde - who w anted not 
only to surprise the same truths, but to gain wide public acclaim at the 
same time. Wit, the form of brevity Wilde favoured, was no doubt the 
only way of doing both things at once: it was the Trojan Horse in which 
he could smuggle amorality into the popular theatre, whose gates were 
patrolled by that embodiment of Victorian narrow-mindedness, the Lord 
Chamberlain. Under the provisions of the Theatres Act of 1843, as 
Kenneth Tynan explains,
anything previously unperform ed m ust be subm itted  to the 
'Malvolio of St James's Palace' (Bernard Shaw's phrase) at least a
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week before opening night.... His Lordship can impose a ban 
'w henever he shall be of opinion that it is fitting for the 
Preservation of Good Manners, Decorum, or of the Public Peace'. 
[Tynan, 1984: 366]
"The arch-fiends," Tynan goes on to say, "were Ibsen and Shaw - social 
critics who brutally exposed the hypocrisies of official morality and their 
destructive effect on personal relationships. Both suffered from the 
censor's gag" [Tynan, 1984: 383].
The Lord Chamberlain refused a licence to W ilde's hum ourless 
Salome,3 And yet W ilde's funny plays, which contained lines far more 
subversive than anything to be found in his sterile Biblical dram a, all 
slipped through the censor's net. The possibility that W ilde's jokes were 
merely jokes allowed him to achieve, temporarily at least, the difficult 
trick of getting society to pay good money to hear its values subjected to 
the utmost ridicule. Perhaps, indeed, Wilde ridiculed the morals of his 
day a little too successfully. He so effectively persuades us of their 
absurdity4 that we forget how dangerous they still were, so that it almost 
comes as a surprise to us - as it did to him  - that these ludicrous 
conventions retained their bite. "How I used to toy w ith that tiger Life!" 
he remarked, re-reading The Importance of Being Earnest after his release 
from prison [Hart-Davis, 1986: 348]. Even when in the dock, W ilde 
showed an alarming incapacity to take his situation seriously; his verbal 
sallies evoked much mirth from the public gallery, but the last laugh was 
had by the Crown [see the trial transcripts in Hyde, 1973]. The judge at his
3Not under the Act of 1843, but under "an old law that forbade the depiction on the stage 
of Biblical characters" [Ellmann, 1988: 351].
4Some moral conventions were so self-evidently absurd that they can raise a laugh even 
without Wilde's gloss. Consider the comment made in all seriousness by Wilde's own 
brother, Willie, after Oscar had been convicted of gross homosexual indecency. "Oscar 
was not a man of bad character: you could have trusted him with a woman anywhere" 
[Shaw, 1969: 96].
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second trial called W ilde's "the worst case I have ever tried", and 
lamented his inability to impose a harsher sentence than the maximum 
one permitted by the law: two years with hard labour [Ellmann, 1988: 448].
"What the paradox was to me in the sphere of thought, perversity 
became to me in the sphere of passion," Wilde wrote in 'De Profundis' 
[Hart-Davis, 1986: 194]. This confirms the point that W ilde's witticisms 
trod, with considerably more success, the same dangerous ground tested 
by his physical transgressions. Where his paradoxes brought him fame, 
his "perversity" brought ruination, suggesting that lightly was the safest, 
perhaps the only, way to tread. "If you tell people the truth," as Bernard 
Shaw said, "make them laugh or they'll kill you" [quoted by Pierpont, 
1996: 106]. This dictum cuts sadly close to the bone in the case of Wilde.
Was it co-incidental, or was it no accident, that this century which 
Kenneth Tynan spoke of as "the censor's paradise and playground" [372] 
was also the century in whose dusk Sigmund Treud proposed the 
existence of an internal censor, a psychic agency devoted to the 
suppression of any thoughts unfitting for the Preservation of Good 
Manners, Decorum, or of the Public Peace? In 1897, the year in which the 
broken Wilde was released from prison, Freud w rote to his friend 
Wilhelm Fliess:
Have you ever seen a foreign newspaper which passed Russian 
censorship at the frontier? Words, whole clauses and sentences 
are blacked out so that the rest becomes unintelligible. A Russian 
censorship of that kind comes about in psychoses and produces the
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apparently  m eaningless d e l i r i a [Masson, 1985: 289; see also 
McGrath, 1986: 246]5
At this early stage, it will be noticed, Freud's notions about internal 
censorship pertained only to the psychical processes of the mentally ill. 
But as Freud broadened his theories about hysteria into a general 
psychology, he came to believe that a censor of this kind dwelt in all 
m inds, sick or well, presiding over the production of everyday (or 
everynight) phenomena like dreams, slips of the tongue, jokes. In a part 
of our minds inaccessible to our conscious scrutiny, Freud proposed, we 
harbour a rabble of scandalous desires; an internal Lord Chamberlain 
who prevents their free expression; and an agency (the dream-work, the 
joke-work) which is capable of smuggling them past him by disguising 
them  in forms which combine the verbal wit of a W ilde w ith the
5In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud draws another interesting parallel between his 
theories about censorship and the political atmosphere of his age: "if this picture of the 
two psychical agencies and their relation to consciousness is accepted, there is a complete 
analogy in political life.... I transpose myself into the life of a state in which a struggle is 
in process between a ruler who is jealous of his power and an alert public opinion. The 
people are in revolt against an unpopular official and demand his dismissal" [quoted by 
McGrath, 1986: 248]. William J. McGrath, citing this passage in his book Freud's 
Discovery of Psychoanalysis: The Politics of Hysteria, notes that "This exam ple 
paralleled the near revolutionary political situation threatening the [Austrian] Badeni 
government during its final days, and since it is possible to date the developm ent of 
Freud's idea of a dream censor to the months immediately following the climax of the 
crisis, the example and the other political references in his theory suggest that his 
intellectual work received an impetus from these political events..." [McGrath, 1986: 248]. 
But of course one's suspicions that Freud's intellectual work received an impetus from his 
political environment do not have to take so specific a form as this, since the Badeni 
government was far from being the only authority under challenge during those turbulent 
times.
Benedict Simon, in his 1978 book Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece, responds on 
Freud's behalf to suspicions of this kind. "The Interpretation of Dreams ... is replete with 
political, social, and economic analogies. For instance, the dream censor operates like the 
postal censor. Psychic agency is an agency in the same sense as a government bureau.... 
[B]ut it is misleading to think of the political structure as the basic model for the structure 
of the mind primarily because the political structure is itself a product of the mind - of 
minds that structure and construe the facts of social life in terms of a particular schema" 
[Simon, 1978: 209]. The principal flaw of Simon's argum ent is obvious. If social and 
political structures are products of an immutable mental "schema", then why do those 
structures fluctuate over time, as they patently do? Rampant censorship is by no means a 
permanent feature of public life. But it was certainly a feature of the moment when Freud 
"discovered" the "fact" that rampant censorship was a perm anent feature of mental life.
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symbolist ingenuity of a Rimbaud. On the face of it this is a far-fetched 
idea, and its im probability has given rise to certain fundam ental 
objections to psychoanalysis.6 Even the generally credulous Wilhelm 
Fliess, who believed that hum an health was governed by the nose,7 
evidently felt that the degree of cleverness that Freud im puted to the 
unconscious was implausibly high. In 1899, Fliess's comments on some 
proofs of The Interpretation of Dreams provoked the following response 
from Freud:
It is certainly true that the dreamer is too ingenious and amusing, 
but it is not my fault, and I cannot be reproached w ith it. All 
dreamers are insufferably witty, and they have to be, because they 
are under pressure, and the direct way is barred to them.... The 
ostensible wit of all unconscious processes is closely connected 
with the theory of jokes and humour. [A. Freud, 1954: 297]
The remarks in Freud's letter to Fliess were, James Strachey tells 
us, one of the factors which prom pted Freud to compose, five years later, 
a study exclusively devoted to the phenomenon of wit - Jokes and Their 
Relation to the Unconscious, first published in 1905 [Strachey, 1960: 4]. 
This is not the place to unravel the complexities of Freud's theory of 
jokes.8 But it is worth quoting a passage from the Jokes book which
6Emest Gellner, for example, complained that "The curious fact is that psychoanalysis is 
a homunculus theory. (By this is meant a psychological theory which 'explains' some 
human competence or capacity by an inner self, which is supplied by the inner, 
physiological self with its data....) Further selves are assumed to lurk within us, which 
are then anthropomorphically credited with human competence (s).
"The circularity and unsatisfactoriness of this kind of explanation is obvious and 
well known." [Gellner, 1993: 95]
7See Gay, 1988: 56, 57; Webster, 1995: 220-222.
8The Jokes book appears to have been a kind of bastard child for Freud. James Strachey in 
his 'Preface' to it points out that while Freud's other works of the period - The 
Interpretation of Dreams, The Psychopathology and the Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality - "were all of them expanded and modified almost out of recognition in their 
later editions", only "half-a-dozen small additions were made to the Jokes when it
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introduces us to a concept intim ately connected with the process of 
internal censorship: the concept of repression. Freud is explaining the 
unconscious purpose of jokes, using sexually obscene hum our as a kind 
of paradigm:
Jokes ... make possible the satisfaction of an instinct (whether
lustful or hostile) in the face of an obstacle that stands in its way.
They circumvent this obstacle and in that way draw pleasure from
a source which the obstacle had made inaccessible. The obstacle
standing in the way [in the case of sm utty jokes] is in reality
nothing other than w om en's incapacity to tolerate undisguised
sexuality7, an incapacity7 correspondingly increased with a rise in the
educational and social level.... The power which makes it difficult
or impossible for women, and to a lesser degree for men as well, to
enjoy undisguised obscenity is termed by us 'repression'; and we
recognise in it the same psychical processes which, in cases of
serious illness, keeps whole complexes of impulses, together with
their derivatives, away from consciousness, and which has turned
out to be the main factor in the causation of w hat are known as
psychoneuroses. It is our belief that civilization and higher
education  have a large influence in the developm ent of
repression, and we suppose that, under such conditions, the
psychical organization undergoes an alteration (that can also
emerge as an inherited disposition) as a result of which what was
formerly felt as agreeable now seems unacceptable and is rejected
reached its second edition in 1912, but no further changes were ever made in it." Strachey 
considers this significant, and offers this explanation: "It seems possible that this is 
related to the fact that this book lies somewhat apart from the rest of Freud's writings.
He himself may have taken this view of it. His references to it in other works are few; in 
the Introductory Lectures he speaks of its having temporarily led him aside from his 
path; and in the Autobiographical Study , there is even what looks like a slightingly 
depreciatory reference to it" [Strachey, 1960: 5-6; the depreciatory reference is in SE, 20: 
65-66].
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w ith all possible psychical force. The repressive activity of 
civilization brings it about that primary possibilities of enjoyment, 
which have now, however, been repudiated by the censorship in 
us, are lost to us. But to the hum an psyche all renunciation is 
exceedingly difficult, and so we find that tendentious jokes provide 
a means of undoing the renunciation and undoing what was lost. 
[Freud, 1991c: 144-145]
Freud would later call repression "the foundation-stone on which 
the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests, the most essential part of it..." 
[1950m: 297-8]. On the basis of that pronouncement and others like it, 
one w ould assume that the theory of "repression" is revolutionarily 
different from the observation that a person's social environm ent can 
inhibit the free play of his or her desires. After all, we hardly needed 
Freud to tell us of the existence of that kind of censorship. But in the 
passage quoted above, Freud defines "repression" as "the pow er which 
makes it difficult or impossible for women, and to a lesser degree for men 
as well, to enjoy undisguised obscenity". It hardly needs to be pointed out 
that men and women differ in this respect - or did in Freud 's age - 
because of cultural conditioning, and not because of some biological law 
which applies across all cultures and all times. Nor is it hard to see how a 
social force which can make women more modest than men m ight well 
be responsible for the whole phenomenon of modesty. It is certainly not 
impossible to imagine a culture in which both men and women do enjoy 
undisguised obscenity - it could even be argued that such a society has 
already been achieved. In any case, the point is that repression, the 
"foundation-stone of psychoanalysis", seems to amount, at least as Freud 
defines it here, to little more than  a synonym  for the com m only
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understood force of social inhibition .9 This of course opens up the 
possibility that Freud's theory of repression was inspired by the socially
9Freud offers a similarly shallow definition of repression in 1895, in connection with his 
seduction theory: "shame and morality are the repressing forces..." he wrote to Fliess in 
the year. "Where there is no shame (as in a male person), or where no morality comes 
about (as in the lower classes of society), or where disgust is blunted by the conditions of 
life (as in the country), there too no repression and therefore no neurosis will result from 
sexual stimulation in infancy. I fear, nevertheless, that this explanation will not stand up 
to deeper examination" [Masson, 1985:163-164].
After abandoning the seduction theory, Freud developed theories in which 
repression was accorded a role of far greater significance: it was no longer the underlying 
cause merely of neurosis, but also of a range of "normal" mental activities as well, such as 
dreams. Everybody has dreams, even lower class people who live in the country, and so 
Freud's mature theories would seem to have - in contrast to the seduction theory of neurosis 
- no room for cases in which "no repression" occurs. And yet Freud offers, in the 
Introductory Lectures, an account of repression which seems very close to the 1895 one, and 
open to the same objections:
In order to demonstrate the effect of the development of the ego upon the tendency 
to conflict and therewith upon the causation of the neurosis, I will quote an 
example which, although entirely imaginary, is not at all improbable in any 
respect. I will give it the title of Nestroy's farce: On the Ground-Floor and in the 
Mansion. Suppose that a caretaker is living on the ground-floor of a house, while 
the owner, a rich and well-connected man, lives above. They both have children, 
and we will assume that the owner's little girl is permitted to play freely 
without supervision with the child of lower standing. It may then very easily 
happen that their games become 'naughty,' that is, take on a sexual character: 
that they play 'father and mother,' watch each other in the performance of 
intimate acts, and stimulate each other's genital parts. The caretaker's daughter 
may have played the temptress in this, since in spite of her five or six years she 
has been able to learn a great deal about sexual matters. These occurrences, even 
though they are only kept up for a short period, will be enough to rouse certain 
sexual excitations in both children which will come to expression in the practice 
of masturbation for a few years, after the games have been discontinued. There is 
common ground so far, but the final result will be very different in the two 
children. The caretaker's daughter will continue masturbation, perhaps up to the 
onset of menstruation, and then give it up without difficulty; a few years later 
will find a lover, perhaps bear a child; choose this or that path in life, perhaps 
become a popular actress and end as an aristocrat. Probably her career will turn 
out less brilliantly, but in any case she will be unharmed by the premature sexual 
activity, free from neurosis, and able to live her life. Very different is the result 
in the other child. She will very soon, while yet a child, acquire a sense of 
having done wrong; after a fairly short time she will give up the masturbatory 
satisfaction, though perhaps only with a tremendous struggle, but will 
nevertheless retain an inner feeling of subdued depression. When later on as a 
young girl she comes to learn something of sexual intercourse, she will turn from it 
with inexplicable horror and wish to remain ignorant. Probably she will then 
again suffer a fresh irresistible impulse to masturbation about which she will not 
dare to unburden herself to anyone. When the time comes for a man to choose her 
as a wife the neurosis will break out and cheat her out of marriage and the joy of 
life. If analysis makes it possible to obtain an insight into this neurosis, it will be 
found that this well-brought-up, intelligent and idealistic girl has completely 
repressed her sexual desires; but that they are, unconsciously, attached to the few 
little experiences she had with the childish play-mate.
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repressive conditions of his age, and has little or no validity beyond that 
age.
But w hile Freud certainly considered social repression and 
psychological repression to be closely related, he did not consider them 
synonymous. His concept of repression is meant to amount to far more 
than the banal (but incontestably true) proposition that society - 
particularly during the Victorian era - imposes certain barriers that oblige 
one to hold one's tongue. Yes, Freud adm itted, a harshly oppressive 
moral environm ent like the Victorian one could make for a greater 
intensity of repression .10 But fundam entally one's moral environm ent 
was neither here nor there, for there is a certain substantial core of 
repression which is a constant, and which will occur even in the most 
liberated of societies. Repression, as Freud saw it, afflicted not only 
him self and his contem poraries, but also Sophocles, Shakespeare, 
Leonardo, and every civilized hum an being since the band of parricidal 
brothers whose existence he posits in Totem and Taboo.
To understand why Freud believed this, we need to turn  our 
attention to another sentence from the passage quoted above. "It is our 
belief that civilization and higher education have a large influence in the 
development of repression, and we suppose that, under such conditions, 
the psychical organization undergoes an alteration (that can also emerge 
as an inherited disposition)" [emphasis added]. By means of the italicised 
phrase, Freud explains how an inconstant form of social conditioning
The differences which ensue in these two destinies in spite of the common 
experiences undergone, arise because in one girl the ego has sustained a 
developm ent absent in the other. To the caretaker's daughter sexual activity 
seemed as natural and harmless in later years as in childhood. The gentleman's 
daughter had been well-brought-up and had adopted the standards of her 
education. Thus stimulated, her ego had formed ideals of womanly purity and 
absence of desire that were incom patible with sexual acts; her intellectual 
training had caused her to depreciate the feminine role for which she is intended. 
This higher moral and intellectual development in her ego had brought her into 
conflict w ith the claims of her sexuality. [Freud, 1940: 296-297]
10See, for example, "'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modem Nervousness".
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like higher education can infiltrate the psyche at a profound level, 
effecting a perm anent structural change in mental organisation.11 But 
the italicised phrase embodies a doctrine that even in Freud's day was not 
generally considered to be sound: namely, the Lamarckian theory that 
acquired characteristics can be inherited . Peter Gay, w ho calls 
Lamarckianism "one of [Freud's] most eccentric and least defensible 
intellectual commitments", points out that "few reputable biologists of 
the time were willing to credit, and few analysts felt at all comfortable 
with, this thesis. But Freud stayed with it" [1988: 290n].
In the context of our present discussion, it is not hard to see why 
Freud did stay with it. "[Scientific work," he once revealingly said, "is 
not satisfied with establishing a departure from the norm " [1950i: 342- 
344]. Repressive Victorian ethics, and the varieties of behaviour they 
produced, were a departure from the norm. It was the job of mere 
sociologists, or creative writers like Wilde, to deal w ith them. The 
repression of which Freud spoke was the norm, at least as he saw it: it 
was a fundamental force in all hum an mental activity. It was not to be 
confused with the mere ripples of psychological discomfort caused by 
cultural vicissitudes. Lamarckian doctrine was a mechanism by which a 
departure from the norm could become the norm. It allowed Freud to 
take processes typical of an individual's interaction with society - sexual 
desire, the curbing of sexual desire, subjection to censorship, evasion of 
censorship - and transplant them to an entirely new realm, deep inside 
the individual's mind.
Lamarckian doctrine, as I have pointed out, is a flimsy instrum ent 
w ith w hich to attem pt such a m assive endeavour. But Freud had
11 "Far from setting out radically to subvert the values of Judaeo-Christian asceticism 
which were deeply internalised in his own culture," as Richard Webster puts it in his 
book Why Freud was Wrong, "Freud m ade the Lamarckian assum ption that such 
asceticism had become part of our biological inheritance, so that it now belonged to our 
very nature" [Webster, 1995: 4].
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another way of asserting the universality of repression: his own doctrine 
of the Oedipus complex. This theory posits the innateness of two sinister 
instincts: sexual desire for the parent of the opposite sex, and jealous 
hostility toward the parent of the same sex. Not even the most liberated 
of societies could possibly allow such drives to cavort freely; and so every 
individual, regardless of his or her cultural situation, must suffer, as an 
infant, wholesale repression of his or her most fundamental desires. It is 
this momentous act of repression - endured by Sophocles, Shakespeare, 
Leonardo, and Victorian alike - which forms the unconscious.
Thus does the theory of the O edipus complex assure us that 
repression is not a form of psychological suffering exclusive to morally 
repressive cultures like those which produced Nietzsche, Wilde, Freud. 
But the theory of the Oedipus complex no more stands above the 
suspicion that it was a mere product of Freud's age than the theory of 
repression does. In my third chapter, I will examine the ways in which 
the destructive component of the Oedipus complex - the male's hostility 
to his father - reproduced certain political features of the time. As for the 
other half of the complex, it is eminently possible to argue that Freud 
ascribed such overwhelming importance to sexuality only because the 
harsh Victorian taboos to which he and his patients were subject had 
grotesquely magnified the role of sex in hum an affairs. A person who 
lives in a straitjacket will no doubt be tormented by a profound desire to 
move his or her arms, but one would be rash to conclude on that basis 
that a profound desire to move the arms is the param ount motive of all 
hum an activity. Carl Jung attacks Freud along these lines w hen he 
protests that "a theory of neurosis or a theory of dreams based on a 
Victorian prejudice is at the most of very secondary import to science":
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[T]he hum an soul is not just a product of the Zeitgeist; it is a thing 
of far greater persistence and im m utability. The 'n ineteen th  
century' is a merely local and passing phenomenon, which has 
only deposited a relatively thin layer of dust on the age-old soul of 
mankind. But if this layer is wiped off, if our professional eye­
glasses are once cleaned, what shall we see then? How shall we 
look upon the soul, and how shall we explain a neurosis? The 
problem presents itself to every practitioner whose cases are not 
cured even after all the childhood sexual experiences have been 
dug up, and all the cultural values dissected into bad elements.... A 
general psychological theory which lays claim to being scientific 
m ust not found itself on the m alform ations of the n ineteenth  
century, and a theory of neurosis m ust also be capable of 
explaining hysteria among the Maoris. As soon as the sexual 
theory leaves the field of the special psychology of neuroses and 
reaches out into other fields, as for example that of prim itive 
psychology, its one-sidedness and inadequacy leap to the eye. 
Views which have been developed out of the observation of 
Viennese neuroses between 1890 and 1920 prove themselves poor 
tools when applied to problems of totem and taboo, even w hen the 
application is made in a very clever way. Freud has not penetrated 
into that deeper layer of what is common to all humanity. [Jung, 
1983: 52-53,55-56]
Jung's distinction between the hum an soul and the layer deposited 
on it by the nineteenth century brings us back to a major them atic 
preoccupation of Wilde's. We can examine this theme in Wilde, and its 
relation to Freud's concept of repression, by turning to W ilde's only 
novel, The Picture of Dorian Gray, which first appeared in 1890.
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Freud as Mephistopheles: Psychoanalysis and 
The Picture of Dorian Gray
D uring Oscar W ilde's ill-fated libel action against the M arquis of 
Queensbury, Q ueensbury 's counsel recited portions of The Picture of 
Dorian Gray to the court in an effort to establish Wilde's immorality. On 
the following day, passages from the same book were read out by Wilde's 
own counsel as evidence of his client's rectitude. [Hyde, 1973: 99, 136]. 
One could hardly ask for a sharper indication of the moral ambivalence 
of W ilde's only novel. In light of that ambivalence, one might have 
hoped that only a lawyer would see fit to read the novel as a flatly moral 
or a flatly immoral tract. But literary critics, too, have tended to think of 
the book as standing either at one or the other moral pole. Upon its 
original publication in Lipincott's M onthly Magazine of July 1890, 
W ilde's tale was attacked by one representative reviewer for being "false 
to morality - for it is not made sufficiently clear that the writer does not 
prefer a course of unnatural iniquity to a life of cleanliness, health and 
sanity. The story ... deals with m atters only fitted for the Criminal 
Investigation Departm ent or a hearing in camera ..." [Hart-Davis, 1986: 
81n2]. The St James's Gazette agreed, deeming W ilde's novel a m atter 
for the police, not for the critic [Ellmann, 1988: 303n].
M odern critics, on the other hand, have tended to read the novel 
as a straightforw ard - too straightforw ard - condem nation of moral 
delinquency. In the opinion of Graham Hough, for example, "W ilde
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simply tells us that conscious cultivation of the senses leads to ruin, in a 
m anner as flat, as perfunctory, as remote from anything that he really 
believed as any bourgeois journalist's attack on aestheticism" [Hough, 
1961: 202]. Richard Ellmann, likewise, views the book as an exercise in 
moral didacticism: for him it is "the aesthetic novel par excellence, not in 
espousing the doctrine, but in exhibiting its dangers" [Ellmann: 1988: 297].
To complicate matters, Wilde himself m ade conflicting public 
statem ents about the novel's moral orientation. On the one hand, he 
wrote indignant letters to the newspapers protesting that his book was, if 
anything, too moral. Responding to the St James's Gazette, for example, 
he replied that
it is a story with a moral. And the moral is this: All excess, as well 
as all renunciation, brings its own punishment.... Yes; there is a 
terrible moral in Dorian Gray - a moral which the prurient will 
not be able to find in it, bu t which will be revealed to all those 
whose minds are healthy. Is this an artistic error? I fear it is. It is 
the only error in the book. [Hart-Davis, 1962: 259]
On the other hand, when the novel was ultimately published in its 
own right, Wilde added a 'Preface' in which he asserted, among other 
things, that "There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book," and 
that "No artist has ethical sympathies. An ethical sympathy in an artist is 
an unpardonable m annerism  of style" [17]. Backing away from his 
journalistic assertions that the book was an impeccably moral one, Wilde 
re-opens the possibility that it was indeed as subversive as the 
newspapers had feared.
Perhaps we can get to the root of the mystery via another rem ark 
Wilde made in his 'Preface': the claim that "Diversity of opinion about a
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work of art shows that the work is new, complex, and vital" [17]. In the 
case of Dorian Gray, this proposition does not stand up particularly well. 
For while the book has certainly provoked diversity of opinion, it is new 
and vital only in part. Its narrative spine reproduces a centuries-old 
myth, that of Faust: "an idea that is old in the history of literature," as 
Wilde put it in a letter, "but to which I have given new form" [Hart- 
Davis, 1962: 263]. In other words, the novel represents a grafting of fresh, 
W ildean narrative elem ents onto a pre-existing m ythical structure. 
These two strata of material carry separate, indeed antithetical, moral 
messages. The Faust m yth offers us the didactic news that self- 
indulgence will ultimately be punished; whereas the material originating 
with Wilde argues, in the true aestheticist manner, that self-indulgence is 
the highest good.
While the journalists who attacked the novel for im m orality 
evidently m ade too m uch of this fresh m aterial, and ignored the 
countervailing propriety of the plot, it seems to me that critics who think 
of the book as straightforwardly moralistic make the opposite mistake: 
dw elling on the m oral inherent in the Faustian s tru c tu re12 w hile 
ignoring the relish and the urgency with which W ilde's Mephistopheles 
states the decadent case.
Of course, the latter critics have on their side w hat looks like an 
unassailable argument: surely the moral message of the Faust plot by 
definition trum ps the doctrines of M ephistopheles. Why else w ould 
Wilde use the Faustian structure, except to condem n those doctrines? 
This argum ent, it seems to me, fails to take into account certain facts 
about Oscar Wilde. First of all, the fact that he was Oscar Wilde. Nearly 
every other w ord Wilde wrote, before the novel and after it, celebrated
12"My difficulty," Wilde wrote to Conan Doyle in 1891, "was to keep the inherent moral 
subordinate to the artistic and dramatic effect, and it still seems to me that the moral is 
too obvious" [Hart-Davis, 1986: 95].
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individualism . Why w ould Wilde w ant to spend a w hole novel 
condem ning the doctrine of w hich he was the m ost passionate 
spokesman?
And then there is that lim itation of W ilde's which we have 
already discussed: namely, the fact that he was not the kind of artist able 
to make the form of a work submit holistically to his intentions. His 
poetry bears almost no trace of his personality. In his plays, plot was 
generally a ram shackle conveyance for his genuine artw orks, his 
epigrams. In Dorian Gray, similarly, the distinctively W ildean touch is 
achieved not by the big picture, but only by certain brushstrokes. Those 
portions of the novel that deal with the overarching Faustian moral are 
melodramatic, hackneyed, and devoid of the daring wit which is the 
trustiest signifier of W ilde's conviction in any m atter. Dorian Gray, 
Wilde's Faust, is as one-dimensional as his portrait and as colourless as 
his name. If the novel contained no other characters, there would be no 
arguing w ith  H ough 's  verdict that it am ounts to a "flat" and 
"perfunctory" delivery of the message that "conscious cultivation of the 
senses leads to ruin."
But the novel does contain other characters, most notably a vivid 
M ephistopheles whose verbal gusto looks suspiciously like that of his 
creator, and who tells us that conscious cultivation of the senses is the 
only way to go. While the Faustian moral is delivered so flatly that it is 
impossible to believe that Wilde's heart was in it, the M ephistophelean 
rhetoric is done with such verve that it is impossible to believe that his 
heart was not in it.
W ilde's Mephisto is Henry Wotton, an idle Lord whose Paterian 
theories lead Dorian Gray to utter his fateful wish for eternal youth. One 
might call Lord Henry a dandy, or an aesthete, or a decadent. For his part, 
Lord Henry thinks of himself as a scientist, a psychologist [Wilde, 1988:
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55-56]. In the context of our present inquiry, this claim would seem to be 
worthy of our attention.
To a certain extent, perhaps, calling himself a scientist is merely a 
provocative pose on Lord Henry's part - for there is a certain naughty 
irony in using science as a weapon against bourgeois values. But there is 
som ething strangely scientific about the texture of Lord H enry 's 
arguments in favour of hedonism. They have rigour as well as vigour; 
they have a kind of logical force which makes it doubly hard for us to 
believe that Lord Henry is a mere straw man whom Wilde has fashioned 
only as fuel for the blaze of the story's inherent moral.
Take Lord H enry 's maxim that "the only way to get rid of a 
tem ptation is to yield to it. Resist it, and your soul grows sick w ith 
longing for the things it has forbidden to itself ..." [29]. Politically this is 
consistent with the sentiments of Lord Darlington in An Ideal Husband, 
who declares that he can resist everything except temptation. But as Lord 
Henry presents it, the idea is no joke. It has the authority of a doctor's 
prescription: he makes it plain that the alternative to self-indulgence is 
illness, and so redefines the quest for pleasure as vitally necessary rather 
than frivolously superfluous.
This argum ent has an im pregnable quality w hich the story 's 
supposed moral lacks. That moral, as Wilde defined it in a letter to a 
newspaper, is that "All excess, as well as all renunciation, brings its own 
punishment" [Hart-Davis, 1962: 259]. Lord Henry, by conceiving of self- 
indulgence as a health measure, alerts us to the large loophole in this 
moral platitude. If all renunciation brings its own punishm ent, then 
avoiding renunciation - that is, indulging oneself - m ust be a means of 
avoiding punishm ent. It can therefore scarcely be defined as a form of 
"excess". Excess is not really what Lord Henry recommends; nor, as we 
shall see, can most of the things that Dorian Gray gets up to during the
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course of the novel fairly be branded excessive. Lord H enry 's 
psychological theories do more than oppose the story's alleged moral: 
they actively deconstruct it. By m aking the quest for satisfaction 
scientifically inevitable, Lord Henry defuses any attem pt to condemn it 
on moral grounds.
"[T]emptations do but increase under constant privation, whereas they 
subside, at any rate temporarily, if they are sometimes gratified" [1949a: 
109]. Framed by Freud in Civilization and its Discontents, this principle 
is an only marginally more scientific way than Lord H enry's of saying 
that the only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it. As we shall 
see in a moment, this is only one of a plethora of respects in which Lord 
Henry anticipates psychoanalysis. But before we consider the many areas 
of theoretical agreem ent between Freud and Lord Henry, it is w orth 
noting that there are also curious parallels between the routes by which 
the two thinkers arrived at their psychologies. Lord Henry, we are told,
had always been enthralled by the methods of natural science, but 
the ordinary subject-matter of that science had seemed to him 
trivial and of no import.... Hum an life - that appeared to him the 
one thing w orth investigating. Compared to it there was nothing 
else of any value.13 [Wilde, 1988: 55]
W ondering "whether we could ever make psychology so absolute 
a science that each little spring of life would be revealed to us" [56], Lord 
Henry embarks on his project in the same way that Freud did, w ith a
13Cf. the letter to Fliess of 1896 in which Freud wrote: "As a young man my only longing 
was for philosophical knowledge, and now that I am changing over from medicine to 
psychology I am in the process of fulfilling this wish" [E. Freud, 1961: 241].
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course of self-analysis: "he had begun by vivisecting himself, as he had 
ended by vivisecting others" [55].
As for the strikingly Freudian quality of the insights which these 
vivisections yield, we might start with the full text of the speech from 
which I have already briefly quoted. The speech, which Lord Henry 
makes shortly after being introduced to Dorian by the painter, Basil 
H allw ard, will "touc[h] some secret chord" [29] in the youngster. 
Compounded by the effect of a second speech - a "strange panegyric on 
youth" [34] - it will prom pt Dorian to give rash voice to his readiness to 
trade his soul for eternal beauty.
Here is the speech:
I believe that if one man were to live out his life fully and 
completely, were to give form to every feeling, expression to every 
thought, reality to every dream - I believe that the w orld would 
gain such a fresh impulse of joy that we w ould forget all the 
maladies of mediaevalism, and return to the Hellenic ideal - to 
something finer, richer than the Hellenic ideal, it may be. But the 
bravest man among us is afraid of himself. The mutilation of the 
savage has its tragic survival in the self-denial that mars our lives. 
We are punished for our refusals. Every impulse that we strive to 
strangle broods in the mind, and poisons us. The body sins once, 
and has done w ith its sin, for action is a m ode of purification. 
Nothing remains then but the recollection of a pleasure, or the 
luxury of a regret. The only way to get rid of a tem ptation is to 
yield to it. Resist it, and your soul grows sick with longing for the 
things it has forbidden to itself, with desire for what its monstrous 
laws have made monstrous and unlawful. It has been said that the 
great events of the world take place in the brain. It is in the brain,
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and the brain only, that the great sins of the world take place also. 
You, Mr. Gray, you yourself, with your rose-red youth and your 
rose-white boyhood, you have had passions that have made you 
afraid, thoughts that have filled you with terror, day-dreams and 
sleeping dreams whose mere memory might stain your cheek with 
shame. [29]
There are some striking anticipations of psychoanalysis here, as we 
can see if we juxtapose Lord Henry's remarks with some comparable 
formulations of Freud.
Lord Henry: The bravest man among us is afraid of himself 
Freud: "If the ego is obliged to admit its weakness, it breaks out in anxiety 
- realistic anxiety regarding the external world, moral anxiety regarding 
the super-ego and neurotic anxiety regarding the strength of the passions
in the id." [New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, SE, 22: 78]
*
Lord Henry: The mutilation of the savage has its tragic survival in the 
self-denial that mars our lives.
Freud: "The turning back of sadism against the self regularly occurs 
where a cultural suppression of the instincts holds back a large part of the 
subject's destructive instinctual components from being exercised in life." 
['The Economic Problem of Masochism' SE, 19: 170 - emphasis in 
original.]
*
Lord Henry: We are punished for our refusals. Every impulse that we 
strive to strangle broods in the mind, and poisons us.
Freud: "[I]n a neurosis the ego, in its dependence on reality, suppresses a 
piece of the id (of instinctual life).... The neurosis consists ... in the process
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which provides a compensation for the portion of the id that has been 
damaged - that is to say, in the reaction against the repression and in the 
failure of the rep ress ion /7 ['The Loss of Reality in N eurosis and 
Psychosis', SE 19:183]
*
Lord Henry: The only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it.
Freud: "An instinct ... never acts as a momentary impact but as a constant
force. As it makes its attack not from w ithout but from within the
organism, it follows that no flight can avail against it." ['Formulations
Regarding the Two Principles of Mental Functioning', 1950d: 62]
*
Lord Henry: Resist [temptation], and your soul grows sick with longing 
for the things it has forbidden to itself with desire for what its monstrous 
laws have made monstrous and unlawful.
Freud: "Anyone who understands how to penetrate to the factors 
conditioning nervous illness will soon be convinced that its increase in 
our society originates in the greater stringency of sexual restraint."
['Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness', 1950j: 89]
*
Lord Henry: It has been said that the great events of the world take place 
in the brain. It is in the brain, and the brain only, that the great sins of 
the world take place also.
Freud: "... human nature has a far greater capacity, both for good and for 
evil, than it thinks it has, i.e. than it is aware of through the conscious
perceptions of the ego." [The Ego and the Id, 1949: 76]
*
Lord Henry: You, Mr. Gray, you yourself, with your rose-red youth and 
your rose-white boyhood, you have had passions that have made you
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afraid, thoughts that have filled you with terror, day-dreams and sleeping 
dreams whose mere memory might stain your cheek with shame.
Freud: "W henever we sleep we cast off our hard-w on m orality like a 
garment, only to pu t it on again next morning. This divestiture is 
naturally unattended by any danger because we are paralysed, condemned 
to inactivity, by the state of sleep .... [A]ll our dreams are governed by 
purely egotistic motives." [An Autobiographical Study, 1950c: 302]
The Freudian flavour is not confined to this one speech. It 
remains pungent as Lord Henry elaborates his psychology during the 
course of the novel:
Lord Henry: "Life is not governed by will or intention. Life is a question 
of nerves, and fibres, and slowly built-up cells in which thought hides 
itself and passion has its dreams." [Wilde, 1988: 162]
Freud: "[T]hese two discoveries - that the life of the sexual instincts 
cannot be totally restrained, and that mental processes are in themselves 
unconscious and can only reach the ego and come under its control 
through incom plete and untrustw orthy  perceptions - am ount to a 
statem ent that the ego is not master in its own house." ['One of the
Difficulties of Psychoanalysis', 1950n: 355]
*
Lord Henry (thinking): "Soul and body, body and soul - how mysterious 
they were!... Who could say where the fleshly impulse ceased, or the 
psychical impulse began? How shallow were the arbitrary definitions of 
ordinary psychologists!" [56]
Freud: '[A]n instinct appears to us as a borderland concept between the 
mental and the physical." ['Formulations Regarding the Two Principles 
of Mental Functioning', 1950d: 64]
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*Lord Henry: "Modern morality consists in accepting the standard of one's 
age." [69]
Freud: "[Ijnstincts in themselves are neither good nor evil. We but 
classify them and their manifestations in that fashion, according as they 
meet the needs and demands of the human community." [A n 
Autobiographical Study , 1950c: 295]
54-
Lord Henry: "All ways end at the same po in t... Disillusion." [155]
Freud: "Our possibilities of happiness are ... limited from the start by our 
very constitution. It is much less difficult to be unhappy." [Civilization 
and its Discontents, 1949a: 28]
54-
Lord Henry: "The terror of society ... is the basis of morals." [25]
Freud: "It has long been our contention that 'dread of society [soziale 
Angst]' is the essence of what is called conscience." [Group Psychology 
and the Analysis of the Ego, 1948: 10]
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Lord Henry: "[T]he value of an idea has nothing to do with the sincerity 
of the man who expresses it. Indeed, the probabilities are that the more 
insincere the man is, the more purely intellectual the idea will be, as in 
that case it will not be coloured by either his wants, his desires, or his 
prejudices." [23]
Freud: "[P]eople unfortunately are seldom impartial where they are 
concerned with the ultimate things, the great problems of science and of 
life. My belief is that there everyone is under the sway of preferences 
deeply rooted within, into the hands of which he unwittingly plays as he 
pursues his speculation." [Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1942: 77]
54-
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Lord Henry: "Pleasure is the only thing worth having a theory about .... 
But I am afraid I cannot claim my theory as my own. It belongs to 
Nature, not to me. Pleasure is Nature's test, her sign of approval." [69] 
Freud: "In the psychoanalytical theory of the mind we take it for granted 
that the course of m ental processes is automatically regulated by the
pleasure principle." [Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 1942: 1]
*
Lord Henry: "I wonder who it was defined man as a rational animal. It 
was the most premature definition ever given. Man is many things, but 
he is not rational." [36]
Freud: "[M]en are so slightly amenable to reasonable argum ents, so 
completely are they ruled by their instinctual wishes...." [The Future of an 
Illusion, 1949c: 81-82]
*
Lord Henry: "Conscience and cowardice are really the same things .... 
Conscience is the trade-name of the firm. That is all." [22]
Freud: "[T]he price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of 
happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt. ('Thus 
conscience does make cowards of us all ...')" [Civilization and its 
Discontents, SE 21: 134]
*
Lord Henry (thinking): "It was the passions about whose origin we 
deceived ourselves that tyrannised most strongly over us. Our weakest 
motives were those of whose nature we were conscious." [56]
Freud: "the core of our being, consisting of unconscious w ishful 
im pu lses, rem ains inaccessible to the u n d e rs tan d in g .... These 
unconscious wishes exercise a compelling force on all later m ental 
trends, a force which those trends are obliged to fall in with...." [The 
Interpretations of Dreams, SE, 5: 603-604]
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It would no doubt be possible to locate passages of Freud which 
m atch Lord Henry's observations even more precisely than the ones I 
have chosen. But in any case, it should be clear enough by now that 
W ilde's fictional aesthete has ideas which strongly resem ble such 
fundam ental Freudian concepts as repression, the unconscious, the 
superego.
What are we to make of this resemblance? It is hard not to let it 
affect the way we read both Wilde and Freud. As far as Wilde is 
concerned, it becomes more difficult than ever to accept the view that 
Lord Henry's philosophies are mere ideological skittles which Wilde sets 
up only in order to knock down with the Faustian moral. For these 
philosophies bear, in effect, the sanction of Freud himself, and one does 
not have to believe in the scientific correctness of Freud's ideas in order 
to think highly of Wilde for anticipating them.
When we read Freud in light of the Lord Henry connection, our 
suspicion that his theories bore an intimate relation to his historical 
situation can only be strengthened. A lthough m any of the above 
quotations of Freud come from late works, the concepts to which they 
refer are by and large present in psychoanalysis from the beginning, as 
either implicit or explicit elements in the model of mental activity Freud 
set forth in The Interpretation of Dreams, published in 1899.14 They were 
form ulated, in other w ords, during the same decade that saw the 
publication of Dorian Gray.
Before we proceed any further in our comparison of Lord Henry and 
Freud, it must be acknowledged that our juxtaposition of excerpts from 
their respective psychologies revealed, as well as a striking num ber of
14But dated 1900 on the title page - see Gay, 1988: 3.
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similarities, certain key differences between their discourses. The fact 
that Lord Henry makes no bones about the sociological nature of his 
theories is one of these differences. A second obvious difference is 
linguistic: where Freud invented new terms with which to delineate his 
conception of the self, Lord H enry makes do w ith  the som etim es 
imprecise m edium  of existing language. A third difference m ight be 
called ethical: Lord Henry, shattering a key rule of scientific discourse, 
explicitly associates his notions of what is with notions of w hat ought to 
be.
Each of these three apparently un-Freudian qualities of Lord 
Henry's discourse can be seen in the following speech:
The aim of life is self-development. To realise one's nature 
perfectly - that is what each of us is here for. People are afraid of 
themselves, nowadays. They have forgotten the highest of all 
duties, the duty that one owes to one's self. [29]
Let us consider each of these three differences in turn, and examine how 
substantial they really are.
First, the linguistic difference. W hen Lord H enry speaks of 
realising one's nature, of being afraid of one's self, of one's duty to one's 
self, he splits the self into two components: a self-as-object capable of 
being developed, realised, feared, served, by the self-as-subject. The self- 
as-object, it emerges during the novel, is in Lord H enry 's view the 
authentic self, a natural condition of being which to our cost has become 
forgotten. This submerged self is not dissimilar to the Freudian notion of 
the id, as we can see quite clearly when Lord Henry informs Dorian that 
"the moment I met you I saw you were quite unconscious of w hat you 
really are, of what you really m ight be" [32 - emphasis added]. The
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similarity can also be seen from the opposite angle - that is, at those 
points in the works of Freud when he discusses his understanding of the 
psyche in everyday language. In the Psychopathology, for example, he 
wrote that slips of the tongue harbour "a warning that one should keep a 
watch on oneself" [1966: 88]. He means that one's conscious mind should 
keep watch on one's unconscious; but in the absence of these technical 
terms, he speaks of a self-as-subject and a self-as-object, precisely in the 
m anner of Lord H enry.15 Even more suggestively, when the 'Rat Man' 
complains to Freud of having a divided self, and wonders w hether he 
can effect "a re-integration of his personality", Freud tells us that
I replied that I was in complete agreement with [his] notion of a 
splitting of his personality. He only had to assimilate this new 
contrast, between a moral self and an evil one, with the contrast I 
had  a lready  m entioned, be tw een  the conscious and  the 
unconscious. The moral self was the conscious, the evil self was 
the unconscious.16 [1991a: 58]
In this case at least, then, the difference between Freud's terminology and 
Lord H enry 's does not reflect any deep ideological division. On the 
contrary, it masks a profound theoretical agreement.
Mixed up in Lord Henry's notion of the split self we find another 
factor which is - unsurprisingly - absent from the Freudian account. This 
is Lord H enry 's belief that the split self is an historically peculiar 
phenom enon, the product of strictly contem porary m oral and social
15Freud also speaks in the Psychopathology of the "self-revealing" nature of certain 
slips, of their status as a "serious self-betrayal" [ibid. 92, 89] - formulations which echo 
Lord Henry not only by their reference to two selves, but also by their apparent suggestion 
that the unconscious represents a truer self than the conscious does.
16Freud adds in a footnote: "All of this is of course only true in the roughest way, but it 
serves as a first introduction to the subject" [ibid.: 58n].
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forces: namely, "the sickly aims, the false ideals of our age" [32].17 "People 
are afraid of themselves, nowadays," says Lord Henry - note that word 
nowadays. It is only due to an historical accident - one which can be, 
m ust be, rectified - that the self has come to consist of a suppressed 
essence in contention with a conformist crust. An undivided self has 
existed before, and can exist again, if only one pursues "the new 
Hedonism" whose aim is "to recreate life, and to save it from that harsh, 
uncomely puritanism that is having, in our own day, its curious revival" 
[104 - emphasis added].
Freud's theory of the divided self, on the other hand, has that 
broader kind of ambition which I have already discussed in relation to 
the theory of repression. For Freud, a self divided into contending parts 
was not merely the Victorian condition but the hum an one. Where Lord 
Henry believes that a realisation of the inner self will constitute a "return 
to the Hellenic ideal,"18 Freud would insist that the ancient Greeks, in 
spite of their relaxed sexual morals, were rvot exempt from the divided 
mental structure that was every civilized hum an's lot. Indeed it was the 
Greeks who came up with the myth of Oedipus, that supposedly classic 
expression of unconscious tensions.
This, then, is a genuine difference between Lord Henry and Freud. 
The former diagnoses, and proposes a cure for, a psychological m alady 
peculiar to his age. The latter, although he makes a similar diagnosis at a 
similar time, wants us to believe that it applies to all humanity.
Lord Henry's talk of the "Hellenic ideal" represents another kind 
of departure from Freud's practice. The scientist's ideals are meant to be
17"To know an essence," Wilde once said to Gide, "it is necessary to suppress it" [Ellmann, 
1988: 335n].
18 "I believe that if one man were to live out his life fully and completely, were to give 
form to every feeling, expression to every thought, reality to every dream - I believe that 
the world would gain such a fresh impulse of joy that we would forget all the maladies of 
mediaevalism, and return to the Hellenic ideal - to something finer, richer than the 
Hellenic ideal, it may be" [Wilde, 1988: 29].
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irrelevant. Lord Henry, by so freely voicing his personal values and 
prejudices, opens up the possibility that it is these things, rather than 
sober observation, that have shaped his hypotheses. How can we believe 
that his psychological theories are accurate, w hen he sham elessly 
contaminates them  with his personal beliefs about “the aim of life", 
about “what each of us is here for“, about “the highest of all [our] duties" 
[29]?
When, for example, Lord Henry makes the impeccably Freudian 
observation that declares that “man" is not a “rational animal", he adds 
something one could not imagine hearing from Freud: “I am glad he is 
not, after all" [36].19 By admitting that his psychological theories agree 
w ith his private ethics, Lord Henry seems to weaken the truth-claim  of 
the former. But the interesting thing about this confession of Lord 
Henry's is that it is superfluous. The reader is already meant to take it for 
granted that Lord H enry 's scientific pronouncem ents are inherently 
ethical, or rather inherently unethical. Throughout the novel, Lord 
H enry 's raw propositions are understood, both by himself and by his 
interlocutors, to imply a politics of radical individualism . W hen, for 
exam ple, Lord H enry makes the observation that “Conscience and 
cowardice are really the same things", Basil Hallward reacts w ith horror: 
“I don 't believe that, Harry, and I don't believe you do either" [22].
What H allw ard presum ably means is that Harry is stating the 
notion merely in order to be provocative. But to be provocative in the 
trivial sense of being frivolously outrageous, this idea must also seem to 
Hallward to be provocative in the deeper sense of suggesting an immoral 
course of action, namely that of ignoring conscience because it is nothing
19On the other hand, perhaps there is a sim ilar note of glee in Freud 's fam ous 
announcement during the Introductory Lectures that "Man's craving for grandiosity is now 
suffering the third and most bitter blow [following those delivered by Copernicus and 
Darwin] from present-day psychological research which is endeavouring to prove to the 
'ego' of each one of us that he is not even master in his own house..." [1940: 241].
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more than cowardice - precisely the course of action that Dorian Gray 
ends up taking. It is telling that this equation of conscience w ith  
cowardice - another impeccably Freudian notion20 - should have been 
considered, by a Victorian spectator, inherently subversive, abhorrently 
M ephistophelean, a self-evidently dangerous component of a wicked 
creed. Lord Henry's theory of the split self is similarly contaminated by 
aesthetic activism: the quasi-scientific observation that Dorian Gray is 
"unconscious of w hat you really are” unfolds at once into the 
unasham edly libertarian suggestion that he is also unconscious "of w hat 
you really might be” To identify the self as divided is to declare oneself 
in favour of a return to wholeness. For the partisan psychologist, 
description and prescription are inextricably bound together; scientific 
data are weapons in a social war.
In a climate in which ideas like his seemed inherently political, Freud 
was naturally keen to stress the value-free nature of his endeavours. In a 
paper of 1912,21 for example, he wrote:
In view of the strenuous efforts being made in the civilized world 
today to reform sexual life, it will not be superfluous to give a 
reminder that psychoanalytic research is as remote from 
tendentiousness as any other kind of research. It has no other end 
in view than to throw light on things by tracing what is manifest 
back to what is hidden. It is quite satisfied if reforms make use of 
its findings to replace what is injurious by something more 
advantageous; but it cannot predict whether other institutions may
20See the quotes on pages 49 and 50 above.
21 'On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love (Contributions to the 
Psychology of Love II)'.
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not result in other, and perhaps graver, sacrifices. [1983b: 256 - 
italics added]
The very fact that Freud feels obliged to issue this disclaimer, 
though, suggests that psychoanalysis m ust be som ehow closer to 
tendentiousness than most branches of science. It is closer by virtue of its 
subject-matter - one can't imagine a geologist, for example, having to 
stress the value-free nature of his or her researches. And it is closer 
historically, because it emerged at a time when "strenuous efforts [were] 
being made in the civilized world ... to reform sexual life" - or, to put it 
another way, at a time when sexual life was subject to particularly  
stringent restraints.
Freud was not always so irreproachably indifferent to sexual 
reform as he sounds in the above extract. In a letter of 1915, Freud 
defines himself as "a very moral hum an being", but adds:
I am taking the notion of morality in its social, not its sexual, 
sense. Sexual morality as defined by society, in its most extreme 
form that of America, strikes me as very contemptible. I stand for 
an infinitely freer sexual life, although I myself have m ade very 
little use of such freedom. [E. Freud, 1961: 314]22
22Freud defined morality as "the control and restriction of instinct" [1950c: 295], and it was 
his theoretical practice to divide instincts into two main camps - those which yearn for 
union with other humans, and those which are anti-social. (In 1920, with his proposal of 
the Death Instinct in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud began to classify instincts 
according to whether they followed the principle of life or of death - Eros versus 
Thanatos, the sexual versus the destructive. Previously, he had divided instincts into two 
less starkly differentiated classes: sexual instincts and ego instincts - Love and Hunger, as 
he would say, quoting Schiller [see Abel, 1989: 17].) It was therefore possible for Freud to 
speak of morality, as he does in the letter above, as a two-pronged affair. The prong 
which attacks our anti-social instincts Freud applauds, for suppression of these instincts is 
essential if society is to exist at all. "Ethics is traffic regulation," Freud once said, in 
reference to this basic layer of morality: "I would be miserable if automobiles ran upon the 
sidewalk" [quoted by Wittels, 1931: 395]. But the other prong of morality, the one devoted 
to suppressing our erotic instincts, Freud considers superfluous, indeed downright harmful,
57
Although Freud's personal sobriety ("I myself have m ade very 
little use of such freedom") has been thought by some critics to have a 
bearing on the debate over the nature of his ideas,23 it is surely beside the 
point. Wilde's Lord Henry does not indulge himself either, but that does 
not render his ideas any less subversive. "You never say a moral thing, 
and you never do a wrong thing," the frustrated  Basil H allw ard 
complains to him [Wilde, 1988: 20]. The interesting question is not 
whether Freud was a Faust - he plainly w asn't - but whether he was a 
Mephistopheles, an ideological subversive in the tradition of Lord Henry.
The conclusion to Freud 's 1908 paper on " 'C ivilized ' Sexual 
M orality and M odern Nervousness" has a significant bearing on this 
question. It reads:
[W]e may well raise the question whether our 'civilized' sexual 
morality is worth the sacrifice it imposes on us, especially if we are 
still so much enslaved to hedonism as to include among the aims 
of our cultural development a certain am ount of satisfaction of 
individual happiness. It is certainly not a physician's business to 
come forward with proposals for reform; but it seemed to me that I 
might support the urgency of such proposals if I were to amplify 
Von E hren fe ls 's24 description of the injurious effects of our 
'civilized' sexual morality by pointing to the im portant bearing of
"very contemptible" - a verdict predicated, like Lord Henry's, on his own theory that 
excessive restraint of these instincts will result in mental illness.
23For example, Philip Rieff: "Freud was no celebrant of the senses.... He hardly claimed 
or - from what we know of his life - himself desired to be free of the civilizing aversions" 
[Rieff, 1959: 1541.
24Von Ehrenfels, explains an editorial footnote, was a "Professor of Philosophy at Prague 
[who] had been praised by Freud for his courageous criticisms of the institution of 
marriage" [SE, 9: 204n].
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that morality upon the spread of m odern nervous illness. [SE, 9:
204]
How does Freud square this blatant politicking with his belief that 
psychoanalysis is as remote from tendentiousness as any science? He 
uses two tactics. The first is to draw a wholly unconvincing distinction 
between "com[ing] forward" with proposals for reform and "supporting] 
their urgency"; if the former is "certainly not the physician's business", it 
is hard to see how the latter can be entirely above board. Freud's other 
tactic is more subtle. He tells us that he is speaking as a "physician" - and 
if Freud the physician believes that sexual morality causes illness, then it 
would be a dereliction of duty as a healer if he did not recommend moral 
reform.
But although Freud purports to be wearing only his physician's hat 
here, his psychological theorist's hat is still firmly in place underneath. 
For Freud the healer's support of reform is prem ised not only on the 
harshness of Victorian morality, but also, crucially, on an assumption 
about hum an nature derived from his own "science" - namely, the 
assum ption that "we are still so m uch enslaved to hedonism  as to 
include among the aims of our cultural development a certain amount 
of satisfaction of individual happiness". This is a paraphrase of the 
psychological law that Freud set down in his concept of the pleasure 
principle. "It seems," as he put it in the Introductory Lectures, "that our 
entire psychical activity is bent upon procuring pleasure and avoiding 
pain, that it is automatically regulated by the PLEASURE-PRINCIPLE" 
[1940, 298-299]. Once one accepts Freud's hypothesis that our entire 
psychical activity is governed by the desire for pleasure - that we are 
"enslaved to hedonism" - then one must (unless one condones needless 
psychological suffering on a mass scale) favour a moral system which
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imposes on this desire only such minimum restraints as are required in 
order that individuals can live together. Plainly Victorian morality did 
not answer this description. It indulged in a large amount of suppression 
for suppression's sake. And so Freudian theory, in the moral climate in 
which it evolved, was indeed a form of subversive ethics.
Again the case of Lord Henry underlines this point. Lord Henry's 
libertarianism is rooted in the pleasure-principle-like assum ption that a 
desire for pleasure is a natural inevitability. "Pleasure is the only thing 
worth having a theory about," he says. "But I am afraid I cannot claim 
my theory as my own. It belongs to Nature, not to me. Pleasure is 
Nature's test, her sign of approval" [Wilde, 1988: 69].25 By thinking of the 
drive for pleasure as incorrigible, Lord Henry renders morality futile - if 
morals cannot extinguish desire, they can only force it inward, damaging 
mental health. "Every impulse that we strive to strangle broods in the 
mind, and poisons us" [29]. Ergo, impulses must  be yielded to, rather 
than stifled - not Lord Henry's whimsical opinion, but a medical fact.
If the theory of pleasure really does belong to nature, then Lord 
Henry has hit on an impregnable argum ent for hedonism, a scientific is 
which is sim ultaneously a hedonistic ought. Freud's theory of the 
pleasure principle likewise offers us a picture of the way things are which 
is also a blueprint for the way things ought to be. Freud was an atheist, 
but his pleasure principle imbued godless life w ith a teleology, for it is 
nothing less than an answer to the question of
what the behaviour of men themselves reveals as the purpose and
object of their lives, what they demand of life and wish to attain
25Wilde framed a similar principle under his own name in 'The Soul of Man Under 
Socialism' (1895): "It is mentally and morally injurious to man to do anything in which he 
does not find pleasure" [1970c: 244], Victorian m oral law, as Wilde would shortly 
discover, saw to it that certain things in which one did find pleasure could prove equally 
injurious.
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in it. The answer to this can hardly be in doubt. They want to 
become happy and to remain so.... As we see, it is simply the 
pleasure principle which draws up the program of life's purpose. 
[1949a: 27-28]
The fact that the pleasure principle is not allowed to administer 
this program in the real world - a task which falls to the reality principle - 
does not alter the fundamentally hedonistic character of life as Freud saw 
it. For the reality principle is a mere delegate of the pleasure principle, a 
modified version of it, and its aim remains the same: "the REALITY- 
PRINCIPLE ... at bottom also seeks pleasure - although a delayed and 
diminished pleasure, one which is assured by its realization of fact, its 
relation to reality" [Freud, 1940: 299]. In the unreal w orld of the 
unconscious, moreover, the reality principle does not get a look in: the 
pleasure principle "exerts undisputed sway" [Freud, 1933: 106] over 
unconscious processes, and constantly secures pleasure on our behalf by 
shaping our dreams, m anipulating our slips of the tongue, engineering 
our "clumsy" movements, and so on. To Freud, we are all thorough and 
diligent Epicureans whether we know it or not. Hence the relish we take 
in the 'Epicurean' jokes Freud mentions in Jokes and Their Relation to 
the Unconscious: The message of such jokes, Freud explains, is
'Yes.... There is nothing higher than enjoyment and it is more or 
less a m atter of indifference how one obtains it.' This sounds 
shockingly immoral and is no doubt not m uch better. But at 
bottom it is nothing other than the poet's 'Carpe diem', which 
appeals to the uncertainty of life and the unfruitfu lness of 
virtuous renunciation .... In reality each of us has had hours and 
times at which he has admitted the rightness of this philosophy of
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life and has reproached moral doctrine with only understanding 
how to dem and w ithout offering any compensation. Since we 
have ceased any longer to believe in the promise of a next world in 
which every renunciation will be rew arded by a satisfaction ... 
'Carpe diem ' has become a serious warning. I will gladly pu t off 
satisfaction: but do I know whether I shall still be here tomorrow? 
... What these jokes whisper may be said aloud: that the wishes and 
desires of m en have a right to m ake them selves acceptable 
alongside of exacting and ruthless morality. And in our days it has 
been said in forceful and stirring sentences that this m orality is 
only a selfish regulation laid down by the few who are rich and 
powerful and who can satisfy their wishes at any time w ithout 
postponement. So long as the art of healing has not gone further 
in making our life safe and so long as social arrangem ents do no 
more to make it more enjoyable, so long will it be impossible to 
stifle the voice in us that rebels against the dem ands of morality. 
[Freud, 1960:109-110]
Passages like this one confirm that Freud installed in us all, like a 
piece of psychological hardw are, a Wilde-like attitude to pleasure. Yet 
partisans of Freud have maintained, apparently against the grain of some 
of Freud's own writings, that psychoanalysis has nothing whatever to do 
with hedonism. Often such critics are content to trundle out the well- 
worn observation that Freud was a "sober bourgeois" - as great a red 
herring, as we have seen, as the personal sobriety of W ilde's Lord Henry. 
But sometimes the defence is mounted on a more sophisticated level. In 
his Freud: The Mind of the Moralist, Philip Rieff argues that "the 
reputation of Freud as a libertine reformer" is unm erited [Rieff, 1959: 
163]. Rieff is familiar, needless to say, with the theory of the pleasure
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principle, and therefore knows that "pleasure is, for Freud, identical with 
motivation in general; there can be no other motive" [325]. Nonetheless, 
Rieff maintains that Freudian theory was not remotely hedonistic, for in 
it "[p leasure is defined, after the manner of Schopenhaeur, as a negative 
phenom enon, the struggle to release oneself from  unpleasure , or 
tension.... To understand pleasure as its own abrogation is scarcely a form 
of hedonism; such a conception serves better as a critique of it" [155].
By Rieff's standards, though, if Freud is not a hedonist then 
neither was Epicurus himself, who stressed in his letter to Menoeceus 
that "when we say, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the 
pleasure of the prodigal or the pleasure of sensuality, as we are 
understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice or wTilful 
misrepresentation.... By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body 
and of trouble in the soul..." [quoted by Vaughan, 1982: 34].
If the hedonism  of W ilde's Lord Flenry is probed, a similarly 
negative definition of pleasure can be found at its core. Lord H enry's 
belief that "the only way to get rid of a tem ptation is to yield to it" is 
outrageously hedonistic, but it also implies a subtle redefinition of what 
pleasure is. Pleasure is not a matter of obtaining something from outside 
the self, a matter of superfluity; it is a getting rid of an internal urge - an 
urge which will fester ("resist it, and your soul grows sick with longing") 
if it is not attended to. Getting pleasure is therefore synonymous with 
getting rid of unpleasure. Neither Wilde nor Lord Henry seems to think 
that the m odesty of this conception of pleasure makes their project 
somehow less than hedonistic. On the contrary, this negative idea of 
pleasure is the very engine of their hedonism. By defining pleasure as 
the release of internal tensions which are in constant supply, they are 
able to make the quest for pleasure both fundam ental and never-ending. 
The p leasure-quest of the decadent hero, from D orian G ray to
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Huysm ans's Des Esseintes, tends to be a story not of satisfaction but of 
ongoing hunger. Dorian, for example, finds that
That curiosity about life which Lord Henry had first stirred in him 
... seemed to increase with gratification. The more he knew, the 
more he desired to know. He had mad hungers that grew more 
ravenous as he fed them. [1988: 103]
And w hen the decadent's attem pt to find nourishm ent in the outer 
world suffers the inevitable, the quest tends to turn inward. Think of Des 
Esseintes's retirem ent into his haven of solitude, and of its deep 
consistency with Freud's dictum that "Painful feelings are connected with 
an increase and pleasurable feelings with a decrease in stim ulation" 
[1950a: 64] .26
"A new Hedonism," says Lord Henry - "that is what our century 
wants" [32]. This new hedonism is based on a negative understanding of 
the nature of pleasure, and in that respect does not differ from the old 
hedonism of Epicurus. Lord Henry makes the project new by bringing it 
into a century in which the self's animal needs had been re-emphasised
26It was, said Freud, "the most important" of his basic postulates that "the nervous 
system is an apparatus having the function of abolishing stimuli which reach it, or of 
reducing excitation to the lowest possible level: an apparatus would even, if this were 
feasible, m aintain itself in an altogether unstim ulated condition" [Freud, 1950a: 63]. 
Com pare this with the insular Paterian ethic which W ilde records in his College 
Notebooks: "The end of life is not action but contemplation, not doing but being..." [Smith 
and Tiefland, 1989: 141]. Such an ethic informed the activities, or inactivities, of many a 
fin-de-siecle  aesthete and decadent. In 'The Critic as A rtist', W ilde defends the 
contemplation of art by linking it explicitly with a definition of pleasure every bit as 
negative as Freud's. "It is through Art, and through Art only, that we can realise our 
perfection; through Art, and through Art only, that we can shield ourselves from the 
sordid perils of actual existence. This results not merely from the fact that nothing one can 
imagine is worth doing, and one can imagine everything, but from the subtle law that 
emotional forces, like the forces of the physical sphere, are limited in extent and energy. 
One can feel so much, and no more" [Wilde, 1970a: 151-152 - emphasis added]. Cf. Freud's 
"What is called happiness in its narrowest sense comes from the satisfaction of pent-up 
needs which have reached great intensity, and by its very nature can only be a transitory 
experience.... Our possibilities of happiness are thus limited from the start by our very 
constitution" [1949a: 27-28].
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by Darwin, while public morality strove all the more vigorously to deny 
them. In these two respects the quest for pleasure acquired a greater 
urgency in the second half of the nineteenth century, shaping  the 
theories of Wilde and his Lord Henry, of Huysm ans and his Des 
Esseintes, of Pater and his Marius - and, arguably, of Freud himself.
"Another name for cowardice": Conscience in 
The Picture of Dorian Gray
If Lord Henry's theories contain a concept radically akin to the pleasure 
principle, must it not also be said that the dire upshot of Dorian Gray's 
im plem entation of those theories points to the indispensability of the 
reality principle? In other words, if the novel does tell us som ething 
about Freud, doesn't it remind us of the ultimately conservative nature 
of his message - that for all his talk of 'Carpe Diem', he sternly counselled 
that the quest for pleasure must be subordinated to a sober respect for 
reality?
A thumb-nail summary of the novel's plot would suggest that the 
answer to that question is yes. Dorian Gray, intoxicated by Lord Henry's 
discourse, utters the fateful wish: "If it were I who was to be always 
young, and the picture that was to grow old! ... I would give my soul for 
that!" [34]. The wish is fulfilled: it is indeed the picture which will grow 
old and ugly, while the fleshly Dorian retains his youthful beauty. Much 
m ore im portantly, the portrait turns out to register D orian 's m oral 
withering as well as his physical ageing. It becomes his conscience. He 
locks it away in an attic, thereby freeing himself to pursue such activities 
as drug abuse and m urder while continuing to appear pure. (The
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assumption that moral impurity is something that will show up 
physically, unless you happen to own a magic picture, is something I will 
return to later).
As the novel progresses, the portrait which Dorian initially thinks 
of as a tool of liberation becomes increasingly something he must liberate 
himself from - an overwhelmingly oppressive presence. Pushing his 
luck, Dorian attempts to destroy the portrait with a knife. The attempt 
fails, the spell is broken, and the novel ends with a seemingly 
unequivocal tableau: a corpse lies on the floor, "withered, wrinkled, and 
loathsome of visage". Hanging above it is the original portrait, depicting 
the late Dorian Gray "in all the wonder of his exquisite youth and beauty" 
[167]. This denouement was described by Wilde, in a letter, thus: "Dorian 
Gray, having led a life of mere sensation and pleasure, tries to kill 
conscience, and at that moment kills himself" [Hart-Davis, 1962: 259].
But as I have already said, we have good reason not to take Wilde 
at his word here. It is hard to believe that Wilde, of all people, would 
perpetrate so facile an endorsement of conscience. For what was 
conscience, if not the internalised repository of all those Victorian moral 
values which Wilde had so vigorously devoted himself to mocking? If 
Dorian Gray is Wilde's way of giving the Victorian moral conscience two 
thumbs up, then how do we explain the scathing critique of conscience 
Wilde assayed in, say, 'The Critic as Artist', published in the same year as 
the novel?
The mere existence of conscience, that faculty of which people 
prate, is a sign of our imperfect development. It must be merged 
in instinct before we become fine. Self-denial is simply a method 
by which man arrests his progress, and self-sacrifice a survival of 
mutilation of the savage, part of that old worship of pain which is
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so terrible a factor in the history of the world, and which even now 
makes its victims day by day.... [1970a: 126]
The fate of Dorian Gray is in fact, I want to suggest, in perfect 
harm ony with these sentiments. By reading Dorian's problematic quest 
carefully, we will find that it confirms, rather than contradicts, Lord 
H enry 's philosophies, and effects the thoroughgoing critique of 
conscience that one would expect of Wilde. This means not only that the 
novel as a whole can be reintegrated into the m ain line of W ilde's 
thought, but also that in the texture of its action, as well as in the 
speeches of its resident psychologist, it has something to tell us about the 
radical implications of Freudian theory.
In order to conduct such a reading of the novel, we have to pay 
heed to one of the book's chief themes: that appearance does not always 
correspond to reality. Let us apply this principle to the device of the 
portrait. The portrait renders evil visible. By having Dorian's misdeeds 
show up as quasi-objective distortions on the surface of the picture, 
Wilde would appear to be endorsing, indeed reifying, an idea which he 
had himself helped to make rather unfashionable - namely, the idea that 
good and evil are perm anent, objectively-determined qualities. Wilde 
would appear, in other words, to agree with the portrait's creator, Basil 
Hallward, who says: "Sin is a thing that writes itself across a m an's face. It 
cannot be concealed" [117].
Could Oscar W ilde really have embraced the notion that sin is 
defined and punished by nature? Some critics believe so. Donald L. 
Lawler, for example, asserts that
[t]hat which finally destroys Dorian is his ow n egotism  and 
wilfulness.... He imagines himself as free from the moral law of
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nature as he was from the physical law of ageing. The oddly 
prophetic quality about this story for Wilde's own life is difficult to 
ignore. [Lawler, 1988: 30 - emphasis added.]
It seems to me that Lawler's allusion to Wilde's private life offers 
definitive proof of the w rong-headedness of his argum ent. Surely 
W ilde 's  personal dem ise is one of h is to ry 's  m ore n o to rious 
dem onstrations of the unnaturalness of moral law. It was the Criminal 
Law Am endment Act of 1885, and not m other nature, which defined 
Wilde's activities as sins, and which put him away for two years. More to 
the point, it seems highly implausible that Wilde himself would have 
been prepared to view the covert activities he was engaging in, and 
getting away with, as violations of eternal natural law s.27 An avid 
Hellenist, Wilde was fully aware that his "sins" were not by definition 
sinful. On this matter, it seems highly unlikely that Wilde would have 
disagreed with Lord H enry 's suggestion that "m odern morality consists 
in accepting the standard of one's age" [69].28
Where, then, does the notion that "sin is a thing that writes itself 
across a m an's face" come from? The answer seems em barrassingly 
obvious. Dorian Gray is a fantastic narrative; Wilde has chosen to make 
his points about hum an nature and the society of his time against a 
backdrop of certain supernatural assum ptions in which we are not 
literally supposed to believe. The most glaring such assumption is that a 
person can change places with a picture - a notion which, as far as I know, 
no critic has ever accused Wilde of seriously crediting. The idea that sin 
writes itself across one's face seems to me to have essentially the same
27According to Richard Ellmann, Wilde's homosexual activities began in 1886, i.e. four 
years before he began work on Dorian Gray. "After 1886 he was able to think of himself as 
a criminal, moving guiltily among the innocent" [1988: 2611.
28A perception Wilde also lent to Gilbert in 'The Critic as Artist'. "It takes a thoroughly 
selfish age, like our own, to deify self-sacrifice" [1970a: 160].
68
Status: it is a narrative cog without which the plot could not function. 
The very fact that Wilde has one of his characters spell the idea out is 
probably a hint that he did not personally accept it, that it seemed to him 
an assumption which had to be voiced because it did not apply outside 
the novel - in contrast to those assum ptions which are not voiced 
because Wilde is confident that the reader will bring them to the novel, 
such as the assum ption that waking up after noon is decadent, that 
knives are sharp, that m urder is bad, that opium results in intoxication, 
and so on.
If the device of the portrait does rise above its status as narrative 
cog to offer a philosophical comment on the notion that sin is a visible 
commodity, it seems to me that the comment is harshly critical. The 
portrait allows Wilde to subject contemporary assum ptions about good 
and evil to some rigorous scrutiny, and ultimately to condemn them. 
We can see this by examining exactly what the picture does in its capacity 
as Dorian's conscience.
Dorian first learns of the p ictu re 's pow ers w hen, after his 
unchivalrous term ination of his romance w ith an innocent young 
actress, Sibyl Vane, a sneer of cruelty appears on the lips of his virtual 
self. "For every sin that he committed," Dorian realises w ith horror, "a 
stain would fleck and wreck its fairness" [78]. On the basis of this 
information, Dorian makes a laudable ethical decision. He decides that 
the picture will offer him a unique opportunity: the opportunity to be 
more moral than usual. If this picture will register his every sin, then 
his response will be simple, and pure:
he would not sin. The picture, changed or unchanged, would be 
to him the visible emblem of conscience. He would resist 
temptation ... the portrait that Basil Hallward had painted of him
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would be a guide to him through life, would be to him what 
holiness is to some, and conscience to others, and the fear of God 
to us all. [78-79]
Dorian's first application of this attitude takes the form of a resolution "to 
go back to Sibyl Vane, make her amends, marry her, try to love her 
again" [79].
On first learning that the picture is his conscience, then, Dorian 
evinces the pious respect for that faculty which the novel as a whole is 
generally accused of upholding. But Dorian's initial reverence for 
conscience seems unsound in several respects. For one thing, it is 
conceived in the grip of fear: even after he makes his good resolution, he 
is still shuddering; he hides the portrait behind a large screen, and 
m urm urs "How horrible!" [79].
M oreover, W ilde explicitly  places D orian 's reverence for 
conscience on a footing with holiness and the fear of God - forms of faith 
which were becoming increasingly problematical in W ilde's age. "The 
faith that others give to what is unseen," Wilde w ould declare in 'De 
Profundis', "I give to what one can touch, and look at" [Hart-Davis, 1986: 
196]. So already, even though Dorian Gray has resolved to obey his 
conscience, the novel has quietly started to question the authority of 
conscience by suggesting that it is based on fear and unreason.
Dorian's reverence for conscience only holds good for about ten 
pages. Before the conclusion of the next chapter, we find him studying 
the picture once more. "He felt that the time had really come for making 
his choice" [87]. But hasn 't he already made his choice, back on page 
seventy-nine? Evidently the answer is no - meaning that we were right 
to think of Dorian's initial piety as unsound, a mere knee-jerk response. 
When it comes to making a choice for the long term, Dorian decides that
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the true significance of the portrait is the freedom it grants him to flout 
the demands of conscience:
Or had his choice already been made? Yes, life had decided that for 
him - life, and his own infinite curiosity about life. Eternal 
youth, infinite passion, pleasures subtle and secret, wild joys and 
wilder sins - he was to have all these things. The portrait was to 
bear the burden of his shame: that was all. [87-88]
The way Dorian sees it, he can continue to observe the picture's message, 
but will be free simply to ignore it. "[TJhere would be," he thinks, "a real 
pleasure in watching it" [88]. On this point he will soon be proved 
drastically wrong.
Let us step back for a moment into Dorian's ten-page period of 
obeisance to the portrait. This initial policy is based, he claims, on an 
important realisation about the nature of conscience, one far more high- 
minded than Lord Henry's notion that conscience is a mere synonym for 
cowardice. "I am perfectly happy now," Dorian tells Lord Henry:
I know what conscience is , to begin with. It is not what you told 
me it was. It is the divinest thing in us . Don't sneer at it Harry, 
any more - at least not before me. I want to be good. I can't bear 
the idea of my soul being hideous. [82 - emphasis added]
Dorian's subsequent decision to ignore the picture seems to imply 
that he has encountered, in the meantime, alternative information about 
what conscience is - something which has extinguished his opinion that 
it is "the divinest thing in us" and inclined him instead towards the 
sneering anti-conscience attitude of Lord Henry. And indeed he has.
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Sibyl Vane, the jilted actress with whom Dorian had decided to make 
amends, has suicided. Immediately after hearing this awful news, Dorian
rushed to the screen, and drew it back. No; there was no further 
change in the picture. It had received the news of Sibyl Vane's 
death before he had known of it himself. It was conscious of the 
events of life as they occurred. The vicious cruelty that marred the 
fine lines of the mouth had, no doubt, appeared at the very 
moment that the girl had drunk the poison, whatever it was. Or 
was it indifferent to results? Did it merely take cognizance of what 
passed within the soul? [87]
The answer to those final two questions (which in any case seem to 
have been thrown in as an afterthought) is a firm no. If the portrait 
confined itself to monitoring what passed in the soul, then Dorian's good 
resolution to marry Sibyl Vane would have erased, or at least mitigated, 
the sneer of evil that formed when he spurned her. But the sneer 
remains intact - meaning that Dorian is right to fear that the portrait is 
more interested in bad results than in good intentions. The portrait 
illustrates, quite literally, a principle that Lord Henry has helpfully just 
uttered: that "Good resolutions are useless attempts to interfere with 
scientific laws.... Their result is absolutely nil" [84].
So Dorian's plan to use the portrait as a tool to assist moral conduct 
is foiled by the distressing discovery that he is not the sole, or even the 
primary, author of the image on the canvas. The picture refuses to 
register his intentions, yet changes in accordance to events totally beyond 
his control. There is therefore truth in Dorian's feeling that his decision 
has been made for him. His confident belief that "conscience is ... the 
divinest thing in us" has been rudely shaken on two counts. First,
72
conscience is not divine: it is unfair and unreasonable, even malicious. 
Moreover, it is not even in us; to a frightening extent it is beyond us, out 
of our control.
Dorian's decision to ignore his conscience is one he is pushed to, 
then, by the nature of his conscience itself. This is our first encounter 
with a revolutionary suggestion about conscience: that it can function as 
a cause of immoral conduct. This suggestion, which later events in the 
novel will amplify, gravely undermines the traditional understanding of 
the novel. Wilde is not saying that we are evil unless we have 
conscience. He is saying that we are evil because of it.
But the novel's critique of conscience begins much earlier, at the 
very moment when Dorian Gray successfully banishes his conscience to 
the surface of a painting. It seems to me that this supernatu ral 
m anoeuvre, far from reifying conscience, makes the highly subversive 
suggestion that your conscience, unlike your desires, is a mere appendix 
of the self - it can be removed w ithout affecting the integrity of the 
individual. "One only realises one's soul," Wilde would write in 'De 
Profundis', "by getting rid of all alien passions, all acquired culture, and 
all external possessions be they good or evil" [Hart-Davis, 1987: 207]. 
W ilde's novel seems to p u t this proposition to the test, identifying 
conscience as a major one of these external possessions, these 
cumbersome pieces of cultural luggage which must be thrown overboard 
before the individualist can effectively pursue his or her goal. "W hat a 
m an really has, is what is in him," Wilde wrote in 'The Soul of Man 
Under Socialism'. "W hat is outside of him  should be a m atter of no 
importance" [1970c: 235]. Lord Henry says something similar: "To be good 
is to be in harmony with one's self. Discord is to be forced to be in 
harmony with others" [1988: 69]. Conscience is implicitly identified as the 
prim e agency ham pering one's harm ony with oneself, and enforcing
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one's harmony with others. Conscience can be effectively transferred to 
the external world, because that is where it belongs in the first place.
A similarly subversive flavour can be detected in Wilde's decision 
to place sin and its supposed consequences on the surface of a portrait. 
Can't this be construed as an expose of the superficiality of the concept of 
sin? Mightn't Wilde be insinuating that sin is something imposed from 
without, like paint, with society wielding the brush? The novel 
persistently speaks of the "spotting" and "staining" and "flecking" 
suffered by the evil-doer - terms suggestive of superficial rather than 
organic corruption. Perhaps Wilde wants to tell us that evil, in common 
with beauty, is only skin-deep, and exists only in the eye of the beholder. 
Those who adjudge Dorian Gray virtuous because of his pure appearance 
have only themselves to blame, because they measure virtue by the most 
shallow of criteria:
Even those who had heard the most evil things against him ... 
could not believe anything to his dishonour when they saw him.
He had always the look of someone who had kept himself 
unspotted from the world. Men who talked grossly became silent 
when Dorian Gray entered the room. There was something in the 
purity of his face that rebuked them. His mere presence seemed 
to recall to them the memory of the innocence that they had 
tarnished. They wondered how one so charming and graceful as 
he was could have escaped the stain of an age that was at once 
sordid and sensual. [102]
Here Dorian looks good when he is really evil. Previously, the 
portrait has made him look evil when he was trying to be good. Wilde is 
surely alerting us to the superficiality of the moral standards of his age of
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stain. If pu rity  is only a m atter of how effectively one rem ains 
"unspotted from the world", then Dorian's victory may not be so shallow 
after all; or, to pu t it another way, in the Victorian moral w orld, a 
shallow  victory was perhaps all that was needed. In retaining the 
appearance of purity, Dorian perhaps retains all that purity really is. He 
thinks of the picture as "the visible emblem of conscience"; but perhaps 
conscience itself is nothing more than an emblem anyway, a record not of 
w hat you really are but only of how the world sees you. In that respect 
there is nothing particularly far-fetched or fantastic about transferring sin 
to a portrait - nothing, at any rate, more far-fetched or fantastic than 
certain conceptions of sin are to begin with.
Dorian's (re)externalisation of conscience does not, of course, have 
the desired effect. The picture turns Dorian's pleasure-quest into a 
nightm are, and ultim ately kills him. Why, if W ilde is lam basting 
conscience, does this happen? The answer, as we shall see, is that Wilde 
introduces into his critique of conscience several complications, so that as 
the novel progresses we find that conscience, as well as being a foreign 
body which ought to be expelled from the self, possesses further 
malicious characteristics which make that expulsion extremely difficult, 
perhaps even impossible.
But before we consider what those characteristics are, let us review 
the basic model of conscience which we have already extracted from the 
text. Conscience, the picture tells us, is nothing more than society's 
picture of you, composed according to arbitrary and oppressive norms, 
and connected to the essential self only in the sense that you are obliged 
to carry it about in your head. In 'De Profundis', Wilde wrote: "'N othing 
is more rare in any man,' says Emerson, 'than an act of his own.' It is
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quite true. Most people are other people" [1986: 208].29 Wilde's novel 
suggests that conscience, and the actions we perform to please it, 
constitute the supreme manifestation of this pernicious principle. It 
shows us a young man who wants to live a life composed exclusively of 
acts of his own, and who takes an apparently large stride towards this goal 
by sending his conscience back where it came from, and where it 
therefore belongs - outside the self, back in the realm of other people. 
Rather than let society paint and taint him, he will cultivate his own 
picture of his self.30
It is not difficult to see how Wilde might have arrived at such a 
view of conscience. The Victorian moral conscience was so grotesquely 
demanding that its more intelligent victims could hardly fail to think of 
it as both foreign and artificial. Wilde, in particular, must have found 
risible, if not downright contemptible, society's demand that he feel guilty 
about activities that he knew full well to be victimless. He could hardly 
accept as a natural part of the self an agency devoted to upholding, and 
enforcing, what he has Lord Henry call "the sickly aims, the false ideals of 
our age" [32].
The Freudian model of conscience has many striking similarities to 
Wilde's. For the early Freud, conscience was associated with a concept he 
called the ego-ideal. When he developed the so-called second 
topography, the ego-ideal was superseded by the concept of the superego, 
which took its place beside the ego and the id as the third chief agency of
29Cf. a comment he made in a letter of 1892: "[A]nybody can act. Most people in England 
do nothing else. To be conventional is to be a comedian" [quoted by Ellmann, 1988: 349]. 
Lord Henry makes a similar point: "Being natural is simply a pose, and the most irritating 
pose I know" [20].
30"One should either be a work of art, or wear a work of art," Wilde wrote in his 'Phrases 
and Philosophies for the use of the Young' [1988:1206].
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mental activity.31 Reading Freud's account of the superego in the New 
Introductory Lectures, it is hard to miss certain echoes of the theory of 
conscience that we have extrapolated from The Picture of Dorian Gray. 
"Even if conscience is something 'within us'," Freud says,
yet it is not so from the first.... The part which is later taken by the 
super-ego is played to begin with by an external power, by parental 
authority.... So long as it is dominant there is no need to talk of a 
super-ego and of a conscience. It is only subsequently that the 
secondary situation develops (which we are all too ready to regard 
as the normal one), where the external restraint is internalised and 
the super-ego takes the place of the parental agency and observes, 
directs and threatens the ego in exactly the same way as earlier the 
parents did with the child. [SE, 22: 61]
In naming the parents as the source of our internalised values, 
Freud is being much more specific than Wilde about the sector of society 
where our conscience originates. But on the essential point that our 
conscience is not an original part of us - that it is, as Freud says elsewhere, 
"imposed from without" [1950h: 57] - Wilde and Freud are in complete 
accord. And it is in this very respect that much of the radical novelty of 
Freud's view of conscience lies, as Richard Rorty explains:
Whereas everybody from Plato to Kant had identified our central 
self, our conscience, the standard-setting, authoritative part of us, 
with universal truths ... Freud made conscience just one more, not 
particularly central, part of a larger, homogenous machine. He
31 On the vexed question of the difference between the ego-ideal and the superego, see note
32 below.
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identified the sense of duty with the internalization of a host of
idiosyncratic, accidental episodes. [Rorty, 1991: 157]
Freud's decentralisation of conscience did not, of course, amount 
to a suggestion that conscience could or should be ignored. On the 
contrary, by linking it with unconscious mental processes, Freud probably 
made conscience less escapable than ever. The superego's "independence 
of the conscious ego and the closeness of its relations with the 
unconscious id", he tells us, gives rise to the "paradoxical proposition 
that normal man is not only much more immoral than he believes, but 
also far more moral than he knows" [1947: 76 - emphasis added]. 
Conscience, in other words, issues its demands, its threats, its rewards 
and its punishments from a venue inaccessible to the conscious mind.
Wilde, while he saw that conscience was beyond the control of the 
conscious self, did not go so far as to posit the existence of an unconscious 
mind whose control it was under. But he did accuse the processes of 
conscience of possessing a deep irrationality. Indeed, as we are about to 
see, Wilde's identification of this irrationality is the sting in the tail of the 
critique of conscience he advances in The Picture of Dorian Gray.
Let us resume our analysis of The Picture of Dorian Gray at the point 
where Dorian, having successfully banished his conscience to the surface 
of the picture, and having decided to live a life free of its demands, locks 
the thing away in a room to which he alone possesses the key. At this 
point Dorian would seem to have clinched a comprehensive victory over 
conscience: not only has he excised it, giving it an appropriately shallow 
new home on the surface of a canvas; he has, crucially, ensured that 
nobody apart from himself will be able to see it. He has secured the 
conditions of which Lord Henry dreams, where the demands of others
78
need have no hold on him whatsoever. "He felt safe now," Wilde tells 
us. "No one would ever look at the horrible thing. No eye but his would 
ever see his shame" [99-100].
A mere eleven pages later, though, we are told that the picture 
retains its capacity to induce in Dorian "a fear that seemed to him  too 
great to be borne" [111]. Why this fear? There is no reason for it: 
objectively, Dorian is home free. We can only deduce that the fear is 
unreasonable, subjective. This proves painfully true. The fact that no 
eye but Dorian's can see the picture - ostensibly a reason to feel safe - will 
turn out to be the very root of his torment, and the cause of his death.
D orian 's irrational fear of the picture is most dram atically  
manifested in his persistent feeling that the picture is watching him. 
"[H]e saw the face of his portrait leering in the sunlight" [133]; "in the eyes 
there was a look of cunning" [166]. The gaze is "horrible in its cruelty", 
manifesting "censure" and "rebuke". "His own soul was looking out at 
him  from the canvas and calling him to judgement" [97].
Such a feeling of being watched was, according to Freud, only a 
slight magnification of a normal function of conscience.32 But in Wilde's
32From 'On Narcissism': "It would not surprise us if we were to find a special institution in 
the mind which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic gratification is secured from 
the ego-ideal and that, with this end in view, it constantly watches the real ego and 
measures it by that ideal. If such an institution does exist, it cannot possibly be something 
which we have not yet discovered; we only need to recognize it, and we may say that 
what we call our conscience has the required characteristics. Recognition of this 
institution enables us to understand the so-called 'delusions of observation' or, more 
correctly, of being watched, which are such striking symptoms in the paranoid diseases 
and may perhaps also occur as an isolated illness.... Patients of this sort complain that all 
their thoughts are known and their actions watched and overlooked.... This complaint is 
justified - it describes the truth; a power of this kind, watching, discovering and 
criticizing all our intentions, does really exist; indeed, it exists with every one of us in 
normal life. The delusion of being watched presents it in a regressive form, thereby 
revealing the genesis of this function and the reason why the patient is in revolt against 
it" [1950h: 52 -53].
It will be seen that this passage defines conscience and the ego-ideal as separate 
agencies. In a footnote to this passage, Freud's editor James Strachey remarks: "In some of 
Freud's later writings this distinction between the ideal and the agency enforcing it 
became blurred" [SE, 22: 65n]. Strachey is right: it is a difficult business establishing 
precisely how the superego differs from the ego-ideal, or how either of them differs from 
what we traditionally call conscience, or whether indeed any of them differ much at all.
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novel, Dorian's feeling of being watched is involved in the crowning part 
of W ilde's critique of the peculiar m onstrosity  of the V ictorian 
conscience. That Dorian's conscience is not an essential part of him 
looks, initially, like exciting news. But the otherness of D orian 's 
conscience cuts both ways: it allows him to smoothly banish it to a place 
beyond him, but it also means that conscience will continue to live, even 
outside him, this life of its own. At first this independent life shows up 
subtly, in distortions of the image which occur in defiance of Dorian's 
intentions. But soon enough the picture demonstrates the chilling extent 
of its autonomy by looking back at Dorian with its own eyes.
If the eyes of the portrait are not Dorian's, whose are they? In 
effect, they belong to society; just as the body depicted by the portrait is 
society's ugly image of him, so its eyes represent society's disapproving 
gaze. Wilde sees, as Freud did, that conscience has a dual function; it 
operates both as an ideal to which one looks for guidance, and, if one fails 
to rise to that ideal, an agency of punishment.
But there is one more complication still. Dorian does not need, 
rationally speaking, to fear the picture's gaze, any more than he needs to 
fear its ugly depiction of his body. If anything, the picture's gaze should 
come as a pleasant reminder of his victory. For society's gaze is only a 
real danger to those who don' t  own magic pictures, and w hose 
corruption occurs in public. Dorian's shame is safely locked away, and so 
the picture's eyes represent an empty threat, a harmless parody of real 
social disapproval. Why then does Dorian fear them? Again the fear is 
obviously irrational, and deepens W ilde's objection to the thuggish 
nature of the "divinest thing in us", and to the superstitious nature of 
our fear of it.
Nor can one resolve this confusion by looking up 'Superego' in the Index to the Standard 
Edition . Directly beneath the subcategory "distinguished from conscience," which has 
three entries, one finds the subcategory "equated with conscience," which has seven.
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But we can say more about Dorian's fear of the portrait's gaze than 
that it is irrational. It is an irrational fear which functions in the service 
of conscience. So there is at least one component of conscience - which 
one might call the fear of conscience - which has not been externalised to 
the portrait, but which has remained all along inside Dorian Gray. To 
put it another way, Dorian Gray's own eyes, the eyes w ith which he 
perceives the picture's reciprocal gaze, are not fully his own. They too 
still belong, to a telling degree, to society, and therefore he continues to 
feel the fear, and the guilt, that conscience w ants him to feel. The 
supernatural transaction with the portrait has not wholly freed Dorian of 
conscience, then. Conscience has sunk its roots too deep into the 
essential self to allow such an easy amputation. It is a malignant tum our 
rather than a benign one.
This point can be borne out if we imagine an alternative version of 
the story. Imagine that Dorian's butler, immediately after Dorian utters 
his fateful wish, short-sightedly m istakes the portrait for a piece of 
garbage, and removes it from the house. Dorian Gray, assuming that it 
has been stolen, gradually forgets about the picture and his impetuous 
wish to change places with it, and gets on with his life. He retains his 
youth forever, although nobody, including himself, knows why. The 
p icture, m eanw hile, carries out its m agical m ission in a dum p 
somewhere, unobserved by anyone. This would not be much of a plot, 
but it would be far more accurately the story of a m an who is free of the 
demands of conscience than the book we have. If this hypothetical 
Dorian Gray committed any sins, they w ould cause a w arping of his 
image which occurred beyond the range of any hum an gaze - including 
his own. It is this last point which is, for the non-hypothetical Dorian 
Gray, the rub: he does see the w arping of his own image, and it is this 
awareness of the portrait's power which is his undoing.
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Although the device of the picture allows Dorian to externalise 
certain parts of his conscience, it still haunts him and taunts him, it still 
costs him sleep, it still condemns his misdeeds - in short, it continues to 
function as his conscience. The portrait does not effect a suspension of 
the workings of conscience, it merely brings those workings out into the 
light of day, where Wilde can analyse and ultimately condemn them. 
We should not have to construct a hypothetical version of the story in 
order to show that Dorian's conscience never stops working, for Wilde's 
novel gives it to us in black and white:
It had kept him awake at night. When he had been away, he had 
been filled with terror lest other eyes should look upon it. It had 
brought melancholy across his passions. Its mere memory had 
marred many moments of joy. It had been like conscience to him. 
Yes, it had been conscience. [166]
The traditional reading of the book paraphrases the story more or 
less as follows: "Look at all the dreadful things we get up to if we disobey 
our conscience. Ergo, conscience must be a good thing, and we must not 
attempt to live without it." This reading hinges on the assumption that 
Dorian Gray, at an early point in the novel, successfully frees himself 
from conscience. But this assumption is invalid. The above passage, 
which occurs on the novel's second-last page, tells us quite clearly that 
Dorian's conscience, despite its partial relocation to the picture, has never 
ceased for a moment to function in the normal way - if normal is the 
right word for a function so grotesque. The Faustian liberation has never 
really occurred.
As well as underlining the point that Dorian's conscience is never 
absent, the passage quoted above offers the novel's last explicit comment
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on what conscience is. The picture, we are told, has "been conscience to 
him". In what sense? Certainly it has not been what Dorian originally 
thought conscience to be, a benign agency which helps one to be good. 
Nor has it agreed with his second notion of what conscience is: an unjust 
bully w hich one can happily  ignore once one has recognised its 
artificiality. No: the picture has "been conscience to him" in the sense 
that it has tortured him remorselessly, irrationally, and irrespective of 
any particular evil deed.
Conscience is a fraud, the novel starts off by saying; it has nothing 
to do with the genuine self; the codes it enforces are mere conventions, 
prejudices; the m ethods by which it enforces them are, perhaps as a 
consequence of this, thoroughly irrational: but even so, comes the 
pessimistic conclusion, one can't get rid of it. The novel tells us about 
the Victorian conscience the same distressing thing that W ilde's private 
life showed about Victorian morality: perceiving its fictional foundation 
does not grant you freedom from its jurisdiction. It was a paper tiger 
with real teeth. Only a reprehensible bigot would interpret Oscar Wilde's 
tragic demise as a trium phant dem onstration of the rightness of 
Victorian morality; we should be careful, then, before we read Dorian's 
demise as a hym n to conscience. The Picture of Dorian Gray is a 
complaint against the grotesque distortions of the Victorian conscience, 
and a lament about the tenacity with which it has sunk its claws into the 
authentic self.
It w ould be intolerable, one w ould think, if the essential self were 
permanently at the mercy of this malignant agency. Happily, Wilde does 
not consider Dorian's condition inevitable. He presents it as an ailment 
peculiar to Dorian's time: a function of what Lord Henry calls "that 
harsh, uncomely puritanism  that is having, in our own day, its curious
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revival" [104]. For Freud, on the other hand, we m ust all be Dorian 
Grays, condemned to be forever at war with ourselves.
From the point of view of morality, the control and restriction of 
instinct, it may be said of the id that it is totally non-moral, of the 
ego that it strives to be moral, and of the superego that it can be 
hypermoral and then becomes as ruthless as the id can be. It is 
remarkable that the more a man checks his aggressive tendencies 
towards others the more tyrannical, that is aggressive, he becomes 
in his ego-ideal.... It is like a displacement, a turning round upon 
the self. But even ordinary norm al m orality has a harshly 
restraining, cruelly prohibiting quality. It is from this, indeed, that 
the conception arises of an inexorable higher being who metes out 
punishment. [1947: 79 - emphasis added]
By thus taking the Victorian moral situation as his norm , Freud made 
hypocrisy and self-hatred perm anent features of the hum an condition. 
As Jung comments in his analysis of 'Sigm und Freud in his Historical 
Setting':
[EJthical motives as final and indisputable factors in hum an life, 
disappear in the Freudian teaching. They are replaced by a 
conventional m orality about which it is rightly assum ed that it 
would never have existed in this form, or never have existed at 
all, if one or more bad-tempered ancestors had not invented such 
precepts as a protection against the evil consequences of their 
im potence. These concepts, it is fu rther assum ed, have 
(unfortunately) been in existence since then, and continue in the 
'super-ego ' of every individual. This grotesque, depreciative
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concept is a just punishment for the historical fact that the ethics of 
the Victorian era were merely a conventional morality, the 
creation of bilious praeceptores mundi. [Jung, 1973: 51 - emphasis 
added.]
Freud knew that conscience was a function of morality, and he 
knew , m oreover, that m oral laws w ere subject to fluctuation . 
N evertheless, he m ade a harsh and ruthless superego a perm anent 
fixture in the healthy hum an mind, thereby implying that there is a 
certain base level of harshness and ruthlessness that moral laws can 
never relax beyond. In Freud's own words, "even ordinary norm al 
morality has [a] harshly restraining, cruelly prohibiting quality." As we 
have already seen, this claim is justified within Freudian theory in the 
first instance by the hypothesis of the Oedipus complex, which asserts 
that our fundam ental instincts are incestuous on the one hand and 
bitterly hostile on the other, and so must be harshly restrained. A severe 
conscience became even more indispensable after Freud hypothesised the 
existence of a primal Death Instinct. If there were no cruelly prohibiting 
agency to watch over that instinct, we w ould all probably end up as 
m urderers.33
The Picture of Dorian Gray , read superficially, would seem to offer 
a spectacular vindication of this particular idea of Freud's. Having 
divested himself of conscience, Dorian Gray does indeed commit the
33In the Autobiographical Study, Freud writes: "Pious souls, who cherish the thought of 
our remoteness from whatever is evil and base, will be quick to draw  from the early 
appearance and the urgency of the prohibition of m urder gratifying conclusions in regard 
to the force of [our] ethical stirrings.... Unfortunately this argument proves even more for 
the opposite contention. So powerful a prohibition can only be directed against an equally 
pow erful impulse. W hat no hum an soul desires there is no need to prohibit; it is 
automatically excluded. [This is a notion in which Freud follows J. G. Frazer.] The very 
emphasis of the commandment Thou shalt not kill makes it certain that we spring from an 
endless ancestry of murderers, with whom the lust for killing was in the blood, as possibly 
it is to this day with ourselves" [1950c: 312].
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ultim ate crime: he stabs to death Basil H allw ard, the painter of his 
portrait, and coolly disposes of the body. But as I have argued, the 
superficial reading of the novel is wrong. Dorian Gray does not divest 
himself of conscience, and therefore the book does not bear Freud out on 
this point. But if Dorian is, as the book unequivocally suggests, never 
free of conscience, then how do we read Dorian's gravest crime, the 
m urder of Basil Hallward? Why does he do the deed? What does it have 
to tell us about the nature of conscience?
Let us return for a moment to our hypothetical version of the 
novel, in which Dorian Gray never becomes aware of the pow er of the 
portrait. As we have seen, this Dorian would not suffer. One might 
venture a further suggestion about this hypothetical Dorian Gray: he 
w ould not sin. He w ould not commit that large category of his 
transgressions - the excursions to ill-famed taverns, the unspecified 
sensual indulgences, the various em ulations of H uysm ans's Des 
Esseintes - which he commits only because he knows - or thinks - that the 
weight of conscience has been lifted from him. Dorian does not indulge 
in these activities because he is free of conscience, but because he has been 
freed of conscience. The difference is profound. A person who was free 
of conscience in the sense that he or she had never developed one would 
perhaps commit the venial sins of a child, but surely not the mortal ones 
of Dorian Gray. Dorian Gray has already experienced the crushing weight 
of conscience, and so when that weight is removed (or when he believes 
it to have been removed) he charges toward sin like a bull from an 
opened gate. Conscience creates an appetite for crime.
That it creates the impulse for Dorian's worst deed becomes clear 
enough when we examine the scene of that crime. Conscience is 
overwhelmingly present there, not just in the crudely literal sense that 
the m urder takes place in front of the portrait. Conscience has bred the
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state of intense distress that Dorian is in at the time of the m urder. 
Moreover, it has imparted a special loathsomeness to Dorian's victim, 
Basil Hallward, "the friend who had painted the fatal portrait to which all 
[Dorian's] misery had been due ..." [123 - emphasis added]. This last factor 
means that Dorian's attack on Hallward is a kind of revenge attack on 
conscience, analogous to Dorian's subsequent assault, using the same 
knife, on the portrait itself.
But conscience is not merely the intended victim of the Hallward 
murder. In a symbolic way it is the perpetrator of the crime, as we can see 
in the sentences immediately preceding the deed:
Dorian Gray glanced at the picture, and suddenly an uncontrollable 
feeling of hatred for Basil Hallward came over him, as though it 
had been suggested to him by the image on the canvas, whispered 
into his ear by those grinning lips. The mad passions of a hunted  
animal stirred w ithin him, and he loathed the m an who was 
seated at the table, more than in his whole life he had ever loathed 
anything. [122 - emphasis added]
It is at this point that Dorian's gaze settles on a nearby knife, which he 
seizes and inserts into Basil Hallward's neck.
The italicised sentence is perhaps the most significant in the novel. 
It tells us unequivocally that the impulse on which Dorian m urders 
emanates not from within his private self, but from the portrait. Our 
general feeling that Dorian Gray is driven to evil not by the absence of his 
conscience but by its oppressive presence is confirmed at the scene of his 
worst crime, where it is stressed that Dorian is a victim rather than an 
offender - "a hunted animal". This point receives further confirmation 
in the book's final chapter, when Dorian looks back at the Hallward
87
m urder and feels no remorse for it: "Basil had painted the portrait that 
had marred his life. He could not forgive him that. It was the portrait 
that had done everything" [165 - emphasis added].
So the principle that "nothing is more rare in a man than an act of 
his own" is proved tragically right with respect to the operation of 
conscience. The m urder is not an act of Dorian's own. It is an act of that 
fanatical enforcer of foreign values, his conscience. It is the Victorian 
moral conscience, and not the philosophies of Lord H enry W otton, 
which lead Dorian so far astray - as Dorian makes plain when he says, 
after murdering the painter of the picture, "You don't know what he had 
made me suffer. W hatever my life is, he had more to do w ith the 
making or the marring of it than poor Harry has had" [130]. Lord Henry 
would applaud the m urder only inasm uch as it proves correct his 
gloomy warnings about external domination of the self: "All influence is 
immoral.... To influence a person is to give him one's own soul. He does 
not think his natural thoughts or burn with his natural passions.... His 
sins, if there are such things as sins, are borrowed" [28]. Conscience exerts 
an immoral influence on Dorian Gray: his sins are borrowed from it.
"All modes of government are wrong," Wilde wrote in 1890, in 
the course of expounding (and thereby endorsing34) the thought of the 
'Chinese sage' Chuang Tzu. "They are unscientific, because they seek to 
alter the natural environm ent of man; they are immoral because, by 
interfering with the individual, they produce the most aggressive forms 
of egotism...; they are self-destructive, because they engender anarchy"
34That Wilde approved of Chuang Tzu's subversive philosophies is obvious enough, but 
the point is proved by his conclusion: "It is clear that Chuang Tzu is a very dangerous 
writer, and the publication of his book in English, two thousand years after his death, is 
obviously premature, and may cause a great deal of pain to many thoroughly respectable 
and industrious persons. It may be true that the ideal of self-culture and self­
development, which is the aim of his scheme of life, and the basis of his scheme of 
philosophy, is an ideal somewhat needed by an age like ours, in which most people are so 
anxious to educate their neighbours that they have actually no time left in which to 
educate themselves. But would it be wise to say so?" [1970b: 295].
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[Wilde, 1970b: 289 - emphasis added]. The Picture of Dorian Gray reads 
like a chilling demonstration of this rule with regard to the government 
of conscience. D orian's egotism does indeed turn  aggressive and 
anarchic, because his V ictorian conscience in terferes w ith  his 
individuality, preventing it from flowering in its natural and victimless 
form. The Victorian definition of moral purity was so exacting that it 
deemed everybody evil; Dorian's conscience is so keen to condem n his 
every deed that it ends up breeding wickedness. This is perhaps the 
ultim ate critique of the Victorian moral conscience: that apart from 
anything else it doesn't even work, and with its excessive savagery will 
provoke things far worse than those it strives to prevent. Its efforts must 
backfire, like those of a parent who tries to make a child good by 
physically abusing it.
A clear echo of this intriguing idea can be found in Freudian 
theory. In a 1915 paper on 'Some Character-Types m et w ith  in 
Psychoanalytic Work', Freud identifies a type called the "criminal from a 
sense of guilt", whose crimes
are done precisely because they are forbidden, and because by 
carrying them out the doer enjoys a sense of m ental relief. He 
suffered from an oppressive feeling of guilt, of which he did not 
know the origin, and after he had com m itted a m isdeed the 
oppression was mitigated. The sense of guilt was at least in some 
way accounted for.
Paradoxical as it may sound, I must maintain that the sense 
of guilt was present prior to the transgression, that it did not arise 
from this, but contrarywise - the transgression from the sense of 
guilt. These persons we m ight justifiably describe as criminals 
from a sense of guilt....
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But scientific work is not satisfied with establishing a 
departure from the norm. There are two further questions to 
answer: whence derives the obscure sense of guilt before the deed, 
and whether it is probable that this kind of causation plays a 
considerable part in the transgressions of mankind.
Prosecution of the former inquiry w ould hold out some 
hope of some explanation regarding the source of m ankind's sense 
of guilt in general. The invariable result of analytic work is that 
the obscure sense of guilt derives from the Oedipus complex and is 
a reaction to the two great criminal intentions of killing the father 
and having sexual relations with the mother ....
The answer to the second question lies outside the scope of 
psychoanalytic work....
A friend has recently called my attention to the fact that the 
'criminal from a sense of guilt' was recognized by Nietzsche. The 
pre-existence of the guilty consciousness, and the efficacy of the 
deed in rationalizing the feeling, gleam forth from the dark 
discourse of Zarathustra 'On the Pale Criminal' [1950i: 342-344 - 
emphasis added].
Not satisfied to identify departures from the norm, Freud makes 
the criminal from a sense of guilt a universal character by asserting that 
the "obscure sense of guilt" in question "derives from the Oedipus 
complex." But given that three thinkers at least - Nietzsche, Wilde and 
Freud - identified this strange phenomenon during the Victorian era, it is 
tempting to conclude that criminality from a sense of guilt is a departure 
from the norm, in the sense that it derives from the peculiarly excessive 
burden of guilt imposed by Victorian morality. Certainly neither Wilde 
nor Nietzsche wants us to think that criminality from a sense of guilt is a
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universal phenomenon. They see it is as disease present only under 
stringent moral conditions. As Nietzsche put it:
The evil which is now evil overtakes [the Pale Criminal] 
who now becomes sick: he wants to do harm with that which 
harms him. But there have been other ages and another evil 
and good. [Nietzsche, 1969: 65-66 - emphasis added]
And in The Picture of Dorian Gray, as we have seen, the idea that a 
harsh conscience can become an active agent of evil comes as the 
clinching detail in a radical critique of Victorianism. As if to leave us in 
no doubt of the nature of this critique, Wilde briefly recapitulates its 
main elements during the novel's final few pages. He presents us with a 
little cameo of a drama in which conscience gives Dorian a last-straw 
dem onstration of its unreasonableness, thereby provoking him to stab 
the portrait and so to kill himself.
This dram a runs as follows. D orian makes, yet again, an 
apparently genuine resolution to mend his ways. Presented w ith the 
opportunity to corrupt a young country girl, he refrains, deciding instead 
to "leave her as flower-like as I had found her" [158]. He is eager to see 
the portrait's registration of this good deed: "Surely it was not still so 
horrible as it had been?... Perhaps the signs of evil had already gone away. 
He would go and look" [165]. But the picture, his conscience, greets this 
last-ditch effort at reform with its usual mockery. "The thing was still 
loathsome - more loathsome, if possible, than before...." [166] This 
loathesomeness can be interpreted in one of two ways. One can suppose 
that the loathesomeness belongs to Dorian, and that the picture is only 
reflecting it. This reading compels the conclusion that it m ust have been, 
as the novel puts it, "merely vanity that had made [Dorian] do his one
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good deed" [166]. On the other hand, one can suspect that the 
loathsomeness belongs entirely to the picture, is inherent in it: that "it 
was an unjust mirror, this m irror of his soul that he was looking at" 
[166].
As the novel races to w ard s its conclusion, these  tw o 
interpretations - the first the view of the portrait itself, the second the 
view of Dorian Gray - tangle for one last time. And Dorian Gray loses the 
battle:
For it was an unjust mirror, this mirror of his soul that he was 
looking at. Vanity? Curiosity? Hypocrisy? Had there been 
nothing more in his renunciation than that? There had been 
something more. At least he thought so. But who could tell?... 
No. There had been nothing more. Through vanity he had spared 
her. In hypocrisy he had w orn the mask of goodness. For 
curiosity's sake he had tried the denial of self. He recognised that 
now. [166 - ellipsis in original]
Does Dorian finally recognise the truth here? I think not. W hat 
we have here, I think, is the moment at which the guttering flame of the 
essential Dorian is finally smothered by the weight of his conscience. If 
conscience keeps calling you wicked, you must eventually buckle under 
its weight, and agree. Dorian's knowledge of his own motives is snuffed 
out and replaced with the twisted view of conscience. It is like the 
parable of Nietzsche's which Freud was fond of quoting. "I did this,' says 
my Memory. T cannot have done this,' says my Pride, and rem ains 
inexorable. In the end - Memory yields" [see Gay, 1988: 129]. Truth, in 
other w ords, is ultim ately determ ined not by the testim ony of the 
authentic self, but by that portion of the self which belongs to society.
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But the essential Dorian has enough life left in him to make one 
final, all-or-nothing bid for autonomy. He assaults the portrait w ith a 
knife. Again this is an act of violence for which conscience is to blame. 
Like a battered wife turned m urderous, Dorian attacks his conscience 
with a brutality which it has itself instilled in him:
He looked round, and saw the knife that had stabbed Basil 
Hallward.... As it had killed the painter, so it would kill the 
painter's work, and all that that meant. It would kill the past and 
when that was dead he would be free. It would kill this monstrous 
soul-life, and, w ithout its hideous warnings, he would be at peace. 
He seized the thing, and stabbed the picture with it. [166-167]
Donald L. Lawler, a proponent of the orthodox reading of the 
novel, believes that this conclusion "tell[s] us that Dorian struck so that 
he w ould be free to pursue a life of pleasure w ithout conscience 
torm enting him" [Lawler, 1988: 19]. But look at the above passage. 
Nowhere does it indicate that Dorian wants to be free "to pursue a life of 
pleasure." His aim is more modest, and far more worthy, than that. He 
just w ants to be free. Free of conscience; at peace. It is the picture's 
"hideous warnings " which he wants to be at peace from; not, Wilde tells 
us one last time, its reflections of his wicked thoughts and deeds, but its 
forewarnings of them, which as we have seen really means its causation 
of them. And perhaps, by ending up dead on the floor, Dorian attains the 
closest thing to such freedom that his age had to offer.
"Dorian Gray, having led a life of mere sensation and pleasure, 
tries to kill conscience, and at that moment kills himself" [Hart-Davis, 
1962: 259]. That is how Wilde, in a letter, characterised the novel's 
conclusion. But this statem ent does not necessarily am ount to an
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endorsement of conscience. Wilde might just as easily be lamenting the 
contemporary fact that conscience, though in essence a foreign agency, 
had so rampantly contaminated the authentic self that one could not 
eradicate the former without also killing the latter. Dorian's misery and 
demise were inevitabilities only in the Victorian context; why else would 
Wilde say, as he did in a different letter, that "Dorian is what I would like 
to be in other ages, perhaps" [quoted by Ellmann, 1988: 301]? Wilde did 
not write a whole novel about conscience in order to illustrate the banal 
proposition that you can't live without it. The Picture of Dorian Gray 
makes the far more radical suggestion that you can't, or at any rate 
couldn't in Wilde's age, live with it.
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Two
"While all melts under our feet": Decadent 
Literature in its Historical Context
The Picture of Dorian Gray shows us that Freud's ideas were in the air 
before they were Freud's ideas. But they were also in the air before they 
were Wilde's. I have started this inquiry with Dorian Gray p rec ise ly  
because it was an unoriginal book - one which crystallised, w ith 
remarkable economy, certain widely circulating literary motifs. Wilde 
was only one player in the literary overture to psychoanalysis. It is the 
purpose of this chapter to look at the entire orchestra, and to ask why it 
was that a body of literature which predated Freud's "discoveries" struck 
up so many distinctly Freudian themes.
The body of literature in question is the one of which Arthur 
Symons was thinking when he wrote in 1893: "The latest movement in 
European literature has been called by many names, none of them exact 
or comprehensive - Decadence, Symbolism, Impressionism, for instance" 
[1974a: 72]. Since the essay in which this sentence appeared was called 
'The Decadent Movement in Literature', it seems fair to conclude that 
Symons ultimately found 'Decadence' to be the most congenial of the 
available term s.1 Symons is right to point out that there is no perfect 
name for the movement. He is also right, I think, to settle on 'Decadence' 
as the least imperfect one. 'Impressionism ' and 'Symbolism' are words 
associated with a particular kind of aesthetic practice; whereas the writers 
w ith whom  we will be dealing were united more by their thematic
*It should be added, though, that Symons wrote another essay, in 1899, called 'The 
Symbolist Movement in Literature'.
concerns than by their technical approach. ('M ovem ent', indeed, is 
probably in itself a misleading word for a group of writings so loosely and 
informally connected.) 'Decadence' seems to be the term we need: a term 
flexible enough to designate the qualities common to the work of, say, the 
impressionist Pater, the symbolist Maliarme, the aesthete Wilde - and, 
perhaps, the psychoanalyst Freud.
The term 'decadence' also has the virtue of gesturing towards the 
historical location of this brand of literature. True, the gesture is vague, 
but again a degree of vagueness is precisely what we need. Fin-de-siede, 
another possible candidate, is too specific in its historical associations: for 
we will be dealing with a literature whose characteristic tropes can be 
found as early as the work of Poe, who was dead before the siede was 
even half-way toward its fin. Wilde and Poe might not have shared any 
history, but their writings did share a feeling  about history which the 
term decadence captures: the feeling that it was about to end. "The most 
representative [literature] of the day," as Symons put it, "is certainly not 
classic, nor has it anything to do with the old antithesis of the Classic, the 
Romantic. After a fashion it is no doubt a decadence; it has all the 
qualities that mark the end of great periods, the qualities that we find in 
the Greek, the Latin, decadence: an intense self-consciousness, a restless 
curiosity in research, an over-subtilizing refinement upon refinement, a 
spiritual and moral perversity" [1974a: 72].
I hope it is clear that I am not about to suggest that Freud was this 
kind of writer. My thesis is that Freud's psychological "discoveries" were 
so heavily anticipated by decadent writers that one m ust wonder whether 
they should be called his discoveries at all. This is not, of course, to 
suggest that Freud acquired his ideas directly from the decadents
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them selves.2 The evidence, on the contrary, suggests that Freud, guided 
by avowedly conservative literary preferences, tended to steer clear of 
such w riters.3 "In choosing his favourites," as Peter Gay puts it, "he 
slighted the European avant-garde of his age" [1988: 166]. Freud liked 
Twain, Shaw, Kipling, Zola. He was spared the shock of finding in the 
decadents, as he found in Nietzsche, some alarming anticipations of his 
central ideas.
If Freud did not derive them directly from the decadents, then by 
what route did these decadent themes arrive in his work? The answer 
m ust lie in the soil from which both psychoanalysis and decadent 
literature grew: the Europe of the late nineteenth century. That Freud 
shared this soil w ith the decadents is an easy fact to forget, because 
Freud's productive phase came relatively late in his long life, whereas the 
decadents - the "tragic generation", as Yeats called them - tended to write, 
and to die, young. Freud was born in 1856, in the thick of the decadent 
generation: well before such men as Beardsley and Dowson (who were 
dead, nevertheless, before Freud had published anything of significance),
2When one considers the circumstances in which Freud formulated his theories, there is no 
basis at all for such a suggestion. But were one to go purely on the internal evidence - that 
is, were one to compare, in a contextual vacuum, the writings of the decadents with those 
of Freud - one might certainly entertain the possibility that they had exercised some 
direct influence on him. There is an amusing case of literary counterfeiting associated 
with this point. In 1934, the Italian writer Giovanni Papini published a fictional spoof 
purporting to be an interview with Sigmund Freud. Papini's sketch has Freud confessing 
that the likes of Mallarme, Huysmans, Verlaine and Rimbaud exercised a decisive 
influence on his imagination: "my attention was attracted to the similarity between 
dreams and works of art and the importance of the language of symbols by the poetry of 
the Decadents. Psychoanalysis was bom ... as a result of the scientific transposition of the 
literary schools I like best" [Papini, 1973: 99]. These literatures formed, the fictional 
Freud says, "the inspiration of all my later work.... Though I have the appearance of a 
scientist, I was and am a poet and a novelist" [quoted by Crews, 1995: 56, n6]. The 
plausibility of Papini's conceit is demonstrated by the fact that at least three reputable 
scholars have mistaken the sketch for a genuine interview. Henrik Ruitenbeek reprinted 
it in his 1973 book Freud as We Knew Him, along with the mild qualification that "its 
veracity has been questioned" [Ruitenbeek, 1973: 98]; James L. Rice quoted portions of it, on 
the assumption that it was authentic, in his 1993 book Freud's Russia; and Frederick 
Crews, reviewing Rice's book, requoted some of the bogus material in The New York 
Review of Books, before correcting his mistake in a subsequent number of that journal [see 
Crews, 1993a: 56 and 1993b].
3For an inventory of Freud's private library, see Trosman and Simmons, 1973.
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and only a couple of years after Wilde and Rimbaud. One can remind 
oneself of the firmness of Freud's membership of the decadent milieu by 
thinking of his visit to Paris in 1885, only a year after the publication of A 
Rebours. There Freud frequented the theatres, wrote letters in praise of 
Sarah Bernhardt, and "walked about the streets, lonely and full of 
longings", as he would later put it [Freud, 1966: 150]. The previous year, 
also as a 29-year-old, a honeymooning Oscar Wilde had trod the same 
streets, rubbing shoulders not only with Bernhardt, for whom he wanted 
to write a play, but with Verlaine, Paul Bourget, Edmond de Goncourt. 
Physically at least, Freud's path and that of the decadents crossed. But 
that is hardly the point. The question is w hether the decadent geist 
infected Freud at a deep enough level to shape the evolution of his 
theories - whether psychoanalysis is irredeemably a child of the decadent 
age.
"To fall down or away" - that is the meaning of decadare, the Latin root of 
the English word 'decadent' [see Gilman, 1979: 22]. In material terms, of 
course, the Europe of the late-Victorian period was doing the very 
opposite of falling down. But ram pant material progress produced, in 
certain quarters, a curious side-effect: a subtle but profound metaphysical 
decay. "Progress and decline," as Ruskin observed during the 1860s, had 
become "strangely mixed in the m odern m ind" [quoted by Siegel, 1985: 
199]. In the shadow  of the Enlightenm ent a m ould of doubt and 
discontent was growing. Scepticism was beginning, for some, to prove 
unhealthy. "There is not a creed which is not shaken, not an accredited 
dogma which is not shown to be questionable, not a received tradition 
which does not threaten to dissolve," wrote M atthew Arnold in 1879 
[quoted by Daiches, 1969: 87].
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Decadent literature was built on this lack of a foundation. The 
connection is neatly illustrated by Walter Pater's famous 'Conclusion' to 
The Renaissance (1873) - a piece which, according to Edm und Wilson, 
"fixed the ideal of a whole generation" [Wilson, 1947: 32]. The 
'C onclusion ' kicks off w ith an epigraph from Plato: "Som ewhere 
Heraclitus says that all things vanish and nothing rem ains fixed." 
[Uglow, 1973: 148]. The implication that a similar anarchy defines Pater's 
own age is confirmed by his opening sentence. "To regard all things and 
principles of things as inconstant modes or fashions has more and more 
become the tendency of modern thought" [Pater, 1973: 39]. The scene is 
set, then: everything that Pater is about to say about the centrality of the 
individual, and the need to burn with a gemlike flame, will look all the 
more urgent against this backdrop of inconstancy. "[T]o treat life in the 
sprit of Art," as Pater said elsewhere, "is to make life a thing in which 
means and ends are identified" [quoted in Chai, 1990: 240]. The aesthetic 
project, in other words, was a response to a state of affairs in which life's 
means and ends were not identified. "While all melts under our feet," 
Pater says in the 'Conclusion', "we may well catch at any exquisite 
passion, or any contribution to knowledge that seems ... to set the spirit 
free for a moment, or any stirring of the senses, strange dyes, strange 
flowers, and curious odours, or work of the artist's hands, or the face of 
one's friend" [1973: 41]. Decadent literature describes, or enacts, a fevered 
search for new principles of existence. Huysmans's Des Esseintes, one of 
the more vigorous participants in that quest, sees himself as a "galley- 
slave of life who puts out to sea alone, in the night, beneath a firmament 
no longer lit by  the consoling beacon-fires of the ancient hope" 
[Huysmans, 1987: 220].
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G od's rem oval from that firm am ent had  been resonantly  
announced by Nietzsche two years earlier, in his Gay Science (1882). 
"God is dead," Nietzsche has the character of the Madman say,
and we have killed him...All oVus are his murderers .... What did we 
do when we unchained this earth from its sun? W hither is it 
moving now? W hither are we m oving now? Away from all
forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we 
not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the
The breath of em pty space was as scary as it w as liberating. 
"[W]hen [Victorians] were sceptical," as David Daiches says, "they took no 
joy in their scepticism , as the m en of the e igh teen th -cen tu ry  
Enlightenment had" [1969: 9]. For those Enlightenm ent thinkers, the 
solution advanced by Nietzsche's m adm an - "M ust we not ourselves 
become gods, sim ply to seem w orthy  of [the killing of God]?" 
[ Kau£rK&nn; ITS2,: %  - emphasis added] - might have seemed a feasible 
enough way of responding to God's death. But in the meantime science 
had discovered certain unflattering things about hum anity which made 
it difficult for the late Victorians to think of themselves as God-like. 
John Fowles, w riting in 1979 about the historical background of The 
French Lieutenant's Woman, noted that:
The great nightm are of the respectable Victorian m ind was the 
only too real one created by the geologist Lyell and the biologist 
Darwin. Until then man had lived like a child in a small room. 
They gave him - and never was a present less welcome - infinite
suns? Continually ? Backward, sidew ard,
breath of empty space? [ Kau-fmann, \°\^2 • 95]
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space and tim e, and a hideously mechanistic explanation of 
human reality into the bargain. Just as we 'live w ith the bom b', 
the Victorians lived with the theory of evolution. They were 
hurled into space. They felt themselves infinitely isolated. By the 
1860s the great iron structures of their philosophies, religions and 
social stratifications were already beginning to look dangerously 
corroded to the more perspicacious. [Fowles, 1977: 140-141]
Charles LyelTs Principles of Geology had been published between 
1830 and 1833, nearly thirty years before the Origin of Species (1859). Lyell 
proposed, among other radical things, that
the configuration of the earth 's surface has been remodelled again 
and again since it was the habitation of organic beings, and the bed 
of the ocean has been lifted up to the height of some of the loftiest 
mountains. The im agination is apt to take alarm, when called 
upon to admit the formation of such irregularities of the crust of 
the earth, after it had become the habitation of living creatures. 
[Carey, 1995: 72]
This had alarming implications for the hum an race:
Amidst the vicissitudes of the earth 's surface, species cannot be 
im m ortal, b u t m ust perish , one after the o ther, like the 
individuals w hich compose them. There is no possibility of 
escaping from this conclusion. [Carey, 1995: 75]
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When Lyell's insights are digested by the literary sensibility, we get 
lines like these, from Tennyson's In Memoriam, written between 1833 
and 1850.
The hills are shadows, and they flow
From form to form, and nothing stands;
They melt like mist, the solid lands,
Like clouds they shape themselves and go. [Carey: 75]
And after Darwin dealt the second, and more telling, blow of the 
combination, the rattled Victorian psyche was ready to produce a 
literature informed, or deformed, by an even more profound sense of 
unease: the literature of the decadents.4 Not that the decadents cursed 
Lyell or Darwin; on the contrary, they welcomed the way in which their 
discoveries helped to blur all external lines, to abolish all rigid 
distinctions. Pater, writing in 1867, declared that
Modern thought is distinguished from ancient by its cultivation of 
the 'relative' spirit in place of the 'absolute'.... To the modem spirit 
nothing is, or can rightly be known, except relatively and under 
conditions. The philosophical conception of the relative has been 
developed in modern times through the influence of the sciences 
of observation. Those sciences reveal types of life evanescing into 
each other by inexpressible refinements of change. They pass into
4We m ust also remember that an atmosphere of political uncertainty prevailed, thanks to 
the events of 1848. "The so-called revolutions of 1848 were but poor incidents," said Marx 
in 1856, "small fractures and fissures in the dry crust of European society. But they 
denounced [sic] the abyss. Beneath the apparently solid surface, they betrayed oceans of 
liquid matter, only needing expansion to rend into fragments continents of hard rock" 
[quoted by Berman, 1989:19].
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their opposites by accumulation of indefinable quantities. [Pater, 
1920: 66]
Scientific discoveries about evanescence in the physical world do 
not, strictly speaking, have anything to do with a relativist epistemology. 
But Pater, infected by the relativist spirit, thought so. He also thought - 
and this suggestion is far more valid - that the rock-like certainties of 
Victorian m orality looked less stu rdy  in the light of these new 
discoveries.
The moral world is ever in contact w ith the physical, and the 
relative spirit has invaded moral philosophy from the ground of 
the inductive sciences. There it has started a new analysis of the 
relations of body and mind, good and evil, freedom and necessity. 
Hard and abstract moralities are yielding to a more exact estimate 
of the subtlety and complexity of our life. [Pater, 1920: 67]
Pater praises inductive science for having detected the unconscious 
of nature, as it were, for revealing the fluid, amoral reality behind what 
had seemed so stable. "Think of all that subtly disguised movement," 
Pater urges, "which m odern research has detected in w hat had seemed 
most substantial to the naked eye, the inattentive m ind" [ibid]. Darwin, 
with his theory "that 'species' ... immutable though they seem now, as of 
old in the Garden of Eden, are fashioned by slow development", strikes 
Pater as the most salient of these modern researchers [Pater, 1922a: 20]. As 
the second principal avatar of m odern relativism Pater names Hegel, “ to 
whom nature and art and polity, aye and religion too, each in its long
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historic series are but so many conscious movements in the secular 
process of the eternal mind" [19].5
It is interesting that Pater should have derived a philosophy of lazy 
drift from a thinker whom Karl Marx appropriated as the foundation for 
a robust and vigorous and even violent politics. But when Marx and 
Engels speak in The Communist Manifesto of "the selfish misconception 
that induces you [i.e. the bourgeois] to transform into eternal laws of 
nature and of reason, the social forms springing from your present mode 
of production and form of property - historical relations that rise and 
disappear in the process of production" [Marx and Engels, 1967: 100], their 
Hegelian deconstruction of bourgeois complacency does not differ 
substantially from Pater's - only the economic terminology distinguishes 
it.6 Nor was Hegel the only influence shared by Marx and Pater: Marx 
saw Darwin, too, as a theoretical ally, whose Origin of Species provided "a 
basis in natural science" for Dialectical Materialism [quoted by Wilson, 
1972: 263].
But for Marx and Engels, of course, the deconstruction of present 
social forms was part of a larger project concerned with the creation of
5Hegel, as A. J. P. Taylor says, "made change itself the heart of his system.... Hegelian 
philosophy was a stroke of enlightenment. For the first time, thinkers made their peace 
with movement instead of insisting on a static universe. They were in fact fumbling 
towards the theory of evolution, which was perhaps the greatest creative idea of the 
nineteenth century" [1967: 8-9].
Another indication of what the decadent mind made of Hegel comes at the end of 
Wilde's "The Truth of Masks": [I]n art there is no such thing as a universal truth. A Truth 
in art is that whose contradictory is also true. And just as it is only in art-criticism, and 
through it, that we can apprehend the Platonic theory of ideas, so it is only in art- 
criticism, and through it, that we can realise Hegel's system of contraries. The truths of 
metaphysics are the truths of masks" [1970d: 32].
6And consider how closely the following excerpt from The Communist Manifesto m irrors 
Pater's vision of everything melting under our feet: "All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with 
their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new- 
formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all 
that is holy is profaned, and men at last are forced to face ... the real conditions of their 
lives and their relations with their fellow men." This passage is cited by M arshall 
Berman in his All That is Solid Melts into Air [Berman, 1989: 21], which contains an 
illuminating discussion of the recurrent "melting vision" in Marx and its relation to 
modernity.
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future ones. The movement involved in the processes of evolution, and 
in the functioning of the dialectic, m attered to Marx because it was 
m ovem ent towards something. For the decadents, on the other hand, 
process was all. M ovement was an end in itself. The outcome of 
evolu tion  was either irrelevant - Pater speaks of "D arw in and 
Darwinism, for which 'type7 itself properly is not, but is only always 
becoming" [1922a: 19] - or downright contemptible: Wilde speaks of "the 
great Darwinian principle of the survival of the vulgarest" [1970a: 111]. 
The key thing about Darwin from the decadent perspective was that he 
had pulled up the anchor and set them adrift. As the Czech decadent 
critic Arnost Prochäzka wrote in a 1912 assessment of the fin  de siede: 
"A n im portant chapter rem ains to be w ritten  on the relationship 
between progress and decay, about their close interconnections, their 
inseparability. Once careful research has been carried out into the points 
of contact between evolution and decadence, it will be found ... that they 
are synonyms" [quoted by Pynsent, 1989:123].
The re la tiv ising  tendency  of D arw inism  w as com pounded  by 
anthropologists working in Darwin's wake. George Stocking, in his book 
Victorian Anthropology, explains that post-D arw inian anthropology, 
w ith  its "rapid  accum ulation of inform ation on the non-European 
peoples", validated the perception that "moral values varied in time and 
place - perhaps, in D arw inian term s, were 'a d ap ted 7 to different 
environm ental situations" [Stocking, 1987: 222]. Because the Victorian 
age insisted so stridently on the stability of its codes and values, the news 
that these things were mere conventions was bound to be inordinately 
liberating. "Races, laws, arts have their origins and end, are themselves
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ripples only on the great river of organic life," Pater rejoiced; "and 
language is changing on our very lips" [Pater, 1922a: 21].
This last point, about relativity in language, was one sanctioned by 
the linguistic research of the period. In 1875 the American philologist 
W illiam Dwight W hitney published The Life and Growth of Language. 
According to Saussure - many of whose key principles were anticipated by 
W hitney - Whitney "changed the axis of linguistics" with his discovery 
that "language is a human institution" [quoted by Jakobsen, 1971: xxxiv - 
em phasis added]. W hitney admitted the principle of evolution into 
language: "If the Darwinian theory is true," he wrote, "and m an a 
development out of some lower animal, it is at any rate conceded that the 
last and nearest transition-form s have perished.... If they could be 
restored, we should find the transition-forms of speech to be, not at all a 
m inor provision of natural articulate signs, but an inferior system of 
conventional signs ..." [Whitney, 1885: 291]. Language, then, was yet 
another place where stability and naturalness had proved to be illusions. 
Whitney showed language to be both
arbitrary and conventional.... For each object, or act, or quality, 
there are as many names as there are languages in the world, each 
answering as good a purpose as any other, and capable of being 
substituted for another in the usage of any individual. There is 
not in a known language a single item which can be truly claimed 
to exist 'by nature'; each stands in its accepted use 'by an act of 
attribution ', in which m en's habits, preferences, will, are the 
determ ining force.... There is no tie of necessity, but only of 
convenience.... [Whitney, 1885: 282]
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The insights of linguists into the artificial nature of language had 
deep im plications about our way of seeing things. The Germ an 
philologist Karl Abel wrote in 1884: "It is clear that everything on this 
planet is relative and has independent existence only in so far as it is 
distinguished in its relations to and from other things.... Man has not 
been able to acquire even his oldest and simplest conceptions otherwise 
than in contrast with their opposite ..." [Freud: 1950b: 187].
I quote these observations of Abel's from a secondary source: 'The 
Antithetical Sense of Primal W ords', Sigmund Freud's 1909 review of a 
pam phlet Abel had published in 1884. Why was Freud reviewing a 25- 
year-old pamphlet? Because of his belief that the antithetical nature of 
primal words confirms the psychoanalytic idea that the unconscious is a 
place of co-existing opposites - a notion Freud had first advanced back in 
The Interpretation of Dreams: "[t]he a ttitude of dream s tow ards the 
category of antithesis and contradiction is most striking. This category is 
sim ply ignored; the w ord 'N o' does not seem to exist for a dream. 
Dreams show a special tendency to reduce two opposites to a unity or to 
represent them as one thing" [1950b: 184].
Freud's interest in Abel resoundingly confirms one's impression 
that there was something id-like about the processes that linguists had 
discovered behind language. When Freud is discussing Abel's finding 
that conceptual opposites can be traced to a common root in compound 
words - the words "old" and "young", for example, stem from the single 
prim al word "oldyoung," "far" and "near" from "farnear", and so on - 
one thinks also of Freud's concept of the pleasure principle (Lustprinzip), 
which began its life as the "pleasure-unpleasure principle" (Lust-Unlust 
Prinzip). Its origins in linguistic ambiguity underline the relativism of 
Freud's concept. Pleasure and pain are not, for Freud, absolute qualities: 
they are measures of the ebb and flow of a continuous process. "[PJainful
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feelings are connected with an increase and pleasurable feelings with a 
decrease in stimulation" [1950d: 64]. In consequence, as Derrida puts it, 
"the definition of the pleasure principle is m ute about pleasure, about its 
essence and quality. G uided by the economic point of view, this 
definition concerns only quantitative relations" [Derrida, 1987: 276].
To speak of relations rather than essence was to express a 
characteristic priority of the age - a priority both of science and of 
literature. The question is, which of these discourses w as Freud 
contributing to when he introduced the spirit of relativity into the mind? 
Was he participating in the scientific tradition of Lyell, Darwin and 
Whitney, and identifying the fluid reality behind what had till then been 
presum ed to be solid? Or was he, like Pater, or Wilde, or Huysmans, a 
mere commentator on the peculiar mental conditions which arose from 
these and other cultural shocks - an analyst of the decadent m ind who 
m istook its troubled w orkings for perm anent features of hum an 
psychology?
In order to answer this question, we will have to consider the various 
ways in which the decadents admitted the spirit of uncertainty into the 
fabric of their work. It is interesting to see how Wilde, for example, used 
linguistic scepticism to legitimise a more radical uncertainty. In 'A 
Chinese Sage', Wilde refers with apparent approval to the strange and 
ancient teaching of Hui Tzu, who pointed out that "a dog could be a 
sheep, because all names were arbitrary" [Wilde, 1970b: 291]. This 
perception that language is an not an emanation of objects, but a human- 
made structure imposed on them, is put to interesting use in W ilde's 
work. "Language ... is the parent, and not the child, of thought," Gilbert 
asserts in 'The Critic as Artist' [1970a: 124]. In The Picture of Dorian Gray,
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Dorian reflects on the way that words "seemed to be able to give a plastic 
form to formless things.... Mere words! Was there anything so real as 
words?" [Wilde, 1988: 30]. A subtle but important extension of this line of 
thinking comes sixty pages later, with Dorian's claim that "If one doesn't 
talk about a thing, it has never happened. It is simply expression, as 
Harry says, that gives reality to things" [89]. In other words, language 
gives form not only to obviously formless things - thoughts, concepts - 
but to actual events and objects too. Was there any reality outside of 
language? Perhaps not: Pater, in the 'Conclusion', speaks of "objects in 
the solidity with which language invests them" [1973: 40].
In the decadent era, it seems, you did not have to be a professional 
linguist to see that no natural bond existed between w ord and thing. 
Public language was so wildly detached from the real, so conspicuously a 
system unto itself, that everybody became a Saussure. By falling ill, 
language had shown itself to be an organism - an organism in a state as 
parlous as Latin during its decadence, when it became, according to 
Huysmans's Des Esseintes, "rotten through and through and hung like a 
decaying carcase, losing its limbs, oozing pus, barely keeping, in the 
general corruption of its body, a few sound parts ..." [Huysmans, 1987: 49].
The tatters were most shamelessly on show in moral language. 
"Language," says Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil (1886), "cannot get 
over its coarseness and continues to speak of antitheses where there are 
only degrees and many subtleties of gradation ... likewise the incarnate 
tartuffery of morals ... twists the words in the m ouths even of us men of 
knowledge" [Nietzsche, 1990: 55]. Nor did one have to be Nietzsche to 
perceive the artificiality of morals. Victorian morality, as we have seen 
in the previous chapter, did not really need scientists or philosophers to 
render it shaky. It was shaky enough already, precisely because it had 
tried to be too strong. M orality had overreached itself, and so
109
underm ined itself; the gulf between public codes and private experience 
had become untenably large. "One has taken the value of [moral] values 
as given, as factual, as beyond all question," Nietzsche said in the 
Genealogy of Morals (1887); "one has hitherto never doubted or hesitated 
in the slightest degree in supposing 'the good man' to be of greater value 
than 'the evil m an' ... " [1989: 20]. That kind of complacency would 
plainly no longer do.
The sorry cliches of respectable language were a sitting duck for 
decadent satire. "Morality is simply the attitude we adopt towards people 
whom  we personally dislike," says Mrs Chevely in An Ideal Husband 
[Wilde, 1983b: 207]. A playwright of today would hardly bother to base a 
joke on the perception that moral codes are a mere convention; but for 
Wilde that notion was still fresh enough to w arrant attention - w ithout 
being so novel as to cause offence to his audience, or to go over its head. 
This confirms the platitude that the decadent era was one of transition: 
old forms and conventions were dead, but the corpses were still decidedly 
w arm .
A good deal of Wilde's hum our derives from his location at this 
transitional moment. Richard Le Gallienne, in his book The Romantic 
90s, called Wilde the "astonishing, im pudent microcosm of the 1890s' 
chaos ... the synthesis of all these phenomena of change" [quoted by 
Gerber, 1960: 60]. Although the people in Wilde's plays and stories tend 
to act in the full knowledge that morality is a lie, they are still not quite 
ready to replace it with the truth. Instead we get codes, passw ords, 
manifest lies, false identities, Bunburying - everything means something 
else. The only certainty about meaning is that it lies beyond what one 
says. "W henever people talk to me about the weather," says Gwendolen 
in The Importance of Being Earnest, "I always feel quite certain that they 
mean som ething else" [Wilde, 1988: 329]. Even Lady Bracknell knows
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that polite discourse consists - is designed to consist - of lies: "No woman 
should ever be quite accurate about her age. It looks so calculating" [1988: 
376]. There is a routine scepticism here which reminds one of Freud's 
insistence that the surface content of a dream is always a sham, and the 
real meaning is necessarily, because of its unacceptable nature, latent. 
Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar - but much more frequently it isn't. For 
the decadents, moral codes were a form of repression, and literature a 
m ethod of liberating the repressed material: thus Lord Alfred Douglas 
dared to speak of "the love that dare not speak its name."
In Wilde, the existence of latent indecency is so taken for granted 
that Lady Alroy, in 'The Sphinx W ithout a Secret', feels obliged to 
m anufacture a covert life for herself: "a wom an w ith a m ania for
mystery", she rents rooms in a shabby part of town "for the pleasure of 
going there w ith her veil down, and im agining she was a heroine" 
[Wilde, 1988: 218]. Lady Plymdale in Lady Windemere's Fan is similarly 
afraid of appearing to be decent:
It's most dangerous nowadays for a man to pay any attention to his 
wife in public. It always makes people think that he beats her 
when they 're alone. The w orld has grown so suspicious of 
anything that looks like a happily married life. [Wilde, 1980: 34]
The language of manners, it seemed, meant the very opposite of what it 
said - a po in t illustrated by this W ildean exchange from A rthur 
Schnitzler's Das Weite Land:
FREIDRICH: Let's stay at home then, fine ... that's an end of it. 
GENIA: I'll be right back ... I'll just put my hat on. [Schnitzler, 1980: 
28]
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The very titles of Wilde's works point ironically to the gap between 
surface meaning and latent meaning in Victorian public language. The 
husband in An Ideal Husband is not exactly ideal; the picture in The 
Picture of Dorian Gray is not exactly a picture, and it is not exactly of 
Dorian Gray; 'The Portrait of Mr W. H.' is a forgery; The Importance of 
Being Earnest is about the importance of being frivolous, and Ernest is a 
false name - you can either be Ernest or earnest, but not both. Lady 
Windemere's Fan, according to its subtitle, is 'A Play About a Good 
W oman'; but really it is a play about two women. One of them is good 
on the surface, but commits an indiscretion. The other is a suspected 
prostitute, "a horrid woman ... absolutely inadmissible to society", who 
selflessly saves the first from humiliation - and thereby turns out to be 
"better than one thought her" [Wilde, 1980: 16, 87]. The subtitle refers not 
to the character of either woman, but to the inflexibility of the prevailing 
concept of 'Good'.
When Algernon in The Importance of Being Earnest is asked to 
deliver "the tru th  pure and simple", he responds by articulating what is 
one of the key principles of W ilde's art, and of decadent philosophy in 
general: "The truth is rarely pure and never simple" [1988: 326]. This 
aphorism hints at the way in which scepticism about moral codes (the 
truth, contrary to what such codes claim, is never pure7) unfolded into a 
scepticism about 'T ruth ' as such, which also was not as simple, as self- 
evident, as people thought. "Truth is entirely and absolutely a matter of 
style," Wilde asserts in 'The Decay of Lying' [1970d: 53]. Actually, Wilde
7A point which Jack reiterates when he says that: "the truth isn't quite the sort of thing 
one tells to a nice, sweet, refined girl" [1988: 336]. In George Egerton's 1894 story 'The 
Regeneration of Two' (see page 132 below) a female character demands the truth of a male 
one, who replies: "The truth? Does Fruen think she could stand the truth? Truth doesn't 
wear a fig-leaf!" [Egerton, 1983: 189]. Freud held similar beliefs: when sending a sexually 
frank early manuscript to his friend Wilhelm Fliess, he warned him to keep it away from 
his young wife [Gay, 1988: 62].
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doesn't assert this: it is his character Vivian. But by making such a point 
w ith in  a dialogue, W ilde casts h is rela tiv ist sen tim en t in an 
appropriately relativist form.8 W ilde's life itself has a certain dialogical 
quality: he hops from position to position, from pose to pose, concealing 
his true beliefs, if he had any, so thoroughly under his style that in the 
end one comes to see him  as constituted by style, composed of nothing 
more than a series of disguises. But such inconsistency was actually a 
form of fidelity to the principle asserted by the title of his essay 'The 
Truth of Masks'. That essay ends, cheekily, the only way it logically can: 
in self-contradiction. "Not that I agree with everything that I have said 
in this essay. There is much with which I entirely disagree.... This essay 
simply represents an artistic standpoint, and in aesthetic criticism attitude 
is everything. For in art there is no such thing as a universal tru th" 
[Wilde, 1970d: 32].
"There are no moral phenomena at all, only a moral interpretation of 
phenom ena," wrote Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil [1990: 96]. In a 
notebook of 1887 - the following year - Nietzsche broadened that 
form ulation to cover all phenomena: "Against that positivism  which 
stops before phenomena, saying 'there are only facts' I should say: no, it is 
precisely facts that do not exist, only interpretations ..." [Kaufmann, 1982: 
458 - the italics are Nietzsche's].
This succinctly demonstrates the ease with which a bad case of 
m oral scepticism  could degenerate into full-blown epistem ological 
scepticism. In that atmosphere of swirling relativism, could anything be 
trusted? Ibsen, in a letter of 1871, wrote: "Neither the conceptions of 
morality nor those of art are eternal. To how much are we really obliged
8He avoids, in other words, the logical inconsistency of affirming as a truth the idea that 
there is no such thing as truth.
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to pin our faith? Who will vouch for it that two and two do not make 
five up in Jupiter?" [quoted by Jackson, 1976: 133]. Pater, writing in 1893, 
could not even vouch for it that two and two made four on Earth: "the 
idea of development is at last invading, one by one, as the secret of their 
explanation, all the products of mind, the very mind itself, the abstract 
reason; our certainty, for instance, that two and two make four" [Pater, 
1922a: 20-21]. By 1897, Oscar Wilde for one had rid himself of doubt about 
the matter: he explained to a prison warder that he knew nothing about 
figures, except that two and two made five [Ellmann, 1988: 485].9
As trivial as it seems, Wilde's joke shows how the two great 
decadent themes, uncertainty and individualism, intersect. If truth is up 
for grabs, why not grab it? Why should there not be as many truths as 
there are individuals? "A truth ceases to be true," Wilde claimed, "when 
more than one person believes in it" [1988: 1205]. The decadents saw no 
reason why their creative impulses should stop at the threshold of Truth: 
they exploited the individualism implicit in relativism. Pater wrote, 
tendentiously, of similar developments in the time of Heraclitus: "And 
this rapid change, if it did not make all knowledge impossible, made it 
wholly relative.... Man, the individual, at this particular vanishing-point 
of time and place, becomes 'the measure of all things'" [Pater, 1922a: 16].
Pater's 'Conclusion' to The Renaissance is a superbly lyrical 
evocation of the same process, this "penetration of the self"10 occasioned 
by the unsatisfactory nature of all things external.
9In Notes From Underground, Dostoevsky's narrator invokes this same sum when attacking 
the question of individual free will. "Good heavens, gentlemen, what sort of free-will is 
left when we come to tabulation and arithmetic, when it will all be a case of twice two 
makes four? Twice two makes four without my will. As if free-will meant that" [quoted 
by Auden, 1974: 56].
10"Penetration of himself" was the phrase applied by Valery Larbaud to what Paul 
Valery did during his spells of self-inflicted solitude [quoted by Wilson, 1947: 67], "The 
study of myself for its own sake," wrote Valery, "the comprehension of that attention 
itself and the desire to trace clearly for myself the nature of my own existence, almost 
never abandoned me. This secret disease alienates one from letters, despite the fact that 
it has its source in them" [ibid., 65].
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At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of external 
objects, pressing upon us with a sharp importunate reality, calling 
us out of ourselves in a thousand forms of action. But when 
reflection begins to act upon those objects they are dissipated under 
its influence; ... each object is loosed into a group of impressions ... 
in the mind of the observer. And if we continue to dwell on this 
world ... of impressions ... it contracts still further; the whole scope 
of observation is dwarfed to the narrow chamber of the individual 
mind. Experience, already reduced to a swarm of impressions, is 
ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality 
through which no real voice has ever pierced on its way to us, or 
from us to that which we can only conjecture to be without. Every 
one of those impressions is the impression of the individual in his 
isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream 
of a world.... [T]o a single sharp impression ... what is real in our 
life fines itself down. [Pater, 1973: 39-40 - emphasis added]
That which we can only conjecture to he without. The decadent 
assertion of subjectivity clearly went far beyond that of the Romantics. 
Decadent individualism amounted, at its most extreme, to what Graham 
Hough calls an "atomised and solipsist epistemology" [1961:140]. There is 
no Byronic vigour about the decadent ethic: theirs is a cocooned, 
unhealthy, negative individualism: not a lamp-like projection of the self 
into the world, but a snail-like retreat from the world, and into the shell 
of the self. One might even call their attitude childish. Mallarme's desire 
to put a cloud of smoke between himself and the world11 was typical of
11 Wilde, evidently, also thought of the cigarette as an anti-social instrument. Curtain- 
called at the first performance of Lady Windemere's Fan, he took to the stage with one 
smouldering between his fingers. Taking a puff, he began: "Ladies and gentlemen, it's
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the decadents' insolent and insular attitude. Where the Romantic self 
was in harmony with nature, the decadent position is summed up by the 
title of Huysmans's great novel: Ä Rebours - against nature. "Nature is 
so uncomfortable," complains Wilde's Vivian, in 'The Decay of Lying'. 
"Grass is hard and lumpy and damp, and full of dreadful black insects. I 
prefer houses to the open air. In a house we all feel of the proper 
proportions. Everything is subordinated to us, fashioned for our use and 
our pleasure. Egotism itself ... is entirely the result of indoor life" [Wilde, 
1970d: 34 - emphasis added].
Once again, Wilde's flippancy harbours a serious decadent theme. 
When decadent literature did concern itself with landscapes or objects - 
things beyond the self - they w’ere almost invariably of an artificial kind: 
things "fashioned for our use and pleasure". Not the countryside, but the 
city; not daylight, but streetlamps;12 not milkmaids, but whores.
Ah London! London! our delight,
Great flower that opens but at night,
wrote Richard Le Gallienne in 'A Ballad of London' [Stanford, 1965: 196]. 
Lambs, butterflies and bumblebees are largely absent from the decadent 
canon; daffodils yielded to "the iron lilies of the Strand" [Le Gallienne 
again, ibid.]. To the decadent sensibility, as Arthur Symons explained, 
"there is no necessary difference in artistic value between a good poem 
about a flower in the hedge and a good poem about the scent in a sachet" 
[quoted by Jackson, 1976: 70].
perhaps not very proper to smoke in front of you, b u t ... it's not very proper to disturb me 
when I am smoking" [Ellmann, 1988: 346n]. This offended, among others, Henry James 
[ibid.: 347], When Lord Henry Wotton first appears he is lying on a divan, "smoking, as 
was his custom, innumerable cigarettes" [Wilde, 1988:18].
*2Aubrey Beardsley claimed to be unable to draw by natural light; when working in the 
daytime he would close all the curtains and work by the light of candles [see Stanford, 
1965: 48],
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In its purest form, however, decadent literature had no time for 
any objects, even artificial ones. Everything outside the self was 
valueless. Yeats, writing in 1898:
I remember that when I first began to write I desired to describe 
outward things as vividly as possible.... And then quite suddenly I 
lost the desire of describing outward things, and found that I took 
little pleasure in a book unless it was spiritual and unemphatic. I 
did not then understand that the change was from beyond my own 
mind, but I understand now that writers are struggling all over 
Europe ... against that 'externality' which a time of scientific and 
political thought has brought into literature. [1961: 89 - emphasis 
added]
One way in which Yeats tellingly reversed those old priorities came in 'A  
Vision', in which he used the phases of the moon to represent various 
types of human personality. At one end of the spectrum stood the purely 
objective mind, which a more obedient child of the Enlightenment than 
Yeats might have associated with a full moon: Yeats, however, equated it 
w ith complete darkness. It was the purely subjective m ind which he 
represented w ith the full moon. Illum inating the inner w orld had  
become literature's proper task: as Arthur Symons said of Symbolism, it 
was a literature which had rid itself of the "old bondage of exteriority"; a 
literature "in which the visible world is no longer a reality, and the 
unseen world no longer a dream ..." [1974d: 83].
"Epochs which are regressive, and in the process of dissolution, are 
always subjective; w hereas the trend in all progressive epochs is 
objective" [quoted by Hughes, 1994: 13]. This aphorism of Goethe's was 
an accurate prophecy of the decadent scenario. The decadents responded
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to dissolution by defiantly asserting their subjectivity. But that stance 
proves, when one examines it, to be quite paradoxical. To make the 
private self "the m easure of all things" is scarcely to trium ph over 
dissolution: for what is dissolution anyway, if not the collapse of Truth 
into truths, the disintegration of objectivity into a million subjectivities? 
Looked at that way, the decadent turning-inw ard was a m atter of 
inevitability, not of choice - it was a part of the crisis, a steepening of the 
slide, rather than a way of arresting it.
But did the decadents really want to arrest the crisis? Didn't they, 
rather, want to revel in it? These questions have no definitive answer. 
In any genuinely decadent sensibility, the urge to overcome chaos was 
accompanied by an equally strong urge to celebrate it. The decadents were 
uncertain about uncertainty. It seems only natural that the era from 
which the decadent self emerged should also have produced the concept 
of ambivalence .13
Ambivalence is certainly one of the dom inant notes of Pater's 
'Conclusion'. Having named inconstancy as the defining quality of his 
age, Pater doesn 't seem to know exactly how to feel about it. All is 
melting under our feet: so what should we do? Half the time Pater seems 
inclined to wallow in this dissolution, to celebrate it w ith images of 
whirlpools and floods and flames. But he also wants to treat it as a crisis 
requiring imm ediate action: a pretext for a new individualist religion. 
This confusion seems to permeate Pater's picture of the self. On the one 
hand, the self is a kind of temple in which one can take refuge from the 
surrounding chaos; on the other, the self is the site of a flux wholly 
continuous with the flux beyond it. For the body, says Pater, is merely a 
concurrence of forces whose action "extends beyond us.... Far out on
13The term was not coined by Freud, but by the Swiss psychiatrist and mentor of Jung, 
Eugen Bleuler. Schizophrenia and autism were two more of his coinages which seem 
particularly applicable to the decadent psyche [see Gay, 1988: 198].
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every side of us these elements are broadcast, driven by many forces.... 
That clear perpetual outline of face and limb is but an image of ours 
under which we group them - a design in a web, the actual threads of 
which pass out beyond it" [Pater, 1973: 39]. Is mobility to be escaped from 
or embraced? The way Pater answers this question in his Plato and 
Platonism is significant: "Mobility! We do not think that a necessarily 
undesirable condition of life, of mind, of the physical world around us. 
'Tis the dead things, we may remind ourselves, that after all are most 
entirely at rest, and [we] might reasonably hold that motion ... covers all 
that is best worth being" [1922: 22 - emphasis added].
Not ... necessarily undesirable. This is a fairly half-hearted 
endorsem ent of mobility. We must "rem ind ourselves" that movement 
is a good thing, by recalling that the alternative is stasis, which is bad. 
This position is more intelligible once we remember that the mobility of 
w hich Pater m ust prim arily  be thinking, nam ely the decay and 
dissolution that characterised the decadence, was conceptual rather than 
physical. To be uncertain about concepts (what is good, what is evil, what 
is truth?) is unpleasant, giddying - but is nevertheless preferable to the 
immobile alternative: the old certainties.
Those old certainties, of course, were in practice far from dead. 
The Victorian moral order might have been deprived, in the eyes of 
certain intellectuals, of spiritual and rational sanction: but in legal terms 
its authority remained intact. More than intact - it was enforced with 
uncomm on brutality. To take a notorious example: W ilde owed his 
imprisonment not to some archaic statute, but to an Act passed in 1885 
[See Ellmann, 1988: 386] - an Act which had little apparent regard for the 
way in which post-Darwinian anthropologists, say, might have decentred 
the concept of 'gross indecency'. In other words, the old Absolutes were 
for all practical purposes still in force. While the decadents engaged in
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their fevered search for new values, the bulk of the com m unity had 
probably not even begun to question the old ones. And so it did not hurt 
the decadents to stress, now and again, the elementary point that there 
was a crisis going on; and that the valueless freefall, as chilly as it 
sometimes got, was in any case preferable to a blind adherence to the 
desiccated, discredited old truths. To wallow in chaos was a way of 
exhibiting one's contempt for such stubborn, complacent old buffers as 
W ilde's Lord Caversham, who rails haughtily against m odern tendencies 
in m anners, and bem oans everything that happens "now adays".14 
Caversham 's son, the "flawless dandy" Lord Goring, embodies the cool 
side of the decadent sympathy to decay: "I don't like principles, father. I 
prefer prejudices" [Wilde, 1983b: 146, 260]. The decadent spirit has been 
likened more than once to the spirit of the 1960s,15 and in the generation 
gap between these two Lords one can see the point of that comparison. 
The decadents were often ready to overlook the gravity of the crisis, if by 
revelling in it they could offend the Richard Nixons of the tim e.16 "We 
live, I regret to say, in an age of surfaces," says the venerable Lady 
Bracknell. Any trend lamented by the likes of her couldn't be all bad.
And yet to a substantial extent the decadents did share Lady 
Bracknell's regret, did crave depth, did want to believe: not, of course, in 
the old values,17 but in ones freshly forged. The story of the typical
14Freud, in Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, admitted that he too was 
almost provoked to satire by the conduct of certain similar buffers: "I have certainly 
heard of some people ... who are scandalized by [my] therapeutic method ... I am too well 
acquainted with the respectability of these gentry to excite myself over them. I shall 
avoid the temptation to write a satire upon them" [1990b: 82].
15 See, for example, Daiches 1969: 5, and Pynsent, 1989: passim.
16In Ä Rebours, Des Esseintes finds that elderly relatives are a bore. "These descendants 
of medieval warriors, these last scions of feudal families, appeared to Des Esseintes in 
the guise of crotchety, catarrhal old men, endlessly repeating insipid monologues and 
immemorial phrases.... The young man felt a surge of ineffable pity for these mummies 
entombed in their Pompadour catafalques behind rococo panelling; these crusty dotards 
who lived with their eyes forever fixed upon a nebulous Canaan, an imaginary land of 
promise" [Huysmans, 1987: 20-21].
17There were, though, several decadents who did embrace organised religion in the 
twilight of their careers: Wilde and Huysmans are two obvious examples. It can be argued
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decadent hero takes the form of a restless, experimental quest for physical 
or m etaphysical satisfaction - this is true of M arius the Epicurean, of 
Dorian Gray, of Des Esseintes, who calls himself an "unbeliever who 
would fain believe" [Huysmans, 1987: 220]. Wilde, in 'De Profundis', 
speaks of the "appetite w ithout distinction, desire w ithout limit, and 
formless greed" that hastened his own downfall [in Hart-Da vis, 1986: 191]. 
The decadents u ttered sighs of despair over the same em ptiness that 
elsewhere they saw no need to fill. Often one can find these conflicting 
attitudes in the space of a single work: as in Rimbaud's 'Bad Blood', in 
which what seems to be an ecstatic celebration of need - "Hunger, thirst, 
shouts, dance, dance, dance, dance!" - is followed a page later by despair: 
"Ah! I am so forsaken that I could dedicate to any divine image that 
came along all my urges towards perfection" [Rimbaud, 1986: 308, 309].
Such urges generally found their way to one or both of two divinities: the 
Self and the work of Art. For the decadents, the line between these things 
was thoroughly blurred. The self had to be a work of art, and art had to be 
unm istakab ly , som etim es un in te llig ib ly , a w ork  of the self. 
Individualism was an aesthetic as well as an ethic: "Art," said Wilde, "is 
the most intense form of individualism  that the w orld has known" 
[quoted by Ellmann, 1973: 97]. Given this relationship, it is unsurprising 
that we find in the decadent artw ork the sam e am bivalence to 
metaphysical decay that we have observed in the decadent self. On the 
one hand, art represented a kind of bulwark against decay (Lord Alfred
that Wilde's conversion had more to do with the aesthetics of religion than its substance. 
As Pater once said, "The Church of England is nothing to me apart from its ornate services" 
[quoted by Aldington, 1948: 21]. But in any case, the finding of God is not inconsistent with 
the decadent quest for orientation in a life devoid of values. Remember Barbey 
d'Aurevilly's oft-quoted verdict on Ä Reborns - that its author would soon have to choose 
either the muzzle of a pistol or the foot of the cross [quoted by Baldick, 1987: 12].
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Douglas, for example, wrote of his desire "Only to build one crystal 
barrier/Against this sea which beats upon our days" [in 'The City of the 
Soul', Symons, 1928: 38]. But decadent art was irretrievably submerged in 
that sea, too. It embodied the chaos through turbulence of theme and 
anarchy of form. "Let my style capture all the sounds of my time," wrote 
Freud's fellow Viennese Karl Kraus. "This should make it an annoyance 
to my contemporaries, but later generations should hold it to their ears 
like a seashell in which there is the music of an ocean of mud" [Zohn, 
1984: following page 156].
This ambivalence of decadent art is caught by Yeats in a metaphor 
he applied to Pater's Marius the Epicurean: it "taught us," Yeats wrote, "to 
walk upon a rope tightly stretched through serene air, and we were left to 
keep our feet upon a swaying rope in a storm ... " [Yeats, 1955: 302]. The 
swaying rope is at once a passage through the storm and a part of it. 
Unlike a sturdy Classical bridge, it doesn't rise comfortably above the 
turmoil. Yeats himself can be seen implementing the swaying rope 
principle in his "Song of the Happy Shepherd':
But O, sick children of the world,
Of all the many changing things 
In dreary dancing past us whirled,
To the cracked tune that Chronos sings,
Words alone are certain good." [Symons, 1928: 168]
Words alone, in this decrepit age, are the only certain good: and yet what 
do the words concern themselves with but the age itself, which Yeats 
evokes in typical decadent style with images of sickness, change, the 
whirling dance of disintegration. As for the formal registration of that
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discord, it is worth noting that the line about the cracked tune also 
sounds like a cracked tune.
*
When used according to the principle that words alone are certain good, 
language is bound to assume peculiar qualities. Like Victorian public 
discourse, decadent language tended to shun the task of representing the 
real. "Unfortunately," lamented Arthur Symons, "words can convey 
facts" [1974b: 87]. The decadents' campaign against representation is of 
course most evident in their poetry, particularly that of the Symbolists. 
But even the prose tends to soar clear of mere signification. The first 
poem in Yeats's Oxford Book of Modern Verse is actually a piece of 
critical prose - Pater's reverie on the 'Mona Lisa', from The Renaissance - 
chopped into lines. It was Pater's practice, Yeats tells us, to draft each 
sentence on an individual page: not in order to clarify its meaning, but in 
the interests of "isolating and analysing its rhythm" [Yeats, 1941: viii].18 
The resulting prose, Max Beerbohm complained, read as if English were 
being "treat[ed] ... as a dead language ... " [quoted by Bergonzi, 1973: 20]. If 
language was becoming, as Gautier put it, "mottled with the greenness of 
decomposition" [Quoted by Jackson, 1976: 136], that was at least partially 
because the decadents wilfully deprived words of the nourishment of 
reality, striving instead to make language a purely formal system: "music 
before all things", urged Verlaine [quoted by Stanford, 1965: 39]. The 
literature of the decadents, then, seems to fit snugly into Valery's 
tendentious definition of literature in general as "an art which is based 
on the abuse of language - that is, it is based on language as a creator of 
illusions, and not on language as a means of transmitting realities" 
[quoted by Wilson, 1947: 284].
18Yet it was the meaning of Pater's prose poem that appealed to Sigmund Freud. See 
below, page 158.
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There was, though, a more rarefied order of reality that decadent 
language was required to transmit: inner reality. The Symbolists in 
particular insisted that language be subjectivised, that words be made to 
conform to the craggy contours of the private self. Rather than 
subm itting one's private vision to the tyranny of form, form had to 
submit to it. "The one certainty is, that society is the enemy of man, and 
that formal art is the enemy of the artist," said Arthur Symons [1974e: 85]. 
Language had to be shattered, reformed, used suggestively, obliquely - 
anything, so long as the poet's essence was not violated. If Symbolist 
language is formless and murky, that is because this is the condition of 
the self it is required to reflect.
But there is an interesting paradox here. Decadent language 
sought to detach itself from history, to repudiate the real, to serve only 
the private self; in consequence, it became mottled, m oribund, decadent - 
and thereby did end up reproducing the qualities of the age. In that sense 
it was a curious form of realism - a point taken up by A rthur Symons, 
writing in 1896:
For its very disease of form, this literature is certainly typical of a 
civilisation grown over-luxurious, over-inquiring, too languid for 
the relief of action, too uncertain for any emphasis in opinion or 
in conduct. It reflects all the moods, all the m anners, of a 
sophisticated society; its very artificiality is a way of being true to 
nature: simplicity, sanity, proportion - the classic qualities - how 
much do we possess them in our life, our surroundings, that we 
should look to find them in our literature - so evidently the 
literature of a decadence? [Symons, 1974a: 72 - emphasis added]
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Since we are exploring the connections between decadent literature 
and psychoanalysis, we should be excited to see that Symons names 
sanity as one of the qualities most conspicuously lacked by decadent 
literature, and by the decadent society it reflects. Earlier in the same piece, 
Symons has made the same point even more emphatically: "If what we 
call the classic is indeed the suprem e art - those qualities of perfect 
simplicity, perfect sanity, perfect proportion, the supreme qualities - then 
the representative literature of today, interesting, beautiful, novel as it is, 
is really a new and beautiful and interesting disease" [Symons, 1974a: 72].
The notion that decadent literature was sick literature, w ritten by 
the ill for the ill, was a common one. We encountered it, indeed, at the 
very outset of this thesis, in the mind of the patient of Ferenczi who 
considered madness to be the salient shared trait of Wilde and Nietzsche 
(and, by im plication, the psychoanalyst Jung).19 By and large the 
decadents were happy to foster this impression. "Je suis VEmpire a la fin 
de la Decadence," Verlaine wrote in ‘Langeur’, diagnosing in himself a 
condition which reproduced the sickness of the age. In Ä Reborns, Des 
Esseintes relishes the literature of his decadent contemporaries because it 
is "a literature attacked," like himself, "by organic diseases, weakened by 
intellectual senility, exhausted by syntactical excesses, sensitive only to 
the curious whims that excite the sick, and yet eager to express itself 
completely in its last hours, determined to make up for all the pleasures 
it has missed, afflicted on its death-bed with a desire to leave behind the 
subtlest memories of suffering.... This was the death-agony of the old 
tongue which, after going a little greener every century, had now reached 
the point of dissolution... " [Huysmans, 1977: 199-200].
In some cases, decadent writers had genuine physical illnesses 
which lent their works a peculiar timeliness. Ernest Dowson, a frail
19See my 'Introduction'.
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consumptive, lived only to the age of thirty-three. Aubrey Beardsley, 
another consumptive, d idn 't even make thirty. Wilde, in all probability, 
contracted syphilis early in his life, and suffered a prolonged private 
decay which Edm und W ilson, for one, related to the "them e of 
im pending collapse" in his w ritings [Wilson, 1951: 341]. Richard 
Ellmann, discussing W ilde's contraction of the disease, speculates: 
"perhaps now the parable of Dorian Gray's secret decay began to form in 
his m ind, as the spirochete began its journey up his spine to the 
meninges" [Ellmann, 1988: 91].
But in general the sickness suffered by decadent artists was of a less 
specific kind. Ä Rebours is no doubt the paradigm atic w ork of the 
decadence, and the "general nervous trouble" suffered by its protagonist 
Des Esseintes is probably the aptest description of the malady that afflicted 
decadent characters and artists alike [Huysmans, 1987: 211]. "I think that 
perhaps our form of lyric, our insistence upon emotion which has no 
relation to any public interest, gathered together overwrought, unstable 
men," Yeats wrote in his Autobiographies [Yeats, 1955: 300].
In 1892, a Hungarian-born physician living in Paris, and writing in 
German, produced a singularly nasty work of criticism which took the 
decadents at their word. Max N ordau's Degeneration set itself the task of 
"investigating," in N ordau 's ow n account, "the tendencies of the 
fashions in art and literature ... [and] of proving that they have their 
source in the degeneracy of their authors, and that the enthusiasm  of 
their admirers is for manifestations of more or less pronounced moral 
insanity, imbecility, and dem entia" [N ordau, 1968: viii]. N ordau  
condemned as mentally degenerate not only the decadents, but just about 
every writer who had recently set pen to paper - his list included writers 
like Tolstoy, Zola, Ruskin, as well as more obvious targets like Verlaine 
("a repulsive degenerate subject w ith  an asym m etric skull and
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Mongolian face ... a dotard who manifests the absence of any definite 
thought in his mind by incoherent speech, meaningless expressions and 
motley images. In lunatic asylums there are many patients whose disease 
is less deep-seated and incurable than is that of this irresponsible 
circulaire at large ... ") [Nordau, 1968: 128].
Bernard Shaw, pillorying Degeneration in his pam phlet The 
Sanity of Art, called it "a bookful of blunders tacked on to a mock 
scientific theory picked up at second hand from a few lunacy doctors with 
a literary turn ..." [100-101]. But lunacy doctors had a right, perhaps 
almost a duty, to concern themselves with decadent literature - not 
merely because it proclaimed its own lunacy, but because that lunacy 
mirrored a mysterious, and all-too-real, phenomenon of the time.
"Repress and repress": The Decadent D isease
"It is a pretty widespread opinion that nervous diseases, and especially 
hysteria, have alarmingly increased during the last decades, and that they 
are about to increase m uch more." The writer is William Hirsch, a 
German who in 1894 produced, in response to N ordau 's book, a work 
called Genius and Degeneration. Hirsch goes on:
In all civilized countries, we are told, and in every stratum  of the 
population, a weakness of the nervous system manifests itself of 
which our forefathers had no knowledge. N eurasthenia and 
hysteria spread wider and wider, like a devastating epidemic.... 
'W hither is this to lead, and how is it to end?' lam ent some 
solicitous prophets who already see yawning before them the gulf
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by which the enervated human race is about to be swallowed up. 
[Hirsch, 1897: 170-171]
The term  "neurasthen ia" (neuro for nerve and asthenia for 
weakness) had itself been coined specifically to account for this peculiarly 
m odern ailment. An American neurologist named George M. Beard had 
come up with the word in 1869. F. G. Gosling, in his book Before Freud: 
Neurasthenia and the American Medical Community , 1870 - 1910, 
explains that Beard's term
gave legitimacy to a group of mystifying complaints torm enting 
the lives of an unknown number of Americans.... The term has no 
equivalent in m odern medicine, but from the late nineteenth 
century until Freud 's psychological terms were accepted in the 
1910s and 1920s, neurasthenia was used to characterize practically 
every nonspecific emotional disorder short of outright insanity, 
from sim ple stress to severe neuroses. N eurasthen ics ... 
complained of vague sym ptoms such as insom nia, headache, 
fatigue, dyspepsia, depression.... Lacking empirical evidence to 
prove neurasthenia 's existence, Beard naturally  turned  to the 
intellectual authorities of the day to construct an etiology for the 
disease.... Arguing that cultural evolution had outstripped the pace 
of individual evolution, he maintained that specific features of the 
young American society - in particular the telegraph, the railroads, 
the periodical press, the sciences, and the atm osphere of political 
and religious liberty  - had increased m ental dem ands on 
Americans, especially on the urban professionals who labored with
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their heads rather than their hands....20 Beard believed that 
neurasthenia was also increasing in the industrialized nations of 
Europe, but that it would be at least twenty-five years before the 
incidence of the disease among Europeans approached that already 
reported in the United States.... So successful was [his] explanation 
that neurasthenia, or 'nervousness/ was to become turn-of-the- 
century America's prim ary mental disorder that still fell short of 
insanity, and a disease symbolically identified with the period. If 
not an epidemic, at least it seemed to be increasing at an alarming 
rate. By 1900 a substantial body of literature on the disease had 
appeared in textbooks, medical journals, and popular periodicals 
across the country. [Gosling, 1987: 9-10, 11,13]
But as we have seen via Hirsch and Nordau, the phenomenon was 
by no means confined to America. As early as 1831, an English physician 
had identified the 'wear and tear syndrom e', an ailment he supposed to 
be peculiarly English, and which he attributed to the stresses of 
industrialization [Webster, 1995: 185]. Paris was known in the 1880s, 
when Freud studied there under Charcot, as "the hysteria capital", and 
hysteria as the "Parisian disease" [Evans, 1991: 9].
Decadent literature, then, coincided with a kind of explosion of 
neuroticism. "M odern nervousness," as Freud himself would write in 
1908, "under our present social conditions is rapidly spreading" [Freud, 
1950j: 77]. The essay in which Freud makes this observation is 
" 'C ivilized ' Sexual Morality and M odern Nervousness." As its title 
suggests, Freud's paper traces the problem to one particular element of 
m odern society: its harsh sexual morality. Before advancing this novel
20"Modem life," Wilde wrote in D e P rofundis, "is complex and relative. Those are its two 
distinguishing notes" [Hart-Davis, 1986: 188].
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theory, though, Freud acknowledges that most experts were taking, ä la 
Beard, a broad sociological approach to the mystery. "Neurologists," he 
says, "have loudly proclaimed the connection between the 'increasing 
nervousness' of the present day and m odern civilized life." He proceeds 
to quote at length the observations of one such neurologist, the German 
Wilhelm Erb, writing in 1893:
Are these [social] causes of nervousness which have been pu t 
before you so markedly on the increase under m odern conditions 
of life as to declare these conditions responsible? This question can 
be answered w ithout hesitation in the affirmative, as a cursory 
glance at our m odern life and its character shall show.... The 
dem ands on the ability of the individual in the struggle for 
existence have enormously increased, and he can meet them only 
by putting forth all his mental powers; at the same time the needs 
of the individual, and the dem and for enjoyment, have increased 
in all circles; unprecedented luxury is displayed by classes hitherto 
wholly unaccustomed to any such thing; irreligion, discontent, and 
covetousness are spreading widely through every degree of society 
... political, religious, and social struggles, party -in te rests , 
electioneering, endless associations of every kind heat the 
imagination and force the mind to ever greater effort ... life in large 
cities is constantly becoming m ore elaborate and more restless. 
The exhausted nerves seek recuperation in increased stimulation, 
in highly-seasoned pleasures, only thereby to become m ore 
exhausted  than  before; m o d ern  lite ra tu re  is concerned  
predominantly with the most questionable problems, those which 
stir all the passions - sensuality and the craving for pleasure, 
contempt of every fundam ental ethical principle and every ideal
130
dem and; it brings pathological types, together w ith  sexual 
psychopathic, revolutionary and other problems, before the mind 
of the reader. [Freud, 1950j: 78-79]
But Freud chastises Erb and his kind for missing w hat he sees as 
the crucial point: it is one aspect, and one aspect only, of m odern 
civilisation which is at the root of the sickness. "Anyone who
understands how to penetrate to the factors conditioning nervous illness 
will soon be convinced that its increase in our society originates in the 
greater stringency of sexual restraint" [89].
This is not the place to go too deeply into the m edical and 
sociological objections to Freud's sexual etiology of neuroses.21 But the
21A brief survey of some of the relevant arguments does, however, seem to be in order. 
Webster [1995], who points out that hysteria has all but disappeared in this century [71], 
examines claims, some of them made before Freud came along, that it is a non-existent 
condition, a mere label which physicians stick on any disorder for which science has yet 
to find an organic explanation [529-547].
If such claims are right, then the patients whom Freud diagnosed as hysterics, 
and whose condition he ascribed to repression of sexual desire, must in fact have been 
suffering from organic disorders. This was certainly true of at least one of Freud's patients. 
The scandalous affair of Emma Eckstein occurred at the very beginning of Freud's 
psychoanalytical career. Unearthed by Jeffrey Masson [1984], the case involved a 30- 
year-old patient of Freud's who suffered from "stomach ailments and menstrual problems" 
[Masson, 1984: 57]. Freud referred her to his friend Wilhelm Fliess, who in early 1895 
surgically removed the turbinate bone from Eckstein's nasal cavity, in accordance with his 
quackish "nasal reflex" theory of neurosis, which held that conditions in the nose 
governed symptoms in other parts of the body. In the wake of the operation Eckstein 
suffered swelling and haemorrhaging, and a fetid odour wafted from the incision site. 
Some fourteen days after the first operation another surgeon, in Freud's presence, re­
opened Eckstein's nasal cavity in quest of the problem: and discovered that Fliess had left 
at least half a metre of gauze packed in there. The surgeon pulled the gauze free, 
provoking a massive haemorrhage which Eckstein was lucky to survive. So Eckstein's 
sufferings in the wake of the operation were not, as Freud and Fliess had suspected, 
hysterical symptoms: "we had done her an injustice," Freud wrote to his friend; "she was 
not at all abnormal, rather, a piece of iodoform gauze had gotten tom  off as you were 
removing it and stayed in for 14 days, preventing healing; at the end it tore off and 
provoked the bleeding" [64]. But then, in April 1896 - that is, a year later - Freud 
informed Fliess that he had m ade theoretical developm ents which let Fliess off the 
hook, by revealing that Eckstein's "episodes of bleeding were hysterical, were occasioned 
by longing" [100]. "There is no doubt," Freud asserted in June 1896, "that her haemorrhages 
were due to wishes; she has had several sim ilar incidents, am ong them  actual 
simulations, in her childhood... " [ibid.].
Stewart [1976] argues that Freud may have opposed the popular view that 
nervous disease was organic, and therefore perhaps hereditary, out of distaste for its 
implicit racism: "Freud's limitations on the role of heredity in mental disorders, and its
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interesting point is that decadent literature echoes such objections, for the 
decadents constructed an etiology of their own ailm ent far m ore 
comprehensive than Freud's erotocentric theory. In Erb's theory, which 
Freud quotes largely to lambast, one finds reference to m any factors - 
irreligion, discontent, covetousness, social struggles, intolerable demands 
on the individual, the pursuit of highly-seasoned pleasures - which were 
clearly at play both in and behind decadent literature.
As a fine example of the decadents' pre-em ptive strike on the 
Freudian project, consider the following diagnosis of the decadent 
disease. It is m ade by a character in George Egerton's22 story 'The 
Regeneration of Two', which appeared in her 1894 collection Discords. A  
unnam ed male character is speaking to a female one named, uncannily 
enough, Fruen:
"Close your eyes, Fruen, and look down over all the cities of the 
world - look with your inner eyes, try to pierce to the soul of 
things; what do you see? Shall I tell you what I see? A great crowd 
of hum an beings. Take all these men, male and female, fashion 
them into one colossal man, study him, and what will you find in
subsequent displacement by sexuality, may be seen as an effort to reject the racial 
component in the concept of hereditary degeneracy he encountered in Paris under the 
tutelage of Charcot" [Stewart, 1976: 228].
Freud's etiology of hysteria has been criticised from the other angle too. Certain 
scholars, while not doubting that the diseases with which Freud was dealing were indeed 
mental ones, have traced their proliferation during the nineteenth century to factors other 
than sexual restraint. Decker [1991: 2] notes that "historically, hysteria has appeared 
prominently among groups - such as slaves, soldiers and servants - who feel they have 
little control over their lives." Thus there was a perfectly good sociological explanation 
of the particularly high rate of hysteria among Victorian women. Evans [1991: 9-11], 
examining the high incidence of hysteria among Frenchwomen of the time, identifies 
"far-reaching changes in the social and political order in France [which] made new 
demands on women of all classes", thus creating "stresses and pressures [which] may have 
cracked the fault-lines in women's mental health." "[T]he metamorphoses of hysteria 
throughout the years and from country to country," says Evans, "have provided one of the 
strongest cases for the influence of social conditions on neurotic disorders" [Evans, 1991: 
155].
22George Egerton was the pen-name of the Australian-born writer Mary Chavelita Dunne.
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him? Tainted blood; a brain w ith the parasites of a thousand 
different systems sucking at its base and warping it; a heart robbed 
of all healthy feelings by false conceptions, bad conscience, and a 
futile code of morality - a code that makes the natural workings of 
sex a vile thing to be ashamed of; the healthy delight in the 
cultivation of one's body as the beautiful perfect sheath of one's 
soul and spirit, w ith no shame in any part of it, all alike being 
clean, a sin of the flesh, a carnal conception to be opposed by 
asceticism. A code that has thrown man out of balance and made 
sexual love play far too prominent a part in life - (it ought to be 
one note, not even a dominant note, in the chord of hum an love) 
- a code that demands the sacrifice of thousands of female victims 
as the price of its maintenance, that has filled the universe with an 
unclean conception of things, a prurient idea of purity  - making 
man a great sick man." [Egerton, 1983: 189-190 - emphasis added]
This remarkable speech might more usefully have been addressed 
to Freud than to Fruen. For it offers some salient warnings to any would- 
be etiologist of fin-de-siecle neuroses. Sexual restraint, to be sure, does 
contribute to the sickness of decadent "m an"; but it is only one of "a 
thousand different systems" w arping the brain. Do not, the passage 
explicitly counsels, make the mistake of overvaluing the role of sexuality 
in hum an life. Yes, sex appears to Victorian eyes to be of overwhelming 
im portance - but that is an illusion m anufactured precisely by the 
prevailing conditions of excessive sexual restraint.
But by 1894 Freud had already embarked on a course which defied 
such subtle objections. The previous year he had w ritten to Fliess: "It 
may be taken as a recognised fact that neurasthenia is a frequent 
consequence of an abnormal sexual life. The assertion, however, which I
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wish to make and test by observations, is that neurasthenia can only be a 
sexual neurosis" [Webster, 1996: 187]. Sexual factors were uniquely 
responsible for hysteria, of course, as well as for neurasthenia;23 and also 
for phenom ena beyond the neuroses: dream s, works of art, failures of 
memory. The possibility raised by Egerton - that this stressing of sexuality 
was not so m uch a solution to the Victorian neuroses as a kind of 
Victorian neurosis in itself - has since been vigorously pursued by others, 
notably Jung:
Like Nietzsche, like the Great War, so too Freud ... is an answer to 
the sickness of the nineteenth century. That is certainly his chief 
significance.... [Psychoanalysis] preaches those things which are of 
param ount importance to the neurotic of the early tw entieth 
century because he is one of the unconscious victims of late 
Victorian psychology. Psychoanalysis destroys the false values in 
the neurotic personality by cauterising away the rottenness of the 
dead nineteenth century.... But in so far as neurosis is not a disease 
specific to the Victorian era, but enjoys a general distribution in 
time and space, and is therefore present am ong peoples or 
in d iv id u a ls  who are not in need of any special sexual 
enlightenment, nor open to any assumptions as to harmful sexual 
disturbances in their lives, a theory of neurosis or a theory of 
dream s based on a Victorian prejudice is at the most of very 
secondary import to science.... [Jung, 1983: 52-53]
23//At the time Freud wrote," Richard W ebster explains, " 'neurasthenia ' was often 
considered to be one of the two main neuroses, the other being 'hysteria'. Whereas the 
former was thought to be predominantly a male condition, the latter was usually, though 
not always, associated with women" [1995: 185].
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Turning back to the passage from Egerton's story, we can extract 
from it another warning to Freud. Do not, the passage says, mistake the 
"great sick man", or woman, of the fin de siede, for an accurate image of 
hum ankind in general - for these people are tainted and unnatural, their 
brains warped by a futile code of morality, by bad conscience, by an undue 
em phasis on sexuality. This w arning goes right to the heart of 
psychoanalysis. For the w arped people in question are the very 
specim ens from whom  Freud derived his conception of w hat was 
normal in hum an psychology.
In a limited and obvious sense Freud made no secret of the fact 
that his propositions about mental functioning proceeded from a study of 
unhealthy minds. For psychoanalysis, as everybody knows, originated as 
a m ethod of diagnosing and treating neuroses. Its expansion into a 
general psychology was announced by two key works: The Interpretation 
of Dreams (1900), and The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901). 
"W hat constitutes the enormous importance of dream -interpretation, as 
well as of the latter study," as Freud explains in his Autobiographical 
Study,
is ... [that] previously psychoanalysis had only been concerned with 
solving pathological phenomena.... But when it came to dreams, it 
was no longer dealing with a pathological symptom, but w ith a 
phenom enon of normal m ental life which m ight occur in any 
healthy person. If dream s turned out to be constructed like 
symptoms, if their explanations required the same assum ptions - 
the repression of impulses, substitutive formation, compromise- 
formation, the dividing of the conscious and unconscious into 
various psychical systems - then psychoanalysis was no longer an 
auxiliary science in the field of psychopathology, it was rather the
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starting-point of a new and deeper science of the m ind which 
w ould be equally indispensable for the understanding  of the 
normal. [SE, 20: 47]
This blurring, or removal, of the boundary between the sick and 
the well is form ulated as a theoretical principle in both of these key 
works. In Dreams, Freud writes that "psychoanalytic research finds no 
fundam ental, but only quantitative, distinctions between norm al and 
neurotic life" [SE, 5: 373] And in the Psychopathology, he affirms that 
"the borderline betw een the norm al and the abnorm al in nervous 
matters is a fluid one ... we are all a little neurotic" [SE, 6: 278].
Freud offered the following explanation of the matter in 1910:
We no longer think that health and illness, normal and neurotic 
people, are to be sharply distinguished from each other, and that 
neurotic traits m ust necessarily be taken as proofs of a general 
inferiority. Today we know that neurotic symptoms are structures 
which are substitutes for certain achievements of repression that 
we have to carry out in the course of our developm ent from a 
child to a civilized hum an being. We know too that we all 
produce such substitute structures, and that it is really only their 
number, intensity and distribution which justify us in using the 
practical concept of illness. [Freud, 1964: 81]
The "norm al" person, then, suffers from the sam e m ental 
structure as the neurotic: a m ind consisting of two basic agencies in 
perpetual conflict, one full of impulses which seek gratification, the other 
with an express mission to beat these impulses down. The process which 
thus cleaves the m ind, repression, is one which every "norm al" person
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suffers "in the course of our developm ent from a child to a hum an 
being." A sick person differs from a well one only through certain 
fluctuations in the flow of energies through this system. T here  d o es, 
though, seem to be one crucial difference between the neurotic and the 
normal person in Freud's conception. Freud acknowledged - he could 
scarcely avoid acknowledging - that the object of his early studies, the 
neurotic, was a part of history - one victim  in an explosion in 
neuroticism. To account for this explosion Freud conceded that his age 
was a particularly repressive one. ("M odern nervousness under our 
present social conditions is rapidly spreading.") But it does not seem to 
have greatly concerned Freud that the subjects, including pre-eminently 
himself, from whom he derived his notion of w hat was normal in 
hum an psychology (and his consequent belief that the norm al did not 
differ greatly from the abnormal) lived in precisely the same era, endured 
precisely the same social conditions. W eren't these normal people also, 
like neurotics, an historical phenomenon? W hy was the repression 
suffered by them to be considered a universal hum an problem, as distinct 
from a function of their harsh age?24 W asn't it possible that the 
phenomenon of repression was in itself peculiar to this era?
To put the question another way: how normal was the "normal" 
psyche of the tim e? 25 Norm al enough to constitute the basis of a 
universal psychology? The decadents w ould have laughed at the 
suggestion. For the decadents, the contemporary psyche suffered from an
24Because, Freud would have replied, the Oedipus complex is universal, and the two 
universally unacceptable instincts of which that complex consists would always have to 
be repressed. We will be examining that theory in the next chapter.
25In The Future of an Illusion, Freud attacks religion's distortion of human psychology in a 
way which seems to have an ironic bearing on his own project: "Can an anthropologist give 
the cranial index of a people whose custom it is to deform their children's heads by 
bandaging them from their earliest years?... So long as man's earliest years are influenced 
by the religious thought-inhibition ... we cannot really say what he is actually like" 
[1949c: 83 - emphasis added]. The answer to Freud's hypothetical question is yes: an 
anthropologist can give the cranial index of such a people, but the index will represent as 
a norm something which is in fact a gross distortion.
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ailm ent remarkably similar to Freudian repression, but w ith one key 
difference - they strenuously identified this as an historical disease. We 
have seen how Oscar Wilde did so in The Picture of Dorian Gray. In 
George Egerton's fruitful story, 'The Regeneration of Two', Fruen points 
out that a more m arked version of the same repression has caused a 
worse distortion in the psyches of women:
We [women] have been taught to shrink from the honest 
expression of our wants and feelings as violations of modesty, or at 
least good taste. We are always battling with some bottom layer of 
real womanhood that we may not reveal; the primary impulses of 
our original destiny keep shooting out mimosa-like threads of 
natural feeling through the outside husk of our artificial selves, 
p roducing  com plex creatures.... One layer in us reverts 
instinctively to the time when we were just the child-bearing half 
of humanity and no more, waging war with the new layers that go 
to make up the fragile latter-day product with the disinclination to 
burden itself w ith motherhood.... [T]he desexualised half man, 
w ith a pride in the absence of sexual feeling, reckoning it as the 
sublimest virtue to have none, what is she but the outcome of 
centuries of patient repression? Repress and repress - how many 
generations has it gone on? You must expect some return for it.... 
[Egerton, 1983:198-199]
A Freudian w ould probably think of this passage as a striking 
anticipation, and confirmation, of the master's insights. But it seems to 
me that Freud's theory of repression is imperilled, rather than validated, 
by the above speech. For here is a contemporary of Freud's complaining 
about the crushing effect of sexual repression - not repression as Freud
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defined it, but repression conceived of as a social force that had attained 
an ugly pitch during the Victorian age. The effects of this kind of 
repression were profound - but not so profound that they could not be 
detected by the conscious mind, and reversed by means of social reform, 
of the kind that has slowly been achieved in the century since.26
The second remarkable thing about the quoted passage is that 
Egerton reproaches this repression with having split the self into two 
parts: a repressed bottom layer consisting of "prim al im pulses" and 
"natural feeling"; and, restraining this secret inner being, indeed waging 
war with it, an "outside husk", an "artificial self". Although not always 
expressed  w ith  such uncanny  p rox im ity  to the language of 
psychoanalysis, this notion of the split self is rife in the literature that 
leads up to Freud. "No mind can engender till divided into two," said 
Yeats [quoted by Gordon, 1979: 36]. The m ost obvious them atic 
manifestations of the divided self come in The Picture of Dorian Gray, in 
which Dorian learns of "the terrible pleasure of a double life" [134], and in 
The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886),27 but one also finds
26Coinciding with this period of reform has been an extraordinary decline in the incidence 
of hysteria, to the point where, as Anthony Storr notes, “the type of case on which early 
psychoanalytic theory was originally based, namely, severe conversion hysteria in 
women, is seldom seen today" [quoted by Webster, 1995: 71]. See also Decker, 1991: 207. 
27Dr Jekyll, in his "Full Statement of the Case", admits that even before undertaking his 
chemical experiments he suffered from "a profound duplicity of life", induced by his 
"impatient gaiety of disposition, such as has made the happiness of many, but such as I 
found it hard to reconcile with my imperious desire to carry my head high, and wear a 
more than commonly grave countenance before the public. Hence it came about that I 
concealed my pleasures.... Though so profound a double-dealer, I was in no sense a 
hypocrite; both sides of me were in dead earnest; I was no more myself when I laid aside 
restraint and p lunged in shame, than w hen I laboured, in the eye of day, at the 
furtherance of knowledge.... And it chanced that the direction of my scientific studies ... 
reacted and shed a strong light on this consciousness of the perennial war among my 
members. With every day, and from both sides of my intelligence, the moral and the 
intellectual, I thus drew  steadily nearer to that truth by whose partial discovery I have 
been doomed to such a dreadful shipwreck: that man is not truly one, but truly two" 
[Stevenson, 1968: 83-84]. The experiments which unleash the monstrous Hyde begin, then, 
as an attem pt to separate "the two natures that contended in the field of my 
consciousness": "If each, I told myself, could but be housed in separate identities, life 
would be relieved of all that was unbearable; the unjust might go his way, delivered from 
the aspirations and remorse of his more upright twin; and the just could walk steadfastly
139
subtler traces of it in the conceptions of thinkers who saw hum an 
existence in terms of two conflicting spirits, one anarchic, the other 
constrictive: Nietzsche w ith his notion of the Dionysian versus the 
Apollonian, Arnold with the Hellenic versus the Hebraic, Pater with the 
Classic versus the Romantic.
Such formulations, as we shall see, often seem to hover on the 
brink of the Freudian distinction between unbound mental processes and 
bound ones, the unconscious and the conscious. But Pater highlights a 
fundamental difference between his position and Freud's when he writes 
that the Romantic spirit, in contrast to the Classic, affords "refuge from a 
tarnished actual present, a present of disillusion" [Pater, 1948: 552 - 
emphasis added]. This confirms the impression we get from Wilde, and 
from Egerton, that by conceiving of the world, or the self, as the site of 
contending forces, the decadents m eant to identify a lam entable 
contemporary disease, one which could, and should, be cured. The age 
was simply too Classic, too Hebraic, too Apollonian. It required one to 
present so rigidly proper an image to society ("anybody can act," as Wilde 
observed in a letter of 1892; "to be conventional is to be a comedian." 
[quoted by Ellmann, 1988: 349]) that effectively one had two selves: a 
public one and a private one.
By presenting this divided self as an historical product, the 
decadents lend weight to the allegation that Victorianism, as Jung put it, 
was "the matrix out of which Freud grew":
His revo lu tionary  tendency to find alw ays the negative 
explanation for things is based on the historical fact that the 
Victorian epoch has fraudulently used cultural values in such a
and securely on his upward path, doing the good things in which he found his pleasure, 
and no longer exposed to disgrace and penitence by the hands of this extraneous evil" [85].
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way as to produce a middle-class idea of the world.... The same is 
true of his idea of man. Man's conscious qualities - all Victorian - 
his idealistic, counterfeited personality, rest on corresponding dark 
backgrounds, that is, repressed  infantile  sexuality .... This 
conception of man, considered historically, is a reaction to the 
tendency of the Victorian era to see everything in a 'rosy ' light, and 
to describe everything sub rosa, for it was the time of m ental 
'pussyfooting', which finally brought to birth a Nietzsche who used 
a hammer in his philosophizing. [Jung, 1983: 50-51]
Dorian Gray is another who objects to psychological pussyfooting: 
he "used to wonder at the shallow psychology of those who conceive the 
Ego in man as a thing simple, perm anent, reliable, and of one essence. 
To him, man was a being with m yriad lives and m yriad sensations, a 
complex m ultiform  creature that bore w ithin itself strange legacies of 
thought and passion ... " [1988: 112]. An appropria te ly  complex 
psychology is delivered by the device of the portrait, which depicts a 
hideously mobile private self entirely removed from the false self Dorian 
displays to society. Dorian's duality reflects, it seems, a common 
condition - a self divided by too great an alienation from its animal core:
The worship of the senses has often, and w ith much justice, been 
decried, men feeling a natural instinct of terror about passions and 
sensations that seem stronger than themselves, and that they are 
conscious of sharing with the less highly organized forms of 
existence. But it appeared to Dorian Gray that the true nature of 
the senses had never been understood, and that they had remained 
savage and animal merely because the world had sought to starve 
them into submission or to kill them by pain. As he looked back
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on man moving through History, he was haunted by a feeling of 
loss. So much had been surrendered! And to such little purpose! 
There had been mad wilful rejections, m onstrous forms of self- 
torture and self-denial, whose origin was fear, and whose result 
was a degradation infinitely m ore terrible than that fancied 
degradation from which, in their ignorance, they had sought to 
escape. [1988:104]
It is rem arkable how close such passages in W ilde come to 
Nietzsche's account of the evolution of the "bad conscience". "I regard 
the bad conscience," Nietzsche wrote in the Genealogy of Morals, "as the 
serious illness that man was bound to contract under the stress of the 
m ost fundam ental change he ever experienced - that change which 
occurred when he found himself finally enclosed w ithin the walls of 
society and of peace." At that moment, says Nietzsche, "the old instincts 
of freedom ... all those instincts of wild, free, prow ling m an turned 
backward against man himself.... [T]hus began the gravest and uncanniest 
illness, from which hum anity has not yet recovered, m an's suffering of 
man, of himself - the result of a forcible sundering from his animal past 
... a declaration of war against the old instincts upon which his strength, 
joy, and terribleness had rested hitherto" [Nietzsche, 1989: 84-87, passim - 
italics in the original].
So Nietzsche, like the decadents, and unlike Freud, regarded the 
split self as an illness, one from which it was possible to recover by giving 
instincts their day in the sun. Just as W ilde's Lord Henry maintains that 
"Every im pulse that we strive to strangle broods in the mind, and 
poisons us" [Wilde, 1988: 29], so Nietzsche affirms that "All instincts that 
do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward - this is what I call 
the internalization of man." This denial of instinct produces an inner
142
agency of the mind: "The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it 
were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, 
acquired depth, breadth and height, in the same m easure as outw ard 
discharge was inhibited" [Nietzsche, 1989: 84].
In one sense this is precisely w hat Freud w ould say. But 
N ietzsche considered  this split self a tem porary  d isease, and 
unasham edly recom m ended the re-externalisation of man as its cure. 
"The bad conscience is an illness, there is no doubt about that, but an 
illness as pregnancy is an illness" [88]. In this respect he differed 
fundamentally from the essentialist and apolitical Freud. The decadent 
position, as we shall see, falls somewhere in between. They did not speak 
of the split self in a tone of scientific aloofness - far from it. Still, it must 
be said that their ideas about what exactly was to be done with the inner 
self had little of the robust activism that we find in Nietzsche.
But if we stick for the moment to their notions about the nature of this 
inner self, we will continue to find talk which, while it seldom has the 
precise linguistic overtones of Freud that we find in Nietzsche, w ith his 
talk of latency and repression ,28 is nonetheless eerily  Freudian. 
Transferring their preference for mobility over stasis to the battlefield of 
the self, the decadents conceived a kind of dynamic psychology before 
Freud. They revelled in all that interior energy - forces, senses, instincts - 
which the age wanted them to neglect. Pater stressed in his 'Conclusion' 
that there could be no divorcing the self from the physical world around 
it, from all those "forces parting sooner or later on their ways". "That 
clear perpetual outline of face and limb is but an image of ours under
28"This instinct for freedom forcibly made latent ... this instinct for freedom pushed back 
and repressed, incarcerated within ... " [Nietzsche, 1989: 87 - italics in original!.
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which we group them - a design in a web, the actual threads of which 
pass out beyond it" [1973: 39]. And when we move from the physical self 
to "the inward world of thought and feeling, the whirlpool is still more 
rapid, the flame more eager and devouring" [1973: 39]. The modern self 
was the site of a struggle similar to the one that Pater saw in the history of 
Greek art: the "struggle ... between the palpable and limited human form, 
and the floating essence it is to contain" [Pater, 1922b: 34].
Language too had to grapple with this anarchic internal essence. 
This is the theme of the famous letter of 1871 in which Rimbaud speaks 
of the poet's duty to "make himself a seer". Poetry, says Rimbaud, must 
begin as Freudian psychology would soon begin: through a course of deep 
self-analysis. "The first study of a man who wants to be a poet is the 
knowledge of himself, complete ... he becomes the great patient, the great 
criminal, the great accursed - and the great learned one! - among men - 
For he arrives at the unknown!" [Rimbaud, 1986: 11]. There is a place, 
according to Rimbaud, deep in the poet's soul, a murky region "down 
there" - the italics are his - which it was the job of poetic language to 
contain: "If what [the poet] brings back from down there has form, he 
brings forth form; if it is formless, he brings forth formlessness. A 
language has to be found ... " [Rimbaud, 1986: 12].29 One wonders 
whether Rimbaud was reflecting the conditions down there when he 
wrote, in 'Solde', of "Wild and infinite impulse [Elan insense et infini] 
towards invisible splendours, intangible delights ... " [Rimbaud, 1986: 
296].
Maliarme, too, spoke of the Symbolist project as an attempt to 
come to grips, in language, with something profoundly akin to the
29Yeats's experiments with automatic writing were another manifestation of this urge to 
get the inner self straight down on paper. An example of a similar procedure in a different 
medium is given by Arthur Symons: "a young American sculptor ... said to me on seeing for 
the first time a picture of Whistler's, 'Whistler seems to think his picture upon canvas - 
and there it is!"' [1974a: 731.
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Freudian unconscious. In his 1896 essay 'Crisis in Verse', Mallarme 
portrayed Symbolism as a backlash against the kind of excessive 
formalism represented by the late Victor Hugo, who had "incarnated 
verse itself ... [like] a m onum ent in a silent desert.... Poetry waited 
respectfully ... for the giant - who identified it with his increasingly firm 
and tenacious blacksmith's hand - to disappear; and then it broke loose" 
[Mallarme, 1980: 2]. The resulting verse, composed as a Dionysiac revolt 
against oppressive Apollonian norms, had qualities which could hardly, 
it seemed, be appreciated by the conscious mind. "The novelty of free 
verse in our day," explains Mallarme, " ... derives entirely from what 
should be called its 'polym orphic' nature; now we are w itnessing all 
degrees of disintegration of the official line of verse.... For example, M. 
M oreas's recent verse - fragmented, with a delightful and ingenious 
precision, whose euphony the reader instinctively agrees to perceive ... " 
[Mallarme, 1980: 4 - emphasis added]. "Prosody's origins," Mallarme 
claims later in the same piece, "he in pre-conscious times" [6]. A more 
homely version of the same project was pursued in English by the 
Rhymers' Club, whose goal, according to Yeats, was "to rediscover in 
verse the syntax of impulsive common life" [Yeats, 1955: 304].
Literature was gradually beginning to throw light on that m urky 
mental place "down there". Wilde recognised this in 'The Critic as 
Artist', in which Gilbert says:
People sometimes say that fiction is getting too morbid. As far as 
psychology is concerned, it has never been morbid enough. We 
have merely touched the surface of the soul, that is all. In one 
single ivory cell of the brain there are stored away things more 
m arvellous and more terrible than even they have dream ed of
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who, like the author of Le Rouge et le Noir, have sought to track 
the soul to its most secret places. [Wilde, 1970a: 181]
This mysterious "cell" in the brain crops up again in the researches of 
Dorian Gray:
for a season he inclined to the materialistic doctrines of the 
D arw inism us  m ovem ent in Germany, and found a curious 
pleasure in tracing the thoughts and passions of m en to some 
pearly cell in the brain, or some white nerve in the body, 
delighting in the conception of the absolute dependence of the 
spirit on certain physical conditions, morbid or healthy, norm al or 
diseased. [Wilde, 1988:106]
The m ention of Darwin is timely, for we cannot ignore his 
considerable role in all this pre-Freudian exploration of an instinctive 
self inaccessible to the conscious mind. To quote Ronald Fletcher, from 
his book Instinct in Man: "The study of instinct can be traced far back into 
the history of thought ... but we are justified in regarding the w ork of 
Darwin as the m ost im portant turning-point in the history  of the 
subject.... [I]t cannot be too often em phasized that all the subsequent 
accounts of instinct were undertaken with [his] evolutionary hypothesis 
in mind" [Fletcher, 1968: 29-30].
This did not apply just to biologists: anybody who wanted to know 
how the m ind functioned had to take Darwin on board. The young 
Wilde, writing in his College Notebooks in the late 1870s, noted that: 
"Comparative anatomy shows us that, physically, m an is but the last 
term of a long series which leads from the highest mammal to the almost 
formless speck of living protoplasm which lies on the shallow boundary
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between animal and vegetable life: so does comparative psychology or the 
anatomy of the mind" [Smith & Hefland, 1989: 163].
To see how thoroughly such m aterialism  infected decadent 
thinking about the composition of the individual, it is instructive to 
consider the purity of a pre-Darwinian account of a dualised self. Victor 
Hugo, as one com m entator points out, "in his fam ous 'Preface to 
Cromwell' (1827) ... advocated a drama whose action was impelled by 
conflicts caused by the struggle of dualistic forces within the individual, 
who was described as 'double ... composed of two beings, one perishable, 
the other immortal, one carnal, the other ethereal, one enchained by the 
appetites, the other borne on the wings of enthusiasm  and dream s'" 
[Williams, 1985: 246].
A little over sixty years later, when Wilde wrote The Picture of 
Dorian Gray, literature had not lost its urge to posit, as a companion to 
the m undane everyday self, an invisible self borne on the wings of 
dreams. On the contrary, this urge had grown even stronger. But it had 
become very difficult to call this inner self a "soul", or to speak in an 
unem barrassed way of its ethereality, of its immortality. The whole 
picture had become irrevocably complicated, as Dorian sees:
Soul and body, body and soul - how mysterious they were! There 
was animalism in the soul, and the body had its m om ents of 
spirituality. The senses could refine, and the intellect could 
degrade. Who could say where the fleshly impulse ceased, or the 
psychical im pulse began? How shallow were the arbitrary  
definitions of ordinary psychologists! And yet how  difficult to 
choose between the claims of the various schools! Was the soul a 
shadow seated in the house of sin? Or was the body really in the 
soul, as Giordano Bruno thought? The separation of spirit from
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m atter was a mystery, and the union of spirit with m atter was a 
mystery also. [Wilde, 1988: 56]
An interesting essay could be written on the deploym ent through 
Wilde's works of this word "soul." As the passage above makes clear, the 
word had been rendered radically unstable; it was no longer possible to 
invoke with a straight face that traditional form of dualism, soul versus 
body. One had to speak instead of a duality within the m ind - of mental 
impulses versus bodily ones, of animalism, of psychology. Indeed it was 
only at that fatal m oment when we internalised all our instincts, said 
Nietzsche, that "man first developed w hat was later called his soul" 
[Nietzsche, 1989: 84].
On the question of what to do with this new soul, the decadents, as I have 
already noted, had a response far less rough-and-ready than Nietzsche's. 
The Nietzschean solution - to liberate one's instincts, to convert them 
into objective movement - would require a suspension of that hostility to 
all things external that characterised the decadent sensibility. For 
"action" as Wilde had Gilbert declare in 'The Critic as Artist', was "a blind 
thing dependent on external influences and moved by an impulse of 
whose nature it is unconscious.... Its basis is the lack of imagination. It is 
the last resource of those who do not know how to dream" [1970a: 124 - 
emphasis added]. "Action! What is action?" Gilbert goes on. "It dies at 
the moment of its energy. It is a base concession to fact" [128]. Similarly, 
Rimbaud, in 'H unger', wrote: "Action is not life, but a way of wasting 
some force, an enervation" [1986: 334 - emphasis added]. And Arthur 
Symons wrote of "the infinite insignificance of action, its imm ense 
distance from the current of life" [1974d: 85 - emphasis added].
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The true current of life was internal. Only w hen rigorously 
confined to that domain could instinctual energy remain pure. "I don't 
want to be at the mercy of my emotions," says Dorian Gray. "I w ant to 
use them, to enjoy them, and to dominate them" [Wilde, 1988: 89]. Freud 
said that "a universal and indispensable attribute of all instincts [is] their 
capacity for initiating movement" [Freud, 1990a: 297]. As far as the 
decadent was concerned, this capacity alone was what mattered. So what 
if instincts had the potential to cause mere objective movement? The 
truly interesting thing was that they constituted actual movement in the 
inner world. When Pater wonders aloud in his 'Conclusion' how we can 
"pass most swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the focus 
where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy?" 
he is not speaking of physical callisthenics, but m ental ones - a 
"quickened, multiplied consciousness" [Pater, 1973: 40, 41].
Even when the decadents did deal with the conversion of instinct 
into activity, their treatm ent rem ained curiously solipsistic, as in the 
following excerpt from Arthur Symons's frenetic essay on 'The World as 
Ballet'.
The dance is life, animal life, having its own way passionately. 
Part of that natural madness which men were once wise enough to 
include in religion, it began w ith the worship of the disturbing 
deities, the gods of ecstasy for whom wantonness, and wine, and 
all things in which energy passes into an ideal excess, were 
sacred.... From the first it has mimed the instincts.... A waltz, in a 
drawing-room, takes us suddenly out of all convention, away from 
those guard ians of our order w ho sit a round  the w alls, 
approvingly, unconsciously; in its w inding m otion it raises an 
invisible wall around us, shutting us off from the whole world, in
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w ith ourselves ... all this really prim itive feeling, all this 
acceptance of the instincts it idealises ... is precisely what gives 
dancing its pre-eminence among the more than im itative arts. 
[1974c: 81-82]
The objective agitation of a dance is somehow subordinate to the 
subjective agitation of instinct. Compared with the instincts, the dance is 
m erely an imitation, a mime, an idealisation: a pale sim ulacrum  of the 
dance of the mind. Instincts are not a path outward to action; action is a 
path  inward to them.30 Hence the strange notion that a dance "raises an 
invisible wall around us, shutting us off from the whole world, in with 
ourselves."
A similar journey inward is traced by Des Esseintes, who early in 
H uysm ans's novel tries to spend his energies vigorously by keeping
30Such notions persist, and produce more ample fruit, as Modernism evolves out of the 
Decadence. They might be said to culminate in that masterpiece of inferiority, A la 
recherche du temps perdu. In Swann's Way, Proust writes: "[E]ven if we have the 
sensation of being always enveloped in, surrounded by our own soul, still it does not seem a 
fixed and immovable prison; rather do we seem to be borne away with it, and perpetually 
struggling to transcend it, to break out into the world, with a perpetual discouragement as 
we hear endlessly all around us that unvarying sound which is not an echo from without, 
but the resonance of a vibration from within. We try to discover in things, which become 
precious to us on that account, the reflection of what our soul has projected onto them; we 
are disillusioned when we find that they are in reality devoid of the charm which they 
owed, in our minds, to the association of certain ideas; sometimes we mobilise all our 
spiritual forces in a glittering array in order to bring our influence to bear on other human 
beings who, we very well know, are situated outside ourselves where we can never reach 
them. And so, if I always imagined the woman I loved in the setting I most longed at the 
time to visit, if I wished that it were she who showed it to me, who opened to me the 
gates of an unknown world, it was not by the mere hazard of a simple association of 
thoughts; no, it was because my dreams of travel and of love were only moments - which I 
isolate artificially today as though I were cutting sections at different heights in a jet of 
water, iridescent but seemingly without flow or motion - in a single, undeviating, 
irresistible outpouring of all the forces of my life" [Proust, 1987: 93-94]. Later in the same 
volume: "the countries which we long for occupy, at any given moment, a far larger place 
in our actual life than the country in which we happen to be. Doubtless, if, at that time, I 
had paid more attention to what was in my mind when I pronounced the words 'going to 
Florence, to Parma, to Pisa, to Venice,' I should have realised that what I saw was in no 
sense a town.... These images, unreal, fixed, always alike, filling all my nights and days, 
differentiated this period in my life from those which had gone before it (and might 
easily have been confused with it by an observer who saw things only from without, that 
is to say who saw nothing)..." [423-424 - emphasis added].
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company with a group of "gay young men [who] were mad on races and 
operettas, lansqeunet and baccarat, and squandered fortunes on horses, 
cards, and all the other pleasures dear to empty minds." But all this 
activity provokes none of those inner stirrings which really count. 
"After a year's trial, Des Esseintes was overcome by an immense distaste 
for the company of these men, whose debauchery struck him  as being 
base and facile, entered into w ithout discrim ination or desire, indeed 
without any real stirring of the blood or stimulation of the nerves" 
[Huysmans, 1987: 21 - em phasis added]. Des Esseintes accordingly 
embarks on the pursuit of rarefied subjective pleasures. He savours 
perfumes, inhales the gamy odour of dead or dying literatures, relishes 
the "internal symphonies" provided by his "mouth-organ" (a drinking 
apparatus which dispenses manifold liqueurs [58]), and generally puts 
into practice, or non-practice, the infamous decadent maxim of Villiers 
de l'isle Adam: "As for living, our servants can do that for us." He 
travels to Holland, but his expectations - fuelled by the Dutch paintings in 
the Louvre - are not met, for the art "had in fact served as a spring-board 
from which he had soared into a dream -w orld of false trails and 
impossible ambitions, for nowhere in this w orld had he found the 
fairyland of which he had dream t..." [141]. Des Esseintes plans a 
subsequent journey to England, but aborts it at the train station. "After 
all," he reflects, "what was the good of moving, when a fellow could 
travel so magnificently sitting in a chair?" [Huysmans, 1987: 142].
When imaginings are so stubbornly withheld from the real world, 
when instincts are so strictly denied passage beyond the border of the self, 
then we do indeed seem to be dealing w ith a kind of disease. Reading 
these works, as a jaded Edm und Wilson rem arked tow ard the end of 
Axel's Castle, "we are oppressed by a sullenness, a lethargy, a sense of 
energies ingrown and sometimes festering" [Wilson, 1947: 283 - emphasis
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added]. But our feeling that the decadent perspective was "sick" - a 
feeling which, incidentally, the decadents shared - implies that there 
exists, somewhere, a perspective which we can confidently define as 
healthy. Our belief that Wilde was wrong when he claimed that two and 
two made five entails a belief in the existence, beyond the self, of certain 
eternal rules by which he can be proved wrong. We might expect to be 
able to turn for this perspective, for these rules, to science - particularly, 
one might think, to a science which presented itself as a cure for mental 
aberrations.
But in the science of psychoanalysis we do not even find norms 
which confirm the abnormality of the decadent condition, much less any 
prospect of its cure. Normal psychology, as Freud defined it, was 
frighteningly close to decadent psychology. As we shall see, Freud would 
have been able to offer no solace to the suffering decadents, except to 
congratulate them on the accuracy of their analysis of the hum an 
condition.
F reud 's theory of instincts is a case in point. Volosinov, in his 
Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, rem arks:
Certain partisans of Freud claim, having primarily his 'theory of 
instincts' in mind, that psychoanalysis has its objective basis in 
biology. This claim is completely groundless. One can with greater 
right speak of Freud's psychologization and subjectivization of 
biology. Freud dissolves all objective biological forms and 
organism ic processes in the subjective-psychical. All those 
biological terms, w ith which the pages of psychoanalytic books
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teem, lose their objective rigour, so thoroughly dissolved are they 
in the subjective-psychological context. [Volosinov, 1976: 72-73]
Subjectivization of biology" w ould be an accurate way of
%
describing the decadent attitude^instincts that we have just been 
discussing. To understand why Volosinov thought that psychoanalysis 
perpetrated something similar, we m ust consider passages of Freud like 
the following one:
a stimulus of instinctual origin does not arise in the outside world 
but from within the organism itself.... An instinct ... never acts as a 
momentary impact but always as a constant force. As it makes its 
attack not from without but from within the organism, it follows 
that no flight can avail against it. A better term for a stimulus of 
instinctual origin is a 'need'; that which does away with this need 
is 'satisfaction'. This can be attained only by a suitable (adequate) 
alteration of the inner source of stimulation. [Freud, 1950a: 62]
Instincts might well be an objective force, but Freud's account of 
motivation begins and ends in what Pater called "the narrow chamber of 
the individual m ind". Movement in the outer world is for Freud 
precisely what Symonds deemed it in his essay on dance: a kind of echo 
of the real m ovem ent that occurs w ith the readjustm ent of inner 
quantities. From the Introductory Lectures: "The final aim of mental 
activity, which can be qualitatively described as a striving tow ards 
pleasure and avoidance of pain, is represented economically in the task of 
m astering quantities of excitation (stim ulus-m asses) p resent in the 
mental apparatus, and in preventing the accumulation of them which 
gives rise to pain" [1940: 313].
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It will be objected that Freud, being a psychologist, was bound to 
focus his attention on the processes of the individual m ind, and can 
scarcely be branded a decadent individualist on that account. That is 
obviously true. But it is also true that Freud granted those processes a 
certain primacy over the world beyond them. At the beginning of life, 
says Freud, the world outside our self is to all intents and purposes non­
existent. "The contrast between what is subjective and objective does not 
exist from the first" [1950k: 184]. The prim al condition of the mental 
apparatus, the state enjoyed by the young infant, is one during which, 
"w hatever was thought of (desired) w as sim ply im agined in an 
hallucinatory form, as still happens today w ith our dream -thoughts 
every night" [Freud, 1950a: 14]. Each one of us begins life as a kind of 
miniature Des Esseintes. What was the good of moving, when one could 
travel so magnificently without leaving one's cot?
But this ideal state of affairs, this unadulterated reign of the 
pleasure principle, must come to an end. Reality m ust eventually be 
recognised. But that recognition, Freud stresses, is still governed by the 
same prim al m otive, the quest for p leasu re .31 "This attem pt at 
satisfaction by m eans of hallucination  was abandoned only in 
consequence of the absence of the expected gratification, because of the 
disappointm ent experienced. Instead, the mental apparatus had to form 
a conception of the real circumstances in the outer world and to exert 
itself to alter them" [1950a: 14]. For the m ind as Freud saw it, then, 
external reality was secondary to subjective reality in two crucial ways: 
chronologically - for the m ind's apprehension of the outer world occurs 
only after a significant period of that u tter inw ardness which is the
31A thesis which, argues Volosinov, perpetuates the priority of "the inner, subjective 
point of view; all external reality is for [Freud], in the final analysis, merely the 'reality 
principle/ a principle that he places on the same level with the 'pleasure principle'" 
[1976: 72 - emphasis in original].
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m ind's original condition - and also, so to speak, qualitatively, for reality 
is a tardy and unreliable supplier of the gratification which hallucination 
had always delivered rain, hail or shine. This deficiency of the real 
obliges the mind to keep "one mode of thought-activity ... split off ... kept 
free from reality testing and ... subordinated to the pleasure principle 
alone" - namely, "the act of phantasy-making, which begins already in 
the games of children, and later, continued as daydreaming, abandons its 
dependence on real objects" [1950a: 16-17]. Thus we retain, in the faculty 
of imagination, a portion of the mental paradise we once possessed and 
will always want back - "Just as a nation whose wealth rests on the 
exploitation of its land yet reserves certain territory to be preserved in its 
original state and protected from cultural alterations, e.g. Yellowstone 
Park" [17n.].
The decadents sought, somewhere beneath the husk of their false 
public identities, an authentic inner self - an internal Yellowstone Park, 
one might say. Freud claimed to have found it. Nor was this park as 
small and circumscribed as Freud implies when he identifies it with "the 
act of phantasy-m aking". For som ething very sim ilar to the park 
function is served by the whole agency of the unconscious, where, with 
an "entire disregard of the reality-test ... thought-reality is placed on an 
equality with external actuality, wishes w ith fulfilment and occurrence, 
just as happens w ithout more ado under the suprem acy of the old 
pleasure-principle" [1950a: 20].
The unconscious escorts wishes to their fulfilment in all sorts of 
ingenious ways - not just through daydreams, but also through nocturnal 
ones, as well as through the engineering of appropriate  neurotic 
symptoms, covertly satisfactory slips of the tongue, agreeably wicked 
jokes, screen memories, cathartic works of art, and so on. One would 
generally think of such techniques of pleasure-getting as synthetic, or
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artificial, because they bypass reality. But since they reproduce, or more 
accurately perpetuate, modes of mental functioning that prevailed when 
reality was not around to be bypassed, artificial is the wrong word for 
them. They are primal modes of gratification; they are no more artificial 
than Yellowstone Park, or at any rate than the environment that we find 
inside Yellowstone Park.
The decadents' fetishisation of artificial and synthetic modes of 
gratification, their shunning of action because of its "immense distance 
from the current of life", their pursuit of a cocooned existence devoted to 
solitary pleasures - these things appear to us, and indeed appeared to the 
decadents themselves, perverse, pathological. But here we find such 
things being theoretically elaborated, and in the process normalised, as 
part of Freud's general psychology. Satisfaction by hallucination, Freud 
decreed, was no mere substitute for 'real' satisfaction; on the contrary, so- 
called objective satisfaction was in fact a substitute for fantasy, and a poor 
one at that, so poor that a more or less constant fund of unm et desires 
accumulate, which the unconscious is obliged to go on gratifying by the 
old failsafe methods.
It is irrelevant here, I think, that Freud the m an professed a 
healthy, and wholly undecadent, respect for the texture of reality. What 
matters is that the model of mind that Freud proposed - a model from 
one w ould not expect Freud's own mental functioning to have been 
exempt - suggests, as the decadents did, that the world of inner desire is so 
real that the outer world pales by comparison:
Let us imagine ourselves in the position of an almost entirely 
helpless living organism, as yet unorientated in the world and 
with stimuli impinging on its nervous tissue. This organism will 
soon become capable of making a first discrim ination and a first
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orientation. On the one hand, it will detect certain stimuli which 
can be avoided by an action of the muscles (flight) - these it ascribes 
to the outside world; on the other hand, it will also be aware of 
stimuli against which such action is of no avail and whose urgency 
is in no way diminished by it - these stimuli are the tokens of an 
inner world, the proof of instinctual needs. The apperceptive 
substance of the living organism will thus have found in the 
efficacy of the m uscular activity a means for discrim inating 
between 'outer' and 'inner'. [1950a: 62]
Our first discrim ination, our first orientation, involves the 
understanding that the self cannot be overcome, w hereas the world 
beyond it can be. The common sense assum ption, the assum ption 
against which the decadents defined themselves as perverse, is that the 
opposite is true: it is the outer world which is intractable. By inverting 
this assumption, Freud implied a radical new ethics, as Ernest Gellner 
points out: "Psychoanalysis ... put forward a new and highly appealing 
version of Stoicism.... W here the old M ark One Stoicism preached 
acceptance of external reality by m eans of bending  inner reality, 
Freudianism  (relatively indifferent to ex ternal reality) preaches 
acceptance of inner reality ... " [1993: 86].
"What a m an really has, is what is in him," said Wilde in 'The 
Soul of Man Under Socialism'. "W hat is outside of him should be a 
m atter of no im portance" [1970c: 235]. Should be a m atter of no 
importance: not even Wilde dared to claim that it genuinely was a matter 
of no importance. But Freud proposed the existence of an unconscious 
mind which operates in full accordance with W ilde's individualist ideal. 
Similarly, the m odel of mental functioning put forw ard in that key 
decadent text, Pater's 'Conclusion' to The Renaissance, is so outlandish
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that Pater would no doubt have been surprised to hear a scientist endorse 
it. But in a sense Freud did. We have already quoted Pater's words, but it 
is worth quoting them again in light of their strong correspondence to 
the Freudian account of perception that we have just examined.
At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of external 
objects, pressing upon us with a sharp importunate reality, calling 
us out of ourselves in a thousand forms of action. But when 
reflection begins to act upon those objects they are dissipated under 
its influence; ... each object is loosed into a group of impressions ... 
in the mind of the observer. And if we continue to dwell on this 
world ... of impressions ... it contracts still further; the whole scope 
of observation is dwarfed to the narrow chamber of the individual 
mind. Experience, already reduced to a swarm of impressions, is 
ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality 
through which no real voice has ever pierced on its way to us, or 
from us to that which we can only conjecture to be without. Every 
one of those impressions is the impression of the individual in his 
isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream 
of a world. [Pater, 1973: 39-40 - emphasis added]
Freud himself inadvertently confirms the Paterian quality of his 
own theories when, in 1910, he quotes Pater in support of a 
psychoanalytic interpretation. The citation comes during Leonardo Da 
Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood,32 while Freud is speculating on 
the mystery of the Mona Lisa's smile.
32A study which Peter Gay calls a "severely flawed performance" [Gay, 1988: 270]. For 
details on the nature of the flaws, see Gay, 270-274 and the chapter entitled 'The Lessons 
of Leonardo' in Stannard, 1980.
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The need for a deeper reason behind the attraction of La Giaconda's 
smile, which so moved the artist that he was never again free from 
it, has been felt by more than one of his biographers. Walter Pater, 
who sees in the picture of Mona Lisa a 'presence expressive of what 
in the ways of a thousand years men had come to desire', and who 
writes very sensitively of 'the unfathomable smile, always with a 
touch of something sinister in it which plays over all Leonardo's 
w ork', leads us to another clue w hen he declares: 'Besides, the 
picture is- a portrait. From childhood we see the image defining 
itself on the fabric of his dreams; and but for express historical 
testim ony, we m ight fancy that this was bu t his ideal lady, 
embodied and beheld at last.' Let us attem pt to clarify what is 
suggested here. It may very well have been that Leonardo was 
fascinated by M. Lisa's smile for the reason that it awoke 
something in him which had for long lain dorm ant in his mind - 
probably an old memory.... Pater's confident assertion that we can 
see, from childhood, a face like Mona Lisa's defining itself on the 
fabric of his dreams, seems convincing and deserves to be taken 
literally. [Freud, 1964: 60 - 61]
W. B. Yeats, we will remember, chopped Pater's impressions about 
the Mona Lisa into lines and placed them in the Oxford Book of Modern 
Verse. To Freud, on the other hand, Pater's cadenced observations have a 
more profound value. They "deserve to be taken literally" because they 
agree with what Freud ventures as a scientific truth - that the picture is 
expressive of Leonardo's Oedipus complex, that "the smile of Mona Lisa
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Giacondo had awakened in [Leonardo] as a grown man the memory of 
the mother of his earliest childhood77 [Freud, 1964: 64].33
This is one of the few occasions in the Standard Edition w h e n  
Freud comes into direct contact with a piece of decadent writing, and it is 
surely significant that he vigorously endorses its propositions. Yet if 
Freud w ants to establish that he is engaging in responsible scientific 
theory, rather than wild, counterfactual speculation, then Pater's criticism 
is the wrong authority to cite. In the 'Preface7 to the Renaissance, Pater 
quotes A rnold's dictum that "the aim of criticism is to see the object in 
itself as it really is", and goes on to explain that his own critical credo 
involves a significant shift in focus: "the first step towards seeing one's 
object as it really is, is to know one's impression as it really is, to 
discrim inate it, to realise it distinctly" [see Ellmann, 1988: 308 and 
Ellmann, 1973: 62-63]. Wilde, in 'The Critic as Artist' offered a more frank 
indication of the distance between Arnold's critical theory and that of the 
impressionistic critic: "the primary aim of the critic," Wilde says, "is to 
see the object as in itself it really is not" [1970a: 137]. In other words, the 
critic's "sole aim is to chronicle his own im pressions" [133].34 As 
am m unition for this audacious theory that criticism m ust be purely 
autobiographical, "treating] the work of art simply as a starting-point for 
a new creation," a creation which will be "the record of one's own soul ... 
more fascinating than history, as it is concerned simply with oneself", 
Wilde cites nothing other than Pater's m editation on the Mona Lisa's 
smile:
3 3At some point between the ages of three and five Leonardo became separated from his 
biological mother.
34A s Wilde said elsewhere, "in aesthetic criticism attitude is everything. For in art 
there is no such thing as a universal truth. A Truth in art is that whose contradictory is 
also true" [Wilde, 1970d: 32].
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Who ... cares whether Mr Pater has put into the portrait of the 
Mona Lisa som ething that Leonardo never dream ed of? The 
painter may have been merely the slave of an archaic smile, as 
some have fancied, but whenever I pass into the cool galleries of 
the Palace of the Louvre, and stand before that strange figure ... I 
say to my friend, T he  presence that thus so strangely rose beside 
the waters is expressive of what in the ways of a thousand years 
man had come to desire'....
And so the picture becomes more wonderful to us than it 
really is, and reveals to us a secret of which, in truth, it knows 
nothing.... [Wilde, 1970a: 134-135]
Freud is right to think of Pater's assertions as "confident", but 
wrong to take that confidence as a sign of their objective veracity. For 
what they are confident assertions of is Pater's subjective impressions. It 
is not logically impossible, of course, that Pater stum bled on the true 
secret of the painting (assuming for a moment that there is one) during 
all that impressionistic waffle about dreams and desires. But in light of 
his carefree allusion to certain "express historical testim ony" which 
disproves his key speculation, this seems unlikely. Pater is free to ignore 
such testimony, because his curious epistemology has it that the existence 
of any reality beyond the self can only be conjectured. But Freud, who 
wanted to be thought a scientist, probably should have been worried by 
that phrase "but for express historical testimony", and perhaps should 
even have tried to establish what that testimony was.
Or perhaps not. The distinction between dream s and historical 
testim ony is rendered problem atic by psychoanalysis. While Freud 
would never have denied that there is such a thing as a tru th  which 
exists independently of w hat Pater wants to be true, and of what Freud
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w ants to be true, and of what we ourselves w ant to be true, he 
nonetheless raises the large conundrum  of which one of us ought to be 
trusted to find it. 'T he ego," Freud says, meaning ego in the traditional 
sense of the self,35 "is always the standard by which one measures the 
external world; one learns to understand it by means of a constant 
comparison with oneself" [1990a: 266].36 The idea that the self is the only 
lens through which we can see the world is already a decadent-sounding 
model of perception, less close to Arnold's ideal of knowing the thing in 
itself than it is to Pater's project of knowing one's im pression of the 
thing. But the Freudian self is driven by desire, so in its capacity as a lens 
it can hardly be said to be free of flaws. To put it another way, reality is 
recognised only by our conscious mind, which is a somewhat ramshackle 
structure built on the still-active volcano of the unconscious - where 
"there is no 'indication of reality' ... so that it is impossible to distinguish 
between truth and emotionally-charged fiction" [Freud, A. et al., 1954: 
216]. While the unconscious continues to assert its emotionally-charged 
fictions, we have the consequence that "[ojnly for the rarest and best 
adjusted mind does it seem possible to preserve the picture of external 
reality, as it is perceived, against the distortion to which it is normally 
subjected in its passage through the psychical individuality  of the 
percipient" [1966: 229]. Ultimately, then, Freud takes us beyond Pater, and
35Freud is writing in 1909 here - before, that is, he developed his 'second topography', in 
which ego became a technical term designating the conscious part of the mind. On the two 
ways in which Freud employed the word 'ego', see the 'Editor's Introduction' to The Ego 
and the Id in the Standard Edition [9: 7-8].
36"There ... runs through my thoughts," as Freud confessed in the Psycho-pathology, "a 
continuous current of 'personal reference'.... It is as if I were obliged to compare everything 
I hear about other people with myself; as if my personal complexes were put on alert 
whenever another person is brought to my notice. This cannot possibly be an individual 
peculiarity of my own: it must rather contain an indication of the way in which we 
understand 'something other than ourself' in general. I have reasons for supposing that 
other people are in this respect very similar to me" [Freud, 1966: 24]. One person who did 
not feel the same way was Einstein, who once commented, "I feel such a sense of solidarity 
with all living things that it does not matter to me where the individual begins and ends" 
[Bom, 1971: 152]. This kind of outlook seems to be a far more sound basis for scientific 
observation than Freud's, which might more appropriately be called an "inlook".
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all the way to Wilde's total inversion of Arnold's ideal: we tend to know 
the thing as in itself it really is not.
It is not the purpose of this thesis to ask how som ebody who 
proposed this model of perception could also have claimed to be, as a 
scientist, in possession of a crystal-clear picture of external reality. We are 
concerned here with the close relation between the Freudian model and 
such ap paren tly  ou trageous decadent u tte rances as Remy de 
G ourm ount's claim, in his 1895 book L'Idealisme, that "M an knows 
nothing other than his own intelligence, his self, the only reality, the 
special and unique w orld that I contain, carry w ithin me, distort, 
dissipate, and recreate according to my own personal activity; nothing 
moves or has its being outside the knowing subject; everything I think is 
real: the only reality is thought" [quoted by Pierrot, 1981: 72].
Max Nordau defined "Ego-mania" as one of the principal disorders 
that shaped "degenerate" literature. "The ego-maniac," he said, "... is an 
invalid who does not see things as they are, does not understand the 
world, and cannot take up a right attitude to it" [Nordau, 1968: 243]. 
Consider the above assertion of Gourmont's, and imagine for a moment 
that he is not writing even partially for effect, but means every word he 
says. Can we really condem n N ordau for thinking that there is 
something sick about such a perspective? Even if we stop short of calling 
Gourmont an invalid, surely we cannot avoid the judgem ent that his 
attitude is an unhealthy one, if only in the sense that he w ould run a 
substantial risk, when stepping out into the world in which he did not 
believe, of being run over by a hansom cab.
But in arriving at that judgement, we would seem to have made 
one fundam ental mistake: that of believing that G ourm ont really 
thought these things. Surely we have taken him too literally, mistaking 
an aesthetic stance for a serious stab at an epistemology. As Bernard
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Shaw points out, such a m isunderstanding of the nature of literary 
expression seems to inform N ordau 's belief that the decadents were 
insane: "People do not write [meaningless rhymes] for the sake of 
conveying information, but for the sake of amusing and pleasing, just as 
people do not eat strawberries and cream to nourish their bones and 
muscles, but to enjoy the taste of a toothsome dish" [Shaw, 1911: 75].
Freud 's apparen t endorsem ent of the decadent perspective, 
though, adds an interesting twist to this debate. George L. Mosse, 
introducing the 1968 edition of Degeneration, suggests that Nordau had 
been wrong to proclaim the decadents insane - because Freud had proved 
their insanity right.
His Interpretation of Dreams (1900) not only marked the end of the 
psychology in which N ordau had believed but also served to 
underwrite the Expressionist view of truth. Two years later 
August Strindberg, in the preface to his Dream Play, put the case 
squarely. 'The laws of space and time have been abolished, reality 
contributes only a slight foundation upon which phantasy works 
and weaves new patterns ... but one consciousness stands above all 
else: that of the dream er. For there exist no secrets, no 
illogicalities, no scruples, no laws.' The certainty of N ordau 's 
world had vanished. [Mosse, 1968: xxx - emphasis added]
Mosse, evidently, takes the objective correctness of Freud's ideas 
for granted, and seems to believe that they confer scientific cachet on the 
strikingly similar ideas of the decadents - including, presum ably, the 
egregious notion that the laws of time and space have been abolished. 
But before we dispense with the laws of space and time, we might want to 
re-examine the credentials of Freud's theories. Can't his proximity to the
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decadents be looked at the other way? Couldn't we just as easily say that 
they underw rite him - and then proceed to reassess his credit rating in 
that light?
Strindberg's is an extreme solipsism indeed, but there are certain 
respects in which Freud surpassed it. For Strindberg, "one consciousness 
stands above all else: that of the dreamer." Freud derived from the case 
of the dream er a more profound proposition: that one unconscious  
stands above all else. Freud's dream er is capable of m aking things 
conform to wishes in ways that he or she cannot consciously conceive of. 
Just as Freud expanded the definition of sex until the original concept 
could scarcely be recognised, so he radically widened the jurisdiction of 
the dream: jokes, artworks, failures of memory, and neurotic symptoms 
all became analogous to dreams, in the sense that they all became arenas 
for the fulfilment of wishes. Freud took a huge range of ostensibly 
objective phenom ena and turned them in an im portant sense into 
subjective ones, putty in the hands of private desire.
The Interpretation of Dreams was the w ork in w hich Freud 
unveiled his notion that wishes could be, and were, fulfilled in ways not 
previously dreamed of. Certain post-Freudian scientists hold that dreams 
do not mean anything at all - Francis Crick, the co-discoverer of the 
structure  of DNA, thinks of dream s as "an accidental by-product 
produced by random  waves" [in Simpson, 1987], and Peter M edawar 
raises the possibility that they are "just ... noise."31 For Freud, though, 
dream s always m ean som ething, and they always m ean, b roadly  
speaking, the same thing: they are a (disguised) fulfilment of a (repressed)
37"[T]hose who enjoy slopping around in the amniotic fluid should pause for a moment to 
entertain (perhaps only unconsciously in the first instance) the idea that the content of 
dreams may be totally devoid of 'meaning'. There should be no need to emphasize, in this 
century of radio sets and electronic devices, that many dreams may be assemblages of 
thought elements that convey no information whatsoever: that they may just be noise" 
[Medawar, 1996:42].
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wish. If dreams often look meaningless, that is because the wishes that 
are being expressed dare not speak their name, and so must be clothed by 
the dream-work in a heavy disguise.
W hat about the nightm are, though? How can a dream  from 
which one wakes up screaming be a wish-fulfilment? Freud's answer to 
this question is instructive:
The very frequent dreams which appear to stand in contradiction 
to my theory because their subject-matter is the frustration of a 
wish or the occurrence of something clearly unwished-for, may be 
brought together under the heading of 'counter-w ish dream s'.... 
One of the two motive forces leading to such dream s is the wish 
that I may be wrong. These dreams appear regularly in the course 
of my treatments when a patient is in a state of resistance to me; 
and I can count almost certainly on provoking one of them after I 
have explained to a patient for the first time my theory that 
dreams are fulfilments of wishes. [SE, 4: 157-158 - emphasis added]
The contention that nightmares are a form of wish-fulfilm ent is 
supremely counter-intuitive. That doesn't mean that it is wrong, but it 
does mean, or ought to mean, that it requires some substantial support. 
But w hen Freud identifies as one of the two motive forces leading to 
such dreams a factor which can only ever be at play in the nightm ares of 
his patients - that is, in an infinitesimally small fraction of people who 
have nightmares - he gives the strong impression that he is clutching at 
straw s. Nor does the second motive force he m entions38 offer a
38Namely, the "masochistic component in the sexual constitution of m any people .... 
People of this kind can have counter-wish dreams and unpleasurable dreams, which are 
none the less wish-fulfilments since they satisfy their masochistic inclinations" [ibid.]. 
Thus Freud's wish-fulfilment theory, as he outlines it in the Dreams book, can account for
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universal reason why people should wish for nightmares. Freud, one 
suspects, believes that nightm ares are w ish-fulfilm ents only out of 
theoretical necessity, and goes in vague search of empirical support after 
the event.
Even a brief glance at Freud's theory of dreams reveals problems, 
then. But Freud was never going to get a better chance to validate his 
thesis about the determinacy of unconscious desire: for dream ing is an 
activity which is purely mental and from which the conscious m ind is 
manifestly absent. In his next book, The Psychopathology of Everyday 
Life, he was obliged to apply his hypotheses to phenomena which seldom 
satisfied both of these conditions, and sometimes satisfied neither. How 
did his principle that "nothing in the mind is arbitrary or undeterm ined" 
[Freud, 1966: 242] apply, for example, to the accidental knocking over of 
the lid of an inkpot: an event which seems to be entirely arbitrary and, 
more to the point, does not even seem to be a mental phenom enon? 
Like so: "seemingly accidental clumsy m ovements," Freud explains, 
"prove to be governed by an intention and achieve their aim w ith a 
certainty which cannot in general be credited to our conscious voluntary 
movements" [1966: 168]. For example:
It is very rare for me to break anything. I am not particularly 
dextrous but a result of the anatomical integrity of my nerve- 
muscle apparatus is that there are clearly no grounds for my 
making clumsy movements of this kind, w ith their unwelcome 
consequences.... Why then did I once dash the marble cover of my 
plain inkpot to the ground so that it broke?... The explanation was 
not hard to find. Some hours before, my sister ... [had] remarked:
nightmares only in two sub-groups of humanity: masochists, and people who wish to prove 
Freudian theory wrong.
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'Your writing table looks really attractive now; only the inkstand 
doesn't match. You must get a nicer one/ I went out with my 
sister and did not return for several hours. But w hen I did I 
carried out, so it seems, the execution of the condemned inkstand. 
Did I perhaps conclude from my sister's remark that she intended 
to make me a present of a nice inkstand on the next festive 
occasion, and did I smash the unlovely one so as to force her to 
carry out the intention she had hinted at? If that is so, my 
sweeping movement was only apparently clumsy; in reality it was 
exceedingly adroit and well-directed, and understood how to avoid 
damaging any of the more precious objects that stood around. 
[1966:167-168]
Thus are the wishes of the inner self projected into the outer 
world. The decadents, we will remember, had written off the world of 
action, because, as Wilde said, it was “a blind thing dependent on external 
influences ... the last resource of those who do not know how to dream." 
But external influences, Freud said reassuringly, were less powerful than 
one might have thought, and internal ones were more so. Action was a 
form of dream.
If this sounds far-fetched, it is w orth rem em bering that Freud 
flirted with even more outlandish manifestations of the omnipotence of 
thoughts. He devoted serious attention, for example, to the question of 
telepathy. In Gay's account:
In 1926 he rem inded Jones that he had long since harboured a 
'favourable prejudice in favour of telepathy' and had held back 
only to protect psychoanalysis from too close a proxim ity to 
occultism. But recently 'the experiments that I have undertaken
168
w ith Ferenczi and my daughter have gained such a persuasive 
power for me, that diplomatic considerations had to take a back 
seat.... [I]f someone should reproach you with my Fall into Sin, you 
are free to reply that my adherence to telepathy is my private affair 
like my Jewishness, my passion for smoking and other things, and 
the theme of telepathy - inessential for psychoanalysis. [Gay: 444- 
445]
The theme of telepathy was inessential for decadent literature, too. 
But it was there on the periphery, and it was there for the same reason it 
was there in Freud: because it is a logical, if not a sensible, extension of 
the thesis that mental desire is omnipotent. Thus Yeats, in 1898, wTrote 
that decadent art "comes to us at the moment when we are beginning to 
be interested in many things which positive science, the interpreter of 
exterior law, has always denied: comm union of m ind w ith m ind in 
thought and w ithout words, fore-knowledge in dreams and in visions ... 
and of much else ... " [Yeats, 1961: 191].
Both Freud and the decadents, then, described how desire plays under 
painfully cram ped conditions, where it m ust resort to means artificial, 
subterranean, and frankly bizarre to find relief. For the decadents, this 
theme was clearly related to the stifling social conditions of the time. For 
Freud, that stifling quality was a perm anent fixture in all hum an mental 
affairs. It is for this reason that Settembrini, the robust hum anist in 
Thomas M ann's Magic Mountain, finds the theories of the m ountain 's 
resident psycho-analyst, Dr Krokowski, "unappetizing": "Analysis as an 
instrument of enlightenment and civilization is good," he says, "in so far 
as it shatters absurd convictions, acts as a solvent upon  natu ra l
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prejudices, and underm ines authority; good, in other words, in that it 
sets free, refines, humanizes, makes slaves ripe for freedom. But it is bad, 
very bad, in so far as it stands in the way of action, cannot shape the vital 
forces, maims life at its roots. Analysis can be a very unappetizing affair, 
as much so as death, with which it may well belong - allied to the grave 
and its unsavoury anatomy" [Mann: 1977: 222].
The unappetizing side of psychoanalysis becomes most apparent 
when Freud explains how his two principles of mental functioning, the 
pleasure principle and the reality principle, combine to make the hum an 
condition one of radical discontent. Effectively, the two principles 
constitute the jaws of a vice in which the mind was perm anently trapped. 
Outlining this depressing proposition in Civilization and its Discontents, 
Freud observes that the "purpose and object" of our lives is to
seek happiness ... to become happy and to remain so.... As we see, it 
is simply the pleasure principle which draws up the program  of 
life's purpose. The principle dom inates the operation of the 
mental apparatus from the very beginning. There can be no doubt 
about its efficiency, and yet its program  is in conflict w ith the 
whole world.... It simply cannot be pu t into execution, the whole 
constitution of things runs counter to it; one m ight say the 
intention that m an should be 'happy ' is not included in the 
scheme of 'Creation'. What is called happiness in its narrow est 
sense comes from the satisfaction - most often instantaneous - of 
pent-up needs which have reached great intensity, and by its very 
nature can only be a transitory experience.... O ur possibilities of 
happiness are thus limited from the start by our very constitution. 
It is much less difficult to be unhappy. [Freud, 1949a: 27-28]
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In a nutshell, the cruel paradox of hum an life is this: "The goal tow ards 
which the pleasure principle impels us - of becoming happy - is not 
attainable; yet we may not - nay, cannot - give up the effort to come 
nearer to realization of it by some means or another" [1949a: 39].
If there is a single element of Freudian theory which decadent 
literature anticipated most heavily, this is it. Decadent literature can 
almost be defined by its furious obsession with this paradox. Axel refuses 
to kiss his mistress, because he knows that it will not live up to his ideal. 
Rim baud com plains that "Great music falls short of our desire" 
[Rimbaud, 1986: 240]. Wilde says that "To be entirely free, and at the same 
time entirely dominated by law, is the eternal paradox of hum an life that 
we realise at every moment ... " [Hart-Davis, 1986: 172]. Pater speaks of 
"that inexhaustible discontent, languer, and home-sickness, that endless 
regret, the chords of which ring all through our m odern literature" 
[quoted by Eliot, 1930: 101]. Paul Bourget asks: "Ah, why is it the common 
law for all hum an creatures that pleasure is always disproportionate to 
the desire? Why is a yearning soul the dupe of a mirage that persuades it 
that it contains the means for a continuous taste of ecstasy?" [quoted by 
Pierrot, 1981: 269].
Des Esseintes encounters constant frustration of his "arden t 
aspirations towards an ideal, towards an unknown universe, tow ards a 
distant beatitude, as utterly desirable as that promised by the Scriptures" 
[Huysmans, 1987: 89]. Dorian Gray has a similarly "wild longing ... that 
our eyelids m ight open some m orning upon a w orld that had been 
fashioned anew in the darkness for our pleasure.... It was the creation of 
such worlds as these that seemed to Dorian Gray to be the true object, or 
amongst the true objects, of life ... " [Wilde, 1988: 105]. And he, like Des 
Esseintes, is thwarted: "Life," he discovers, "is a great disappointm ent" 
[137] - a conclusion w hich is echoed by the novel's theoretical
171
mouthpiece, Lord Henry: "All ways end at the same point ... disillusion" 
[155],
Wilde recognised both jaws of the vice - the inevitability of the 
thirst for pleasure, and the inevitability of its disappointment - under his 
own name, too. In a letter written shortly after the publication of Dorian 
Gray, he told a correspondent that "I look forward to the time when 
aesthetics will be the dominant law of life: it will never be so, and so I 
look forward to it" [Lawler, 1988: 43]. And on his lecture tour of the 
United States, Wilde defined aestheticism as "the search after the secret of 
life.... Some people might search and not find anything. But the search, if 
carried on according to the right laws, would constitute aestheticism. 
They would find happiness in striving, even in despair of ever finding 
what they sought" [quoted by Ellmann, 1988: 151-152].
This cascade of despair is intelligible as an historical phenomenon, 
a product of a time when public reality was egregiously and lamentably 
distant from private desire. Sometimes, indeed, the decadents were plain 
about the historical specificity of their despair. Paul Bourget again:
When the human being is extremely civilized, he requires that 
things shall exist in accordance with the desires of his own heart, a 
coincidence made all the rarer by the fact that his heart is curiously 
refined, thus producing irremediable unhappiness.... The man 
who dreams up a setting of fascinating and complicated events for 
his personal destiny has every chance of finding the reality of 
things in disharmony with those dreams, above all if he was born 
into an ageing civilization where a more general distribution of 
welfare is accompanied by a certain banality in private and public 
lifestyles. [Quoted by Pierrot, 1981: 13-14 - emphasis added]
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The book in which this passage appeared was called Essais de Psycologie 
Contemporaine. Was Freud, too, commenting merely on contemporary 
psychology when he suggested that reality was always in disharm ony 
with our dreams?
A further Freudian element enters the decadent picture when Des 
Esseintes, in the presence of a prostitute, reflects miserably on the failure 
of his pleasure quest:
... the feverish desire for the unknown, the unsatisfied longing for 
an ideal, the craving to escape from the horrible realities of life, to 
cross the frontiers of thought, to grope after a certainty, albeit 
w ithout finding one, in the misty upper regions of art! The 
paltriness of his own efforts was borne in upon him and cut him 
to the heart. He clasped the wom an beside him in a gentle 
embrace, clinging to her like a child w anting to be comforted. 
[Huysmans, 1987: 115]
The reversion to childhood in this context is highly suggestive. 
W alter Pater is another decadent who invokes childhood, and other 
Freudian tropes besides, when speaking of the friction between desire and 
reality in the 'Denys L'Auxerrois' chapter of Imaginary Portraits:
Almost every people, as we know, has had its legend of a 'golden 
age' and of its return  - legends which will hardly be forgotten, 
how ever prosaic the world may become, while m an him self 
remains the aspiring, never quite contented being he is. And yet 
in truth, since we are no longer children, we might well question 
the return to us of a condition of life in which, by the nature of the 
case, the value of things would, so to speak, lie wholly on their
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surfaces, unless we could regain also the childish consciousness, or 
rather unconsciousness, in ourselves, to take all that adroitly and 
with the appropriate lightness of heart. The dream, however, has 
been left for the most part in the vagueness of dreams: in their 
waking hours people have been too busy to furnish it with details. 
[1948: 180 - emphasis added]
Passages like this can leave us in no doubt: there is a relationship 
between decadent writing and the insights of Freud which simply cannot 
be ignored. The question is what kind of relationship it was. A Freudian 
would have no trouble interpreting the above passage as a vindication of 
psychoanalytical theory. For in the space of a single paragraph Pater 
speaks of the kind of unsatisfied yearnings one might associate w ith the 
pleasure principle, and expresses a dim awareness that the possibility of 
satisfaction m ight lie som ewhere in childhood, in dream s, in the 
unconscious. But to envy the blissful unconsciousness of a child, its 
interest only in the surface of things, is an attitude which can also be 
construed historically, as part of the decadent recoil from that "m odern 
life" which Wilde defined as "complex and relative. Those are its two 
distinguishing notes" [Hart-Davis, 1986: 188].
But, the Freudian will reply, doesn't Pater explicitly detach his 
reflections from history here? Doesn't he define "man" in general - not 
merely decadent "man" - as an "aspiring, never quite contented being"; 
doesn't he say that almost every people yearns for a golden age? This is 
no doubt true; but few yearned for a golden age with the peculiar force of 
the decadents. To quote John Stuart Mill, from his 1831 essay 'The Spirit 
of the Age': "the idea of comparing one's own age with former ages, or 
w ith our notion of those which are yet to come, had occurred to 
philosophers; but it never before was itself the dominant idea of any age"
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[quoted by Eksteins, 1985: 3 - emphasis added]. Similarly, literature before 
the decadents and since them has entertained the theme of longing met 
by disappointment. But no other literature has been so pathologically 
obsessed by it. What other period could possibly have given us Ä 
Rebours? What other literature has been so exclusively determined to 
show us humanity, in Nietzsche's memorable image, rubbing itself raw 
against the bars of its cage? Who else but a decadent could have produced 
a poem like this:
Last night, ah, yersternight, betwixt her lips and mine 
There fell thy shadow, Cynara! thy breath was shed 
Upon my soul between the kisses and the wine;
And I was desolate and sick of an old passion,
Yea, I was desolate and bowed my head:
I have been faithful to thee, Cynara! in my fashion.
All night upon mine heart I felt her warm heart beat,
Night-long within mine arms in love and sleep she lay;
Surely the kisses of her bought red mouth were sweet;
But I was desolate and sick of an old passion,
When I awoke and found the dawn was gray:
I have been faithful to thee, Cynara! in my fashion.
I have forgot much, Cynara! gone with the wind,
Flung roses, roses riotously with the throng,
Dancing to put thy pale lost lilies out of mind;
But I was desolate and sick of an old passion,
Yea, all the time, because the dance was long:
I have been faithful to thee, Cynara! in my fashion.
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I cried for madder music and for stronger wine,
But when the feast is finished and the lamps expire,
Then falls thy shadow, Cynara! the night is thine;
And I am desolate and sick of an old passion,
Yea, hungry for the lips of my desire:
I have been faithful to thee, Cynara! in my fashion.
[Stanford, 1965: 64]
The shadow that always falls between desire and its fulfilment; the 
invisible ideal so pressing that the physical world - the kiss of the whore - 
seems negligible beside it. It is a poem about the speaker's unrequited 
love, but it is also a poem about the decadent condition, which might be 
defined as an unrequited love for the world. In Cynara the condition has 
reached, almost literally, fever pitch: we are dealing unmistakably with 
an illness, with a psyche desolate and sick, and we can only hope that 
Freud was wrong when he made such a condition the inevitable hum an 
lot. W hen Pater, w riting in Imaginary Portraits, im puted his own 
decadent condition to Watteau, he could be frank and call it a sickness. 
"He has been a sick m an all his life. He was always a seeker after 
something in the world that is there in no satisfying measure, or not at 
all" [quoted by Aldington, 1948: 23].39 Yeats, w riting about Lionel 
Johnson, tells us: "One day ... he spoke of 'a craving that made every
39That Pater is indeed being autobiographical here is confirmed by Richard Aldington: 
"The first sentence is true: Watteau suffered from tuberculosis. The second sentence is a 
perfect summing up of Walter Pater, but there is little in the records of Watteau's life or in 
his paintings to suggest that it has any truth at all as far as he is concerned" [Aldington, 
1948: 23].
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atom of his body cry out' and said the moment after, 'I do not want to be 
cu red '... " [1955: 310].
Not wanting to be cured was no doubt a part of the illness. But 
ultim ately the decadent had to be cured. One could not live forever in 
the state of the narrator of 'C ynara', or of Des Esseintes. Barbey 
d'Aurevilly, after reading Ä Rebours, suggested that its author was left 
with only one choice: between "the muzzle of a pistol and the foot of the 
Cross" [Baldick, 1987: 12]. Indeed Huysmans himself had recognised, at 
the novel's end, that the condition of Des Esseintes required a remedy.
Des Esseintes told [his doctor] of his unrealizable ideals and was 
beginning to outline new experiments in colour, to talk about new 
combinations and contrasts that he m eant to organize, when the 
doctor threw  cold water on his enthusiasm  by declaring in 
perem ptory fashion that wherever he put his ideas into effect it 
would certainly not be in that house.
Then, without giving him time to breathe, he stated that he 
had attended to the most urgent problem first by putting right the 
digestive functions, and that he now m ust tackle the general 
nervous trouble, which had not cleared up at all and to do so 
would require years of strict dieting and careful nursing. He 
concluded by saying that before trying any particular remedy ... he 
would have to abandon this solitary existence, to go back to Paris, 
to lead a normal life again, and above all to try and enjoy the same 
pleasures as other people.... The doctor ... assured him that this 
radical change of life he prescribed was in his opinion a matter of 
life and death - that it meant the difference between a good 
recovery on the one hand and insanity speedily followed by 
tuberculosis on the other. [Huysmans, 1987: 211]
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There is an echo of this prescription in the comments of those 
critics who condemned decadence as a disease from which literature had 
to recover. Edmund Wilson, whom we have already observed in a jaded 
mood towards the end of Axel's Castle, lays his cards on the table during 
the book's conclusion. Having watched decadent literature enact again 
and again its sterile stalemate between private desire and public reality, 
Wilson finds that he needs some air:
I believe ... that the time is at hand when these writers ... will no 
longer serve us as guides. Axel's world of the private imagination 
in isolation from the life of society seems to have been exploited 
and explored as far as for the present is possible.... [W]ho hereafter 
will be content to inhabit a corner, though fitted out with some 
choice things of one's own, in the shuttered house of one of these 
writers - where we find ourselves, also, becoming conscious of a 
lack of ventilation? [Wilson, 1947: 292]
William Empson, using a different metaphor, expressed a similar 
complaint: Symbolism, he said, "is the poetry of the hamstrung, the 
people who have cut the strings in their legs. Such a poet cannot go 
where he wants to; he has to sit and wait like a barnacle and seize on any 
associations of the kind he wants that happen to drift toward him. This 
is a distinctive condition, and not pretty.... The truth is, it is high time 
they got the use of their legs back" [Empson, 1988: 170].
These suggestions are all very well, if the ailment in question is 
confined to a particular school of literature. But as I have argued, Freud 
imputed the decadent condition, or something very like it, to the whole 
of civilized humanity. If insular anti-realism in literature proved a dead-
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end, it doesn't really matter; it was an interesting dead-end, and there are 
other roads to go down. But Freud's proposition that life is a dead-end is 
somewhat more alarming. What window can we throw  open to relieve 
the lack of ventilation; how can we get the use of our legs back?
There is an interesting passage in the New Introductory Lectures 
which offers one possible answer. Writing about the alleged restrictions 
imposed on hum an development by religious thinking, Freud suggests 
that:
Intellect ... or rather, to call it by a more familiar name, reason - is 
among the forces which may be expected to exercise a unifying 
influence upon men - creatures who can be held together only 
w ith the greatest difficulty, and whom  it is therefore scarcely 
possible to control. Think how impossible hum an society would 
be if every one had his own particular multiplication table, and his 
own private units of weight and length. Our best hope for the 
future is that the intellect - the scientific spirit, reason - should in 
time establish a dictatorship over the hum an m ind.... [T]he 
common pressure exercised by such a domination of reason would 
prove to be the strongest unifying force among men, and would 
prepare the way for further unifications. W hatever, like the ban 
laid upon thought by religion, opposes such a development is a 
danger for the future of mankind. [Freud, 1933: 234 - 235]
There is something else which opposes such a development, and 
which therefore, on Freud's own terms, should be considered "a danger 
for the future of m ankind": namely, the theoretical propositions of 
psychoanalysis. Doesn't psychoanalysis itself, especially its idea of a 
determinate unconscious, present a severe obstacle to the domination of
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reason? Doesn't the cultural malaise that Freud associates with religious 
belief - a malaise characterised by the inhibition of proper perception, by 
the dominance of unreason - correspond precisely to that hamstringing 
of hum anity which Freudian theory perpetrates when followed to its 
decadent ends? It was Freud himself, not Christ or Buddha, who limited 
the hum an mind with his suggestion that "only for the rarest and best- 
adjusted mind does it seem possible to preserve the picture of external 
reality, as it is perceived, against the distortion to which it is normally 
subjected in its passage through the psychical individuality  of the 
percipient". This model of perception, as we have seen, came awfully 
close to the thinking of Freud's decadent contemporaries, whose notions 
about the ind iv idual's ow nership of tru th  ended precisely in that 
assertion of private multiplication tables - two plus two equals five, said 
Wilde - which Freud attem pts to represent as the very antithesis of his 
own project. The idea that people are "creatures who can be held 
together only w ith the greatest difficulty, and whom  it is therefore 
scarcely possible to control" - the fulcrum of Freud's above remarks - is an 
article of faith in psychoanalysis; but one could argue that it is less self- 
evidently and pressingly true in the real world than it is between the 
covers of Freud's increasingly pessimistic books. Once one has accepted it 
as a truth, though, then one is bound to think that hum an society will 
quiver m ore or less perm anently  on the brink of m eltdow n, of 
atomisation, unless in the future some unifying force is imposed.
But Freudian theory debars the very solution to the crisis that 
Freud advances. His evangelical faith in the unifying potential of reason 
does not sit easily beside his dark theoretical belief that "m an is not 
master in his own house", that irrational motives govern our behaviour, 
that reason is a far weaker force than people suppose. If Freud is to be 
consistent, he m ust adm it that the same theories which make the need
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for a rational unification of humanity so urgent also deem it impossible. 
In darker moods Freud adm itted this point. "The ideal condition of 
things would of course be a community of men who had subordinated 
their instinctual life to the dictatorship of reason/' he w rote in 'W hy 
W ar?' (1932). "Nothing else could unite men so completely and so 
tenaciously, even if there were no emotional ties between them. But in 
all probability," he adds glumly, "that is a Utopian speculation" [Freud, 
19501: 284 - emphasis added]. Karl Kraus said that psychoanalysis is the 
disease for which it presents itself as the cure. But when Freud faces the 
gloomy implications of his own theories, we are obliged to m odify 
Kraus's aphorism. Psychoanalysis is the disease for which psychoanalysis 
proclaims there can be no cure. Conscious that his own theories implied 
a lack of ventilation, Freud reached to open a window - only to find that 
he had shut it, locked it, and thrown away the key.
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T h r ee
"Fathers are certainly not popular just 
at present": Decadent Literature 
and the Oedipus Complex
In 1897, the year in which Freud first identified the phenomenon that he 
would later name the 'Oedipus complex',1 Stephane Mallarme published 
his Divigations, which contained the essay 'Crisis in Verse'. "Whoever 
grants literature a prim ary im portance - or any im portance - m ust 
recognise the momentousness of the present hour," wrote Mailarme in 
that essay:
we are w itnessing upheavals w hich suggest the finale of a 
century.... A French reader, whose habits were interrupted by the 
death of Victor Flugo [in 1885], can only be disconcerted. In the 
course of his m ysterious mission, Hugo reduced all prose - 
philosophy, eloquence, history - to verse, and as he incarnated 
verse itself he virtually confiscated the thinker's, the orator's and 
the historian's right to expression: a monument in a silent desert, 
he was as well the concealed god of a majestic, unconscious idea 
which said that the form we call verse is itself, quite simply, 
literature.... Poetry waited respectfully, so to speak, for the giant - 
who identified  it w ith  his increasingly firm  and tenacious 
blacksmith's hand - to disappear; and then it broke loose. The
^ e e  Freud's letter to Fliess of October 15, 1897. "Only one idea of general value has 
occurred to me. I have found love of the mother and jealousy of the father in my own case 
too, and now believe it to be a general phenomenon of early childhood..." [Freud, A. et al., 
1954: 223].
entire language had been geared to prosody and drew from it the 
vital sense of pause; but then it broke away, scattering freely its 
innumerable basic elements, having suddenly become like a verbal 
orchestration of multiple sounds. [Mailarme, 1980: 2]
Isn 't there som ething oedipal about this passage? Reading 
Mallarme's dance on the grave of the poetic patriarch today, it is difficult 
not to ask oneself this question, and once one has asked the question it is 
nearly impossible to arrive at any answer but 'yes'. During the century 
since its form ulation, F reud 's notion of the O edipus complex has 
m etam orphosed from an ou tland ish  hypothesis into som ething  
approaching conventional wisdom. Even if one is not a card-carrying 
Freudian, one finds oneself pouncing suspiciously, or superstitiously, on 
words like concealed god, giant, firm and tenacious hand, and m oving 
effortlessly to the conclusion that Mallarme's attack on the authority of 
Hugo is underw ritten by that hostility to the father that lurks in the 
psyches of all normal males.
W hat assum ptions do we make en route to this extraordinary 
conclusion? To begin with, we make a substantial leap of faith when we 
entertain the possibility (which swiftly hardens into a probability) that the 
true object of Mallarme's hostility here is his father - a figure to whom 
there is not the slenderest of allusions in the actual text. But that leap, 
while audaciously large, is still not sufficient to land us at our conclusion 
that this hostility is oedipal - for 'oedipal hostility' is not, or should not 
be, a mere synonym  for hostility to one's father per se. The (male) 
Oedipus complex, we should remember, has two emotional constituents: 
"love of the mother," as Freud explained in his landm ark letter to Fliess
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of October 1897, "and jealousy of the father."2 These two components are 
not only linked, they are prioritised: jealousy of the father is a 
consequence, an epiphenomenon, of love of the mother. On the basis of 
this information, it w ould seem fair to conclude that hostility to the 
father is a necessary condition of an "oedipal" sentim ent, but not a 
sufficient one. In other words, even if Mallarme's essay were peppered 
w ith explicit derogatory references to his actual father, which it clearly 
isn't, it still would not qualify as self-evidently oedipal. One would need, 
in addition  to that hostility, evidence of its connection w ith  an 
underlying desire for the mother before the adjective "oedipal" could be 
fully justified.
But evidence, the Freudian will reply w ith some justice, is 
necessarily scarce in the case of such taboo desires. If Maliarme really did 
rejoice in the death of his father,3 then he would hardly come right out 
and say so. Such emotions are too heinous to articulate even to oneself, 
which is precisely why they have been pushed into the unconscious in 
the first place. As far as evidence of such a deeply repressed desire is 
concerned, then, vague allusions are as m uch as we can expect. 
Similarly, the Freudian w ould continue, a certain lack of evidence of
2When unveiling the theory in the letter quoted above, Freud calls mother-love and 
father-envy "a general phenomenon of early childhood". But strictly speaking these 
phenomena are not general at all - they occur only in the case of the male. This sexist slip 
inaugurates what will become, as the oedipal theory unfolds, an enduring vice of Freud's - 
namely, that of writing as if the female subject did not exist. His focus, as we will see, fell 
almost exclusively on the complex of the male. More often than not, it is left to the reader 
- in this first instance Wilhelm Fliess - to reshuffle the male-centred formulations in 
order to deduce the conditions of the female complex. The very term 'Oedipus complex' 
crystallises this sexist bias, of course. Freud never deigned to give the female complex its 
own name. As late as the Outline of Psychoanalysis, the book he was writing when he 
died, he was still speaking of "the feminine Oedipus attitude" - adding laconically, in 
parentheses, that "the name of 'Electra Complex' has been proposed for it" [1949: 99]. One 
needn't point out how insidiously that phrase "feminine Oedipus attitude" subordinates 
the female complex to that of the male. But I hope to show that Freud can be convicted of 
something far worse than sexism here. Freud's silence about the female subject might well 
point us towards a fatal defect in the theory of the Oedipus complex.
3 A death which had occurred, incidentally, back in 1863, a good twenty years before 
Hugo's.
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M allarm e's sexual yearning for his m other ought not to surprise us. 
Indeed a complete lack of evidence, such as we have here, is perhaps 
even more telling, for that absence only serves to dem onstrate how 
comprehensively the impulse has been repressed. So if we persist in 
calling the above passage //oedipal,,/ despite the absence of direct internal 
evidence of either of the desires which constitute the Oedipus complex, 
we are not breaking the rules of psychoanalysis.
If we strip the Freudian argum ent of terms like 'repression ' and 
'the unconscious', and examine its logic, it begins to look less impressive. 
What it says, in essence, is that a male person cannot express hostility to 
any older male person w ithout really speaking of something else: his 
parallel hostility to his actual father. Moreover, it assumes that hostility 
to one's actual father can only ever have one motive: sexual jealousy.
Let us concentrate on this second assumption. It is an extreme 
view, and it was never advanced as a formal principle of psychoanalysis, 
but it certainly seems to inform many of Freud's own interpretations. As 
we shall see, Freud was not averse to treating hostility to the father and 
the Oedipus complex as if they were entirely synonym ous things: any 
negative thought you have about your father, even if it occurs while he is 
beating you ,4 is by definition a manifestation of sexual love for your 
mother. The principle that a cigar is sometimes just a cigar - a formula 
designed to reassure us that Freud does not, God forbid, hold the 
implausible theory that everything has an ulterior motive - seems not to 
be in force when it comes to father-hostility. When psychoanalysing 
literature, Freud clearly considered the presence of parricidal them es 
enough to define a work as oedipal; indeed he seemed to consider it 
something of a rare treat when evidence of an erotic attachm ent to the
^ ee  the discussion of the 'Rat Man' beginning on page 224.
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mother - the impulse, it should be remembered, that supposedly lay at 
the heart of the complex - appeared too .5
To ascribe the parricidal theme to latent sexual motives seems 
especially bold in cases where it can readily be explained with reference to 
patent non-sexual motives. Mallarme, for example, had some perfectly 
good conscious reasons to resent Victor Hugo - and for that m atter his 
own father, as we shall see. But to confine ourselves for the moment to 
the resentm ent of H ugo, M allarm e's m otives become transparen t 
enough if we momentarily extend him the courtesy of listening to what 
he purports to be saying. He speaks of a crisis in verse, a joyous 
dismantling of poetic form which came as a backlash against forces of 
excessive restraint. We know from the previous chapter that this 
situation was no mere figment of Mallarme's fancy: his age indeed saw 
an authentic upheaval in the world of art, an upheaval which reflected a 
general m etaphysical crisis among fin-de-siecle Europeans. Once we 
accept that this historical climate existed, it becomes possible, more than 
possible, to trace Mallarme's hostility to the stern patriarch Hugo to this 
context, to read it as an expression of that spirit of decadence which 
opposed itself to all that was old, static, authoritarian, conservative, 
institutional. Do we really need to search for hidden reasons why 
Mallarme, during such an era, m ight have been unfriendly to a figure 
who had em bodied, or seem ed to em body, nearly  all of these 
objectionable things? 6 When we restore it to the historical context from
5Take, for example, these sentences from his essay on 'Dostoevsky and Parricide': "It can 
scarcely be owing to chance that three of the masterpieces of the literature of all time - 
the Oedipus Rex of Sophocles, Shakespeare's Hamlet and Dostoevsky's The Brothers 
Karamazov - should all deal with the same subject, parricide. In all three, moreover, the 
motive of the deed, sexual rivalry for a woman, is laid bare" [1961: 188 - emphasis addedj. 
I will analyse this statement in more detail later (see Chapter Four, page 293).
6J.-K. Huysmans was another writer who detected something fatherly in the objectionable 
qualities of Victor Hugo. Des Esseintes, when reading Hugo, finds that: "The Oriental, 
patriarchal aspect was too trite and hollow to retain his interest, while the nursery- 
maidish, grandfatherly pose annoyed him intensely" [Huysmans, 1987: 190 - emphasis 
added]. This sharp echo of Mallarme's sentiments can only strengthen our opinion that
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which the Freudian reading has ripped it, Mallarme's 'parricidal' outburst 
looks less like a projection of private psychology, and more like a 
personified distillation of the antinomian spirit of the times.
So the decadent context supplies us with a way of explaining the 
phenom enon of "father-hostility", one which does insist on its link to a 
wholly invisible mother-love. This historical approach can also be used 
to explain another quasi-parricidal event from the psyche of Mallarme: 
his less than grief-stricken response to the death of his actual father. 
"Their relationship was not, nor had it ever been, a particularly close 
one," one of Mallarme's biographers tells us. "At the time of his father's 
death, Mallarme rejected virtually everything he stood for" [Millan, 1994: 
78]. A Freudian explanation seems superfluous here, for we are 
presented with two salient biographical facts which render the son's 
a ttitude  wholly intelligible. The first is the fact that M allarm e's 
relationship with his father was "not ... a particularly close one." In other 
words, their relationship was characterised by certain particular tensions 
capable of accounting for the son's hostility. The second is that Mallarme 
rejected not his father per se, but rather "virtually everything he stood 
for." This phrase reminds us that Mallarme pere was more than just the 
cardboard cut-out husband of his son's alleged primal love object. He 
stood for other things too, including that range of obnoxious social 
practices and institu tions which the decadent generation found so 
repugnant, and whose patriarchal nature is obvious enough. In sum, if 
we ascribe M allarm e's "parricidal" feelings to the universal motives 
posited by the theory of the Oedipus complex, we do so at the cost of 
deem ing certain glaring particularities of his case irrelevant. This
they were an articulation of a public mood, rather than an indulgence of an obscure private 
desire.
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suppression of the particular, as we shall see, is a vice which characterises 
many an oedipal reading of fin-de-siecle literature.
If the motives behind M allarme's parricidal leanings were not 
universal in the sense of being present across all cultures and times, were 
they universal in the more limited sense of being w idespread through 
his culture and time? How many fathers of that era were distant from 
their sons? How many sons of the time were disturbed by w hat their 
fathers "stood for"?
If we turn to decadent literature, we will find that the answer is - 
many. Mailarme was by no means the only writer of the time to register 
discontent with a father, or a father-figure. The father in the decadent 
novel or play tends to be either a tyrant, or a buffoon, or both, or dead. 
He has either far too much or far too little authority; either way, he tends 
to inspire filial revolt. Sometimes, indeed, the decadents can get 
downright parricidal: "In literature," said Oscar Wilde, "you must always 
kill your father."7 Dorian Gray, slightly modifying this principle, kills the 
painter of his portrait; and the portrait, enacting another subtle variation 
of it, kills Dorian. M arius the Epicurean, when he thinks of his dead 
father, feels "a not unpleasant sense of liberty" [1921: 16]; and then there is 
The Brothers Karamazov (1880), the period 's most resonant contribution 
to the literature of parricide. The literature of Freud's age exhibits a 
hostility to fathers, and to father-figures, that is pronounced enough to 
require some form of explanation. But the Freudian form of explanation 
seems inadequate, for it m ust leave two crucial questions unanswered. 
Why did the supposedly universal Oedipus complex produce such a 
proliferation of evidence at this particular moment in history? And why 
did this evidence point only to the destructive side of the complex - why
7This was in response to a friend who detected hints of Flaubert's 'Herodias' in Wilde's 
Salome. See Ellmann, 1988: 354-355.
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was there no corresponding cavalcade of evidence of the erotic desires 
from which Freud supposed father-hostility to spring?
On the other hand, if we are able to historicise these parricidal 
themes, by dem onstrating their deep continuity w ith that culturally- 
inspired spirit of negation8 that impelled the decadence, then  these 
questions will not arise. We will be left with a different kind of question 
- the question of whether the theory of the Oedipus complex is itself a 
mere historical artefact. Did Freud, in supposing father-hatred to be a 
perm anent presence in the (male) psyche,9 mistake a peculiarly Victorian 
psychological trope for a universal one? A lot is at stake when we probe 
the validity of the Oedipus complex. "I venture to assert," as Freud wrote 
late in his life, "that if psychoanalysis could boast of no other 
achievement than the repressed Oedipus complex, that alone w ould give 
it a claim to be counted among the more precious new acquisitions of 
m ankind" [1949: 97]. If an "achievem ent" so fundam en ta l to 
psychoanalysis proves to have been constructed on tainted evidence, 
then clearly we will have a right to wonder about the legitimacy of 
Freud's "science" as a whole.
8In The Rebel, Camus defines the dandy's aesthetic as one of "singularity and negation.... 
The dandy is, by occupation, always in opposition. He can only exist by defiance. Up till 
now, man derived his coherence from his Creator. But from the moment that he 
consecrates his rupture with Him, he finds himself delivered over to the fleeting moment, 
to the passing days, and to wasted sensibility. Therefore he must take himself in hand. 
The dandy rallies his forces and creates a unity for himself by the very violence of his 
refusal. Disoriented, like all people without a rule of life, he is coherent as a character. 
But a character implies a public; the dandy can only play a part by setting himself up in 
opposition" [Camus, 1971: 47-48].
9At this point one can begin to see why Freud's confusion of the male complex with the 
complex as such might amount to a shortcoming worse than mere sexism. We seldom hear 
about - nor are we presented with evidence of - the phenomenon of female hostility to the 
mother. Instead we are asked to believe that this phenomenon exists on the grounds that 
male hostility to the father is demonstrable. But if the son's hostility can be 
satisfactorily explained without reference to his alleged incestuous desires, then why 
should we believe that females do harbour a corresponding hostility to their mothers? 
Freud's silence on the complex of the female, then, leaves him highly vulnerable here, for 
an inquiry into the historical warping of oedipal data in the case of males is instantly 
magnified into an interrogation of the validity of the theory of the Oedipus complex as a 
whole.
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Before we proceed, we ought to be clear about a problem that is bound to 
ham per any inquiry of this kind. Psychoanalysis has a kind of built-in 
resistance to attempts to historicise it, because it proposes that m uch of 
w hat one m ight naively call history is really a projection of private 
psychological patterns. As far as the present project is concerned, this 
resistance presents us with the following difficulty: as rigorously as we 
trace the father-hostility of Freud's contemporaries to the revolutionary 
social atmosphere of the time, psychoanalysis will always be ready to 
reply that that atmosphere was a product of the revolutionaries' oedipal 
hostilities in the first place. In light of this theoretical resilience, it hardly 
matters how impressive a body of evidence we assemble in support of 
our position, because Freud would query the very status of the evidence - 
he would claim it, indeed, as evidence in support of his position. It is a 
kind of philosophical impasse - as if, during a m urder trial, the 
prosecution were to subm it graphic video footage of the accused 
committing the crime; and the defence, instead of engaging w ith  the 
contents of the tape, were to dispute its very existence, by branding it an 
imaginary product of the prosecution's desire that the accused be found 
guilty. Could the prosecution conclusively prove the defence wrong?
Let us consider an example of Freud's practice of converting 
historical "reality" into an expression of the Oedipus complex. It comes 
from his 1910 paper on 'Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of His 
Childhood'. Freud is discussing Leonardo's dictum that "He who amidst 
the struggle of opinions calls upon authority, works with his memory 
rather than his reason." As a w ould-be scientist himself, Freud 
acknowledges that this outlook is correct , and that it enabled Leonardo to 
become "the first m odern natural scientist ... the first man since the time 
of the Greeks to probe the secrets of nature while relying solely on
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observation and his own judgement" [Freud, 1964: 72]. But to Freud it is 
neither here nor there that Leonardo might have had perfectly sound 
scientific reasons to reject the erroneous theories of the ancients. The 
objective value of his outlook is merely a lucky accident, for its origin lay 
in Leonardo's subjective desires:
In teaching that authority should be looked down on and that 
imitation of the 'ancients' should be repudiated, and in constantly 
urging that the study of nature was the source of all truth, he was 
merely repeating - in the highest sublimation attainable by m an - 
the one-sided point of view which had already forced itself on the 
little boy as he gazed in wonder on the world. If we translate 
scientific abstraction  back again  into concrete in d iv idua l 
experience, we see that the 'ancients ' and au thority  sim ply 
corresponded to his father, and nature once more becomes the 
tender and kindly mother who had nourished him. [1964: 72]
So we are up against a theory which considers science and history, 
and truth and error, to be abstractions, and baseless speculations about the 
childhood wishes of a man who died two centuries ago to be concrete.10 
If Leonardo's profoundly valid defence of scientific empiricism can so 
effortlessly be written off as an oedipal fantasy, then w hat hope do we 
have of establishing that a mere literary theme, that of parricide, had a 
contemporary public significance which discredits the view that it was a 
private wish-fulfilment?
10Much of Freud's essay turns on a dream which the young Leonardo had about a "vulture" 
- a bird emblematic of femininity and motherhood. Unfortunately for Freud, the German 
translation of Leonardo's notebooks on which he relied was faulty on this point: the bird 
of which Leonardo dream ed was actually a nibbio, a kite. As Peter Gay puts it, "the 
superstructure that Freud built on the mistranslation collapses into dust" [Gay, 1988: 273].
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There are several ways of dealing with this problem. We could 
throw  up our hands and abandon the project as futile. We could 
conclude that psychoanalysis must be right, because it has an answer for 
everything. Ideally, of course, one would like sim ply to suspend the 
question of whether psychoanalysis is wrong or right, and to find out 
which of these alternatives is more likely in view of the evidence. But as 
I have pointed out, the evidence looks like one thing if you believe that 
psychoanalysis is wrong, and another thing if you believe it is right. This 
makes it very difficult to weigh up the truth-claims of psychoanalysis 
from a neutral perspective. The best one can do, then, is to be as honest 
as possible about one's lack of neutrality. I will therefore admit at once 
that the following consideration of oedipal theory in its historical context 
is hostile to psychoanalysis from the start, for it entails the a priori 
assum ption that social forces are sufficiently concrete, and private 
psychology sufficiently malleable, for the former to exert a substantial 
influence on the latter - an assumption with which Freud would appear 
to have vigorously disagreed. This is not to say that my disbelief in the 
theory of the Oedipus complex is in itself an a priori attitude. On the 
contrary, one has to observe Freud's theory in action in a variety of 
contexts before one can gain a full appreciation of its myriad deficiencies. 
W hat these deficiencies are will become clear enough during  the 
remainder of this chapter.
What the Father "Stood For"
Even on Freud's own terms, there is a certain kind of male writer who 
can speak of parricidal currents in history w ithout inviting the allegation
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that he is indulging an oedipal fantasy. This is the writer who detects 
such currents from a father's perspective, rather than a son's. Leo Tolstoy 
was one such fin-de-siecle father. W riting in his diary in June 1889, 
Tolstoy hazards a striking speculation.
Thought: aren 't the bad feelings children have for their parents 
due to the contempt they feel for their parents because of their 
sensuality? They feel it somehow. Verochka K. hates her parents. 
[Christian, 1994: 217]
Read superficially, this "thought" m ight look like a fully-fledged 
anticipation of Freud, one in which both halves of the Oedipus complex - 
sensuality  and hostility - are m entioned together. But on closer 
examination the phenomenon identified by Tolstoy has little to do w ith 
the Oedipus complex. According to Freud's theory, a child feels, broadly 
speaking, desire for the parent of the opposite sex and resentment for the 
parent of its own sex.11 Tolstoy, on the other hand, paints a picture in
11 To speak less broadly, one should take note of the fact that Freud complicated this basic 
model with two additional considerations. One is that the boy's feelings for his father 
are not exclusively hostile: there is also a certain amount of affection, which means that 
the boy's aggregate attitude to his father will be one of "ambivalence". As Freud 
explained in The Ego and the Id (1923):
In its simplified form the case of a male child can be described as follows. At a 
very early age the boy develops an object-cathexis for his m other, which 
originally related to the mother's breast and is the prototype of an object-choice 
on the anaclitic model; the boy deals with his father by identifying himself with 
him. For a time these two relationships proceed side by side, until the boy's 
sexual wishes for his mother become more intense and the father is perceived as 
an obstacle to them; with this the Oedipus complex originates. His identification 
with his father then takes on a hostile colouring and changes into a wish to get 
rid of his father in order to take his place with his mother. Henceforward his 
relation to his father is ambivalent.... An ambivalent attitude to his father and 
an object-relation of a solely affectionate kind to his mother make up the content 
of the simple positive Oedipus complex in a boy. [Freud, 1991d: 374]
M atters are clouded further by the consideration that the boy is also bi-sexual. "The 
m atter is made more difficult to grasp," as Freud put it in 1925, "by the complicating 
circumstance that even in boys the Oedipus complex has a double orientation, active and 
passive, in accordance with their bisexual constitution; a boy also wants to take his
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which children feel simply "bad feelings" and "contempt" for both of 
their parents. In such a context, a son's resentment of his father hardly 
qualifies as 'oedipal', since he will have equally negative feelings towards 
his mother. Tolstoy's reference to sensuality is really a red herring, an 
off-the-cuff attempt to account for a phenomenon which he thinks of as a 
given: namely, hatred of parents by their children. This point is clarified 
by an entry Tolstoy makes the following month: "Thought: what an 
astonishing thing - lack of respect by children for their parents and elders 
in all classes of society has become an epidemic! It's an important sign of 
the times: respect and obedience from fear is finished, it's had its day, and 
freedom has appeared" [1994: 220].
Having dropped the sensuality theory, Tolstoy here advances 
another possible reason for filial disrespect: it is a function of the age, a 
"sign of the times." By now, of course, we are beginning to suspect that
m other's place as the love-object of his father - a fact which we describe as the feminine 
attitude" [Freud, 1950o: 188].
In light of these theoretical elaborations, isn 't it unacceptably crude to speak as 
though Freud proposed that a boy's attitude to his father was generally hostile? Not 
necessarily. For one thing, Freud was not averse to speaking that way himself: for every 
passage in which he defines the Oedipus complex as containing an ambivalent attitude 
towards the father one can find another passage in which he refers to that attitude as 
straightforwardly hostile. In the letter in which he revealed the Oedipus phenom enon 
to Fliess, for example, he defined it as "love of the mother and jealousy of the father" [see 
note 1 above]. In 1922 he wrote: "In the very earliest years of childhood ... a convergence 
of the sexual impulses occurs of which, in the case of boys, the object is the mother. This 
choice of an object, in conjunction with a corresponding attitude of rivalry and hostility 
towards the father, provides the content of what is known as the Oedipus Complex..." 
[1950p: 120 - emphasis in original]. And in An Outline of Psychoanalysis, which Freud 
was working on when he died, he tells us that "the Oedipus Complex [is] so nam ed because 
its essential substance is found in the Greek myth of King Oedipus, which has luckily been 
preserved for us in a version from the hand of a great dramatist. The Greek hero killed 
his father and married his mother" [1949b: 88 - emphasis added].
These quotations from Freud himself confirm that we are wholly within our 
rights to believe that the tendency of the boy's father-complex is jealous hostility. 
Freud's phrase "essential substance" is a pertinent one in the present context. We do not 
need Freud to tell us that young boys feel affection for their fathers, and wish to be like 
them. But the idea that those boys also want to kill their fathers is incontestably novel: 
it is the "essential substance" of the Freudian position on son-father relations. 
Theoretically it is only one part of an ambivalence, but in practice it is clearly the 
dom inant term of the ambivalence. The affection by which it is accompanied does not 
seem to be potent enough to generate many dreams of union with the father; indeed it is not 
even strong enough to stop the generation of fantasies, or in certain cases even acts, of 
parricide. It can only make one feel guilty about them afterwards.
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Tolstoy's continuing attem pt to explain this general trend of children 
disrespecting their parents is really an attem pt to explain his own 
children's disrespect of him. Whether or not he was deluded in ascribing 
his domestic problems wholly to the Zeitgeist is a moot question; but it is 
only fair to say that his account of the nature of that geist looks sound 
enough. The trends of which Tolstoy speaks - the lack of respect from 
fear, the failure to respect authority merely because it is authority - were, 
as we have seen in the previous chapter, among the defining trends of 
the fin de siecle. Morals, manners, language, religious belief - all these 
things were increasingly being thought of as matters of convention only. 
A uthority was everywhere being exposed as contingent, arbitrary - a 
contract from which the ruled had the pow er to w ithhold  their 
signatures. This perception permeated decadent literature. Oscar Wilde 
plays comically with it in 'The Canterville Ghost', in which the venerable 
old spirit of Canterville Chase attempts to scare away some new tenants, 
but is hampered by their blunt refusal to be terrified by him. The tenants, 
being m odern and materialistic (traits Wilde underscores by m aking 
them Americans) are scandalously unresponsive to the ghost's authority. 
Here is one of them encountering the ghost for the first time:
His eyes were as red as burning coals; long grey hair fell over 
his shoulders in matted coils; his garments, which were of antique 
cut, were soiled and ragged, and from his wrists and ankles hung 
heavy manacles and rusty gyves.
'My dear sir,' said Mr Otis, "I really m ust insist on your 
oiling those chains, and have brought you for that purpose a small 
bottle of the Tammany Rising Sun Lubricator .... "
For a moment the Canterville Ghost stood quite motionless 
in natural indignation; then, dashing the bottle violently upon the
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polished floor, he fled down the corridor.... Never, in a brilliant 
and uninterrupted career of three hundred years, had he been so 
grossly insulted. [1988:196-197]
Wilde's story could almost have been written to illustrate Tolstoy's 
point that "respect and obedience from fear is finished, it's had its day". 
But w hile W ilde speculates on the ram ifications of fin-de-siecle 
scepticism in the spirit world, Tolstoy is concerned with its impact on real 
power relations. Tolstoy's fear is that there was no reason w hy the 
authority of a parent - or, to be realistic about the way his family and 
others like it were structured, the authority of a father - should have 
been immune from this general spirit of insubordination. His fear seems 
justified enough once we move beyond the one-dimensional conception 
of the father proffered by Freud (who viewed the father merely as the 
villain in a domestic love-triangle), and take, instead, a view of the father 
that encompasses his social dimension, his villainy on a wider stage, his 
role as the domestic emissary of a political system in which power was 
distributed unfairly and wielded tyrannically.
In the previous chapter, I suggested that much of the era 's scepticism 
radiated from a central form of disbelief: the loss of faith in God. In the 
present context, God's demise takes on additional significance. It was not 
merely the authority of this ultimate father which had relied entirely on 
the faith of His children: His very existence had. To lose faith in Him 
was therefore to m urder Him. "God is dead," as Nietzsche's m adm an 
said, "and we have killed him." Atheism amounted to an act of spiritual 
parricide.
Freud did not overlook the nexus between religious scepticism and 
hostility to literal fathers. On the contrary, he stressed it. But as we
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would expect, he saw hostility to the flesh-and-blood father as the root 
form of disbelief, and atheism as one of its many flowers. Psychoanalysis, 
Freud explained, "has shown us that a personal God is, psychologically, 
nothing other than an exalted father, and it brings us evidence every day 
of how young people lose their religious beliefs as soon as their father's 
authority breaks down" [Freud, 1964: 73].
Freud's formula starts to look inadequate when it is called on to 
explain a wave of scepticism, the kind of mass decline in religious faith 
that characterised the decadent era. It seems implausible to suppose that 
millions of individual fathers all over Europe spontaneously lost their 
authority, thereby provoking this spate of atheism. And w hat of the 
public factors to which one traditionally ascribes Victorian religious 
scepticism, such as the scientific discoveries of Lyell and Darwin? Were 
these m atters of pure coincidence? Interestingly enough, Freud himself 
did not seem to think so: in The Future of an Illusion, while celebrating 
the rise of atheism, he speaks rapturously of how "natural science has 
shown up the errors [religious documents] contain; comparative research 
has been struck by the fatal resemblance of the religious conceptions we 
revere to the mental products of primitive peoples and times" [quoted by 
Gay, 1988: 533]. Fatal resemblance: Freud seems to forget here his own 
theoretical claim that the death of God proceeds entirely from the 
atheist's loss of faith in his own flesh father.12 Or perhaps one can put 
that another way: he finds that this thesis is unsustainable in the real 
w orld.
Either way, Freud obviously recognised that the era in which he 
worked was m arked by certain scientific advances that had eroded 
religious faith. This is a more significant concession than Freud might
12I say "his own father" because it is very hard to see how Freud's formula can be used to 
account for atheism, or belief, in females - see the discussion beginning on page 245 below.
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think. For when you concede that historical developments are capable of 
shaping one's faith in God, you surely admit that the same factors can 
shape one's opinion of one's actual father, of whom  God is "nothing 
other than an exalted" version. You entertain, in other w ords, the 
Tolstoyan view that loss of faith in the authority of fathers was an effect, 
rather than the cause, of the general scepticism of the age.
It is the Tolstoyan view, rather than the Freudian one, which 
decadent literature tends to substantiate. From the House of Usher to the 
house of Karamazov, the period's literature is full of families in ram pant 
decay. But that was just one of the many forms of disintegration with 
which the decadents were obsessed. "Relations," said one of W ilde's 
characters, advancing the opposite view, "are a sort of aggravated form of 
the public" [1988: 335]. In other words, a collapse in the authority of the 
father was only a manifestation of a wider, more public collapse of 
authority. The revolutions of 1848 had, according to one historian, 
"underm injed] the concept of absolute monarchy and established] an 
impetus for liberalism and socialism" [Gildea, 1994]. Ferdinand I, the 
Habsburg Emperor ousted in that tum ultuous year, had spoken of his 
kingdom as "a worm-eaten house. Take away part of it, and the rest 
might collapse" [quoted by Zanuso, 1986: 3]. His was far from being the 
sole political rule of the time to possess this 'worm -eaten' quality. The 
very concept of authority was being eaten away by thinkers like Hegel, 
Marx and Darwin, who left structures that had once seemed immutable 
looking perilous and temporary. In nature and society these thinkers had 
perceived processes in which newer, robuster forms were continually 
trium phing over old staid ones. There was som ething oedipal, in the 
pre-Freudian sense, about such processes. In the clash between the old 
thesis and the upstart antithesis, there is a hint of the violent half of the 
oedipal crime, while in the resolution provided by synthesis one can see
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its erotic side. Oscar Wilde, writing in his College Notebooks, detected an
oedipal pattern in the process by which science supersedes, or in certain
e$sc+ <x
cases attempts to synthesis with, religion:
A
Primitive religions contain the germ of philosophy and of physical 
science - unnatural children who seek to annihilate their mother 
when they have attained to their m aturity: yet the intellectual 
synthesis between religion and science as it is commonly given to 
us is nothing more than a m onstrous13 QBdipodean union of 
vigorous manhood with the effete m other who bare [sic] it - a 
union whose children must be wanderers and born to evil things. 
[Smith & Hefland, 1989: 124]
One interesting thing about these remarks is that Wilde applies the 
adjective "CEdipodean" only to the "m onstrous" cases of synthesis 
between science and religion, although the term would seem to be just as 
applicable to those cases in which science, rather than seeking to mate 
with its parent, kills it instead. Actively resisting this extension of the 
metaphor, Wilde calls these sciences children, their gender unspecified, 
who seek to annihilate their mother. W hen these children are later 
figured as male, the oedipal implications of their m urder are reduced still 
further - the m urder of a mother by her son is the opposite of oedipal. 
Moreover, although Wilde calls these m urderous children "unnatural", 
the logic of the passage suggests that their conduct is only superficially 
unnatural, and is at bottom actually natural - that the replacement of 
effete religion by vigorous science is an inevitability, the proper outcome
13Interestingly, the word "monstrous" will again crop up in connection with an oedipal 
theme at the other end of Wilde's career. In 'The Ballad of Reading Gaol', the speaker 
notes that Justice slays alike the weak, the strong, and "the monstrous parricide!" [Wilde, 
1988: 852] .
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against which the alternative (synthesis) is defined as “m onstrous". In 
other words, there is a certain natural, inevitable, and perfectly healthy 
process by which children challenge and assume the authority of their 
parents. To this process it would be misleading to apply the sensational 
adjective “oedipal", with its connotations of perversity. The pre-eminent 
example of this natural and healthy and inevitable process would appear 
to be the assumption of a father's authority by his son.
The Politics of Parricide
“There m ust always be a struggle between father and son, while one aims 
at power and the other at independence" [Boswell, 1995: 25]. So said 
Samuel Johnson, offering what one m ight broadly call a political, as 
opposed to an erotic, reading of son-father conflict. There is at least one 
respect in which this approach is indisputably superior to Freud's. Freud, 
by conceiving of the struggle between son and father as a biological 
inevitability, renders himself incapable of explaining why the intensity of 
that struggle might fluctuate through time. Faced w ith the proposition 
that there was an epidemic of father-hostility during the fin  de siede, 
Freud would probably have to write this “epidemic" off as a fantasy.14
14In 1905's Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud does acknowledge the existence 
of purely political patterns of authority and rebellion in the family, but takes care to 
distinguish these from the sexual power-struggle initiated by the Oedipus complex:
Among [infantile] tendencies the first place is taken with uniform frequency by the 
child's sexual impulses towards his parents, which are as a rule already 
differentiated owing to the attraction of the opposite sex - the son being drawn 
towards his mother and the daughter towards her father. At the same time as 
these plainly incestuous phantasies are overcome and repudiated, one of the most 
significant, but also one of the most painful, psychical achievements of the 
pubertal period is completed: detachment from parental authority, a process that 
alone makes possible the opposition, which is so important for the progress of 
civilization, between the new generation and the old. At every stage in the course
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But by taking Johnson's less stifling perspective, we perm it ourselves to 
embrace, rather than shun, the wealth of evidence that such an epidemic 
occurred. For Johnson does not privilege the father-son conflict. He sees 
it as but one manifestation of a broader conflict, the struggle between 
authority and independence. This broad struggle, while a constant theme 
of h isto ry ,15 is one which can assume varying forms and degrees of 
ferocity according to local conditions. During the age of the decadence, 
for example, authority had the worm -eaten quality of which I have 
spoken above, com bined w ith a tendency tow ards harshness of 
enforcement. "After the turmoil of 1848," as one historian says,
of development through which all human beings ought by rights to pass, a certain 
num ber are held back; so there are some who have never got over their parents' 
au thority  and have w ithdraw n their affection from  them  either very 
incompletely or not at all. They are mostly girls, who, to the delight of their 
parents, have persisted m all their childish love far beyond puberty. It is most 
instructive to find that it is precisely these girls who in their later marriage lack 
the capacity to give their husbands what is due to them; they make cold wives 
and remain sexually anaesthetic. We learn from this that sexual love and what 
appears to be non-sexual love for parents are fed from the same sources; the latter, 
that is to say, merely corresponds to an infantile fixation of the libido. [1974: 93 - 
emphasis added.]
In other words, Freud concedes that there is such a thing as a Fathers and Sons- 
style opposition between the new generation and the old, and that this opposition is 
"im portant for the progress of civilization." But this opposition begins only after one 
becomes detached from parental authority, and that detachment occurs, it seems, only 
with the repression of the Oedipus complex. Therefore, it would seem, this opposition of 
the new to the old cannot possibly be confused with the father-hostility that arises for 
purely sexual reasons during the reign of the Oedipus complex. One is forced to deduce 
that point, for Freud does not see fit to complicate this passage by introducing the matter 
of oedipal hostility at all; he speaks of the Oedipus complex as though it consists only of 
impulses of attraction. But why does parental authority suddenly become an issue when 
one is detached from it? Why shouldn't we imagine that it was capable of inducing 
father-resentment in a son, particularly when it was violently enforced? And why does 
Freud in other places - the Leonardo essay is one - take phenomena which would seem to 
constitute straightforw ard examples of this post-oedipal, political opposition between 
the new and the old, and speak as though they were instances of sexual hostility? 
Moreover, this passage was written prior to the appearance of the concept of the superego 
- a concept which, as we shall see, raises fresh questions about the relationship of 
fatherly authority to the Oedipus complex.
15"Not to conform to what is established," as Wilde said in his College Notebooks, "is 
merely a synonym for progress" [Smith & Tiefland, 1989: 108].
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the autocratic regimes of Europe returned to pow er more than 
ever determ ined to retain their position and curb the forces of 
liberalism. G radually the concessions granted in the year of 
revolution were eroded. [Joll, 1970: 72]
At a time w hen authority  possessed these tw in hallm arks - 
oppressiveness, and hollowness - there was bound to be som ething 
especially fierce about the struggle for independence. In some strugglers 
the thirst for independence grew so strong that it could only be slaked by 
assassination. As Alasdair MacIntyre points out, "[i]n one single period 
of five years in the late nineteenth century a Czar was killed, two 
attempts were made on the life of the King of Spain, two on the Kaiser, 
and one on the King of Italy, and the Chief Secretary for Ireland and his 
Under-Secretary were killed in Phoenix Park" [Macintyre, 1970: 59]. One 
can see why the father-son struggle, if it is always a part of general 
politics, might have taken on a parricidal edge at a time like this.
Edmund Gosse, in his 1907 memoir Father and Son, offers plenty 
of m aterial in support of this historical view. Recounting the epic 
antagonism  between his younger self and his fundam entalist father, 
Gosse is careful to stress that their antipathy was nothing personal. It was 
inspired by forces which lay beyond both of them. "This book is the 
record of a struggle between two temperaments, two consciences and 
almost two epochs," Gosse's work begins.
It ended, as was inevitable, in disruption. Of the two hum an 
beings here described, one was born to fly backward, the other 
could not help being carried forward. There came a time when 
neither spoke the same language as the other, or encompassed the 
same hopes, or was fortified by the same desires. But, at least, it is
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some consolation to the survivor, that neither, to the very last 
hour, ceased to respect the other, or to regard him w ith a sad 
indulgence.
The affection of these persons was assailed by forces in 
comparison with which the changes that health or fortune or place 
introduce are as nothing. [Gosse, 1973: 7 - emphasis added.]
Even w hen a w riter is not so forthcom ing about the social 
dimension of the parricidal theme, the link can usually be found without 
much effort. Take Wilde's claim that "in literature, one m ust always kill 
one's father." This looks spectacularly oedipal on its own, but really one 
m ust read it in context, as the utterance of a m an whose work was 
dom inated by the them e of irresponsibility. This is the m an who 
affirmed, in 'The Soul of Man Under Socialism', that "Disobedience, in 
the eyes of one who has read history, is m an's original virtue. It is 
through disobedience that progress has been made, through disobedience 
and through rebellion" [1970c: 231]. Occasionally, as in the example of the 
Flaubert rem ark, Wilde pursued this theme of disobedience into the 
sphere of the father-son relationship. But generally he deployed it in 
manifestly political contexts, where one can clearly see that the theme 
had no essential connection w ith fathers and sons. W ilde's servant 
characters, for example, tend to evince an outrageous disrespect for 
authority. In The Importance of Being Earnest, Jack's servants openly 
pilfer his champagne. When the powerless master tentatively asks his 
butler Lane for an explanation ("I ask merely for inform ation," he 
stresses), the insolent flunkey replies: "I attribute it to the superior quality 
of the wine, sir" [Wilde, 1988: 321]. Nor is the servant of Dorian Gray to 
be trusted - "There was something sly about him, and he had thoughtful, 
treacherous eyes" [1988: 97]. The link betw een the unreliability of
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servants and the insubordination of children is visible w hen Lady 
Bracknell suppresses the elopem ent of her daughter, having been 
"Apprised, sir, of my daughter's sudden flight by her trusty maid, whose 
confidence I purchased by means of a small coin..." [372]. In The Brothers 
Karamazov, the parricide Smerdyakov is the victim's servant as well as 
his son.16
These fictional hints about the political dimension of family affairs 
were fleshed out, as it were, by the serious political theory of the time. 
Marx viewed the family as a key venue of oppression and decay, and 
therefore a suitable site for revolution. In Capital he writes of "the 
dissolution, under the capitalist system, of old family ties" [Bekerman, 
1983: 63]. Engels made an expanded version of the same point in The 
Condition of the Working Class (1845): "If the family of our present 
society is being ... dissolved, this dissolution merely show s that, at 
bottom, the binding tie of this family was not family affection, but private 
in terest lu rk ing  under the cloak of a p retended  com m unity of 
possessions" [Bekerman, 1983: 61-62].17
In The Communist Manifesto (1848), it is m ade clear that this 
dissolution, accompanied as it is by parental oppression, justifies a 
violent response:
Abolition of the family! Even the most radical flare up at this 
infamous proposal of the Communists.
16Cf. A Tale of Two Cities: "They even whisper that because he has slain Monseigneur, 
and because Monseigneur was the father of his tenants - serfs - what you will - he will be 
executed as a parricide" [Dickens, 1993: 258-259].
The connection between parricide and the unreliability of servants can be traced 
right back to the Oedipus myth itself. When the oracle prophesies that the baby 
Oedipus will grow to kill his father, Laius decides to get in first by killing the child. He 
delegates the deed to a lackey, who does not have the heart to go through with it. By 
letting the child live, the disobedient servant effectively acts as an accomplice to the 
parricide of his master.
17Engels would later devote a full study to these issues: The Origin of the Family, Private 
Property and the State, first published in 1884.
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On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, 
based? On capital, on private gain....
Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of 
children by their parents? To this crime we plead guilty....
The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about 
the hallowed co-relation of parent and child, becomes all the more 
disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all family 
ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children 
transformed into simple articles of commerce and instruments of 
labour. [Marx and Engels, 1967: 100-101]
The impulse to parricide was therefore, if Marx is to be believed, a 
political impulse.18 To kill one's father was to enact the shifting power 
relations of the time. Like revolution, parricide is simply the hastening 
of a process which is inevitable anyway, according to the dialectic. So the 
crumbling of the father's authority is already a kind of slow-motion 
parricide in itself. Parricide is implicit in decay.
18In The Law of Civilization and Decay, first published in 1895, the American historian 
Brooks Adams proposed that the disintegrative trends of his own age were governed by a 
general law of decay discernible throughout history, and argued that the decline of the 
nuclear family was a function of advanced capitalism: "If, then, although nature never 
precisely repeats itself, she operates upon the hum an mind according to immutable laws, 
it should be possible by comparing a living civilization with a dead, to estimate in some 
degree the course which has been run. For such an attempt an infinite variety of standards 
might be suggested, but few, perhaps, are more suitable than the domestic relations which 
lie at the basis of the reproduction of life.
"In a martial and imaginative age, where energy vents itself through fear, and 
every man must be a soldier, the family generally forms a unit; the women and children 
being under the control of the father, as they were under the control of the Patriarchs in 
the Bible, or of the paterfamilias in Rome.... As the pressure of economic competition 
intensifies with social consolidation, the family regularly disintegrates, the children 
rejecting the parental authority at a steadily decreasing age; un til, finally, the 
population fuses into a compact mass, in which all individuals are equal before the law, 
and all are forced to compete with each other for the means of subsistence. When at 
length wealth has accumulated sufficiently to find vent through capitalistic methods of 
farming and m anufacture, children lose all value, for then hiring labour is always 
cheaper than breeding. Thenceforward, among the more extravagant races, the family 
dwindles, as in ancient Rome or m odem  France..." [Adams, 1943: 336, 338-339 - emphasis 
added].
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It might seem curious to cite Marx in connection w ith themes in 
decadent fiction. Yet it is a measure of how stifling and untenable the 
Victorian power structure had become that even Oscar W ilde, of all 
people, deemed himself a socialist. Not, of course, that T he  Soul of Man 
U nder Socialism' (1890) represents a serious contribution to leftist 
discourse. W ilde's essay is thoroughly unconcerned with w hat a just 
m ode of social organisation might look like. W ilde's stance is one of 
pu re  opposition: he is against all au thority , au thority  as such. 
"[A uthority  is quite degrading", he explains. "It degrades those who 
exercise it, and it degrades those over whom it is exercised. When it is 
violently, grossly and cruelly used, it produces a good effect, by creating, 
or at any rate bringing out, the spirit of revolt and Individualism that is 
to kill it" [1970c: 242].19 Individualism, the freedom from all external 
constraint, is Wilde's political ideal.20 He longs for an apolitical future; 
but so long as the present abuse of authority persists, he will be as 
political as Marx. He insists, as Marx and Engels do, that authority 
contains its own undoing, that oppression will provoke an equal but 
opposite reaction from the oppressed. This principle applies not only to 
the politics of government, but also, we find out later in the essay, to the 
politics of journalism (and presum ably to any agency that abuses its 
authority). "Fortunately, in America, journalism has carried its authority 
to the grossest and most brutal extreme. As a natural consequence it has 
begun to create a spirit of revolt" [255 - emphasis added].
If this formula of W ilde's is right, then the parricidal leanings of 
his generation might be explained as a natural consequence of another
19See also Wilde's essay 'A Chinese Sage': "All modes of government are wrong ... they 
are immoral because, by interfering with the individual, they produce the m ost 
aggressive forms of egotism ... they are self-destructive, because they engender anarchy" 
[289 - italics added].
20Nietzsche's concept of the 'w ill to pow er' represents a similarly self-centred politics. 
For the concept, Nietzsche explained, was nothing more than a synonym for "the instinct 
for freedom" [See Nietzsche, 1989: 87, and Kaufmann, 1950: 215].
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contem porary phenom enon - the grossness and brutality  w ith which 
Victorian fathers wielded their authority. But how can we establish that 
the authority of the Victorian father answered this description? We 
could point to instance after instance of bad fathering w ithou t 
establishing that this was a general phenomenon: pointing to a lot of 
black swans does not confirm the proposition that all swans are black. 
W hat we m ust do is consider the structural characteristics of the 
Victorian family, and the ways in which this structure fostered hostility 
to the father.21
To put it another way, we must attend to the fact that the bourgeois 
Victorian family, the foundation on which Freud built so m any of his 
central hypotheses, had an acutely patriarchal structure .22 In certain 
contexts, ones in which it suited him to do so, Freud dem onstrated an 
awareness of this elem entary but crucial po in t.23 His theory of the
21A point at which Henri Ellenberger hints in his book The Discovery of the Unconscious, 
in the section entitled "The World in 1880":
There was a strong emphasis on male domination.... M an's authority over his 
children and also over his wife was unquestioned. Education was authoritarian; 
the despotic father was a common figure and was particularly conspicuous only 
when he became extremely cruel. Conflicts between generations, particularly 
between fathers and sons, were more frequent than today. But authoritarianism 
was a feature of the times and reigned everywhere, not only in the family. The 
military, m agistrates and judges enjoyed great prestige. Laws were more 
repressive, delinquent youth sternly punished, and corporal punishm ent was 
considered indispensable. All this must be considered with regard to the genesis 
of Freud's Oedipus complex. [Ellenberger, 1970: 2551
22In Feminist theory, the relationship between psychoanalysis and patriarchy has been 
dealt w ith in a variety of ways, as M argaret W hitford points out in Feminism and 
Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary . "Psychoanalysis," W hitford explains, "had 
originally been seen by Kate Millet [in Sexual Politics (1969)] as a version of patriarchal 
ideology" [Whitford, 1992: 301]. But a later wave of fem inists engaged in a "re­
consideration of psychoanalysis ... [which] came about largely through Lacan's re-reading 
of Freud", and treated Freudian theory "as a feminist resource" [302]. Juliet Mitchell's 
Psychoanalysis and Feminism (1974) is an important contribution to this second tradition. 
"[T]he argument of this book," Mitchell writes in her introduction, "is that a rejection of 
psychoanalysis and of Freud's works is fatal for feminism. However it may have been 
used, psychoanalysis is not a recommendation for a patriarchal society, but an analysis of 
one. If we are interested in understanding and challenging the oppression of women, we 
cannot afford to neglect it" [Mitchell, 1974: xv].
23 In Totem and Taboo , for example, when Freud is speculatively tracing the evolution of 
civilization to an act of parricide in the outrageously patriarchal prim al horde, he
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Oedipus complex, though, seems to ignore the fact of patriarchy, locating 
the child in a cultural and political vacuum, in which the distinction 
between its mother and its father is very largely, if not wholly, a matter of 
biology. In the real world, however, the genital differences which were of 
such prime significance to Freud were scrupulously concealed under silk 
and serge;24 it was the discrepancy of power between parents that was far
admits that civilized society, and the families which constitute it, retain that sexist 
structure: "With the introduction of father-deities a fatherless society gradually changed 
into one organised on a patriarchal basis. The family was a restoration of the former 
primal horde and it gave back to fathers a large portion of their former rights" [SE, 13: 
149],
24A s proof of this point, it is instructive to consider Freud's own childhood experience. 
Writing to Fliess on October 3, 1897, a mere twelve days before he announces the theory of 
the Oedipus complex, he says: "For the last four days my self-analysis ... has presented 
me with the most valuable elucidations and clues.... [I]n my case ... my libido towards 
matrem was awakened ... on the occasion of a [train] journey with her from Leipzig to 
Vienna, during which we must have spent the night together and there must have been an 
opportunity of seeing her nudam (you inferred the consequences of this for your son long 
ago, as a rem ark revealed to me)..." [Masson, 1985: 268]. We have here a strong 
implication that the young Freud only ever saw his mother naked on one occasion, thanks 
to the extraordinary opportunity provided by an overnight train trip. Freud does not seem 
to think that once is an inordinately low number of times to see one's mother in the nude - 
indeed his self-analysis depended on the assumption that his own experiences were more 
or less typical, and in this respect one has no reason to doubt that the assumption was 
valid. But to see one's mother naked only once is to come perilously close to missing out on 
the spectacle altogether - if the Freuds had been late for that train, Sigmund w ould 
presumably never have made the optical acquaintance of his m other's body. Oedipal 
theory, however, seems to assume that no child will ever miss out on the sight - how else, 
apart from seeing them naked, can a child become aware of the sexual difference between 
its parents, or make those discoveries about the relation of their respective genders to its 
own which are supposed to have such a decisive influence on psychological development? 
On the basis of what Freud's letter inadvertently tells us about the drought of parental 
nudity  suffered by the Victorian child, it would seem impossible to believe that such 
sexual discoveries were invariably made. (A similar problem surrounds the importance 
that Freud ascribes to the child's observation of parental coitus. "[Ajnalysis," Freud says 
on this issue, "shows us in a shadowy way how the fact of a child at a very early age 
listening to its parents copulating may set up his first sexual excitation, and how that 
event may, owing to its after-effects, act as a starting-point for the child's whole sexual 
development.... It is impossible, however," Freud concedes, "to suppose that these 
observations of coitus are of universal occurrence, so that at this point we are faced with 
the problem of 'prim al phantasies'" [1950o: 189]. But if a child does not witness such a 
scene, then where does it get the material to construct a fantasised version of it? How does 
it know what to fantasise? And if a child's "whole sexual development" does not begin 
until it witnesses this scene, then what motivates the primal fantasy of the child who 
has not seen it?)
On the other hand, imagine a culture in which children are constantly exposed to 
the sight of their unclothed parents: under such conditions, parental nudity would surely 
lack the monumental and enduring psychological significance that it had for Sigmund 
Freud, for whom the sight was as rare as gold. This is another rem inder of how 
quintessentially Victorian was Freud's insistence on the importance of sexuality, and of
208
more rudely on show. Surely that discrepancy alone was enough to 
generate a marked fear of the father, or even a hostility to him. Surely, in 
other words, the structure of the patriarchal family imparted to fathers in 
general that grossness of authority which Wilde defined as the wellspring 
of the revolutionary spirit. In order to be oppressive, the patriarch did 
not have to maltreat his children, or his wife, in any active way. Fatherly 
oppression - in the sense of a radical power imbalance in the father's 
favour - was systematically inscribed in family relations. Is it not 
probable, indeed inevitable, that children should have reproduced that 
distortion in their affections, by preferring their mothers to their fathers? 
Edm und Burke was one pre-Freudian writer who thought so: back in 
1757, in his Philosophical Enquiry, Burke wrote: "The authority of a 
father, so useful to our well-being, and so justly venerable on all 
accounts, hinders us from having that entire love for him that we have 
for our mothers, where the parental authority is almost melted down 
into the m other's fondness and indulgence" [Burke, 1990: 101]. The 
Freudian who reads this as an expression of Burke's Oedipus complex is 
missing the point. Burke's words give us a good reason to suspect that 
the Oedipus complex is an illusion. The Freudian is obliged to prove, 
rather than merely to assert, its reality.
The word patriarchy refers to the structure of more than just the 
family, of course. The patriarchal family was the kernel of a patriarchal 
society. The conflation of authority and maleness that we find in the 
V ictorian fam ily w as generally p resen t th roughou t institu tions, 
government, the law. In this sense, there was quite literally a continuity
the possibility that if the psyches of his contemporaries were dom inated by sexuality, 
that was because their bodies were rigorously and unnaturally denied it. A victim of 
starvation will presum ably be obsessed by the subject of food, but that does not 
dem onstrate that a desire to eat is the universal driving force behind all m ental 
activities and products. (On this point, consider Freud's description of the food dreams 
experienced by the hungry in The Interpretation of Dreams, in the chapter entitled 
'Dreams as Wish-Fulfilment'.)
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betw een rebellion w ithin the family and rebellion beyond it. To 
challenge society was to challenge the authority of one's father, and vice- 
versa. The Lear-like protagonist of Balzac's Pere Goriot (1834) recognises 
as much. "The country will go to ruin if the fathers are tram pled 
underfoot," he says. "The thing is clear as day. Society, the whole world, 
turns on fatherly love, everything falls to pieces if children do not love 
their fathers" [Balzac, 1988: 286].25 These words, written at the dawn of the 
decadent era, read like a prophecy of the impending state of affairs, when 
a lack of love for social institutions and a lack of love for fathers went 
hand in hand.
How deeply did the patriarchal system shape the theory of the 
Oedipus complex? At the very least, Freud participated in the sexism of 
his epoch by taking the male's complex as the central one, the only one 
worthy of a name.26 But Freud's gaze, as we shall see, was even more 
narrow ly sexist than that - for not only did he take the male as his 
paradigmatic subject, he devoted the bulk of his attention to that half of 
the male's complex which related to his male parent. Hence we have the 
curious paradox that a theory which proposes the immense significance 
of infantile sexuality ends up concerning itself, when it comes to such 
practical m atters as engaging w ith  actual data, w ith the hostile 
relationship between two males. This male-centred perspective may well 
have originated as a relatively innocent function of Freud's sexism, but it 
raises profound questions about the validity of Freud's theory. For we 
have already seen evidence, and during the course of this chapter we will 
be seeing plenty more, that the kind of father-son struggle that so excited 
Freud, and which form ed a d isproportionately  large chunk of his
25Goriot utters these words on his deathbed. During the same speech, he urges: "Ah! my 
friend, do not marry; do not have children! You give them life; they give you death in 
return. You bring them into the world, and they push you from it" [Balzac, 1988: 284].
26See note 2 above.
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evidence that the O edipus complex existed, was a struggle  so 
contaminated by political factors that it is misleading to read it as purely 
sexual. And that is to put it as charitably to Freud as the facts allow. To 
put it less kindly, Freud's contention that there was such a thing as the 
Oedipus complex, in so far as it had any empirical basis at all, was 
founded on contemporary cases of father-hostility like the Rat M an's, or 
Little H ans's, or even Dostoevsky's - hostilities which were quite 
conceivably purely political. In short, the extent to which Freud's data 
were poisoned by patriarchy gives us very good reason to w onder 
whether the Oedipus complex exists at all.
One way of distinguishing between "oedipal" resentm ent of the 
father, if it exists at all, and political resentment of the patriarch, is that 
the latter form of resentment is not exclusive to sons. Patriarchy saw to it 
that "wife and children," as Marx and Engels bluntly p u t it in The 
German Ideology , "are the slaves of the husband" [quoted by Bekerman: 
62 - em phasis added]. We w ould therefore expect to find that the 
patriarch was resented by his wife and by his daughters as well as his 
sons. If we can unearth instances of such resentment, the effect will be to 
desexualise, either partially or fully, the Victorian son's hostility to his 
father.
War and Peace offers the following instance of parricidal wishes on 
the part of a daughter. As old Bolkonsky lies dying, his daughter Maria 
reflects:
She went over their lives together, and in every word of his, every 
action, found a manifestation of his love for her. Occasionally 
these recollections were interrupted by those prom ptings of the 
devil, the thoughts of what would happen after his death, and how 
she would arrange her new life of freedom. But she drove away
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such imaginings with loathing.... She woke late. The clear­
sightedness which often accompanies the moment of waking 
showed her unmistakably what it was that was of most interest to 
her in her father's illness. She woke, listened to what was going 
on behind the door and, hearing him groan, said to herself with a 
sigh that things were still the same.
'But what change could there be? What did I hope for? I 
hope for his death!' she cried, revolted with herself. [Tolstoy, 1973: 
849]27
What about fiction in which the patriarch is wished dead by his 
wife? In George Egerton's28 story 'Virgin Soil', published in her 1894 
volume Discords, a young woman reproaches her mother with having 
made her enter, at the age of eighteen, an arranged marriage. She speaks 
of
the loathing horror that has made my married life a nightmare to 
me - ay, made me a murderess in heart over and over again.
This is not exaggeration.... He has stood on his rights; but do 
you think, if I had known, that I would have given such insane 
obedience, from a mistaken sense of duty, as would lead to this? I 
have my rights too, and my duty to myself.... I loathe him,
27It is true of course that Maria is a fictional female created by a man. But that point is 
detrimental to my case only if you can bring yourself to believe that no real female ever 
felt the way that Tolstoy has Maria feel here - i.e. that the scene rendered by Tolstoy 
could not possibly have occurred in real life.
Another point at which War and Peace illustrates the principle that a patriarch 
can be wished dead by people other than his son, for reasons other than sexual jealousy, 
comes when Anna Mihalovna reflects on the case of the ageing Count Bezuhov: "I often 
think," said the princess [Anna Mihalovna], "maybe it's a sin but I often think: There's 
Count Kirill Vladimirovich Bezuhov all alone ... that enormous fortune ... and what is he 
living for? Life's a burden to him, while Bory's [i.e. Boris, her son and the Count's godson] 
life is just beginning" [Tolstoy, 1973: 54].
28George Egerton was the pen-name of the Australian-born decadent Mary Chavelita 
Dunne.
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shiver at the touch of his lips, his breath, his hands;... my whole 
body revolts at his touch;... when he has turned and gone to 
sleep, I have watched him with such growing hatred that at times 
the temptation to kill him has been so strong that I have crept out 
of bed and walked the cold passage in my bare feet until I was too 
benumbed to feel anything.... [Egerton, 1983: 159-160]
Imagine if this murderous impulse had been confessed to by the 
patriarch's son: imagine the smile that would bring to the face of the 
Freudian. But as it is the Freudian can only wince, for Egerton has 
confirmed that the patriarch could induce in the victims of his 
oppression - a category which obviously includes his sons - a violent 
political resentment of him. This striking fictional case of what might be 
called husband-hostility becomes all the more significant when Egerton's 
character goes on to identify this as a common complaint, a structural 
problem: "She feels ... as if all the needs of protesting women of whom 
she has read with a vague displeasure have come home to her" [161].
Kate Chopin's 'The Story of an Hour' (1894) is another story in 
which a wife's husband-hostility attains the intensity of a death-wish. An 
un-named woman is informed of the death of her husband. (It later 
emerges that the death has not really occurred, but in the present context 
that is immaterial). The widow weeps briefly, but then begins to reflect - 
well within the hour, as the title suggests - on the positive side of her 
husband's premature demise.
[S]he saw ... a long procession of years to come that would belong to 
her absolutely. And she opened and spread her arms to them in 
welcome.
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There would be no one to live for during those coming 
years: she would live for herself. There would be no powerful will 
bending hers in that blind persistence w ith which men and 
women believe they have a right to impose on a fellow-creature. 
A kind intention or a cruel intention made the act seem no less a 
crime as she looked upon it in that brief moment of illumination.
And yet she had loved him - sometimes. Often she had not. 
W hat did it matter! What could love, the unsolved mystery, 
count for in the face of this possession of self-assertion which she 
suddenly recognised as the strongest impulse of her being.29
Tree! Body and soul free!' she kept whispering. [Chopin, 
1986: 214-215]
Like Egerton, Chopin gives us just the confirmation we w ant of 
the generality of this phenomenon. For we are explicitly informed that 
the husband in this case was not especially objectionable - "she had loved 
him - sometimes", and he, for his part, "had never looked save with love 
on her." [215; 214] But what did that matter! Whether the patriarch has 
kind or cruel intentions is neither here nor there: w hat m atters is the 
cruelty of the structure, that crushing of the wife's drive to self-assertion 
which is inherent in the institution of marriage, such as it then was.
Elaine Showalter, in a fascinating essay,30 has docum ented the 
curious prevalence of husband-hostility among British wives of the time. 
While some young women m ourned the death of Queen Victoria's 
husband, Showalter explains, others
29In connection with this idea that self-assertion is one's strongest impulse, see 
Nietzsche's definition of the Will to Power, in note 20 above.
3°'Family Secrets and Domestic Subversion: Rebellion in the Novels of the 1860s' in The 
Victorian Family: Structure and Stresses, ed. A. Wohl.
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were lining up at Mudie's Select Circulating Library to demand 
quite another sort of family chronicle. In the sensational 
bestsellers of the 1860s, such as the Bigamy Novels of Mary E. 
Braddon, Mrs Henry Wood's East Lynne, and Rhoda Broughton's 
Cometh Up as a Flower, readers enjoyed fantasies which 
countered the official mythology of the Albert Memorial. In 
these novels, the death of a husband comes as a welcome release 
and wives who lack the friendly agency of typhoid seek desperate 
remedies in flight, adultery, divorce and ultimately murder. As a 
critic reviewing sensation fiction for the Westminster Review in 
1864 noted, with characteristic cautious reserve, 'The institution 
of marriage might almost seem to be ... just now upon its trial.'
Sensation fiction appearing in the first decade after the 
Matrimonial Causes Act (1857)31 certainly seems to be recording 
a new kind of family pattern. It portrays an unhappy marriage as 
a cage rather than a spiritual opportunity.... Stories of domestic 
murder struck a note of uncomfortable psychological 
authenticity, one assumes from critical reactions, clerical panic, 
rumours, jokes, and legal action centering on the possibility of 
widespread female homicide.... While the actual number of 
women executed for murder in England between 1830 and 1874 
was not very great, forty percent of them had indeed killed their 
husbands. By 1868, public concern over the availability of the 
preferred female weapon, arsenic, led to its control in the Sale of 
Poisons Bill. [Showalter, 1978: 101]
31 "The M atrimonial Causes Act of 1857," Showalter explains, "still limited w om en's 
rights to obtain a divorce, making it possible for a husband to petition on the grounds of 
adultery, while the wife had to prove desertion, cruelty, incest, rape, sodom y or 
bestiality. But at least the Act recognized that the Victorian home so rapturously 
celebrated in theory could, in reality, be a prison or a madhouse" [Showalter, 1978: 106- 
107].
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Husband-hostility, then, was a real enough phenom enon of the 
Victorian age. It manifested itself not only in m urderous impulses, but 
in m urderous acts. It would be superfluous to seek the roots of this 
hostility in some obscure psychological complex. Every action produces 
an equal and opposite reaction, and hostility to the husband is precisely 
the reaction one would expect to oppression of the wife. The political 
nature of husband-hostility is crystal clear, and it seems more than fair to 
entertain the possibility that the sim ultaneous rash of father-hostility 
might have been equally political.
Take the following passage from Pater's Marius the Epicurean:
The feeling with which he thought of his dead father was almost 
exclusively that of awe; though crossed at times by a not 
unpleasant sense of liberty, as he could but confess to himself, 
pondering, in the actual absence of so weighty and continual a 
restraint, upon the arbitrary power which Roman religion and 
Roman law gave to the parent over the son...." [Pater, 1921: 16 - 
emphasis added]
When looked at alongside the husband-hostility described by Showalter, 
this passage sheds its "oedipal" connotations, and its political essence is 
revealed. Compare the "not unpleasant sense of liberty" Marius feels 
over the death of his father with the "welcome release" that attended, for 
the fictional heroines mentioned by Showalter, the death of the husband. 
But we shouldn 't need to adduce the corresponding sentim ents of 
Victorian wives in order to illuminate the political nature of M arius's 
feelings. Pater specifically tells us that we are in the field of power 
relations. In the authority of his Roman father Marius detects precisely
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the two key qualities that the decadents found so objectionable about 
authority in their age: it was arbitrary, and it was oppressive. Moreover, 
the substitution of the word 'parent' for the word 'father' in the final 
phrase demonstrates the power of patriarchy, and the patriarchy of 
power: when the parental agency was considered in terms of its 
restrictive function, 'parent' and 'father' became synonyms.
The neurotic Des Esseintes is similarly alienated from his parents, 
especially from his father:
There was no gratitude or affection associated with the memories 
he retained of his parents: only fear. His father, who normally 
resided in Paris, was almost a complete stranger; and he 
remembered his mother chiefly as a still, supine figure in a 
darkened bedroom in the Chateau de Lourps. It was only rarely 
that husband and wife met, and all that he could recall of these 
occasions was a drab impression of his parents sitting facing each 
other over a table that was lighted only by a deeply shaded lamp, 
for the Duchess had a nervous attack whenever she was subjected 
to light or noise. In the semi-darkness they would exchange one 
or two words at the most, and then the Duke would 
unconcernedly slip away to catch the first available train.
His family showed little interest in his doings. Occasionally 
his father would come to see him at school, but all he had to say 
was: 'Good day, goodbye, be good, and work hard.' [Huysmans,
1987: 18-19]
There are several ways in which this passage resists a Freudian 
reading. For one thing, there is nothing uniquely privileged about Des 
Esseintes's fear of his father. He fears both his parents. If he fears his
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father more than his mother, that is only because his father is an even 
more repellent embodiment than she is of the parental agency's cold 
authoritarianism . Des Esseintes is an outlandish character, but his 
rela tionsh ip  w ith  his paren ts cannot, alas, be deem ed w holly  
unrepresentative. Freud himself confirmed, in a paper written in 1898,32 
that grotesque aloofness was a common, and harm ful, feature of 
contem porary fathering. "The increase in neurasthenia," he declares, 
"may quite rightly be accounted to our civilization. There is a great deal 
which m ust be changed." Among the required changes: "the pride of 
fathers who are unwilling to descend to the level of common hum anity 
in the eyes of their children will have to be overcome" [1950e: 239]. So at 
a very early stage Freud knew perfectly well that society made fathers play 
a lofty, inhumane role, and that this amounted to a form of oppression 
which could have nasty consequences, such as the production of nervous 
illness in children of either sex. Again, it does not seem at all 
unreasonable to suggest that the same structural problem might have 
been responsible for a child's fear of the father, or resentment of him, or 
even for feelings which might be considered parricidal. In other words, it 
seems perfectly conceivable that a Victorian child might have disliked its 
father because of the content of his character, rather than the contents of 
his trousers.
We can observe the patriarch in action by returning to the case of Tolstoy 
- who, we will recall, detected among his children a certain disregard for 
his authority. If we read further through his Diaries we will find that 
Tolstoy inadvertently explains that disregard, by furnishing us w ith  
ample evidence of his participation in patriarchal oppression. It is
32'Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses' [Freud, 1950el.
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interesting, for example, that in Tolstoy's mind his wife did not seem to 
differ in status from his children. They all belonged together on the same 
plane: that of servility. He speaks of "my unhappy family: my wife, sons 
and daughters who live side by side with me and deliberately put barriers 
between me and themselves in order not to see the truth and the good, 
which would expose the falseness of their lives..." [198]. Above them all, 
on the plane of authority, towered the father. In Tolstoy's case, this 
power relation was reified by chronological seniority: he was sixteen years 
older than his wife. (Freud's father, interestingly enough, towered over 
his wife by twenty years.)33
How did Tolstoy's style of fathering feel from the receiving end? 
His son Ilya wrote:
In all my life my father never once caressed me ... he never 
expressed his love in any overt, spontaneous way and always 
seemed to be afraid of such spontaneous demonstrations of 
affection. In our childhood every expression of affection was 
called 'sloppy sentimentality'.... He never sympathised, never 
expressed affection. If we wanted sympathy or felt like howling we 
ran to maman. She applied a compress, then petted and consoled 
us. [I. Tolstoy, 1971: 40]
Whatever his eccentricities in other regards, Tolstoy was in this 
respect perhaps not atypical. The fathering style of one Sigmund Freud, 
for example, squared with Tolstoy's. According to Peter Gay:
33Writing about Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse, Harold Bloom calls the character of 
Mr Ramsay "a last Victorian who is more of a grandfather than a father to his children" 
[Bloom, 1995: 440]. This nice formulation refers to the style of Victorian fathering, but not 
infrequently one finds, as in the cases of Jacob Freud and Leo Tolstoy, that the 
grandfather-like father was of an appropriately grandfatherly age.
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As a bourgeois of his time and his northern culture, Freud was 
not very demonstrative. He was, his nephew Harry remembered, 
'always on very friendly terms with his children' but not 
'expansive'; rather, he was 'always a bit formal and reserved.'
Indeed, 'it rarely happened that he kissed any of them; I might 
almost say, really never....' [Gay, 1988: 162]
There is a further curious respect in which Freud's and Tolstoy's 
practice as fathers coincided. Having described Freud's frostiness toward 
his sons, Gay adds: "It is likely that what he withheld from his boys he 
gladly gave to his girls; on one of his visits, [Ernest] Jones saw a Freud 
daughter, 'then a big schoolgirl, cuddling on his lap'" [Gay, 1988: 162]. 
Tolstoy's frostiness, too, thawed somewhat in the presence of his 
daughters. Ilya Tolstoy notes of his sister Masha:
Sometimes she would go to him quite simply, as to a beloved 
elderly father, and stroke his hand or caress him, and he accepted 
this affection and returned it with like simplicity.
For some reason it was not the same with us, his sons. 
[Tolstoy, 1971: 40]34
An era in which it was acceptable for a father to dish out affection 
to his daughters while withholding from his sons provides, to say the 
least, a wonky foundation for a theory which regards the imbalance of a 
child's feelings for its parents as an expression of its sexual desires. If Ilya 
Tolstoy preferred his mother to his father, isn't it possible that this 
preference was wholly conditioned by his upbringing? If so, it would be
34Cf. the parenting style of Oblonsky in Anna Karenin: "He was conscious that he did not 
care as much for [his] boy as for [his] girl and did his best to treat the children alike; but 
the boy felt this and did not respond to his father's cold smile" [Tolstoy, 1981: 20].
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cheating to use cases like Ilya's to support the contention that all sons, 
irrespective of their cultural situation, love their m others and resent 
their fathers. Were the emotions which Freud attribu ted  to child 
sexuality really the product of adult sexism?
One might have expected decadent literature to play into Freud's 
hands on this question. The decadents, after all, were radical 
individualists, and therefore unlikely to admit that their precious private 
emotions m ight have been installed in them  by society. Curiously 
enough, though, when the decadents dealt with feelings that we might 
call parricidal, they were unusually frank about the cultural context of 
these impulses. Consider this exchange from The Importance of Being 
Earnest:
ALGERNON: My dear boy, I love hearing my relations 
abused. It is the only thing that makes me put up with them at all. 
Relations are simply a tedious pack of people, who haven't got the 
remotest knowledge of how to live, nor the smallest instinct about 
when to die.
JACK: Ah! I haven't got any relations. Don't know 
anything about relations.
ALGERNON: You are a lucky fellow. Relations never 
lend one any money, and w on't give one credit, even for genius. 
They are a sort of aggravated form of the public.
JACK: And after all, what does it matter whether a man 
ever had a father and mother or not? Mothers, of course, are all 
right. They pay a chap's bills and don't bother him. But fathers 
bother a chap and never pay his bills. I don't know a single chap 
at the club who speaks to his father.
221
ALGERNON: Yes! Fathers are certainly not popular just at
present. [Wilde, 1988: 335]
Is this discussion merely a rationalisation of Oscar W ilde's 
carnally-generated hatred of his father? If so, it is a remarkably intricate 
one, with a lot of irrelevancies in its superstructure. That point does not 
necessarily count against Freud, of course: the unconscious is supposed to 
be ingenious in its secondary revisions. But what does count against 
Freud is the fact that all of these "irrelevancies" happen to be highly 
relevant to an alternative thesis, namely the proposition that there was a 
form of father-hostility peculiar to the fin  de siede. The most telling 
piece of evidence for this historical reading is the final line: "fathers are 
certainly not popular just at present". And leading up to it we have 
several strong indications of just w hat it was about that historical 
m om ent that had rendered fathers so unpopular. The phrase about 
relations (and by strong implication fathers) having not "the smallest 
instinct of when to die" is effectively historicised by the preceding 
allegation that they "haven't got the remotest knowledge of how to live." 
This line, it seems to me, alludes to the w idth of the decadent generation 
gap. To a dandy like Algernon, or Jack, or Wilde, well-versed in the latest 
philosophies of m oral scepticism, and enacting them  through such 
frivolous pursuits as Bunburying, how old those Victorian fathers must 
have looked, how stale, how remote. They simply d idn 't know how to 
live, in the italicised way that the dandy did. And by having not the 
smallest instinct of when to die, they echoed the stubbornness of all those 
other decrepit Victorian institutions that had had their day.
Then there are the financial factors Wilde m entions - income, 
credit, the paym ent and non-paym ent of bills. W ith such economic 
themes in mind, we can improve our understanding of the complaint
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about relations having "not the smallest instinct of when to die". When 
their sons need money is when fathers ought to die. At least the sons, 
unlike the abject old men, will think of an appropriately hedonistic way 
to spend it. This idea is expressed even more sharply by a character in 
Vera (1880), Wilde's first play:
I have been an eldest son myself. I know what it is when a father
won't die to please one. [Wilde, 1995: 541]
Thanks to the principle of patrilineal inheritance, an eldest son in 
particular had an economic reason to desire the death of his father. But it 
would be naive to think that this economic motive was held exclusively 
by the eldest son. It would also be a mistake to think of it as purely 
economic. For in light of what we know about patriarchy, we cannot fail 
to see that the sexist way it distributed money was emblematic of the 
sexist way it distributed power. The principle by which the eldest son 
enjoyed financial inheritance did not come out of the blue: it was an 
extension of the deep structural privileging of the male in general. The 
heir's monetary gain was only a token of the far deeper kind of profit he 
stood to derive from the death of his father: namely, succession to a 
station of absolute authority. As far as questions of pow er were 
concerned, all male children, not just the eldest, stood to gain from the 
death of the father. First, there was a negative gain: a relaxation of the 
filial oppression of which they, as sons, had felt the brunt. Then there 
was a more positive reward: graduation to the role of participant in 
patriarchy, beneficiary of it. All that m oney does, then, is bring 
patriarchy's latent incitement to parricide vulgarly out into the open.
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The Beating of the Rat Man
Interestingly enough, the connection between money and parricide is 
made, fleetingly, in Freud's 'Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis' 
(1909), otherwise known as the case of the 'Rat Man':
six months before his father's death ... he [i.e. the Rat Man] had 
already been in love with his lady, but financial obstacles made it 
impossible to think of an alliance with her. The idea had then 
occurred to him that his father's death might make him rich 
enough to marry her 35.... [T]hese thoughts surprised him very 
much, for he was quite certain that his father's death could never 
have been an object of his desire but only of his fear. [Freud, 1991a: 
60 - the italics are Freud's.]
Needless to say, Freud does not think of these financial factors as 
fundamentally important. He insists on the sexual character of the Rat 
Man's parricidal leanings, and presents the case as a more or less classical 
illustration of the Oedipus complex and its role in the formation of 
neuroses. It is true that Freud does report incidents from the Rat Man's 
life which support this sexual hypothesis. But it is equally true that along 
the way he drops several morsels of data which severely undermine his 
reading.
The meatiest of these morsels is this one:
When he was very small [i.e. between three and four years old] ... 
he [i.e. The Rat Man] had done something naughty, for which his
35One can remind oneself of the non-oedipal nature of this idea by remembering that a 
money-hungry daughter can conceive an identical parricidal wish, as in the passage from 
War and Peace quoted on page 211 above.
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father had given him a beating. The little boy had flown into a 
terrible rage and had hurled abuse at his father even while he was 
under his blows. But as he knew no bad language, he had called 
him all the names of common objects that he could think of, and 
had screamed: 'You lamp! You towel! You plate!' and so on. His 
father, shaken by an outburst of such elemental fury, had stopped 
beating him, and had declared: 'The child will either be a great 
man or a great criminal!' [85-86]
"These alternatives did not exhaust the possibilities," Freud adds in a 
footnote. "His father had overlooked the commonest outcome of such 
premature passions - a neurosis" [86n].
Almost a century later, there is something sickening about the 
casualness with which Freud accepts the violent beating of a three-year- 
old boy. These days such an assault would make a father a pariah, if not a 
prisoner. But to Freud, as indeed to the Rat M an's father, the beating 
itself is a mere part of the landscape. The whole point of the story lies in 
the child's response, his "prem ature passions". The only remarkable 
thing about the episode is that a three-year old should respond to a 
beating in any other fashion than to lie there and take it.
But instead the poor child seems to resent the beating, and this 
resentment must mean something. To the father - so flabbergasted that 
he calls a prem ature halt to the attack - it means that the boy will be 
either a great man or a great criminal.36 To Freud, the child's outburst
36Incidentally, if the resistance of the great man cannot be distinguished from that of the 
criminal, then the system against which they are rebelling must be in rotten condition. By 
speaking of both forms of resistance in the same breath, the Rat Man's father seems 
tacitly to concede this point. Moreover, he seems to acknowledge, at an unconscious level 
of course, that the patriarchal violence of which he is such a vigorous practitioner has 
something to do with this rottenness. The law of the patriarch is so unjust that the 
resister of it is simultaneously a criminal and a great man. The life of Oscar Wilde bears 
this notion out. So does his work at certain points: consider his definition of disobedience 
as "man's original virtue", and his frequent flirtation (in the essay 'Pen, Pencil and
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vindicates a hypothesis at which he had already arrived, nam ely the 
hypothesis that "at some prehistoric period in his childhood he had been 
seized w ith fury (which had subsequently become latent) against the 
father whom he loved so much" [87-88].37 From our perspective, though,
Poison', for example) with the idea that the criminal is a kind of artist, and the artist a 
kind of criminal.
37When a father oppresses his son, let alone beats him on a regular basis, then singling out 
the boy's sexual desire for his mother as the wellspring of his parricidal thoughts would 
seem to be a problematic enough move - even if that desire had already been conclusively 
proved to exist. But to deduce the existence of that sexual desire merely from the presence 
of the parricidal wishes, as Freud arguably does, would seem to be highly illegitimate. 
The contam ination of "oedipal" data by fatherly violence is present right from the 
beginning. The very name "Oedipus" ("swollen foot") refers to an horrendous act of 
mythical child abuse. Oedipus acquired his deformity when, three days after his birth, 
on the orders of his parents, his ankles were pierced and bound with a leather thong, and 
he was left to die on a desert mountain. (As we have seen, this attem pt to cheat the 
oracle's "prophecy of parricide" [Sophocles, 1993: 31] is undone when a kindly servant 
takes pity on the infant.) Freud, removing the deeds of Oedipus from their context, reads 
the m yth and the play as a revelation of the universal will to parricide. To Freud, the 
myth is about Oedipus's inability to escape his fate. It complicates the Freudian reading 
when we consider that the myth also demonstrates the inability of Laius, the father, to 
elude his destiny. Fate decrees that he will one day be succeeded by his son; his attempt 
to abort the inevitable by means of violent oppression is met by a lethal return of serve. To 
put it crudely, Laius was asking for it. This point seems to be underlined by the 
circumstances of the parricidal act, as related by Oedipus:
The old man in the carriage was waiting for his chance.
He waited till I passed him. And then, he struck me 
Full on the head with his two-pronged stick - 
The kind you use for goading the horses 
To make them gallop. I paid him back 
With interest, and double quick.
I whacked him, savagely, with my staff,
And knocked him out of the carriage.... [Sophocles, 1993: 35]
Laius treats Oedipus the adult stranger the same way he dealt with Oedipus the baby 
child: violently, from on high. "I struck a man who struck me, in self-defence," as Oedipus 
puts it in Oedipus at Colonus. "Was that a crime?" [Sophocles, 1993: 76].
There is an element of self-defence, too, in the crime of the supposed model for the 
female complex: the matricide Electra, who says to her mother:
It is you,
Your hatred and ill-treatment, drive me on
To act against my nature; villainy
Is taught by vile example. [Sophocles, 1977: 87]
But Freud can of course write off these political elements of Oedipus Rex and 
Electra as mere secondary revisions of the core psychological content. This manoeuvre, 
which effectively allows Freud to neutralise any evidence against the theory of the 
Oedipus complex, was pioneered in The Interpretation of Dreams, as Derrida points out: 
"nullifying all the differences between 1) Oedipus, 2) the legend, and 3) Sophocles's 
tragedy, Freud formulates a rule: the "secondary revision of the m aterial' includes
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the im portant thing to note is that patriarchal thuggery w as so 
entrenched in the social structure that neither m an even noticed it, 
much less entertained the possibility that it might have been enough in 
itself to account for the little boy's outburst, and for his abiding fear of his 
assailant.38
"The patient believed," Freud goes on to tell us,
that the scene made a perm anent impression upon himself as well 
as upon his father. His father, he said, never beat him  again; and 
he also attributed to this experience a part of the change which
everything in a text that does not make up the semantic core of the two 'principal dreams' 
that he has just defined (incest with the mother and m urder of the father), everything 
that is foreign to the absolute nakedness of these dream-contents. The formal (textual, in 
the usual sense) differences that, from the outside, affect thus this semantic structure, in 
this case Oedipus, constitute secondary revisions. For example, whenever critics have 
considered Oedipus Rex to be a tragedy of fate, a conflict between men and gods, a 
theological drama, etc., what they have considered to be the essential element of the 
play was actually an afterthought, a garment, a disguise, a fabric added to the Stoff 
itself in order to mask its nakedness" [Derrida, 1975: 33].
38An even more egregious example of this kind of mistake is Freud's 1911 case study of the 
profoundly disturbed paranoiac Dr Paul Schreber, entitled 'Psychoanalytic Notes on an 
Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia'. Although Freud never met Schreber, 
and based his analysis entirely on evidence contained in Schreber's autobiography, he 
still felt able to venture the confident pronouncement that "in the case of Schreber we find 
ourselves once again on the familiar ground of the father-complex. The patient's struggle 
with Flechsig became revealed to him as a conflict with God, and we m ust therefore 
construe it as an infantile conflict w ith the father whom he loved.... In infantile 
experiences such as this the father appears as an interferer w ith the satisfaction which 
the child is trying to obtain; this is usually of an auto-erotic character, though at a later 
date it is often replaced in phantasy by some other satisfaction of a less inglorious kind" 
[Freud, 1991b: 191-192]. Unfortunately for Freud, sensational information about Schreber's 
actual relationship w ith his father has since come to light. As Janet Malcolm 
entertainingly explains: "In the fifties, [William] N iederland began to delve into the 
background of Schreber. What he found was horrifying. Schreber pere was revealed as a 
tyrant and a sadist, and the childhood of Schreber fils (and his sisters and brother) as a 
nightm are of physical and m ental oppression, imposed in the nam e of the father's 
Teutonic educational ideals. The most horrifying of N iederlande findings, and those most 
directly relevant to Paul Schreber's craziness, concerned the father's invention of 
orthopedic devices involving straps, belts, and iron bars for the straightening of children's 
posture.... N iederland, an orthodox New York analyst, presented his findings as a 
reverent complication of Freud's paper rather than as a challenge to it.... Flowever, in 
1973 Morton Schatzman, a young American psychiatrist living in England, published a 
book called Soul Murder: Persecution in the Family ... which proposes a clear cause-and- 
effect relationship between the oppression of the child and the m adness of the man." 
Schatzman, as Malcolm puts it, "did a good deal more than m urm ur, 'My, how 
interesting!' as Niederland had done. 'Christ, how appalling!' is the tone of Schatzman's 
book ..." [Malcolm, 1984: 78-79, 79-80].
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came over his own character. From that time forward he was a 
coward - out of fear of the violence of his own rage. His whole life 
long, moreover, he was terribly afraid of blows, and used to creep 
away and hide, filled with terror and indignation, when one of his 
brothers or sisters was beaten. [86]
Lucky enough to live in a culture which views violence of this 
kind as profoundly damaging, we do not require any elaborate theoretical 
constructs to explain why somebody who has been regularly thum ped as 
a toddler might develop a lasting fear of blows. Nor would we regard it 
as suspicious if a child should "creep away and hide, full of terror and 
indignation", when one of its siblings is being mercilessly thrashed. But 
to Freud, this behaviour seems to confirm the presence in his subject of 
perverse (albeit universal) hidden passions. His suggestion that the Rat 
Man's cowardice stems from a fear of the violence of his own rage would 
be more convincing if he had fully tested, or even recognised, the banal 
possibility that it stemmed from a fear of the violence of his father's rage. 
O bviously one m ust rem em ber that psychological d iso rders are 
complicated affairs, but some of the Rat M an's behaviour looks like that 
of a m an more afraid of external assault than of his own "passion". In 
Freud's consulting room, for example, we find the Rat Man
avoiding my proximity for fear of my giving him a beating. If he 
stayed on the sofa he behaved like some one in desperate terror 
trying to save himself from castigations of terrific violence; he 
would bury his head in his hands, cover his face w ith his arm, 
jump up suddenly and run away, his features distorted with pain, 
and so on. He remembered that his father had had a passionate
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temper, and sometimes in his violence had not known where to 
stop. [89-90]
But let us consider Freud's diagnosis of the Rat Man in more 
detail. Early in the course of the analysis, Freud advances to his patient 
the hypothesis that "the source from which his hostility to his father 
derived its indestructibility was evidently something in the nature of 
sensual desires, and that in connection he m ust have felt his father as in 
some way or other an interference" [62 - emphasis in original]. He soon 
develops a more elaborate version of this thesis:
I ventured to put forward a construction to the effect that when he 
was a child of under six he had been guilty of some sexual 
m isdem eanour connected w ith  m asturbation  and had been 
soundly castigated for it by his father. This punishment, according 
to my hypothesis, had, it was true, put an end to his masturbating, 
but on the other hand it had left behind it an ineradicable grudge 
against his father and had established him for all time in his role 
of an interferer in the patient's sexual enjoyment. [85]
To Freud, the revelation of the beating incident comes as a 
thorough vindication of this hypothesis. But if we refer back to his 
account of the scene, we will find that while it certainly shows the father 
interfering in the Rat M an's enjoyment of life, it does not show him 
interfering in his sexual enjoyment. There is nothing in the story as we 
have it to suggest that the incident gave the boy a reason to hold an
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oedipal grudge against his father, as distinct from the kind of grudge any 
person might feel against somebody who beats them up .39
39It will not hurt to re-emphasize the point that the sexual element must be there in order 
for a phenomenon to qualify as oedipal. This was a point on which Freud himself, in 
theory, rigorously insisted. Consider his irate response when, in 1910, the renegade 
analyst Alfred Adler dared to develop theories in which the m otivating force of 
sexuality was downplayed. "He has created for himself a world system without love," 
Freud said of Adler, "and I am in the process of carrying out on him the revenge of the 
offended goddess Libido" [Webster, 1995: 359]. The revenge took the form of expelling 
Adler from the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. "Freud ... insisted," wrote the analyst 
Max Graf, "that if one followed Adler and dropped the sexual basis of psychic life, one 
was no more a Freudian" [quoted by Webster, 1995: 362], It follows that Freud himself, at 
those moments when he forgot about the sexual basis of the Oedipus complex, was not 
being an authentic Freudian either.
In his book Freud: The Assault on Truth, Jeffrey M asson quotes from the 
unpublished diaries of the Hungarian analyst Sändor Ferenczi, another of Freud 's 
disciples who perpetrated theories in which the role of sexuality was devalued. Among 
other things, Ferenczi "maintained (July 24, 1932) that the Oedipus complex could well be 
'the result of real acts on the part of adults, namely violent passions directed towards the 
child, who then develops a fixation, not from desire [as Freud maintained], but from fear'" 
[Masson, 1984: 147]. "Ferenczi never dared show this diary to Freud," Masson adds drily.
From Masson's point of view, the exciting thing about Ferenczi's notion is that it 
resurrects an old theory of Freud's, the theory that had been supplanted in 1897 by the 
theory of the Oedipus complex: namely, the infamous seduction theory. It is M asson's 
belief that Freud's seduction theory (which held that hysteria developed as a result of 
the subject's having been 'seduced' - i.e. molested - as a child, generally by a parent) was 
and is correct, and that Freud's repudiation of it was "a failure of courage" [xxi].
From the pomt of view of the present inquiry, Freud’s rejection of the seduction 
hypothesis serves a sharp rem inder that his m ature theory of the Oedipus complex 
considers itself to be far above the mundane idea that a son's resentment of his father 
might have something to do with the latter's objective misdeeds. Indeed, the Oedipus 
theory grew out of a rejection of that essentially sociological notion. "When Freud 
dropped the seduction theory," as Janet Malcolm puts it, "and introduced the theories of 
infantile sexuality and the Oedipus complex, he transformed psychoanalysis from a form 
of social psychiatry into a depth psychology" [Malcolm, 1984: 76]. Or as Anna Freud put 
it, writing to Masson during the composition of his book: "Keeping up the seduction theory 
would mean to abandon the Oedipus complex, and with it the whole importance of 
phantasy life, conscious or unconscious phantasy. In fact, I think there would have been no 
psychoanalysis afterwards" [Masson, 1984: 113].
The paradox we have been considering is that Freud, owing either to intellectual 
or to ethical laxity, behaved as though the reams of patriarchal data which supported 
the sociological explanation of filial resentment in fact supported his own theory of the 
O edipus complex, a theory which from the start defined itself by its diam etrical 
difference from the sociological approach.
Masson's book contains some disturbing data on the prevalence of child abuse in 
the late nineteenth century, and is in that respect not incompatible with my argum ent 
that Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex was contaminated by an atmosphere in which 
children were not treated especially well by their fathers. But to suggest that the theory 
of the Oedipus complex was misguided does not necessarily entail the suggestion that the 
seduction theory was right. Masson reaches that conclusion only because, paradoxically, 
he has too much faith in Freud. As Frederick Crews points out: "never once does it occur to 
Masson that there may be more than two candidates for an explanation of 'neurosis.' Nor 
was this possibility raised in any of the (mostly hostile) reviews that came to my 
attention. Masson and his antagonists agreed that Freud m ust have been either right 
about neurosis before 1897 or right about neurosis thereafter" [Crews, 1986: 64]. An
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Freud's hypothesis has pre-em pted this problem, as it were, by 
supposing that the sexuality lay in the nature of the misdeed for which 
the boy was being punished. How does this supposition fare in 
connection with the beating story? Not very well: not only is there no 
evidence to support it, there is one piece of evidence which actively 
contradicts it. The Rat Man's mother, who is the source of the story (the 
Rat Man himself having forgotten the episode), testifies that "he had 
been given the punishm ent because he had bitten some one.... In her 
account there was no suggestion of his misdeed having been of a sexual 
nature" [86].
Strangely, Freud goes on to admit that the m other's story, despite 
contradicting the essential proposition of his hypothesis, is nevertheless 
one of the best pieces of empirical validation that his hypotheses of this 
kind have ever received. "It is seldom," he says with some excitement, 
"that we are in the fortunate position of being able, as in the present 
instance, to establish the facts upon which ... tales of the individual's 
prehistoric past are based, by recourse to the unimpeachable testimony of 
a grown-up person" [87n]. W hat Freud means, it emerges, is that the 
mother's story is unimpeachable only in those areas where it supports his 
hypothesis - that is, in so far as it confirms that the boy was at some point 
in his childhood soundly castigated by his father, and had a vehement
alternative view of the seduction theory is that it dem onstrated Freud 's capacity to 
invent vastly ambitious theoretical structures which had no grounding in reality 
whatsoever. If the seduction theory was entirely inaccurate, as the orthodox Freudian 
m ust believe, is it not possible that the theory with which he replaced it was equally 
fictional? Crews again: "[A]ll parties to the debate over 'seduction' have shared a 
radically faulty sense of the way Freud reached his scientific judgements. Taking his 
apologetics at face value, they have assum ed that he drew  theoretical conclusions 
directly from clinical observation, deciding after x number of cases that his patients had 
fallen ill through molestation but after x + n cases that the preponderance of evidence now 
lay on the other side. The dispute, then, has been over which set of Freud's observations 
was the accurate one. But this narrow inductivist perspective overlooks the remoteness of 
Freud's inferences from any data available to him in the consulting room. While he may 
or may not have been able to tell w hether his patients had been abused in early 
childhood, the leap to calling such events (or fantasies) neurosegenic had to be largely one 
of faith" [Crews, 1986: 46-47].
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reaction to this. Her suggestion that the boy's misdeed was not of a sexual 
nature, on the other hand, is eminently impeachable.
[T]he statement made by our patient's mother leaves the way open 
to various possibilities. That she did not proclaim  the sexual 
character of the offence for which the child was punished may 
have been due to the activity of her own censorship; for w ith all 
parents it is precisely this sexual element in their children's past 
that their own censorship is most anxious to eliminate. But it is 
just as possible that the child was reproved by his nurse or by his 
m other herself for some commonplace piece of naughtiness of a 
non-sexual nature, and that his reaction was so violent that he was 
castigated by his father. In phantasies of this kind nurses and 
servants are regularly replaced by the superior figure of the 
m other. A deeper in terpretation  of the pa tien t's  dream s in 
relation to this episode revealed the clearest traces of an 
imaginative production of a positively epic character. In this his 
sexual desires for his mother and sister and his sister's premature 
death were linked up with the young hero's chastisement at his 
father's hand. [87n-88n]
I have quoted this passage in full in order that the reader might 
appreciate two things. One, the way Freud reads evidence at face value 
when this suits him, and w hen it doesn 't reads it as a censored or 
disguised version of the truth. In other words, when confronted with 
m aterial which does not support his hypotheses, or even absolutely 
refutes them , Freud sim ply retreats like a snail into the shell of 
psychoanalytical doctrine.
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The second thing to observe in the above passage is how swiftly 
the argum ent turns m uddy when Freud is obliged to explain precisely 
why the bashing of the Rat Man had sexual connotations. "In phantasies 
of this kind," Freud suddenly says, even though the previous sentence 
had not been dealing with phantasies at all. It had been dealing, albeit in 
a speculative way, w ith objective events. One m oment we are talking 
about w hat happened, or might have happened; the next we are hearing 
about the Rat M an's phantasies, and about Freud's interpretations of his 
dreams and imaginative productions .40
So the case of the Rat Man offers us a neat sum m ation of the 
problems we have already identified in oedipal theory. Here, as in so 
many of the other cases we have looked at, it is not hard for Freud to 
establish the presence of a fear of the father. There is a w ealth of 
evidence available, and Freud deploys so much of it that one comes to 
suspect that he is under the impression that it is evidence of something 
more - or, if one is a conspiracy theorist, that he wants to leave us under 
that impression. But when it comes to demonstrating the sexual basis of 
this fear - and this is the very nub of the Freudian project, remember, the 
very thing that makes it Freudian - Freud has much less to say. As far as 
raw, untreated evidence for this proposition is concerned, he can produce 
absolutely nothing. The best he can do is to take a piece of evidence 
which categorically opposes it, and then proceed to doctor it - or perhaps 
one should say to Professor it - until it is rendered compatible w ith his 
speculations. This is not a particularly impressive manoeuvre, since all 
it does is dem onstrate the point that anything can be made to illustrate
40It is scarcely fair of Freud to count the Rat Man's dreams as evidence of his sexual desire 
for his mother, since the meaning of these dreams emerged only after they were subjected 
to Freudian analysis - that is to say, only after they are decoded with the help of a 
theory which takes the existence of this primal love of the mother as one of its core a 
priori assumptions. This is like a psychic proving that spirits are real by citing the 
corroborating testimony of Einstein's ghost.
233
psychoanalytical doctrine. In short, Freud is able to supply abundant 
evidence of the m ale's fear of his father; but w hen it comes to 
dem onstrating the underlying love of the m other, he is obliged to 
terminate his visit to the land of hard evidence, and to fly back into the 
ether of baseless assertion.
What Happened to Jocasta, Not to Mention Electra? 41
So far, we have considered a fair array of evidence which suggests that 
certain psychological phenom ena which Freud defined as "oedipal" 
might more plausibly be read as emanations of patriarchal culture. But to 
this line of argum ent a Freudian w ould no doubt reply: So what? 
Patriarchy is an historical circumstance which might well explain a son's 
hostility to the father. But it is less capable of explaining his erotic 
attachm ent to the mother; and not capable at all of explaining the 
'oedipal' sentim ents of female subjects, whose love of the father and 
hostility to the mother represents the opposite of the affective distortion 
that I have accused patriarchy of producing. At the very best, then, the 
sexist distortion of family affairs during  Freud 's age can account 
convincingly for a mere quarter of all oedipal sentiments. The theory of 
the Oedipus complex would therefore seem to be impervious to the kind 
of historical re-reading I have been attempting.
These considerations are all completely valid, so long as we think 
of the Oedipus complex as a piece of abstract theory, a purely ideal 
structure. But when oedipal theory is brought into contact with the real
411 am expanding here on the apt title of an essay by Iza S. Erlich, 'What Happened to 
Jocasta?' - see page 237.
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world - as it must be when Freud considers the evidence for it, for 
example, or when he uses it as a tool with which to analyse literature, 
anthropological data, religious sentiments, case histories - it undergoes 
the transformations that I have referred to above. The mother and 
daughter end up on the cutting-room floor, as it were, and the hostility of 
a son towards his father, far from representing the mere quarter of 
oedipal sentiments that it amounts to in the abstract, seems for all 
practical purposes to become the Oedipus complex. One can see this 
happening in the following passage from the Introductory Lectures :
The son, when quite a little child, already begins to develop a 
peculiar tenderness towards his mother, whom he looks upon as 
his own property, regarding his father in the light of a rival who 
disputes this sole possession of his; similarly the little daughter 
sees in her mother someone who disturbs her tender relation to 
her father and occupies a place which she feels she herself could 
very well fill. Observation shows us how far back these 
sentiments date, sentiments which we describe by the term 
Oedipus complex, because in the Oedipus myth the two extreme 
forms of the wishes arising from the situation of the son - the 
wish to kill the father and to marry the mother - are realised in an 
only slightly modified form. [Freud, 1940: 174-175]
In the first sentence Freud is in the realm of pure assertion. It is 
worth noting, though, that even in that realm Freud gives the complex 
of the boy primary status: the girl's complex is a kind of reflection of it. In 
the second sentence, inaugurated by that key word "observation", Freud 
starts to bring the theory into contact with facts, albeit the facts of a myth. 
Flere the female subject disappears altogether. Moreover, in Freud's
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formulation of the male complex a subtle but significant alteration 
occurs: the son's wish to kill his father - in theory the secondary, 
consequential wish of his complex - is shifted into a position of 
primacy.42 In the space of a single paragraph, Freud demonstrates his 
propensity to place the male's complex at centre stage, and then to focus 
the spotlight on his hostility to the father.
Freud's lack of practical interest in the boy's erotic attachment to 
his mother - the attachment which is, one has to keep reminding oneself, 
the core of the boy's complex - is not easy to demonstrate in a short space. 
It is hard to quote a silence. But that there was such a silence is not really 
in dispute. Even writers who are largely sympathetic to Freud have 
recognised its existence. Peter Gay, for example:
Throughout his life as an analyst, he recognised the crucial 
importance of the mother for the child's development. He could 
hardly do less. 'Whoever has been fortunate enough to evade the 
incestuous fixation of his libido does not wholly escape its 
influence/ he wrote in 1905. 'Above all a man looks for the 
memory picture of his mother as it had dominated him since the 
beginning of his childhood.' Yet, almost deliberately evading this 
insight,43 Freud exiled mothers to the margins of his case 
histories. Dora's mother, beset by what Freud calls a
42While not strictly consistent with the theory of the Oedipus complex, this order of 
priority is consonant with the Oedipus myth, in which sexual desire for the mother is 
secondary to violent hostility to the father - in the chronological sense, obviously, and 
also in respect of its weight of meaning (see note 55 below). Another moment at which 
Freud reverses the terms of the complex in order to achieve a better fit with the data 
comes in An Autobiographical Study, when he is recalling the project he undertook in 
Totem and Taboo: "My starting-point was the striking correspondence between the two 
taboo-injunctions of totemism (not to kill the totem and not to have sexual relations with 
any woman of the same totem-clan) and the two elements of the Oedipus complex (killing 
the father and taking the mother to wife)" [Freud, 1950c: 123].
43One has to quarrel with Gay's use of the term "insight" here. How can Gay tell that it 
is an insight, as distinct from a wild guess, without the very evidence whose absence he is 
in the middle of discussing?
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'housewive's psychosis/ is a silent, minor actor in the family 
melodrama. Little Hans's mother, though to her husband's mind 
the cause of her son's neurosis with her seductive behaviour, is 
subordinated to that husband.... The Wolf Man's biological 
mother achieves only limited significance as a partner in the 
primal scene he had observed, or fantasized, as a little boy, 
though certainly mother substitutes contributed to his neurosis.
The Rat Man's mother makes some fleeting appearances, mainly 
as the person whom the patient consults before he starts his 
analysis. And Schreber's mother might as well have not lived.44 
[Gay, 1988: 505 - the 1905 quotation from Freud is taken from the 
Three Essays on Sexuality.]
In connection with this point, Gay quotes from an essay of Iza S.
Erlich's called 'What Happened to Jocasta?':
Reading these cases, I could not help wondering about the 
discrepancy in Freud's presentations of his patients' fathers and 
mothers. Why is it always the father who becomes the central 
part of the child-parent relationship, regardless of whether the 
child is male or female?... Perhaps these portrayals were bound up 
with Freud's self-analysis, or, more specifically, with his 
preoccupation at that time with the relationship between himself 
and his father. Whatever the reason, the 'oedipal mother' in 
Freud's early work is a static figure, a Jocasta who unknowingly
44This sentence can be read in a more literal way than Gay intended: in light of the 
horrendous tortures which Herr Schreber turned out to have inflicted on his son (see note 
38 above), it is probably true that Schreber's mother might as well not have lived, at 
least as far as the genesis of her son's neurosis was concerned.
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plays out her destiny while Laius springs back to life. [Quoted by
Gay, 1988: 718-719]
Erlich specu la tive ly  a ttribu tes the b lin d -sp o t to F reu d 's  
relationship with his father; Gay, to his feelings for his m other. It is 
charitable of these writers to use Freud's theories to explain why there is a 
gaping hole in the empirical base of Freud's theories. A more stringent 
analyst of this evidential lacuna might say that it renders psychoanalysis 
invalid as a mode of explaining anything. If so, we would be obliged to 
assess Freud's blind-spot in non-psychoanalytical terms, perhaps even 
with reference to the standards by which other scientists are judged. How 
w ould we characterise it then?
If Freud largely overlooked the boy's feelings towards his mother, 
then how on earth could he distinguish between the resentment that the 
son of an authoritarian father feels because of that authoritarianism, and 
the resentment that he feels through sexual jealousy? The answer is that 
he couldn't. This, you might naively suppose, left Freud with a large 
problem. W hen you watch him in action, however, you tend to find 
him profiting from the confusion, by adducing all resentm ent of the 
father as solid proof of the Oedipus theory. Freud 's responsibility to 
science - especially, one would have thought, to his own science - was to 
do the very opposite: to distinguish scrupulously between the emotional 
distortions produced by patriarchy and the emotional patterns which he 
considered to be eternal, patriarchy or no patriarchy. His failure to do so 
means that it is Freud himself whom one must largely blame for the lack 
of rigour with which the term 'oedipaT is bandied about today. Far too 
often one hears the term deployed without any consideration at all of the 
eroticism that is m eant to be its defining element: either it is used as a
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mere synonym for hostility to the father; or, worse, to describe hostility to 
the parents in general; or, worse still, to describe hostility to authority in 
general; or, worst of all, to describe a girl's hostility to her father!45 The 
insight that authority provokes rebellion can hardly be credited to Freud; 
indeed it can hardly be called an insight. Nor did Freud, in theory, want 
to be credited w ith it. His depth psychology asserted, in the abstract, 
som ething far, far more ambitious than that. But w hen it came to 
demonstrating the rightness of that theory, Freud tended to point to cases 
which did not necessarily prove anything more profound than that sons 
feared their fathers. In that era especially, such a fear could scarcely be 
said to constitute proof of those infantile erotic drives which were the 
theory's chief novelty.
There is one obvious way in which Freud might have risen above 
this problem, and proved the validity of the Oedipus theory once and for 
all. He could have focussed on the complex of the female. A girl's 
attraction to her father and hostility to her m other cannot possibly be 
dismissed as a mere effect of political conditions. By feeling that way, the
45W riting about Jane Austen, Brigid Brophy says that "Her moral dilemmas are often 
draw n in precisely oedipal terms: the end of N orthanger Abbey explicitly questions 
whether the story's tendency h e  altogether to recommend parental tyranny or rew ard 
filial disobedience'. A childish nonsense piece discloses no less explicitly the matters on 
which her fantasy played ...: 'I m urdered my father at an early period of my life, I have 
since murdered my Mother, and I am now going to murder my sister'" [Brophy, 1967: 251- 
252]. Disobedience of tyrannical parents and a fantasy involving the m urder of both 
parents are not 'precisely oedipal' phenomena at all. Filial disobedience can only be 
classified as oedipal in the Freudian sense if it can be shown to be sexually generated - 
that is to say, if it can be reduced to an essential disobedience of the father on the part of a 
boy, or to a disobedience of a mother on the part of a girl. And one can hardly apply the 
term 'oedipal' to a fantasy in which a girl's father, the figure whom Freud would consider 
the object of her desires, features as the first victim of a killing spree. On the other hand, 
this fantasy is intelligible as a reaction to parental oppression, for which the father can 
be held primarily responsible.
Since Brophy has just mentioned Oedipus Rex, it is conceivable, although not very 
likely, that she is em ploying the adjective 'oedipal' in strictly a Sophoclean sense, 
rather than a Freudian one. But that possibility is not particularly helpful to Freud 
either, for it w ould involve the proposal that the rebellion of Sophocles's Oedipus was 
purely political.
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girl is swimming against the current of patriarchy, and thereby supplying 
us with a demonstration of some powerful innate drives.
But Freud had little to say about the complex of the female, beyond 
making the occasional assertion that it existed. He never even deigned to 
give it an official name: as late as the Outline - his final, unfinished work 
- he was still referring to it as the "feminine Oedipus attitude" [SE, 23: 
194]. One could hardly ask for a neater indication than that phrase of the 
secondary importance that Freud assigned to the female's complex. His 
typical procedure was to speak as if the male condition were synonymous 
w ith the hum an one, leaving it up to the reader to rem em ber the 
existence of females and to deduce the features of their complex by 
reshuffling the terms of the male one. At best, he paid the female 
complex a kind of lip service. "As you see, I have only described the 
relationship of a boy to his father and m other,"46 he says in the 
Introductory Lectures, having just given a run-dow n of the classic 
Oedipus situation: "things proceed in the same way, with the necessary 
reversal, in little girls ... " [Freud, 1940: 280]. By accident or design, this 
policy of Freud's prevents oedipal theory from coming into any direct 
contact with the situation which would have been its severest test. Only 
by engaging directly w ith the experiences of the female subject would 
Freud have been able to prove the O edipus theory correct beyond 
reasonable doubt. For if the female complex is merely deduced, "with the 
necessary reversal", from that of the male, and if the complex of the male 
is, as we have seen, constructed with alarmingly little empirical reference 
to his feelings for his mother, then in effect the theory of the Oedipus 
complex is built entirely on the phenom enon of male hostility to the 
father - a phenomenon wholly attributable to the politics of Freud's day.
46Note again, incidentally, how within the male complex the boy's relationship with 
his father is elevated to a position of primacy.
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"Freud," Peter Gay tells us, "repeatedly deplored the way that the 
prized respectability of his time forced women patients into reticence, and 
hence made them less helpfully indiscreet than the men. It followed, as 
he observed in the early 1920s, that psychoanalysts knew a great deal 
more about the sexual development of boys than about that of girls" [Gay, 
1988: 505].47 While deploring the sexism of his time, Freud might have 
paused to contemplate some of its other possible effects. For one thing, it 
was capable of producing emotional distortions which look alarmingly 
similar to the ones he ascribed to child sexuality. Moreover, if sexism 
was entrenched enough to make women more reticent than men, then 
one fails to see how it can be valid to deduce the features of the female 
complex by simply reversing the emotional disposition of the male. 
Males and females were separated by far too many socially-structured 
divisions to allow ready translation of male experience into female 
terms. The "necessary reversal" was too big an ask.
There are moments when Freud's forgetting of the female complex 
seems to involve more than the sexism of his time, or the alleged 
unavailability of data resulting from it - moments when it is suspiciously 
convenient for Freud to forget the existence of females altogether. One 
such moment comes in Totem and Taboo (1913):
No detailed analytic examination has yet been made of children's 
animal phobias, though they would greatly repay study.... But a 
few cases of this kind directed towards the larger animals have 
proved accessible to analysis and have thus yielded their secret to 
the investigator. It was the same in every case: where the 
children concerned were boys, their fear related at bottom to
47In 'The Infantile Genital Organization', Freud writes: "Unfortunately we can describe 
this state of things only as it affects the male child; the corresponding processes in the 
little girl are unknown to us" [SE, 19: 142].
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their father and had merely been displaced on to the animal.
[Freud, 1957:127-128]
And where the children concerned were girls? Bizarrely, 
scandalously, Freud passes over that elementary question in silence. Fie 
forgets - or thinks that we will forget - the existence of half the human 
race.
Why does Freud so conspicuously neglect to discuss the case of 
girls here? What purpose does this lacuna serve? To answer these 
questions, we need to understand what Freud is in the process of arguing 
here. Fie is trying to use animal phobias as an example of tensions 
arising from the Oedipus complex. This argument could be empirically 
clinched with the following affirmation: "it was the same in every case: 
the fear of the children related at bottom to their parent of the opposite 
sex, and had merely been displaced on to the animal." But something 
prevents Freud from uttering so comprehensive a statement. Instead he 
refers only to boys and fathers. Why? We have to suspect one of two 
things: either he has no evidence at all about animal phobias in girls, or 
else he has evidence of their fears which conflicts with his thesis.
Again one has to stress that this absent evidence is precisely the 
evidence which Freud really needs to produce. We need to see a young 
girl experiencing an intense and nightmarish fear of her mother before 
we can believe that a boy's similar fear of his father has a sexual basis. If 
Freud wants to convince us of the irrational - i.e. unconscious, erotic, 
primal, in a word oedipal - basis of these phobias, the mother-fear of girls 
is precisely the phobia he ought to be focussing on, for unlike the father- 
fear of boys this fear is not explicable as a rational fear. By passing over 
the female case in silence, Freud does nothing to allay one's suspicion 
that the Oedipus complex does not exist.
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Let us pursue the argum ent of Totem and Taboo, and watch the 
way that the forgetting of females continues to function in Freud 's 
favour. Having established to his own satisfaction the oedipal basis of 
anim al phobias, Freud in tegrates this inform ation into his m ain 
argum ent, which concerns totems. The characteristics of male animal 
phobias, he says, "justify us, in my opinion, in substituting the father for 
the totem animal in the formula for totemism (in the case of males)." 
[131] From this we move to the broader conclusion that it is "probable 
that the totemic system - like Little H ans's animal phobia and little 
A rpad 's poultry perversion - was a product of the conditions involved in 
the Oedipus complex" [132 - italics added].
Flere we have, then, a shining example of that slackness of thought 
by which male fear of the father is allowed, to all intents and purposes, to 
be the Oedipus complex. True, Freud does vaguely gesture towards the 
existence of females with that bracketed phrase, "in the case of males". 
But let us examine this phrase. It amounts to a telling sleight-of-hand. 
What it says is "in the case of males". But what it means, or wants to 
mean, is surely something far more: it means in the case of males only. 
For it is absolutely imperative that the totem animal does not equate to 
the father in the case of females too. That would thoroughly desexualise 
the boy's fear - and Freud's oedipal analysis, perhaps even the theory of 
the Oedipus complex itself, would collapse. But the problem for Freud is 
that only the weaker statem ent, "in the case of m ales", has been 
empirically validated, with reference to the cases of Little Hans and Little 
Arpad. The statement he really needs to make, "in the case of males 
only", cannot be justified, for it requires that the case of girls has been 
exam ined and an opposite kind of fear discovered in them . The 
bracketed phrase is Freud's way of assuring us that the phenom ena of
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which he is speaking are oedipal. But it points us, I would suggest, to the 
very reason why they aren't.
A charitable reader might think that Freud has inserted the 
bracketed phrase in order to acknowledge his silence about the female 
case, perhaps even to offer a whisper of an apology for it. Perhaps Freud 
means to tell us that he is sticking to the case of males only for the 
moment, and only in the interests of keeping the argument flowing. But 
there will be no point at which he does break his silence, and during the 
next step of Freud's argument we can see why: the silence is fundamental 
to the structure of his thesis.
The move in question is Freud's speculative location of the origins 
of totemism in an actual historical event. He invokes Darwin's notion of 
the prim al horde, the "earliest state of society" which consists of "a 
violent and jealous father who keeps all the females for himself and 
drives away his sons as they grow up" [141]. To Darwin's hypothesis 
Freud adds one of his own: that the primal horde met its end in an act of 
parricide. The guilty sons then "revoked their deed by forbidding the 
killing of the totem, the substitute for their father" [143]. Up to this 
moment in the argument it has been possible to compensate for Freud's 
silence on the female subject by extrapolating from the attitudes of the 
male an improbable, but theoretically conceivable, m other-fear on the 
part of girls. But how can we fit the psychology of the female into this 
twist of Freud's narrative? If the psychological significance of the male's 
totem proceeds from an actual act of parricide, how  did the female 
attitude to her totem evolve? If the male complex originated in an actual 
deed, a thoroughly male-centred incident for which history offers no 
parallel on the female side, then what has happened to the symmetry 
between the male and female cases which Freud relies on when he tells
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us that the features of the female complex can be deduced, "w ith the 
necessary reversal", from those of the male one?
The theory of the Oedipus complex rests on the assum ption that 
the prim e difference between males and females, the difference that 
really matters psychologically, is genital. But when Freud starts to speak 
of the primal horde, we get a sense of how brittle this assumption is, how 
apt it is to shatter when brought into contact with the real world, or even 
with an hypothesis about the real world. By ascribing to parricide a 
primal reality which matricide doesn't have, Freud seems to confirm our 
suspicion that a lthough  male father-hostility  is a real enough 
phenomenon, female mother-hostility is a fiction, a purely theoretical 
construct. At the very least, Freud has irrevocably conceded that there is 
a peculiarity about male father-hostility, an element in its motivation 
which exceeds the gender-neutral factor of "sexual rivalry". He has 
allowed politics to contaminate his theory. He has confessed that 
psychology can be altered by an oppressively patriarchal social structure. 
And he has admitted that that structure remains in place: "The family 
was a restoration of the former primal horde and it gave back to fathers a 
large portion of their former rights" [149].
But Freud's forgetting of the female has not yet reached its 
acme. This comes when he attem pts to extend his oedipal 
account from the construction of totems to the emergence of "the concept 
of God" [147]:
The psychoanalysis of individual hum an beings ... teaches us 
with quite special insistence that the god of each of them is 
formed in the likeness of his father, that his personal relation to 
God depends on his relation to his father in the flesh and oscillates 
and changes along with that relation, and that at bottom God is
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nothing other than an exalted father. As in the case of totemism, 
psycho-analysis recommends us to have faith in the believers who 
call God their father.... If psychoanalysis deserves any attention, 
then ... the paternal element in that concept must be a most 
important one. [147]
Sexist language is by now the only thing holding Freud's argument 
together. The truth of the matter is that psychoanalysis recommends us 
to have faith only in the male believer who calls God his father. The 
female believer who calls God her father presents Freud with a problem. 
It is very hard to accept that Freud did not perceive this problem. And 
therefore it is very hard not to suspect that there was something 
deliberate about his response to it, which involved pretending it did not 
exist, covering it with a linguistic smokescreen. Freud's sexism is, like 
any sexism, reprehensible in its own right.48 But behind it lies a deeper 
scandal: without the marginalisation of the female subject, the theory of 
the Oedipus complex simply would not work.
Consider the last quoted sentence. "If psychoanalysis deserves any 
attention, then ... the paternal element in that concept [of God] must be a 
most important one." Just what does Freud mean by paternal here? In 
psychoanalytical theory, the word "father", and by extension the adjective 
"paternal", can mean one of two vastly different things, depending on
48The view that Freud's sexism can be excused on the grounds that all bourgeois Victorians 
were sexist is spurious. The fact is that Freud was exposed to enlightened views on 
women's issues, and chose to reject them. In 1880, he translated John Stuart Mill's 1869 
essay 'Subjection of Women' - in which Mill compared the exploitation of women to that 
of black slaves - into German. In a letter to his then fiancee Martha Bemays, Freud 
offered the following verdict on Mill's ideas: "Any girl, even with no right to vote or legal 
competence, whose hand a man kisses and for whose love he dares all, could have set him 
straight" [Gay, 1988: 39]. Elsewhere in the same letter, Freud gives this line of argument a 
more comprehensive airing: "It seems a completely unrealistic notion to send women into 
the struggle for existence in the same way as men. Am I to think of my delicate, sweet girl 
as a competitor? After all, the encounter could only end by my telling her ... that I love 
her, and that I will make every effort to get her out of the competitive role into the quiet, 
undisturbed activity of my home" [quoted by Decker, 1991:106].
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whether the man in question is being viewed from his son's perspective 
or his daughter's. One's natural assum ption is that Freud is using the 
w ord from the son's perspective here, as he did when discussing the 
paternal elem ent of anim al phobias, and the paternal elem ent of 
totemism. But if "paternal" is being used in that sense, we are being 
asked to believe that the concept of God has a maternal element in the 
case of female believers - in other words, that females in general believe 
in a female God. Obviously Freud would not seriously advance this 
suggestion, so we must have read him wrongly. Fie m ust be using the 
word 'paternal' in its traditional, pre-Freudian sense. This squares w ith 
the unignorable fact that the Judaeo-Christian God tends to be God the 
Father for male and female believers alike. But this raises another 
problem . To suggest that the general authority of God the Father 
emanates from the general authority of the flesh father is to make a point 
about the flesh father's power, not about his status as an object of erotic 
desire or envy. It is to admit that the earthly father exercises God-like 
authority  over his son and daughter both. This is a profoundly  
unFreudian observation, one which exposes the folly of trying to derive 
sexual meaning from a son's fear of his father.
When probed, then, this sentence turns out to have two possible 
meanings - one Freudian but radically implausible, the other plausible 
but radically unFreudian. Freud wants it to mean something in between: 
he w ants us to think that w hat he is saying is both Freudian and 
plausible. He has written a vague and lazy sentence, and he needs it to be 
read in a similar way. Only if we forget the existence of females entirely 
can we believe that the juicy-looking fact that God is God the Father is a 
point in Freud's favour.
247
Perhaps we can clear this matter up by examining a passage Freud 
wrote twenty years later, in a section of the New Introductory Lectures 
(1933) which deals once more with the question of God 'the father':
Psychoanalysis infers that he really is the father, with all the 
magnificence in which he once appeared to the small child ... the 
same person to whom the child owed its existence, the father (or 
more correctly, no doubt, the parental agency compounded of the 
father and mother ), also protected and watched over him in his 
feeble and helpless state.... Even now [as an adult] he cannot do 
without the protection he enjoyed as a child. But he has long 
since recognised, too, that his father is a being of narrowly 
restricted power, and not equipped with every excellence. He 
therefore harks back to the mnemic image of the father whom in 
his childhood he so greatly overvalued.... [163 - emphasis added]
The beginning of the passage seems to reiterate the novel, bold, 
specifically psychoanalytical contention that God and one's flesh-and- 
blood father are intimately connected concepts. But inside the brackets 
comes a qualification which blunts that sensational claim: we learn that 
God is not, after all, a glorification of the flesh-and-blood father, but a 
projection of the father's power, or more accurately of the parental power 
of which the father happens to wield the lion's share. In other words, 
Freud relinquishes his own special conception of the father - whereby the 
father is defined as the object of sexual desire for the girl and of sexual 
hostility for the boy - and adopts a more or less Marxist conception of 
him, whereby his main difference from his wife is political, conditioned 
by the imbalance of power under the patriarchal system. Freud 
effectively surrenders, then, before the fact of the maleness of God. It is a
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fact w hich psychoanalysis can explain only by ceasing to be 
psychoanalysis.
A parallel problem seems to arise in the case of the superego, or 
ego-ideal - the agency which forms when the Oedipus complex dissolves. 
"[T]he ego ideal had the task of repressing the Oedipus complex; indeed, it 
is to that revolutionary event that it owes its existence../' [Freud, 1947: 34]. 
Writing in The Ego and the Id (1923), Freud describes the consequences of 
the dissolution of the Oedipus complex in boys, and repeats the old 
formula that things happen "in a precisely analogous way ... in a little 
girl" [Freud, 1991d: 371]. But Freud's descriptions of the superego are so 
male-centred that it is very difficult to imagine analogous processes in a 
girl. In 'Dostoevsky and Parricide', for example, he gives this account of 
the superego: "the identification w ith the father finally makes a 
perm anent place for itself in the ego. It is received into the ego, but 
establishes itself there as a separate agency in contrast to the rest of the 
content of the superego. We then give it the name of superego.... If the 
father was hard, violent and cruel, the super-ego takes over those 
attributes from him..." [1961: 185]. We can easily accept that certain 
Victorian fathers were "hard and cruel", and we can hardly doubt that the 
consciences of many of their sons had similar attributes - remember the 
conscience of Dorian Gray, for example. But what of the female subject? 
While it is not hard to imagine her conscience being every bit as "hard" 
and "cruel" as a male's - as Freud himself observed, Victorian sexual 
morality was tougher on women than it was on m en - it is difficult to 
picture the generation of hard and cruel m others at the root of this 
toughness. One is more inclined to think of those m others as being 
relatively indulgent; but if they were, of course, then one would be 
obliged to conclude that the consciences of their daughters were 
accordingly easy-going.
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One can start to clear up the mystery by consulting the editorial 
footnote of James Strachey's which accompanies Freud's remarks in The 
Ego and the Id. Strachey explains: "The idea that the outcome of the 
O edipus complex was 'precisely analogous' in girls and boys was 
abandoned by Freud not long after this" [ibid: 371n]. FFe then refers us to 
the 1925 paper 'Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatom ical 
Distinction between the Sexes'. One turns to that paper w ith alacrity, 
eager to learn about the distinctive features of the female conscience. 
And one finds this:
I cannot escape the notion (though I hesitate to give it expression) 
that for women the level of w hat is ethically norm al is different 
from what it is in men. Their superego is never so inexorable, so 
impersonal, so independent of its emotional origins as we require 
it to be in men. Character-traits which critics of every epoch have 
brought up against women - that they show less sense of justice 
than men, that they are less ready to submit to the great necessities 
of life, that they are more often influenced in their judgements by 
feelings of affection or hostility - all these w ould be am ply 
accounted for by the modification in the formation of their super­
ego which we have already inferred. We must not allow ourselves 
to be deflected from such conclusions by the denials of the 
feminists, who are anxious to force us to regard the two sexes as 
equal in position and worth.... [1950o: 196-197]
The reason Freud "cannot escape" this notion is because he is bent on 
interpreting conscience as an emanation of sexuality. He has been forced 
into making this egregious pronouncement not by observation of the real 
world, but by the outlandish dictates of his own theories. His sole gesture
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toward empirical substantiation is to mention the nasty mutterings of 
unnamed sexists down the years. And if Freud is so hesitant to give 
expression to his offensive thesis, then why does he repeat it in 1933, in 
an infamous passage of the New Introductory Lectures?
In a boy the Oedipus complex, in which he desires his mother and 
would like to get rid of his father as being a rival, develops 
naturally from the phase of his phallic sexuality. The threat of 
castration compels him, however, to give up that attitude. Under 
the impression of the danger of losing his penis, the Oedipus 
complex is abandoned, repressed and, in the most normal cases, 
entirely destroyed, and a severe superego is set up as its heir.
What happens with a girl is almost the opposite. The castration 
complex prepares for the Oedipus complex instead of destroying 
it; the girl is driven out of her attachment to her mother through 
the influence of her envy for the penis and she enters the Oedipus 
situation as though into a haven of refuge. In the absence of fear 
of castration the chief motive is lacking which leads boys to 
surmount the Oedipus complex. Girls remain in it for an 
inordinate length of time; they demolish it late and, even so, 
incompletely. In these circumstances the formation of the 
superego must suffer;49 it cannot attain the strength and 
independence which give it its cultural significance, and feminists 
are not pleased when we point out to them the effects of this 
factor upon the average feminine character.50 [SE XXII: 129]
49Freud's use of the word 'suffer7 in this context is a subtle yet outrageous piece of sexism 
which is in danger of being overshadowed by the egregious bigotry of the passage as a 
whole. To think of the female as "suffering" when her development differs from that of 
the male is to define the male as the healthy norm, of which the female is a kind of 
malformed version.
50Freud was right to predict that feminists would find fault with this pronouncement, but 
wrong in his smug presumption that they would do so merely for the trivial reason that it
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This m ust not be brushed aside as a sample of naughty but trivial 
sexism on the part of F reu d . As I have demonstrated, 
sexism is fundam ental to oedipal theory: it will not work w ithout it. 
Oedipal theory is at its best, its most convincing, when the female subject 
is forgotten altogether. When the awkward fact of her existence comes 
up, Freud has two options. The first is to allow the experiences of the 
female subject to force him into a theoretical retreat, a watering dow n of 
his conviction that all of the male's father-related feelings - his fear or 
resentm ent of authority, his conscience, his relations with God - were 
purely functions of sexuality. We have seen Freud forced into such a 
retreat w hen his speculations about male belief in God "the father" came 
up against the regrettable fact that females did not believe en masse in a 
female God. Freud's second option was to go on the attack, to affirm that 
w hat his theories and methodology whispered was really true: wom en 
were second-class hum ans. This is the option Freud embraces in the 
passages quoted above, in which we find him making the remarkable 
assertion that half of the human race either has a defective conscience or 
no conscience at all. This claim is sexist and indefensible, but it is only a
impugned their characters. Feminists have rightly pointed to this passage, and to others 
like it, as proof of Freud's scandalously muddled thinking about female psychology. 
Elizabeth Grosz, writing in Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary, 
provides a neat summary of the gaps and confusions in Freud's narrative of female 
development. "In Freud's account of the oedipus complex repression is the central means by 
which the boy resolves the castration threat: he represses his desire for the mother 
through the establishment of the superego which is based on his identification with the 
father-figure.... Although Freud presumes that repression must operate in the case of the 
girl as well, he remains obscure about what it is she represses. For example, he claims 
that the girl's superego is weaker than the boy's; yet he also implies that in some sense at 
least, the girl is more repressed, and less sexual, than the boy.... Nor is it clear how she 
has access to the establishment of a superego, given that an identification with the 
father's authority is precluded precisely because of her castrated status. If the girl does 
not resolve her oedipus complex through repression but, as Freud claims, gradually accepts 
her castrated position and may remain in an oedipal attachment to her father for many 
years, then Freud leaves entirely obscure how her unconscious is formed. It may be for this 
reason that Iragaray asks whether women have an unconscious, or rather, whether women 
are the unconscious, the repressed, for men" [Grosz, 1993: 383-3841-
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logical extension of oedipal theory. It follows that oedipal theory is sexist 
and indefensible at its core. Freud's rare and calamitous investigations of 
the female Oedipus complex made this embarrassingly clear. The male 
was the only subject in whom Freud could confidently identify and 
demonstrate hostility to the parent of the opposite sex, because the male 
was the only subject in whom it existed.
Degeneration as Parricide
In light of these deficiencies of oedipal theory, our discussion of parricidal 
themes in decadent literature takes on a greater significance. If male 
father-hostility  practically is the Oedipus complex, then it is quite 
conceivable that Freud's theory was entirely rooted in the historical 
conditions that we find behind the literary theme of parricide.
A good way of resum ing our analysis of the decadents is to 
consider a passage from Richard Fenn's recent book The Death of Herod. 
(Herod, as we shall see when discussing Wilde's Salome, is an interesting 
figure in the history of parricidal politics.) In contextualising H erod 's 
troubled reign, Fenn makes some useful general observations:
[T]he succession in a patrilineal society m ust go smoothly if that 
society is to continue to believe in its ability to own and control the 
sources of life. If the society in question is going to reproduce itself, 
sons m ust succeed fathers, and kings-designate m ust succeed the 
former ruler. That process of reproduction occurs, however, in 
many spheres: in the fertility of the fields, in the deference of the 
young to the old, in success in hunting or in agriculture, in the
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martial or in the fine arts. The issue in each case is the same, that 
is, that the vitality of the society depends on the succession of one 
generation and of one regime to another. A society whose vitality 
is in question leads its members into a sense of despair: a haunting 
and increasingly palpable awareness that the promises of future 
and abundant life will never be realised. [Fenn, 1992: 132]
These remarks ring true when tested against the sense of despair 
that haunted the European fin de siede. The succession of kings by 
kings-designate did not always happen smoothly, owing to such trends as 
democracy and assassination. Nor did the young necessarily defer to the 
old any more - and why should they in the wake of Darwin? As Max 
Nordau said, the degenerate movement formed "a union against taking 
one's hat off to people" [quoted by Hirsch, 1897: 194]. And society's lack of 
vitality was certainly accompanied by a crisis in patrilineal relations.
Right from the beginning of the decadence, the theme of decay was 
strongly associated with the family. In Poe's 'The Fall of the House of 
Usher' (1839), the 'House' refers both to the decaying residence of the 
Usher family, with its "bleak walls ... vacant eye-like windows ... a few 
rank sedges ... a few white trunks of decayed trees", and to the family 
itself, which is in a similarly advanced state of decomposition [Poe, 1979: 
245]. Once vigorous, the clan now has only two surviving members: the 
lady Madeline, who suffers from a "settled apathy, a gradual wasting 
away of her person" which has "long baffled the skill of her physicians"; 
and her brother Roderick, who has an obscure nervous illness but is still 
likely to survive his sister. "Her death ... would leave him (him the 
hopeless and the frail) the last of the ancient race of the Ushers" [252]. 
Discussing the family's decline, the narrator alludes to
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the very remarkable fact, that the stem of the Usher race, all time- 
honoured as it was, had pu t forth, at no period, any enduring 
branch; in other words, that the entire family lay in the direct line 
of descent, and had always, with very trifling and very temporary 
variation, so lain. It was this deficiency, I considered, while 
running over in thought the perfect keeping of the character of the 
prem ises w ith the accredited character of the people, and while 
speculating upon the possible influence which the one, in the long 
lapse of centuries, might have exercised upon the other - it was 
this deficiency, perhaps, of collateral issue, and the consequent 
undeviating transmission, from sire to son, of the patrim ony with 
the name, which had, at length, so identified the two as to merge 
the orig inal title of the estate in the quaint and equivocal 
appellation of the 'House of Usher'. [246-247]
Ancient families are as susceptible to the process of decay as 
ancient buildings are. And it is in the relation between sire and son, the 
line down which power and money and property are conveyed, that the 
decline is visible at its most abject. But perhaps 'abject' is the wrong 
word. Like later decadents, Poe seems more inclined to wallow in decay 
than to m ourn it - which means, when it comes to decay in families, that 
he will not be especially saddened by the death of the father, and will tend 
to celebrate the sickly autonomy of the son.
The argum ent that Poe's story represents an indulgence of his 
oedipal fantasies has been put by Freud's protegee Marie Bonaparte. 
Commenting on the passage from Poe's story quoted above, she says:
Thus, Poe informs us that the males of the line, from father to son, 
could justifiably regard themselves as the very 'sons', m oulded by
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it in its image, of their strange and lugubrious habitation. Since 
Fatherland and patrimony both, however, signify that which is 
owned by the father, and the father's dearest possession is the 
m other, of which the 'fatherland ', representing the nourishing 
m other-earth, is but the greatly magnified extension, a similar 
transference has clearly taken place in regard to the patrim ony of 
the Ushers. [Bonaparte, 1949: 238-239]
So patrilineal inheritance can be reclaimed by the Freudian as a 
process which has essentially to do w ith the m other, although the 
argument by which Bonaparte reclaims it looks far more like a recital of 
Freudian doctrine than a responsible analysis of the story. But 
Bonaparte's conclusion that "The Fall of the House of Usher is a story of 
retribution for infidelity to the m other" [251] does involve one key 
moment of engagement with the text. The atm osphere of the House, 
Bonaparte points out, is "[som ething  ... like the atm osphere round a 
corpse" [239]. Connecting this with the fact that Poe's mother had died 
when he was two, Bonaparte asserts that the corpse-like house of Usher is 
really Poe's dead mother in a symbolic disguise. "[T]he inner truth of the 
matter," Bonaparte claims, is "that the manor - its curse, its tarn and its 
'atmosphere' - is but a transference from one who once existed: the dead 
mother who still survived in the unconscious memory of her son" [243].
The major flaw in this argum ent becomes evident w hen one 
considers the following anecdote, related by Derrida.
M eryon asked Baudelaire w hether he believed 'in  the real 
existence of this Edgar Allan Poe'; Meryon attributed Poe's tales 'to 
a group of highly skilled and most powerful men of letters, acutely 
aware of everything that was going on.' [Derrida, 1975: 103n]
256
In other words, Poe's tales, far from projecting neuroses exclusive to him, 
crystallised the obsessions of a generation. The decaying atmosphere of 
the so-called "Mother mansion" [240] was not a unique product of Poe's 
imagination: it was the defining motif of a whole body of literature. Men 
whose mothers were alive and well were as fond of the theme of 
corruption as Poe was.51
For historical reasons we considered in the previous chapter, the 
decadents were bent on examining the corrosive effects of time on all that 
had once seemed stable. Poe's use of this theme in other contexts should 
reassure us that there nothing intrinsically oedipal about its deployment 
in 'The Fall of the House of Usher'. There is his poem 'The Conqueror 
Worm', for example, based on the conceit
That the play is the tragedy 'Man,'
And its hero the Conqueror Worm. [1969: 23]
Or there is 'A Dream Within a Dream':
I stand amid the roar 
Of a surf-tormented shore,
And I hold within my hand 
Grains of golden sand - 
How few! yet how they creep 
Through my fingers to the deep,
5 E d v a rd  Munch, bom  in 1863, was another member of the decadent generation who 
"exulted in his tainted ancestry," according to the critic Patrick Bade. Munch "describ[ed] 
his mother as 'eaten away by the worm of consumption' and his father as 'tainted with a 
tendency towards degeneracy.' 'Sickness, insanity and d ea th / he wrote, were the black 
angels that hovered over my cradle and have followed me throughout my life'" [Bade, 
1985: 228].
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While I weep - while I weep!
Oh God! can I not grasp 
Them with a tighter clasp?
Oh God! can I not save 
One from the pitiless wave?
Is all that we see or seem
But a dream within a dream? [1969: 73]
The theme of evanescence was not, of course, a decadent 
invention. It is the theme of Hamlet's reflections on Yorick; it is an 
eternal truth on which even Oedipus himself, in Oedipus at Colonus, 
muses:
only the gods
Escape the penalties of age and death.
Time undermines everything, nothing
Can stop the inevitable process of decay.
The earth itself is eroded, the bodies
Of men wither, shrink, and die. [Sophocles, 1993: 87]
But why did this theme resurface with such a vengeance in the 
decadent age, becoming an obsession which was allowed to corrupt even 
the form of language itself? One obvious answer is that not even the 
gods were exempt from the process any more. If the authority of God was 
dead, then how obnoxious and vain were the pretensions to power of his 
earthly surrogate, the venerable old patriarch! Huysmans's Against 
Nature begins with an account of familial decline which graphically 
deflates these patriarchal pretensions:
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Judging by the few portraits preserved in the Chateau de Lourps, 
the Floressas des Esseintes family had been composed in olden 
times of sturdy campaigners with forbidding faces. Imprisoned in 
old picture-frames which were scarcely wide enough for their 
broad shoulders, they were an alarming sight with their piercing 
eyes, their sweeping mustachios, and their bulging chests filling 
the enormous cuirasses which they wore.
These were the founders of the family; the portraits of 
their descendants were missing. There was, in fact, a gap in the 
pictorial pedigree, with only one canvas to bridge it, only one 
face to join the past and present. It was a strange, sly face, with 
pale, drawn features; the cheekbones were punctuated with 
cosmetic commas of rouge, the hair was plastered down and 
bound with a string of pearls, and the thin, painted neck emerged 
from the starched pleats of a ruff.
In this picture of one of the closest friends of the Due 
d'Epernon and the Marquis d'O, the defects of an impoverished 
stock and the excess of lymph in the blood were already apparent.
Since then, the degeneration of this ancient house had 
clearly followed a regular course, with the men becoming 
progressively less manly; and over the last two hundred years, as 
if to complete the ruinous process, the Des Esseintes had taken to 
marrying among themselves, thus using up what little vigour they 
had left.
Now, of this family which had once been so large that it 
occupied nearly every domain in the Ile de France and La Brie, 
only one descendant was still living: the Due Jean des Esseintes, a 
frail young man of thirty who was anaemic and highly strung, 
with hollow cheeks, cold eyes of steely blue, a nose which was
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turned up but straight, and thin, papery hands. [Huysmans, 1987:
17]
To an extent this reminds one of the House of Usher, but here the 
process of decline is described w ith a relish that makes its political 
meaning a little clearer. To dwell on the demise of past patriarchs makes 
a provocative point about those of the present. Their days were 
num bered.52 Their authority was subject to the same laws of process that 
had put paid to the rule of those ancient "sturdy campaigners" with their 
"sweeping mustachios". That the baton of power had in this case been 
passed to the anaemic Jean only served to underline how im partial and 
iron-clad the law was. Besides, from the perspective of a revaluer of 
values like Des Esseintes, the process by which sturdy cam paigners 
become hyper-refined neurotics was not necessarily one of degeneration. 
Perhaps it could even have been described as one of evolution.
Darwin and the Primal Parricide
We have already looked at the ways in which Darwinism fed into general 
decadent meditations about the fragility of authority. But Darwin might 
be said to have p rov ided  an additional and specific form  of 
encouragement to those decadents who, like Huysmans, pursued these
52"The generation which will take your place is now growing and will inevitably grow 
up," warns Fyodor Dostoevsky in a notebook covering the years 1875 and 1876. "It is only 
in the fifth grade now and will inevitably grow up and come forward, and then no trace of 
you will be left" [Proffer, 1975: 111-112 - "generation" appears in italics in the original; 
other italics added]. This throws more light still on the political nature of the quasi- 
parricidal battle of the generations: for Dostoevsky, as the context of this comment makes 
clear, thinks of the up-and-coming generation as a generation of liberals, and of his own 
generation of political incumbents as anti-liberals. See Chapter 4 below for a fuller 
discussion of these questions in the Russian context.
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m editations into the sphere of the family. For in a curious way, The 
Origin of Species sanctioned parricide.
[W]e have seen in the chapter on the struggle for existence that it is 
the most closely-allied forms - varieties of the same species, and 
species of the same genus or of related genera - which, from 
having nearly the same structure, constitu tion  and habits, 
generally come into the severest competition w ith each other. 
Consequently, each new variety or species, during the progress of 
its form ation, will generally press hardest on its nearest kindred, 
and tend to exterminate them.... Many curious instances could be 
given showing how quickly newT breeds of cattle, sheep, and other 
animals, and varieties of flowers, take the place of older and 
inferior kinds. In Yorkshire it is historically know n that the 
ancient black cattle were displaced by the long-horns, and that 
these were 'swept away by the short-horns' (1 quote the words of an 
agricultural writer) 'as if by some murderous pestilence/" [110-11 - 
emphasis added]
This underm ines patriarchal society's attem pt to naturalise the 
father's hegemony over the son, and to legitimate any violence needed 
for its preservation. Darwin's science legitimated, or at least recognised 
the naturalness of, violence in the opposite direction. It was to the 
young, not to the old, that nature gave power. "Every one is born a king, 
and most people die in exile, like most kings," says Lord Illingworth, in A 
Woman of No Importance [1983a: 73].53 From the point of view of
53"And I was born a king ... " laments the exiled Oedipus in Oedipus at Colonus 
[Sophocles, 1993: 67]. W hether the sorry career of Oedipus demonstrates the operation of 
an obscure sexual complex is a moot point, but there is another eternal tru th  which his life 
undoubtedly does illustrate: namely, the law that in m atters of hum an authority, all 
things must pass. His accession to the throne demonstrates the inability of Laius, his
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nature, it was the tyrannical patriarch, rather than the upstart son, who 
was the perverse and presum ptuous one. Parricide was progress.
As natural selection acts solely by the preservation of profitable 
modifications, each new form will tend in a fully-stocked country 
to take the place of, and finally to exterminate, its own less- 
im proved parent or other less-improved forms w ith  w hich it 
comes into competition. Thus extinction and natural selection 
will, as we have seen, go hand in hand. Hence, if we look at each 
species as descended from some other unknown form, both the 
parent and all the transitional varieties will generally have been 
exterminated by the very process of formation and perfection of 
the new form. [Darwin, 1964: 148]
Civilized humans, of course, are no longer engaged in the struggle 
for existence. Nevertheless, Darwin provides us with a model by which 
parricidal im pulses in civilized societies m ight be explained. If 
civilization imposes unnatural restraints on evolution, it m ight well 
become a hothouse for revolution instead. Victorian patriarchy, by 
unnaturally preserving the father's authority and by ham pering the son's 
natural progression tow ards it, might have made a flourishing of the 
parricidal impulse inevitable. Perhaps that is a misreading of Darwinian 
theory, but in the present context that doesn't matter. W hat m atters is 
not what Darwin said, but how he was read by his contemporaries. His 
talk of parent-species being done in by child-species could be, and was, 
construed as an endorsem ent of parricide. In The Brothers Karamazov,
father, to evade this law, and Oedipus's own susceptibility to it is confirmed by his 
disgrace and exile. Oedipus not only enacted this eternal law, he formally identified it 
by supplying the answer to the Riddle of the Sphinx: hum an beings, he saw, were the 
creatures that walk on four legs in the morning, two legs at noon, and three in the evening.
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for example, the free-thinking Ivan erupts during the trial of his brother: 
"My father has been m urdered and they pretend they are horrified.... 
Liars! They all desire the death of their fathers. One reptile devours 
another" [Dostoevsky, 1974: 727 - emphasis added].
Like Marx then, Darwin offers us a theoretical framework by which 
parricide, and the impulse toward it, can be explained. The former reads 
parricide as revolutionary step, the latter as an evolutionary one. Their 
understandings of parricide differ from Freud's in the following respects. 
The processes to which they ascribe the impulse manifestly exist outside 
the world of their own theories. They allow us to acknowledge the 
existence of economics and politics and history, rather than obliging us to 
dismiss them as projections of desire. They allow us to speak frankly 
about power, particularly about the excessive power enjoyed by the father, 
and the lack of power endured by the son, under the regime of patriarchy. 
By construing parricide as a public or social phenomenon, they allow us 
to understand why parricidal tendencies might fluctuate over time, and 
therefore do not oblige us to tiptoe around, or to bury under desperate 
theoretical elaborations, the palpable truth that these tendencies surged 
during the fin de siecle .
Strangely enough, Freud did not seem to consider himself to be at 
odds with Darwin on the question of parricide. On at least one occasion, 
Freud thought their theories on the m atter perfectly compatible. I am 
referring to the final essay of Totem and Taboo, in which Freud attempts 
a psychoanalytic developm ent of Darwin's theory of the prim al horde. 
We have already dealt with that essay in a slightly different context. But 
we must now examine it in more detail, in order to discover how Freud 
could possibly have believed that Darwin's conjectures about the origins 
of society were in harmony with the theory of the Oedipus complex.
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According to Darwin's hypothesis, Freud explains, the primal 
horde consisted of
a violent and jealous father who keeps all the females for himself 
and drives away his sons as they grow up. This earliest state of 
society has never been an object of observation. The most 
primitive kind of organization that we actually come across - and 
one that is in force today in certain tribes - consists of bands of 
males; these bands are composed of members with equal rights 
and are subject to the restrictions of the totemic system, including 
inheritance through the mother. Can this form of organization 
have developed out of the other one? and if so along what lines? 
[SE, 13:141]
Freud's answers are: yes; and along psychoanalytical lines. The 
first form of society was transformed into the second one by an act of 
oedipal violence:
One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, 
killed and devoured their father and so made an end of the 
patriarchal horde.... The violent primal father had doubtless 
been the feared and envied model of each one of the company of 
brothers: and in the act of devouring him they accomplished their 
identification with him, and each one of them acquired a portion 
of his strength. [141-142]
Fifteen pages after hypothesizing the occurrence of this primal 
murder, Freud is to be heard making the claim that "the beginnings of 
religion, morals, society and art converge in the Oedipus complex. This
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is in complete agreement with the psychoanalytic finding that the same 
complex constitutes the nucleus of all neuroses ..."  [156] Considering 
that Freud would later call this discovery "the very climax of my 
psychoanalytic work" [1950c: 133], it is worth examining the argum ent by 
which he reaches it, and the quality of the evidence he adduces in its 
favour.
To a certain extent, of course, evidential proof is not possible in 
this case: one does not expect Freud to produce the primal father's bones, 
or a m urder weapon bearing the fingerprints of his sons. We cannot 
disprove Freud's claim that this primal act of parricide occurred any  
more than he can prove it. But Freud is making a metaphysical claim, 
too: he wants us to believe not only that the crime happened, but that it 
was an expression of the Oedipus complexes of the sons. If we are to 
agree that the Darwinian hypothesis has been successfully converted into 
a Freudian one, this is the point on which Freud m ust convince us. Fie 
m ust tell us why he believes, and why we should believe, that this 
hypothetical crime had sexual desire as its fundamental motive.
This would seem a tall order, given the nature of the prim al 
horde. As we have seen, the patriarchal conditions of Freud's own age 
p rev en ted  him  from  convincingly  estab lish ing  the overrid ing  
importance of sexuality in the contemporary male's resentm ent of his 
father. The grotesque patriarchy of the primal horde would seem to 
amplify this problem. The primal patriarch, as Freud describes him, 
sounds like such a nasty piece of work that it would appear to be arbitrary 
to single out any one form of resentment, let alone such an obscure one 
as repressed sexual jealousy, as the key motive for his m urder. If the 
m urder of the primal father did indeed occur, doesn't it tend to confirm 
the unFreudian proposition that the parricide is actuated by political 
forces beyond him, rather than by instinctual forces within? In the
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portions of Freud's argument I have quoted so far, only one word has 
gone any way towards combating this impression. The word envied, in 
the phrase about the father being "the feared and envied model of each 
one of the company of brothers", perhaps contains a ghost of an assertion 
that the motive was sexual.
At this early point one naturally assumes that Freud will spend the 
rest of his essay elaborating on this crucial point. But then one reads 
passages like the following one, which suggests that Freud is not even 
aware that motive is the question on which his argument stands or falls.
This hypothesis, which has such a monstrous air, of the tyrannical 
father being overwhelmed and killed by a combination of his 
exiled sons, was also arrived at by Q. J.] Atkinson as a direct 
implication of the state of affairs in Darwin's primal horde.... 
Atkinson ... also pointed out that the conditions which Darwin 
assumed to prevail in the primal horde may easily be observed in 
herds of wild oxen and horses and regularly lead to the killing of 
the father of the herd. He further supposed that, after the father 
had been disposed of, the horde would be disintegrated by a bitter 
struggle between the victorious sons. Thus any new organization 
of society would be precluded: there would be 'an ever-recurring 
violent succession to the solitary paternal tyrant, by sons whose 
parricidal hands were so soon again clenched in fratricidal strife.' 
[SE, 13:142n]
"In its essential feature," Freud says of Atkinson's argument, "it is 
in agreement with my own" [142]. This is entirely untrue. The belief that 
an act of parricide occurred might well be the essential feature of 
Atkinson's argument, but it is, or ought to be, merely the starting point of
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F re u d 's . 54 Parricide, as one has become tired of repeating, is not by 
definition oedipal. The essential feature of Freud's argum ent - the 
feature  w hich m akes his argum ent Freudian , as d istinc t from  
Atkinsonian or Darwinian or even Marxist - is the assertion that the 
prim al parricide was a libidinal deed. And on this essential point 
A tkinson's argum ent is in strident disagreement w ith Freud's. For 
A tkinson's narrative places parricide squarely in the arena of pow er 
relations: he reads it as a response to oppression, a bestial answering of 
violence w ith violence. In particular, the em pirical fact that the 
"conditions which Darwin assumed to prevail in the primal horde may 
easily be observed in herds of wild oxen and horses and regularly lead to 
the killing of the father of the herd" seems devastating to the Freudian
54Indeed, Freud points out in his Autobiographical Study that the primal m urder need not 
have occurred at all for his thesis to be right. Calling his conjectures about the primal 
horde more of a "vision" than a "hypothesis", he says: "Now whether we suppose that 
such a possibility was a historical event or not, it brings the formation of religion within 
the circle of the father-complex and bases it upon the ambivalence which dominates that 
complex" [Freud, 1950c: 124,125].
This quotation raises a point with which a Freudian might respond to my present 
line of attack. Perhaps the oedipal dimension of the primal m urder does not lie in its 
motivation (particularly if it did not even occur) so much as in the sense of guilt which 
attended the deed (or the desire to commit it). This guilt supposedly spawned the taboo 
against killing the totem animal, which creature was "a substitute for him, the primal 
father, at once feared and hated, honoured and envied.... The son's rebelliousness and his 
affection for his father struggled against each other through a constant series of 
compromises, which sought on the one hand to atone for the act of parricide and on the 
other to consolidate the advantages it had brought" [Freud, 1950c: 125-126]. But let us 
examine the ambivalence of which Freud speaks here. Initially, Freud says that the 
ambivalence consists in "fearing and hating" the father while at the same time 
"honouring and envying" him. Examining the two terms at the positive pole of the 
ambivalence, we find that they are not especially positive at all. "Envy", one would 
have thought, is scarcely the opposite of fear and hate: on the contrary, Freud insisted 
that envy was precisely what lay at the root of a son's negative feelings about his father. 
The remaining ingredient of the son's positive feelings, honour, is somewhat equivocal too, 
and surely not unrelated to fear. So if honour and envy were the strongest positive 
emotions the sons felt about their father, then one fails to see how m urdering him could 
have left them with a sense of guilt potent enough to generate a whole system of religious 
belief. On the other hand, Freud does subsequently use the word 'affection' in reference to 
the positive pole of the ambivalence. He stops short of saying love, but affection is still 
roughly the kind of emotion that we might expect to find at the positive pole of a true 
ambivalence. This raises a different problem, though, that of implausibility. Affection 
for the father is 'natural' and 'norm al' enough within the nuclear family, but it seems 
unlikely that the primal father could have inspired anything resembling pure affection 
in his sons.
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position. All of Freud's superstitions about parricide are destroyed by it. 
How can we believe that the deed of the prim al brothers was darkly 
neurotic, uniquely criminal, deeply psychological, obscurely sexual, and 
profoundly  constitutive of religion, m orals, society, w hen precisely 
analogous killings are committed on a regular basis by wild oxen? Do 
parricidal oxen and horses have a repressed sexual desire for their 
mothers? If not, then Freud is asking us to believe something even more 
far-fetched: that the primal brothers performed a killing which is similar 
in every detail to a natural animal phenomenon, but that they performed 
it for uniquely human reasons.
When Atkinson speaks of parricide and fratricide in the same 
breath , he deals another body-blow to Freud. A tkinson draw s no 
profound distinction between the father-son struggle and the subsequent 
son-son struggle. Both struggles are political. When we read that a 
brother can occupy the position of "solitary paternal tyrant", we have to 
conclude that the concept of fatherhood, in the context of this parricide, 
has been drained of everything except its political content. The operative 
words, the ones which ensure that the brother will meet w ith violent 
death, are solitary and tyrant. The same principle applies to the original 
m urder. The prim al father was m urdered not because he was a father, 
but because he was a tyrant. It was his political identity, not his biological 
one, which made his m urder at the hands of his sons so inevitable.
One m ight think A tkinson's account of the prim al parricide 
superior to Freud's, because it at least supplies us w ith an empirical 
reason to believe that the act occurred. But Freud finds Atkinson's effort 
som ewhat deficient, because he had "no psychoanalytic hints to help 
him" [142]. This phrase seems to imply that Freud intends to flesh out 
A tkinson's naive narrative with a few of his own discoveries, and in 
particular to put him right about the motivation of the m urderous sons.
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In thus promising to provide a uniquely psychoanalytical illumination of 
the m urder of this "violent and jealous father who keeps all the females 
for himself and drives away his sons as they grow up", Freud seems to set 
himself two main tasks. First, he m ust dem onstrate that although the 
primal father was in general "violent" and "jealous", it was his sexual 
power, the fact that he "keeps all the females for himself", which drove 
the sons to m urder. Having established that, he m ust then show that 
even though the father kept all the females to himself, his possession of 
their respective mothers exercised some decisive influence.
But instead of clearing these obstacles, Freud merely presents us 
with formulations in which they are preserved. The sons, he says, "hated 
their father, who presented such a formidable obstacle to their craving for 
power and their sexual desires..." [143]. Far from telling us
something uniquely Freudian about the nature of their hate, this only 
informs us that the sons' craving for withheld power was their prim ary 
drive, of which their desire for withheld women was a mere subsidiary. 
So Freud inadvertently admits that from the very dawn of society, sexual 
relations have been enfolded within political relations. This tru th  was 
reasonably evident during Victorian times, too, but being a Victorian 
himself Freud managed to overlook it. Here though, in the case of the 
prim al horde, it is far too luridly on show to be ignored, and Freud 
cannot possibly pretend that sexuality exists in a political vacuum. He 
therefore finds himself unable even to assert that sexual desire for the 
m other is the crime's governing motive, much less to provide proof o f  
the point. On the key question of the sons' motive, he can only offer 
vague pronouncements in which his sexual thesis is watered down to the 
point of invisibility. "The cherished fruit of the crime" he says, was
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"appropriation of the paternal attributes" [145].55 Later, he says: "Each 
single one of the brothers who had banded together for the purpose of 
killing their father was inspired by a wish to become like him..." [148]. 
These slack speculations, it will be seen, add nothing very revolutionary 
to the pre-psychoanalytical gropings of Atkinson.
Freud comes closest to attaching a properly Freudian motive to the 
deed when he suggests that "the women whom they desired ... had been 
their chief motive for despatching their father" [144]. This is nothing 
more than a hopeful guess, as one can see by comparing it with the more 
tentative, and more honest, form ulations about m otive that Freud 
advances in the quotations above. But even when arbitrarily singling out 
sexual desire as the telling motive, Freud still cannot make the facts of 
the m atter conform to pure oedipal theory. He is obliged to talk about 
desire for women,  not for that particular wom an whom  his theory 
considers the primal object of desire. To say that a father who forcibly 
withheld all female flesh from his sons might have given them a sexual 
motive for parricide is not to say much. It certainly has no necessary link 
to the far more extreme notion that all sons in all circumstances harbour
55T o demote the mother so that she becomes merely one of the "paternal attributes" is a 
concise way of confirming that the motive for this crime lies in the field of power 
relations, not sexual ones. In Sophocles's play (Lines 259 and 260), Oedipus himself is 
similarly clear - insultingly clear, one might say - about the relative insignificance of 
Jocasta. She is just one of the many trappings of kingly power: "Now ... I am a king/ I enjoy 
Laius's title, his bed, and his wife..." [Sophocles, 1993: 15]. (In Gould's translation: "It's I 
who have the power that he had once, and have his bed, and a wife who shares our seed" 
[Sophocles, 1970: 46].) Jocasta merely comes as part of the deal: "the Thebans," as Gould 
explains in his 'Introduction', "had given Oedipus the hand of the widowed Queen Jocasta 
at the time of his elevation to the kingship" [Gould, 1970: 1].
This is not to suggest that Freud ever ventured the radically untenable claim that 
sexual desire for Jocasta motivated Oedipus's crime. To Freud, the myth showed deeply 
repressed instincts in a heavy disguise. "[T]he Oedipus Complex [is] so named because its 
essential substance is found in the Greek myth of King Oedipus, which has luckily been 
preserved for us in a version from the hand of a great dramatist. The Greek hero killed 
his father and married his mother" [Freud, 1949b: 88]. But the point remains that the 
myth actively undermines the theory by portraying union with the mother as an 
incidental benefit of a crime whose prime reward is power.
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parricidal wishes based on a sexual desire for their mothers. Even so, 
Freud behaves as if this connection had been triumphantly established.
At the conclusion, then, of this exceedingly condensed inquiry, I 
should like to insist that its outcome shows that the beginnings of 
religion, morals, society and art converge in the Oedipus complex. 
This is in complete agreement with the psychoanalytic finding that 
the same complex constitutes the nucleus of all neuroses, so far as 
our present knowledge goes. It seems to me a most surprising 
discovery that the problems of social psychology, too, should prove 
soluble on the basis of one single concrete point - man's relation to 
his father. [156-157]
Amid the sound of Freud blowing his own trumpet, one can hear 
an even more familiar theme: a repetition of that sloppy definition of the 
"Oedipus complex" which has facilitated, but at the same time radically 
undermined, his whole argument to this point. The phrase "man's 
relation to his father" is used as though it were a synonym for the 
Oedipus complex. It isn't, of course; and yet it is. In theory, Freud defines 
the Oedipus complex sharply enough, but in practice he was happy to let 
the concept blur to the point where something which should have 
counted as evidence against it - a savage patriarch oppressing his sons so 
comprehensively that they become parricidal - can become evidence for 
it.
The case of the primal horde is illuminating because it raises, in a 
very glaring fashion, the same concerns which have made one sceptical 
about Freud's applications of Oedipal theory to Victorian data. As far as 
the data are concerned, we have found the same blatant sexism in the 
social structure, a sexism which clearly introduces political peculiarities
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into the father-son relationship, and in particular gives the son special 
reasons to hate his father which do not indicate the operation of a 
universal sexual complex. And in Freud's approach to this data we have 
seen the same opportunistic reduction of the Oedipus complex to the 
father-hostility of sons, and the same reluctance to prove, or even to 
discuss, the supposedly fundamental influence of sexual love for the 
mother.
We shall now return to the matter of patriarchy in Freud's own 
day, and consider two works of fin-de-siecle literature which treat the 
theme of parricide in its historical and political context.
The Son as Revolutionary: 
Parricide in Oscar Wilde's Vera
CZAR (nervous and frightened): "Don't come too near me, boy! 
Don't come too near me, I say! There is always something about 
an heir to a crown unwholesome to his father. [Wilde, 1955: 544]
This neat comment on the politics of parricide comes from Oscar Wilde's 
first play, Vera; Or, The Nihilists (1880), a piece of melodramatic 
juvenilia set in Russia in 1800, but mainly inspired, as we shall see, by 
events in the Russia of Wilde's own day. The plot runs as follows. A cell 
of Nihilists, led by the fiery female of the title, hatch a plot to murder the 
Czar, Ivan. Modelled on the reactionary Paul I [see Ellmann, 1988: 116], 
Wilde's Czar is a paranoid tyrant with plans to quell the insurrectionary
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mood of his people by imposing m artial law. His son Alexis, the 
potential parricide to whom those lines quoted above are addressed, 
desperately counsels his father against such a confrontation of the 
masses; a program  of liberal reform, he argues, would be a better way of 
dealing with public discontent. But the tyrannical Ivan scoffs at such 
suggestions. Secretly sympathetic to the Nihilists' cause, Alexis has been 
attending their meetings and participating in their regicidal plotting 
under a false identity. He and Vera are in love. When the Czar learns 
that his son is a Nihilist, he orders that he be put to death; but before the 
sentence can be carried out the Czar is himself killed, shot by a Nihilist 
assassin. His dying words, addressed to his son, are: "M urderer! 
Murderer! You did it! Murderer!" [1995: 554]. (It should be becoming 
apparent already that this is a play in which family politics and public 
politics are tightly plaited together.)
Alexis assumes the throne, thereby breaking the N ihilist's oath, 
which has sw orn him against authority of any kind. He begins to 
implement his liberal agenda - but the Nihilists, being Nihilists, plan to 
assassinate him anyway, and Vera herself is assigned with the task. But 
rather than go through with it, she stabs herself - in order, she explains, 
to "save Russia."
It will be clear from this synopsis that Vera is not a very glittering 
example of W ilde's art. But precisely because it is unstam ped by Wilde's 
mature aesthetic, it has an unW ildean willingness to engage with, or at 
least to acknowledge the existence of, the political atmosphere of the age. 
As well as being Wilde's most overtly political play, it is also his most 
thorough treatm ent of the theme of parricide. I am not inclined to view 
this as a coincidence. I am inclined, rather, to read it as a confirmation of 
my argum ent that the theme of parricide was thoroughly political. 
Consider the lines I quoted at the beginning of this analysis: the nervous
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Czar is both father and monarch, the upstart Czarevitch is both son and 
heir, and parricide cannot be disentangled from regicide. The play 
thereby seems to bear out the two main points I have been trying to 
make: one, that all father-son relationships of the time had a political 
dimension, a distinct hint of King and Heir about them; two, that the 
parricidal tensions present in those relationships were related to the 
revolutionary climate which prevailed in general politics. It was not 
only royal fathers who were tyrants. And princes were not the only kind 
of sons who stood to gain power through their father's death. This last 
point is nicely illustrated when Alexis calls his father a "tyrant", and in 
doing so strikes a chord with a non-royal, the Prime Minister. "I have 
been an eldest son myself. I know what it is when a father w on't die to 
please one" [541]. The word "eldest" should make it clear that the Prime 
M inister is sym pathising not on psychological grounds, but w ith 
reference to the factor of patrilineal inheritance.
But the consideration that the play's central relationship is at once 
familial and political56 does not necessarily nullify the Freudian reading. 
On the contrary, a psychoanalyst would read it as a vindication of the 
view that political activity is nothing more than an emanation of private 
psychology. The Nihilists' campaign to free Mother Russia from the 
clutches of the tyrannical little Father has oedipal desire w ritten all over 
it, the Freudian w ould argue, and W ilde betrays his unconscious 
aw areness of this by placing the C zar's  actual son am ong the 
revolutionaries.
Certainly the play can be interpreted along Freudian lines, but that 
is hardly the point. It can be interpreted in an infinity of ways. One can
56A coincidence which of course obtains whenever parricide occurs in a royal family. 
"Tyranny links the political and the family crim e/' writes Seth Bemadete of Oedipus 
Rex, pointing out that the first words of Oedipus in Sophocles's play, addressed to his 
people, are "my children", or "O children" [Bemadete, 1966: 107].
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interpret it, no doubt with some degree of plausibility, as an expression of 
Wilde's star sign. (He was a Libra, by the way.) So the mere fact that a 
Freudian reading is possible ought not to impress us, but ought simply to 
lead us to the question of the quality of that reading. The Freudian 
reading cannot be proved wrong or right, any more than the astrological 
interpretation can. But its pros and cons can be measured against those of 
other modes of interpretation, such as the historical one.
One immediate problem for the Freudian reading is that Vera, like 
so many works of decadent literature, explicitly connects the theme of 
parricide with uniquely contemporary political events. "I have tried in 
[Vera]," wrote Wilde, "to express within the limits of art that Titan cry of 
the peoples for liberty, which in the Europe of our day is threatening 
thrones, and making governments unstable from Spain to Russia, and 
from north to southern seas" [Ellmann, 1988: 116]. Wilde's adherence to 
contemporary reality is evident in very name of his heroine, which he 
borrowed from an actual Nihilist named Vera Sassoulich, who in 1878 
had tried to assassinate St Petersburg's Chief of Police. "Her pistol shot", 
said the Pall Mall Gazette of that Vera, "rang like a bugle across Europe" 
[in the issue of December 14, 1889, quoted by Ellmann, 1988: 116-117]. By 
violently assaulting a male authority figure, she articulated a Europe­
wide mood.
But what of the proposition that that revolutionary geist was itself 
merely a mass oedipal fantasy?57 To make that glib assertion in this case 
is to saddle oneself with a large problem: that of explaining why oedipal 
fantasies from Spain to Russia, from north to southern seas, registered a 
spontaneous surge at this m om ent in h istory . M oreover, the 
consideration that Vera Sassoulich was a female assailant of a male
57A s an example of this line of thinking, see the claims Freud makes about the scientific 
revolution of Leonardo, quoted on page 191 above.
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would seem to throw  another spanner into the Freudian works. An 
oedipal reading of revolution, like an oedipal reading of many things, is 
convenient only as long as the conditions of patriarchy prevail: as long, 
that is, as authority figures and revolutionaries remain generally male. 
Had Vera Sassoulich wanted to act out her father-complex on the Chief of 
Police, she would presumably have written him a love letter .58 In light 
of the fact that she shot him instead, we have to suspect that there was 
something genuinely political about her motivation, and about that of 
other revolutionaries like her - female or male.
One scarcely needs to repeat why a fin-de-siecle European, let 
alone a Russian, should have felt political discontent. While their 
aspirations were being pushed in one direction by enlightened political 
thought, they were being repressed in the other by regimes which were 
stale and stagnant at best, tyrannically oppressive at worst. Authority had 
fallen into the kind of decadence that the Italian critic Claudio Magris 
evokes while discussing the twilight of the Habsburg empire.
The last phase of the Habsburg civilization seemed to be poised 
between two contrasting poles, between the nostalgic awareness of 
its own decline which it endures w ith silent dignity, and the 
thoughtless lightheartedness of an operetta. The Em peror's 
tedious old age symbolises the Habsburg decline and epitomises 
the pathetic stoicism with which the m onarchy of the Danube 
w ithstood the blows which rained dow n on it. T am spared 
absolutely nothing' Franz Josef would sigh in the face of repeated 
domestic and political mishaps, echoing the passive tragedy of the
58And no, she wasn't a lesbian: her grudge against the Police Chief was bom when he 
imprisoned her (male) lover [Ellmann, 1988: 117].
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finis Austriae, and som ehow investing this a ttitude  w ith  a 
dignified sense of duty. [Quoted by Zanuso, 1986: 35-36]
In Vera , such feebleness on the part of the ruling class strikes the 
Nihilists as an incitement to violence - contempt alone is a sufficient 
motive for revolution. "Oh, to think w hat stands betw een us and 
freedom in Europe!" says one of W ilde's insurgents: "a few old men, 
wrinkled, feeble, tottering dotards whom a boy could strangle for a ducat, 
or a woman stab in a night-time" [531].59 Seeing such "dotards" in power 
w ould scarcely have reassured one that m odern philosophers were 
wrong in deeming all authority a matter of convention only.
Those philosophies, as I have argued, had a significant influence 
on decadent thinking, in particular on W ilde's. "How steep the stairs 
within king's houses are," he once said, summing up his fascination with 
the precariousness of authority [quoted by Ellmann, 1988: 445].60 Parricide 
in Vera is an extension of this W ildean theme. Hence it is folly to read 
Wilde's parricidal play as though it were an oasis of significance whose
59Cf. Engels's definition of "force" as "The instrument with the aid of which social 
movement forces its way through and shatters the dead, fossilized political forms" 
[Bekerman, 1983: 64].
60To a certain extent this preoccupation was no doubt prompted by aspects of Wilde's 
private life. Richard Ellmann argues that Wilde contracted syphilis as a youth [1988: 
88n], and therefore spent his life in a body whose natural decay was accelerated by 
disease. Another story related by Ellmann has a peculiar bearing on the theme of doom in 
Wilde's life. In 1893, while approaching the acme of his fame, Wilde had his future told 
by a palm-reader named Cheiro. "The left hand in front of him, he said, promised a 
brilliant success, the right, impending ruin. 'The left hand is the hand of a king, but the 
right that of a king who will send himself into exile.' Wilde, a superstitious man ... 
asked 'At what date?' 'A few years from now, at about your fortieth year.' (He was then 
thirty-eight.) Without another word Wilde left the party.
"The word that triggered his response may have been 'king'. It was associated in 
his mind from Portora [i.e. Wilde's school] with Aeschylus's Agamemnon. Wilde's sense 
of being lucky did not prevent his thinking of himself as unlucky, too. In De Profundis he 
repeatedly used the word 'doom' as opposed to mere 'destiny,' and he pointed to 'the note 
of doom that like a purple thread runs through the gold cloth of Dorian Gray.' Wilde was 
too good a classicist not to piece together from the plays of Aeschylus and Euripides and 
the Iliad, the stages of doom for Agamemnon. Prosperous, he became blase, the man who 
has everything, and later Wilde would invoke another rule and speak of 'my Neronian 
hours, rich, profligate, cynical, materialistic'" [Ellmann, 1988: 360, 361].
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sole wellspring was his unconscious. In fact the play is part of a thematic 
river which flows through W ilde's work as a whole, whose source lies 
beyond Wilde and beyond decadent literature, somewhere in the history 
that shaped them both.
Wilde's interest in the fragility of authority is evident as early as 
his College Notebooks, in which he quotes David Hume: "Force is always 
on the side of the Governed: all governm ents rest ultim ately  on 
opinion" [164].61 When uttered by a decadent, this ceases to be a 
comment about the strength of the people, and refers entirely to the 
brittleness of authority. It sanctions the kind of audacious inversions of 
the power structure that the decadents liked to perpetrate, as in Lord 
Illingworth's comment in An Ideal Husband. "The tyranny of the weak 
over the strong is the only tyranny that lasts" [1983b: 77].
In Vera, this modern scepticism of authority can be detected when 
Alexis, having been elevated to the throne, is moved to m editate on the 
essence of power - and to conclude that it has none.
Before my father's hideous shriek of death had died in my ears I 
found this crown on my head, the purple robe around me, and 
heard myself called a king.... What subtle potency lies hidden in 
this gaudy bauble, the crown, that makes one feel like a god when 
one wears it? To hold in one's hand this little fiery-coloured 
world, to reach out one's arm to earth 's utterm ost limit, to girdle
61Cf. Tolstoy, in his Diaries (1897): "Ultimately it is those people who are the victims of 
oppression, i.e. those people who obey the law of non-resistance, who always rule. So 
women seek rights, but it is they who rule, just because they are the ones subjected to force - 
were, and still are. Institutions are in the power of men, but public opinion is in the power 
of women. And public opinion is a million times stronger than any laws and armies. The 
proof of the fact that public opinion is in the hands of women is that not only is the 
organization of houses and food determined by women ... but the success of works of art and 
of books, even the appointment of rulers, is determined by public opinion, and public 
opinion is determined by women. It was well said by somebody that men need to seek 
emancipation from women, and not the other way round" [Tolstoy, 1994: 321].
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the seas with one's galley; to make the land a highway for one's 
hosts; this is to wear a crown! to wear a crown! The meanest serf 
in Russia who is loved is better crowned than I. How love 
outweighs the balance.... [572]
Authority isn 't tangible: only its trappings and its trinkets are. 
Beneath their im pressive surface lies a terrifying void. This is an 
interesting usage of a familiar decadent tactic, that of emphasizing the 
surface of something until we are persuaded that nothing exists beneath 
it. Another place in which Wilde interrogates the authority  of a 
monarch in this way is his fairy story 'The Young King'. In that story, the 
Chamberlain urges the youngster to "put on this fair robe, and set this 
crown upon thy head. For how shall the people know thou art a king, if 
thou hast not a king's raiment?" [1988: 231]. Raiments might be mistaken 
for a mere representation of authority, but really they are its very essence. 
Appearance is the only reality. If you don't look like a king, the people 
will not know you are a king - and if the people do not know you are a 
king, then you are not one, for all authority rests on opinion.
A few items of clothing and the good will of the people: that is all 
there is to power, according to the sceptical Wilde. Consequently, his 
works repeatedly represent power as something one w ould rather not 
have, so flimsy are its foundations. Glory is always tem porary in Wilde, 
a mere prelude to decline. "There is a fatality about all physical and 
intellectual distinction," says Basil Hallward, painter of the portrait of 
Dorian Gray:
the sort of fatality that seems to dog through history the faltering 
steps of kings. It is better not to be different from one's fellows.
The ugly and the stupid have the best of it in this world.... If
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they know nothing of victory, they are at least spared the 
knowledge of defeat. They live as we all should live, 
undisturbed, indifferent, and without disquiet. [Wilde, 1988: 19]
So says the man who will wind up being murdered by his own 
metaphorical son, the picture-perfect Dorian Gray.
In The Soul of Man Under Socialism', Wilde applies this 
subversive idea to the reign of Julius Caesar:
Caesar, says Mommsen, was the complete and perfect man. But 
how tragically insecure was Caesar! Wherever there is a man who 
exercises authority, there is a man who resists authority. Caesar 
was very perfect, but his perfection travelled by too dangerous a 
road. [1970c: 236 - emphasis added]
Look at the italicised sentence. Remember the climate of oppression and 
insurrection in which Wilde wrote it; and consider that only seven years 
later Freud would produce his theory of the Oedipus complex, which has 
all sons resisting all fathers for supposedly sexual reasons.
In Wilde's Salome, Caesar makes a peripheral appearance, as the 
author of a letter explaining to Herod why he is unable to come to Judea. 
Among other excuses, he cites "reasons of State. He who leaves Rome 
loses Rome" [Wilde, 1988: 564]. Before long, Herod will be getting a more 
personal taste of the perils of authority. No sooner has he declared that "I 
have never been so happy. There is nothing in the world that can mar 
my happiness," than he is treated to the following prophecy of Jokanaan:
He shall be seated on this throne. He shall be clothed in scarlet and 
purple. In his hand he shall bear a golden cup full of his
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blasphemies. And the angel of the Lord shall smite him. He shall 
be eaten of worms. [1988: 567]
By the end of the play, there can be little doubt about which King 
the prophecy refers to. Herod is still alive, but his authority, his power, is 
already food for worms. "Surely some terrible thing will befall," he 
moans.
.... [P]ut out the torches. I will not look at things, I will not suffer 
things to look at me. Put out the torches! Hide the moon! Hide 
the stars! Let us hide ourselves in our palace, Herodias. I begin to 
be afraid.62 [1988:574]
The Czar in Vera also finds having power a frightening business, 
and his panicky speeches have the same jerky rhythms as Herod's. "Who 
is that man over there?" demands the jumpy Czar.
I don't know him. What is he doing? Is he a conspirator? Have 
you searched him? Give him till tomorrow to confess, then hang 
him! - hang him! ... [To his Prime Minister:] Why do you startle 
me like that?... (Watches the courtiers nervously). Why are you 
clattering your sword, sir? Take it off. I shall have no man wear a
62The real Herod was similarly uptight about the stability of his reign, and naturally 
his paranoia was at its sharpest in relation to his sons. Since Herod had at least ten 
wives and more than fifteen children, it was unclear who his heir would be. He was 
plagued by visions in which one of his sons stood over him with a drawn sword. He ended 
up putting no fewer than three of his sons to death, out of fear that they were conspiring 
against him. Speaking at the trial of one of them, Herod said: "Since some evil genius 
desolates my house and makes my dearest one rise against me one by one, I shall indeed 
lament my cruel fate and inwardly grieve for my loneliness. But I will let no one escape 
who thirsts for my blood, not even if judgement finds every one of my children guilty." "I 
would rather be Herod's pig," Augustus once commented, "than his son" [Grant, 1971: 202, 
195 and passim.].
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sword in my presence (looking at CZAREVITCH), least of all my 
son. [Wilde, 1995: 544]
In the decadent political climate, the appropriate mental state for a 
monarch was one of deep paranoia. Wilde's Czar again:
Vera, the Nihilist, in Moscow! O God, were it not better to die at 
once the dog's death they plot for me than to live as I live now! 
Never to sleep, or, if I do, to dream such horrid dreams that hell 
itself were peace when matched with them. To trust none but 
those I have bought, to buy none worth trusting! To see a traitor 
in every smile, poison in every dish, a dagger in every hand! To 
lie awake at night, listening from hour to hour for the stealthy 
creeping of the murderer, for the laying of the damned mine!
You are all spies! You are all spies! You worst of all - you, my 
own son! [548]
A crucial thing happens at the end of both of these speeches. The 
Czar's fear of his son is identified as a part - the worst part, but still a part - 
of his fear of his subjects in general. Relatives are an aggravated form of 
the public, and the threat posed by the son is merely an aggravated 
version of the threat posed by the masses. An heir is a walking reminder 
of the mortality of a King's rule at the best of times: and these are 
emphatically not the best of times for this Czar, or perhaps for any ruler, 
fictional or real.
Wilde's play is meticulous in establishing the parallels and 
interconnections between the father's squabble with his son and the 
monarch's squabble with his subjects. The Nihilists recite an oath in 
which they vow, among other things, "to set father against son, and
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husband against wife..." [526].63 Article Five of the Nihilists' Code of 
Revolution states that "The family as subversive of true socialistic and 
communal unity is to be annihilated" [558]. The family as an instrument 
of State oppression: again the father's oppression of his son, and the son's 
resentment, are contextualised within a wider politics. The Czar himself 
is painfully aware of the link:
My father gave me the Iron Cross of Valour. Oh, could he see me 
now, with this coward's livery ever in my cheek! (Sinks into his 
chair). I never knew any love when I was a boy. I was ruled by 
terror myself, how else should I rule now? [Wilde, 1995: 548]
Is the Czar alluding to his rule of terror over his people, or over 
his son? The answer is, both. Just as he has oppressed the masses, so he 
has brought his son up according to a domestic version of martial law, 
keeping him imprisoned in the palace under guard. "An excellent 
training to make him a tyrant in his turn," muses one of the Nihilists 
about this rearing technique [527]. But the training makes the Czarevitch 
grow up to be something else instead: a Nihilist, a parricide. Instead of 
passing the violence on down the line, as his father did, Alexis reflects it, 
justly, on the oppressor himself. There is a subtle indication that the 
Czar recognises his own culpability for both of the types of uprising with 
which he is faced. "The people! The people! A tiger which I have let 
loose on myself; but I will fight with it to the death" [549], is his response 
to the public's revolt. Complaining about the parricidal threat, he uses a 
curiously similar formulation: "A plague on all sons, I say! There should
63Ellmann points out [1988: 117] that Wilde "borrowed the N ihilists' oath from 'The 
Catechism of a Revolutionary' by S. C. Nechayev and Mikhail Bakunin."
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be no more marriages in Russia when one can breed such Serpents64 as 
you are!" [553]. So the patriarch has bred the animal response of 
parricide, just as the tyrant has bred public revolution.
Having lost the good will of the people, and of his son, the Czar 
lavishly confirms the hollowness of his power by appealing to the 
ludicrously superficial fact that he is still their father by name. "What did 
you say, boy? tyranny! tyranny! Am I a tyrant? I'm  not. I love the 
people. I'm  their father. I'm called so in every official proclamation" 
[545 - emphasis added]. The Nihilists, for their part, find this language 
offensively hollow. "The father of his people," scoffs one of them, and 
Vera adds: "Ay! a father whose name shall not be hallowed, whose 
kingdom  shall change to a republic, whose trespasses shall not be 
forgiven him, because he has robbed us of our daily bread; w ith whom is 
neither right, nor glory, now or for ever" [545].
This is an im portant speech. The little Father is compared with 
the heavenly father - which links political scepticism w ith religious 
scepticism - and both of them are likened to the literal father, the 
footsoldier of patriarchy who enforces its rules (or endures their 
decomposition) in the battlefield of the family. Religious scepticism - 
political scepticism - parricide. What applied to God the Father and to the 
Little Father applied just as surely to the father as such. His power was 
merely conventional, too; it only depended on the good-will of the ruled. 
In that climate fathers had to be on their toes, had to prove themselves 
w orthy of the name. This point is made during the defence of Mitya 
Karamazov, who is on trial for parricide: "such a father as the m urdered 
old Karamazov," says M itya's attorney, "cannot and does not deserve to
64Used in this connection, the word "serpent" echoes the words of another foolish father 
plagued by filial insurrection: King Lear's "How sharper than a serpent's tooth it is/ To 
have a thankless child".
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be called a father. Love for the father that is not justified by the father is 
an absurdity, an impossibility" [Dostoevsky, 1992: 788].65
The climate of scepticism, then, carried a warning for fathers. 
Respect from superstitious fear, as Tolstoy perceived, was over. It was 
time for kings and for fathers to earn respect, to be respectable - or to live 
w ith the consequences, which m ight well mean dying from them. 
"What root should there be of discontent among the people but tyranny 
and injustice amongst their rulers?" [545], explains W ilde's Alexis, the 
tyrant's son. His father proves the point right by ignoring it; he imposes 
martial law instead, and only succeeds in whipping up discontent to a 
m urderous pitch. "It [martial law] is the death-w arrant of liberty in 
Russia," declares the president of the Nihilists. "Or the signal for 
revolution," replies Vera - who means, in effect, that it is the death- 
warrant of the Czar [530].
So the Czar, in trying to retard the decadence of his power with 
more oppression, only succeeds in speeding the decadence up. W ilde's 
Prime Minister sums the situation up nicely: "Good kings," he says, "are 
the only dangerous enemies that m odern democracy has" [560]. This 
principle is a m odern version of a proverb which Freud himself once 
quoted: "Harsh rulers have short reigns".66 It is a pity that Freud did not 
ask himself how good this proverb might have been at explaining the 
kind of politics that he insisted on calling "oedipal". Victorian fathers
65Sophocles's Electra protests that her mother is "in name, but nothing else, a mother" 
[Sophocles, 1977: 105]. "Mother!" she scoffs at an earlier point in the play:
more like a jailer, with the slavery 
You put upon me, the insults I have to bear 
From you and your partner.... [1977: 86]
66Freud quotes the proverb during the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), 
while discussing character types and their durability: "There is no justification for the 
fear that trends which set in with the greatest violence in childhood will permanently 
dominate the adult character; it is just as likely that they will disappear and make way 
for an opposite tendency. ('Harsh rulers have short reigns')" [1983a: 167],
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were harsh rulers; perhaps that harshness had something, or everything, 
to do with the "parricidal" leanings of their sons. In order to test this 
proposition further, let us now turn to another harsh ruler w ith a short 
reign: Fyodor Karamazov, perhaps the most famous victim of parricide 
in all literature.
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F o u r
"A sign of the times": Parricide in 
Brothers Karamazov
On March 30, 1878, Dostoevsky attended the trial of Vera Zasulich, 
accused of firing a shot at General Trepov, the governor of the 
Petersburg district, who had ordered a political prisoner to be 
flogged. She was acquitted by the jury and Dostoevsky witnessed 
the great ovation given her by a large crowd. This turned him 
against trial by jury, of which he had previously approved, and led 
him to treat it, in The Brothers Karamazov, as a farce. (David 
Magarshack, Dostoevsky [1962: 471])
This is the same Vera Zasulich who would lend her name, as well as her 
politics, to the fiery heroine of Wilde's first play. What are we to make of 
this curious coincidence? Why does the name of this feisty assassin come 
up in connection with Wilde's first major work and with Dostoevsky's 
last one, both of which were completed in 1880, and both of which had an 
act of parricide at the centre of their drama?
At first glance, what we have here is a vivid but perhaps trivial 
vindication of the argument that both works had their roots in history. 
But it was not just in the trivial sense that she was a real person that Vera 
Sassoulich represented history. The shot of her pistol, we will recall, 
"rang like a bugle across Europe", because it reified the turbulent mood of 
the time. And clearly it was this symbolic dimension of Vera that 
mattered to Wilde and Dostoevsky. For both writers, she possessed a 
significance which transcended the local specifics of her deed. For Wilde
she represented the people's healthy thirst for liberty, for Dostoevsky the 
pernicious anarchism  of progressive politics. But while they had 
differing attitudes toward the social upheaval that Vera stood for, Wilde 
and Dostoevsky felt the force of that tum ult with comparable intensity - 
and both produced works in which it finds its ultimate expression in an 
act of parricide.
If W ilde's slight Vera only sketches the connections between the 
theme of parricide and the conditions of the age, then The Brothers 
Karamazov gives us the broad canvas in living colour. It is fitting that 
W ilde's intuitions about the social significance of parricide should have 
been echoed, on so much more grand a scale, by a Russian: Russia was, 
after all, notoriously a crucible for the social tendencies that W ilde 
detected beneath the deed (or notion) of parricide. Tyranny and 
insurrection , 1 slavery and freedom, the death of God - for a Russian these 
were not mere ideas to be toyed with, but issues of supreme urgency .2 
The Brothers Karamazov was a wilfully contem porary novel, and no 
Freudian could possibly deny that Dostoevsky was, at least at the level of 
secondary revision, determ ined to deal w ith these pressing social 
questions. But I reject the view that the novel's engagement with history 
was only a secondary revision, a mere cloak of contemporaneity w orn by 
the timeless, oedipally-generated theme of parricide. I believe, on the
1 Introducing the Russian edition of The Communist Manifesto in 1882, Marx and Engels 
observed that "During the Revolution of 1848-49 ... the Tsar was proclaimed the chief of 
European reaction. Today he is a prisoner of war of the revolution ... and Russia forms the 
vanguard of revolutionary action in Europe" [57 - emphasis added].
2"How have Russian boys handled things up to now?" says Ivan to Alyosha in 
Dostoevsky's novel. "Take, for instance, some stinking local tavern. They meet there and 
settle down in a comer. They've never seen each other before in their whole lives, and 
when they walk out of the tavern, they won't see each other again for forty years. Well, 
then, what are they going to argue about, seizing this moment in the tavern? About none 
other than the universal questions: is there a God, is there immortality? And those who 
do not believe in God, well, they will talk about socialism and anarchism, about 
transforming the whole of mankind according to a new order, but it's the same damned 
thing, the questions are all the same, only from the other end. And many, many of the 
most original Russian boys do nothing but talk about the eternal questions, now, in our 
time" [Dostoevsky, 1992: 234].
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contrary, that the theme of parricide grew out of Dostoevsky's historical 
agenda, and that he used the murder of a father by his son as a metaphor 
for his anxieties about Europe, and in particular Russia. What Freud saw 
as the oedipal novel par excellence is actually, I will argue, the 
dem onstration par excellence of the historicity of the theme of parricide 
in fin-de-siecle literature.
In challenging the  F reud ian  reduction  of The Brothers 
Karamazov, we have at our disposal a resource which we did not possess 
in the case of Vera - we have an oedipal reading of the text conducted by 
Freud himself. Not that 'Dostoevsky and Parricide', the famous paper of 
1928, devotes itself exclusively, or even primarily, to Dostoevsky's novel. 
Freud 's reflections about the novel are in fact rather brief, and are 
sandwiched between a lengthy psychoanalysis of Dostoevsky's epilepsy, 
and a briefer discussion of his compulsive gambling. The latter section of 
Freud's paper is irrelevant to the present inquiry. But the analysis of 
Dostoevsky's epilepsy is im portant, because it provides Freud w ith 
"evidence" of the novelist's private wish to kill his father - evidence 
which paves the way for Freud's attempt to read the theme of parricide in 
The Brothers Karamazov as an expression of Dostoevsky's unconscious 
guilt.
According to Freud, Dostoevsky's epilepsy - or "so-called epilepsy", 
as he is impertinent enough to dub it [Freud, 1950f: 231] - was of an 
hysterical, rather than an organic, character. It was fuelled by the vast 
fund of oedipal guilt incurred by the novelist when, in 1839, his father 
was m urdered. Dostoevsky was seventeen at the time of this traumatic 
e v e n t . 3 Prior to it, Freud contends, D ostoevsky had  w ished 
unconsciously for his father's death, and had experienced guilt in the 
form of mysterious blackouts. "His early symptom of death-like seizures
3For a full discussion of the murder, see page 326 below.
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can ... be understood as a father-identification on the part of his ego, 
permitted by his superego as a punishment. 'You wanted to kill your 
father in order to be your father yourself. Now you are your father, but a 
dead father'" [1950f: 232]. When this wished-for death actually occurred, 
Dostoevsky's guilt soared, and his seizures of self-punishment became 
full-blown epileptic fits.
If it proved to be the case that Dostoevsky was free from his 
seizures in Siberia, that would merely substantiate the view that 
his seizures were his punishment. He did not need them any 
longer when he was being punished in another way. But that 
cannot be proved. Rather does this necessity for punishment on 
the part of Dostoevsky's mental economy explain the fact that he 
passed unbroken through these years of misery and humiliation. 
Dostoevsky's condemnation as a political prisoner was unjust and 
he must have known it, but he accepted the undeserved 
punishment at the hands of the Little Father, the Tsar, as a 
substitute for the punishment he deserved for his sin against his 
real father. Instead of punishing himself, he got himself punished 
by his father's deputy. [1950f: 233]
Freud's argument, as usual, consists almost exclusively of the kind 
of airy speculations that are as hard to disprove as they are to prove. But 
he does adduce, as a kind of launching-pad for his assertions, a handful of 
hard biographical facts about Dostoevsky. Recent scholarship suggests 
that most of these 'facts' are either not particularly hard or not facts at all. 
Joseph Frank, in an article appended to the first volume of his 
Dostoevsky [Frank, 1976: pp 379-391], demonstrates that Freud's analysis 
of Dostoevsky's illness is premised at nearly all of its key points on
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erroneous or gravely misinterpreted data. Moreover, there is one fact 
which, although crucially pertinent to the matter, is absent from Freud's 
account: the fact that Dostoevsky's son Alexey died of a massive epileptic 
fit. The boy's death offers us a strong indication, as Frank points out, that 
"epilepsy ran in Dostoevsky's family, and that the child had probably 
inherited it from his father. This creates a strong presum ption that 
Dostoevsky's epilepsy was organic in origin and not primarily hysterical" 
[Frank, 1976: 382].4 If Dostoevsky's epilepsy was organic, then all of 
F reud 's speculations about the nature of Dostoevsky's hysteria are 
rendered irrelevant.
But let us assume for a moment that Freud was right to think of 
Dostoevsky's illness as psychosomatic. Even if we grant Freud that, he is 
still obliged to prove his additional contentions about the nature of that 
hysteria. He suggests that the disease was activated by the death of 
D ostoevsky 's father, and was therefore a m ode of oedipal self- 
punishm ent. "It would be very much to the point," Freud says on this 
question, "if it could be established that they [i.e. the fits] ceased 
completely during his exile in Siberia" - that is, when Dostoevsky was 
enjoying surrogate punishm ent at the hands of the Little Father [Freud, 
1950f: 228]. Frank demonstrates, however, that the opposite is the case: "it 
is regrettably awkward for Freud's whole thesis that, according to all the
4James L. Rice, in his book Dostoevsky and the Healing Art, points out that Freud had 
encountered, and had chosen to ignore, other evidence pointing to the organic nature of 
Dostoevsky's epilepsy. In the article by Fülöp-Miller on which Freud's essay heavily 
drew, Rice explains, "[s]eizure records quoted from Dostoevsky's notebooks give 
specifically symptomatic counter-indications of hysteria: post-ictal depression, 
disorientation, and incapacity; self-inflicted severe psychical damage; and seizures 
occurring in sleep.... The classic works by Janet on Hysteria (1905, 1920) point to precisely 
the known symptoms of Dostoevsky (seizures in sleep and depressive aftermath) as among 
the most convincing arguments against hysteria and for organic or genuine epilepsy in 
differential diagnosis. Following hysterical seizures, on the contrary, the patient's mood 
sharply improves, and hysteria is seldom privately experienced, let alone in sleep. These 
signals should have helped Freud to avoid his mistaken diagnostic hypothesis" [Rice, 
1985: 219-220].
291
evidence except the family tradition,5 Dostoevsky's epilepsy began in 
Siberia; the only possible proof of Freud's argum ent turns out to be a 
counter-proof" [Frank, 1976: 389 - emphasis in original]. As for the "early 
symptom of death-like seizures" of which Freud makes so much: "there 
is," says Frank, "no evidence w hatever relating such sym ptom s to 
Dostoevsky's childhood" [387]. Frank's rigorous examination of the data 
leads him, justifiably enough, to the devastating conclusion that "the case 
history [Freud] constructed in the effort to 'explain ' [Dostoevsky] in 
psychoanalytical terms is purely fictitious" [28].
W hat of F reud 's a ttem pt to explain D ostoesvky's novel  in 
psychoanalytical terms? To the extent that it is bound up w ith his 
discredited notions about Dostoevsky's epilepsy, Freud's reading of the 
novel begins to look shaky. Take, for example, Freud's opinion that it is 
"rem arkable" that Smerdyakov, the parricide in Dostoevsky's novel, 
happens to be an epileptic [1950f: 236]. This circumstance is "remarkable" 
only if one believes that Dostoevsky's own epilepsy had  a parricidal 
meaning. It looks considerably less suggestive once one has embraced the 
overw helm ing  evidence that D ostoevsky 's illness w as not even 
hysterical, let alone parricidal.
On the other hand, much of what Freud has to say about the novel 
relies only on the general theory of the Oedipus complex, and therefore 
cannot be dismissed simply because Freud was wrong about the novelist's 
medical condition. This is certainly true of the paragraph which ushers 
in his discussion of the book:
5Freud quotes a tradition according to which Dostoevsky's fits dated back to his "earliest 
youth" [Freud, 1950f: 227n]. That story, Frank explains, originated w ith Dostoevsky's 
second wife, and was in all probability an "innocent falsification" which "was destined to 
have an astonishing career when it became the centre of the case-history which Freud 
constructed, out of such fragmentary and questionable data, to deal with the enigma of 
Dostoevsky" [Frank, 1976: 391].
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It can scarcely be owing to chance that three of the masterpieces of 
the literature of all time - the Oedipus Rex of Sophocles, 
Shakespeare's Hamlet and Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov 
- should all deal w ith the same subject, parricide. In all three, 
moreover, the motive of the deed, sexual rivalry for a woman, is 
laid bare. [Freud, 1950f: 235]
This brief passage contains two timely reminders of the slackness 
of Freud's thinking when it came to m atters parricidal. First, consider 
F reud 's lum ping together of Karamazov and Hamlet  as texts whose 
"subject" is parricide. Is Hamlet really about parricide? This suggestion 
would have come as news to its author, and indeed to any pre-Freudian 
reader of the play. The truth is that Hamlet is only about parricide once it 
has been subjected to a Freudian decoding - or, to be less charitable, a 
F reud ian  rew ritin g .6 Karamazov,  on the other hand, is m anifestly, 
tran sparen tly , consciously about parricide. Even if you accept the 
Freudian notion that Hamlet is about parricide, then surely you m ust 
stipulate that it is not about parricide in the same way that Karamazov is 
about parricide. The two works engage with the Oedipus complex from 
opposite ends.
To put it another way, the parricidal content of Hamlet emerges 
only at the conclusion of a Freudian reading; whereas the parricidal 
content of Karamazov is, or ought to be, merely the starting-point of the 
Freudian reading - or of any reading, for that matter. The argument must 
turn on what kind of parricide we are dealing with; Freud's burden is to
6So when he says that it can "scarcely be owing to chance" that all three of these 
narratives are about parricide, Freud is inadvertently right. Hamlet is about parricide 
owing to Freud. But what Freud wants to suggest, of course, is that what we have here is a 
Coincidence so vast that it amounts to a proof of the Oedipus theory. Freud's argument is 
perfectly circular: he would like us to accept that these works of literature, by echoing 
oedipal theory, confirm its validity; and yet they must first be decoded with the aid of 
that very theory before they can be seen to echo it.
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establish that it is sexually-driven, oedipal.7 But the fact that Freud 
immediately places the actual parricide in The Brothers Karamazov on a 
par w ith the reconstructed psychological parricide in Hamlet indicates 
that he is unlikely to deal with this burden scrupulously. It suggests that 
Freud considers Karamazov a self-evidently oedipal text simply because it 
deals with the subject of parricide. When Freud laconically adds that "[i]n 
all three, moreover, the motive of the deed, sexual rivalry for a woman, 
is laid bare," his reference to "the motive of the deed" carries the subtle 
suggestion that parricide can have no other motive than sexual rivalry, 
and the word "moreover" implies that evidence of this sexual rivalry is 
som ewhat superfluous - that sexuality does not have to be laid bare in 
order to be considered present. So the very point that Freud m ust 
establish is simply taken for granted from the very beginning, via the 
assum ption that parricide is by definition oedipal. (The idea that this 
assum ption might be justified by some rigorous, painstaking, empirical 
groundwork at some earlier point in Freud's writings is, as we have seen, 
w ithout foundation.) This outrageous corner-cutting receives its classic 
expression in the memoirs of Freud's patient and protege, the Wolf Man: 
"In The Brothers Karamazov Dostoevsky deals w ith patricide, that is, 
with the Oedipus complex" [Gardiner, 1971: 145 - em phasis added]. 
Although Freud never spelt things out that crudely, such a formula is 
clearly implicit in his essay on Dostoevsky. Only when blinkered by such 
a preconception could one possibly assert that sexual rivalry is "laid bare" 
as the motive for the m urder of Fyodor Karamazov.
What, then, is the motive? It is history. Dostoevsky, I will argue, 
presents us w ith an act of parricide which is m otivated by historical 
forces. When the prosecutor of Dmitri Karamazov calls the m urder a
7 A burden which looks considerably heavier when we consider the fact that The Brothers 
Karamazov was written in an era in which parricide was so thoroughly explicable in 
social terms.
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"sig[n] of the times" [Dostoevsky, 1992: 693], he is articulating a belief 
which saturates the novel. Parricide is presented to us as the epitome of 
the m odern, the abominable apotheosis of social disintegration. To 
establish this point is to do more than merely debunk Freud's reading of 
the novel. It is to raise the possibility that the novel is capable of reading 
Freud. By furnishing social and historical explanations of phenom ena 
that Freud took to be universal, The Brothers Karamazov m ight well 
condemn the theory of the Oedipus complex as a product of its time.
History in The Brothers Karamazov
A good way to start examining the profoundly historical character of 
Dostoesvky's novel is to consider The Diary of a Writer, the ram bling 
public journal in which Dostoevsky aired his social and political 
opinions betw een 1873 and 1881. Edw ard W asiolek, the editor of 
D ostoevsky's Notebooks for The Brothers Karamazov, says of the Diary  
that it "reads like the historical correlative of The Brothers Karamazov, 
yet it seems to have been written so that the history did not have to be 
incorporated in the novel itself" [Wasiolek, 1971: 9]. The novel, says 
Wasiolek, was written by "a Dostoevsky intent upon eliminating topical 
references" [10]; it is "as if Dostoevsky wanted to distance the topical and 
invite the universal" [9]. Wasiolek far overstates the case, I think, when 
he suggests that Dostoevsky did not incorporate history into his novel: 
surely its presence is palpable on nearly every page. But the drift of his 
argument is sound: there is more - even more - history behind the novel 
than there is in it. The Diary, and the Notebooks, dem onstrate that 
Karamazov derived its "universal" themes from local and historically-
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specific concerns. The novel therefore evolved according to a process 
exactly the opposite of that proposed by Freud, who viewed contemporary 
references as a mere garnish of irrelevancies, which the analyst should 
sweep away in order to reveal the universal myth beneath.
Of special interest to us here is the insight the Diary gives us into 
the connections between the theme of parricide and Dostoevsky's 
anxieties about the age. In 1877, the year in which he commenced work 
on Karamazov, Dostoevsky wrote:
from hour to hour Europe is changing from what she used to be 
recently - from what she was only six months ago - so that one 
cannot even vouch three months ahead for her further 
immutability. The point is that we are on the eve of the greatest 
and most violent events and revolutions in Europe - and this 
without exaggeration.... Yes, immense cataclysms are awaiting 
Europe, perturbations which the human mind refuses to believe.... 
[Dostoevsky, 1954: 908]
This sense of impending disaster will be familiar to the reader of 
The Brothers Karamazov. The opening pages of the novel are strewn 
with tantalising references to an impending "catastrophe". In Book V, 
Alyosha is visited by a sense of foreboding which closely resembles 
Dostoevsky's fears about European cataclysm: "with each hour the 
conviction kept growing in Alyosha's mind that an inevitable, terrible 
catastrophe was about to occur. What precisely the catastrophe consisted 
in ... he himself would perhaps have been unable to define" [Dostoevsky, 
1992: 222].
This feeling compels Alyosha to pay a visit to his brother Dmitri, 
who has been making increasingly less vague suggestions that he wants
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to kill his father. In the very near future their father will indeed be 
m urdered, and Dmitri will be charged with the crime. So the "terrible 
catastrophe" feared by Alyosha turns out to be the crime of parricide. 
This creates the strong impression that parricide in the novel functions 
as a kind of objective correlative of the fears expressed by Dostoevsky in 
the Diary. Parricide was a metaphor for the great public catastrophe that 
he feared - a reasonable fear, in light of what did end up happening in 
Russia - was imminent.8 After all, the novel makes no secret of the fact 
that the Karamazovs are meant to constitute a microcosm of a nation 
held to be in a bad way,9 and it stands to reason that the act of violence 
that rends the family should have a com m ensurate symbolic weight. 
"[Aj great num ber of our Russian, our national, crim inal cases bear 
witness precisely to something universal, to some general malaise that 
has taken root among us," says Dmitri's prosecutor, expanding on his 
point that the defendant's crime is a sign of the times. In such offences, 
he says, one can see "the whole tragic topsy-turveydom  of the present 
moment" [694].
In an 1876 chapter of the Diary entitled 'Segregation', Dostoevsky 
attempts to put his finger on the nature of the contemporary malaise.
Verily, I keep thinking that we have reached an epoch of some 
universal 'segregation.' Everybody segregates himself, keeps aloof 
from others.... Former ties are being severed w ithout regret and 
everybody acts by himself.... If he doesn't act, he wishes he could 
act.... M eanwhile, in alm ost nothing is there m oral accord:
8In Mark's gospel, Christ prophesies a time of tribulation in which parricide will figure 
prominently: "Now the brother shall betray the brother to death, and the father the son; 
and children shall rise up against their parents, and shall cause them to be put to death" 
(13:12).
9"[C]ertain basic, general elements of our modern-day educated society shine through, as 
it were, in the picture of this nice little family," sneers the Prosecutor during Dmitri's 
trial [Dostoevsky, 1992: 695].
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everything has been, or is being, broken up, and not even into 
groups but into units.... [T]he 'segregation7 of un its and the 
extreme, so to speak, chemical decomposition of our society into its 
component parts, which has occurred suddenly in our time.... 
[N]owadays everybody is 7on his own and by himself7.... 'A nd in 
Europe7 - why, everywhere - isn 't it the same? H aven 't all these 
cohesive forces, which we had so trusted, been converted into a sad 
mirage? Isn 't their decomposition and segregation even worse 
than ours?7 These are questions which cannot be evaded by a 
Russian.... [Dostoevsky, 1954: 245, 249, 250]
Decomposition, segregation, the severing of former ties - this social 
vision sounds awfully familiar. It is the vision of the decadents. But it is 
important to stress that while Dostoevsky shared the decadent vision, his 
sensib ility  was in bitter opposition to the decadent one. W hat 
Dostoevsky condemned as "segregation", the decadents celebrated: Wilde 
in the name of "indiv idualism ", Pater of "relativ ism ", Remy de 
Gourmont of "I'idealisme" , Valery Larbaud of "the penetration of the 
self." The Brothers Karamazov, while clearly not a piece of decadent art, 
was just as clearly a reaction to precisely the same social trends that 
prompted the art of the decadents. Indeed the Karamazov family may be 
seen to represent, among other things, Dostoevsky's condemnation of the 
decadent attitude. "I'm  a Karamazov," says Mitya at one point: "when I 
fall into the abyss, I go straight into it, head down and heels up, and I'm 
even pleased that I'm  falling in just such a humiliating position, and for 
me I find it beautiful" [Dostoevsky, 1992: 107].
Dostoevsky's anxieties about "segregation" come to the surface of 
The Brothers Karamazov at several key points, finding their w ay into the
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mouths of some disparate characters. The Mysterious Visitor 
encountered by the young Zosima in Book Six speaks of the
human isolation which is now reigning everywhere, especially in 
our age.... For everyone now strives most of all to separate his 
person, wishing to experience the fullness of life within himself, 
and yet what comes of all his efforts is not the fullness of life but 
full suicide, for instead of the fullness of self-definition, they fall 
into complete isolation. For all men in our age are separated into 
units, each seeks seclusion in his own hole, each withdraws from 
others, hides himself, and hides what he has, and ends by pushing 
himself away from people and pushing people away from himself. 
[303]
There is an implicit violence in this clashing of social units, and the 
Mysterious Visitor knows this violence first-hand. For he is himself a 
murderer: fourteen years earlier he had stabbed a woman to death, and 
successfully framed a drunken servant for the deed.10
Zosima, glossing the story of the stranger, is even more emphatic 
about the relationship between social decay and murder:
The world has proclaimed freedom, especially of late, but what do 
we see in this freedom of theirs: only slavery and suicide! For the 
world says: 'You have needs, therefore satisfy them, for you have 
the same rights as the noblest and richest men. Do not be afraid to 
satisfy them, but even increase them' - this is the current teaching 
of the world. And in this they see freedom. But what comes of 
this right to increase one's needs? For the rich, isolation and
10See note 28 below.
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spiritual suicide; for the poor, envy and murder, for they have 
been given rights, bu t they have not yet been shown any way of 
satisfying their needs. We are assured that the world is becoming 
m ore and m ore u n ited , is being form ed in to  b ro therly  
communion, by the shortening of distances, by the transmitting of 
thoughts through the air. Alas, do not believe in such a union of 
people. Taking freedom  to m ean the increase and prom pt 
satisfaction of needs, they distort their own nature, for they 
generate many m eaningless and foolish desires, habits, and the 
most absurd fancies in themselves. They live only for m utual 
envy, for pleasure-seeking and self-display. To have dinners, 
horses, carriages, rank, and slaves to serve them is now considered 
such a necessity that for the sake of it, to satisfy it, they will sacrifice 
life, honour, the love of mankind, and will even kill themselves if 
they are unable to satisfy it. We see the same thing in those who 
are not rich, while the poor, so far, simply drown their unsatisfied 
needs and envy in drink. But soon they will get drunk on blood 
instead of wine, they are being led to that. I ask you: is such a man 
free?... [I]nstead of freedom  they have fallen into slavery, and 
instead of serving brotherly  love and hum an unity, they have 
fallen, on the contrary , into d isunity  and isolation, as my 
mysterious visitor and teacher used to tell me in my youth. [313- 
314 - emphasis added]
The increase in isolation and segregation, and therefore murder, is 
now explicitly identified w ith a contem porary political process: the 
pernicious rise of "freedom". Zosima's dim view of freedom is shared, 
curiously enough, by his ideological arch-enemy, the Grand Inquisitor,
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who finds m urder and suicide to be implicit in the freedom promised by 
Christ:
With us everyone will be happy, and they will no longer rebel or 
destroy each other, as in your freedom, everyw here.... They 
themselves will be convinced that we are right, for they will 
remember to what horrors of slavery and confusion your freedom 
led them. Freedom, free reason, and science will lead them into 
such a maze ... that some of them, unruly and ferocious, will 
ex term inate  them selves; o thers, u n ru ly  b u t feeble, w ill 
exterm inate each other; and the rem aining th ird , feeble and 
wretched, will crawl to our feet.... [258]
We will consider these ideas more deeply at a later stage. For now, 
the important thing to note is that Dostoevsky was deeply troubled by the 
anarchy he saw in m odern liberalism, and made his novel's most pious 
Christian and most zealous anti-Christian agree on the point that too 
much freedom results in murder.
The m urderous im plications of m odernity  had been one of 
Dostoevsky's pet notions well before The Brothers Karamazov, of course. 
In Crime and Punishment (1866), the m urdere r Raskolnikov is 
m otivated by social alienation combined with w hat Dostoevsky, in a 
letter outlining that novel, referred to as "certain strange and half-baked 
ideas which are in the air" [quoted by Peace, 1971: 25]. One might even 
call Raskolnikov's crime doubly historical, since it enacts both 
contemporary social disorder and contem porary revolutionary ideas. 
"Our papers are full of stories which show the general feeling of 
instability which leads young men to commit terrible crimes," wrote 
Dostoevsky in the same letter. "In short, I am quite sure that the subject
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of my novel is justified, to some extent at any rate, by the events that are 
happening in life today" [quoted by Magarshack, 1979: 13-14].
So when Freud asserts, in his Dostoevsky essay, that "a criminal is 
to [Dostoevsky] almost a Redeemer, who has taken on himself the guilt 
which must else have been borne by others" [Freud, 1950f: 237], he comes 
inadvertently close to the truth. Dostoevsky does use criminals to 
illum inate som ething communal which lies beyond their conscious 
desires. But that something is history: the Dostoesvkean criminal brings 
social developments to a head so that their evil essence may be perceived. 
Dostoevsky had already used one m urderer to dem onstrate society's 
decay, and there seems to be a strong possibility that in The Brothers 
Karamazov he was doing nothing more profound than  offering a 
stronger version of the same formula.11 Murder of the father is, after all, 
still a kind of murder. If this argument is right, then Dostoevsky did not 
ascribe unique significance to the crime of parricide: the difference 
betw een the parricide 's deed and that of the historically-m otivated 
Raskolnikov was one only of degree, not of kind.
But what Freud means is something else altogether. In his view, 
w hat D ostoevsky's crim inals enact are not historical trends that 
Dostoevsky deplores, but psychological im pulses that Dostoevsky 
unconsciously shares:
Dostoevsky's sympathy for the criminal is, in fact, boundless.... 
There is no longer any need for one to m urder, since he [i.e. the 
criminal] has already murdered; and one must be grateful to him, 
for, except for him, one w ould have been obliged oneself to 
murder. That is not just kindly pity, it is identification on the basis
}1A possibility enhanced by the fact that three characters in this very novel - Zosima, 
the Inquisitor, and the Visitor - explicitly identify social breakdown with murder (see 
pages 298 - 301 above).
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of a similar m urderous impulse - in fact, a slightly displaced 
narcissism .... There is no doubt that this sym pathy  by 
identification was a decisive factor in determining Dostoevsky's 
choice of material. He dealt first w ith the common criminal 
(whose motives are egotistical) and the political and the religious 
criminal; and not until the end of his life did he come back to the 
primal criminal, the parricide, and use him, in a w ork of art, for 
making his confession. [Freud, 1950f: 237]
So Freud knows that Dostoevsky has dealt w ith the subject of 
m urder before. But he suggests that Dostoevsky's previous criminals 
were nothing less than parricides in disguise - for the parricide is the 
"prim al criminal", to whom  Dostoevsky comes back in his final novel. 
How valid, though, is the underlying proposition that Dostoevsky felt a 
"boundless" sympathy for his criminals? This thesis looks to be at its 
least sustainable precisely where Freud wants it most to apply most 
strongly: in the case of the prim al criminal himself, the loathsome 
parricide Smerdyakov. Is there another character in the whole novel, in 
his whole corpus, for whom Dostoevsky displays less sympathy? It could 
be argued - or perhaps asserted is a better word - that this utter lack of 
apparent sympathy points to an abundance of sym pathy in the author's 
unconscious, bu t that contention m ust necessarily go unsupported  - 
indeed, must necessarily be contradicted - by the textual evidence. That 
does not mean it is wrong, but it does mean that it looks vulnerable 
when placed beside a reading that can point to plenty of textual support - 
namely, the view that Dostoevsky lacks sym pathy for Smerdyakov 
because Smerdyakov is a kind of social lab rat, whom Dostoevsky is using 
to bring out the envy and resentment and finally the violence that he 
considered to be implicit in contemporary political developments.
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The point is complicated, of course, by the consideration that the 
other brothers m ight be classified as crim inals too, at least in a 
psychological sense. This is particularly true of Ivan, who vocally desires 
the death of his father and whom Smerdyakov will repeatedly identify as 
the true perpetrator of the crime. But here again the historical reading is 
eminently possible, for Ivan is, like Raskolnikov, a vocal proponent of 
the revolutionary philosophies which Dostoevsky blam ed for the 
European malaise. Freud suggests that Dostoevsky's political criminals 
were parricides in disguise, but isn 't Ivan, the "actual" parricide, a 
political crim inal himself, perhaps the ultim ate political criminal? 
Parricide was not a crime Dostoevsky came back to in his final novel, but 
rather the crime he finally arrived at by pursuing his fears about the 
m urderous implications of modernity to their most hideous conclusion.
I shall deal w ith the characters of Smerdyakov and Ivan more 
thoroughly in due course. But to proceed for now with our more general 
discussion about the relationship between the them e of parricide and 
Dostoevsky's political philosophies, we need to ask why it was that 
som ew here  be tw een  Crime and Punishment and The Brothers 
Karamazov, Dostoevsky's interest in the theme of historically-generated 
m urder acquired a familial emphasis. What made him come to see one 
particular form of m urder, a son's m urder of his father, as the sharpest 
possible symbol of contemporary social collapse?
One simple answer can be found in the Diary of 1876. In a passage 
headed 'The Future Novel', Dostoevsky speaks of his intention to write 
"my Fathers and Sons ":12
12Turgenev's Fathers and Sons had appeared in 1861. It is a textbook demonstration of 
the convenience with which political tensions could be represented in terms of a quasi- 
Oedipal struggle between fathers and sons. Literally, the book's title translates as 
Fathers and Children. But the mistranslation Fathers and Sons is significant: for the 
rebellious children in the novel are indeed sons, in keeping w ith the fact that power 
struggles were almost by definition male affairs.
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I always used to observe children, but now I am especially 
observing them. Long ago I set myself the ideal of writing a novel 
about contem poraneous Russian children and, of course, about 
their present-day fathers, in their actual m utual interrelation. The 
poem  is ready; it was conceived before anything else - and so it 
m ust always be in the case of a novelist. I shall take fathers and 
children, if possible, from all strata of society and I shall trace the 
children from their earliest childhood. [Dostoevsky, 1954: 160]
But Dostoevsky turned his attention to fathers and children out of 
an impulse far more profound than a mere desire to emulate Turgenev. 
At the same time that he was planning this novel about children, he was 
also working on the idea of novelising his anxieties about social decay - 
anxieties which had the institution of the family as one of their principal 
objects. "The title of the novel is 'Disorder'," he wrote in a note of 1875, 
outlining a project which would eventually become assimilated into The 
Brothers Karamazov. "The whole idea of the novel is to show that 
universal disorder now reigns everywhere in society, in its affairs, in its 
leading ideas (which for that reason do not exist), in its convictions
An entry in a Dostoevsky notebook covering the years 1875 and 1876 echoes 
Fathers and Sons by speaking of the up-and-coming generation of rampant liberals as the 
wipers-out of the insufficiently liberal old generation:
A certain liberal newspaper of ours is [like] that vainly rushing captain 
who pushed his way into the center of the hall at a Moscow ball and barked in his 
national tongue. [Alas] Poor fellow! Why in fact, he thinks that he is in Europe. 
My dear sir, you are only a captain, not a liberal, you are a nationalist, and they 
will throw you out. Throw you out, my dear sir, throw you out! [Soon, very soon, 
just you wait.]
The generation which will take your place is now growing and will 
inevitably grow up. It is only in the fifth grade now, but it will grow up and come 
forward, and then no trace of you will be left.
You, you are just hindering a good cause. It will happen soon. The generation 
which will be humane, humanistic, and magnanimous is already growing up. 
[Proffer, 1975: 111-112]
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(which do not exist, either), in the disintegration of family life" [quoted 
by Magarshack, 1982: xviii].
So Dostoevsky looked on the family as Tolstoy did in his Diary, 
and as W ilde and Huysm ans, Marx and Engels did - as a decaying 
institution, whose sickness was part of a broader social crisis. In 
particular, Dostoevsky was horrified by the apparently  w idespread 
phenom enon of child abuse: he used the Diary to docum ent the vile 
deeds of patriarchs who make Fyodor Karamazov look like a m odel 
father. "In The Diary of a Writer," says Wasiolek, "not only the horrors 
perpetrated against children, but horrors of parents against children, 
husbands against wives ... are chronicled" [Wasiolek, 1971: 9]. Such 
horrors m ust have seemed to Dostoevsky to bear out a maxim of his 
friend N. F. Fyodorov, whose "peculiar philosophy", according to 
Michael Holquist, Dostoevsky treated with "reverence" [Holquist, 1977: 
174]. "For the present age," Fyodorov wrote, "father is the most hateful 
word, and son is the most degrading..." [quoted by Holquist, ibid].13
Dostoevsky offers a pertinent insight into his general social 
philosophy when dealing, in March 1876, w ith the Kroneberg case, a 
cause celebre in which a Petersburg father was tried for sadistically beating 
his seven-year-old daughter with barbed sticks. Dostoevsky seizes on a 
line of argument taken by the defence attorney:
T take it, you will all concede that there is family and parental 
authority....' Earlier he has been exclaiming that 'only then is the 
state solid, when it is founded upon solid family.' [Dostoevsky, 
1954: 236]
13Cf. Algernon's "Fathers are not popular just at present" in The Importance of Being 
Earnest.
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Dostoevsky's reply is of crucial significance:
We Russians are a young people ... and we do not possess sanctities 
cjuand-meme. We love our sanctities but only because they are, in 
fact, holy. We support them not only to defend Vordre by using 
them. Our sanctities are founded not upon their utility but upon 
our faith in them. We shall even refuse to defend those sanctities 
should we ever cease to believe in them - unlike those ancient 
priests who, at the end of paganism, continued to defend their 
idols which they had long since ceased to regard as gods. Not even 
one of our sanctities need ever fear a free scrutiny, but this is only 
because it is in reality solid. We love the sanctity of the family 
w hen it is in reality holy, and not because the state is solidly 
founded upon it. And, believing in the solidity of our family, we 
should not become afraid even if the abuse of parental authority 
should be brought to light and prosecuted. [237]
"I should like to see sanctities just a bit more holy," Dostoevsky 
adds in conclusion; "otherwise, there is no point in worshipping them" 
[238].
It is worth pondering these remarks about the family. Evidently 
Dostoevsky draw s an almost Platonic distinction14 between the real
14Speaking of platonic distinctions, it is interesting to consider something Dostoevsky 
wrote in 1876, while psyching himself up to write the novel that would become 
Karamazov. "[Gjetting ready to write a long novel, I have decided to immerse myself in 
the study - not of reality itself, for I know it, as it is - but of the details of current life. One 
of the most important problems of current life, for instance, concerns the younger generation 
and the Russian family, which I cannot help feeling is not the same as it was twenty years 
ago" [quoted by Magarshack, 1962: 452 - emphasis added]. Reality, then, is what 
Dostoevsky knows (or believes in, has faith in). The details of current life may or may not 
be in conformity with this "reality". The same point is made in a slightly different way 
in a famous letter Dostoevsky wrote in 1854. "If someone proved to me that Christ is 
outside the truth, and that in reality the truth were outside of Christ then I should prefer 
to remain with Christ than with the truth" [quoted by Ozick, 1997: 119]. In other words, 
Christ is a truth more important than the truth itself.
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family and the ideal one. Viewed abstractly, the family is a sacred 
institution; but in practice - particularly in modern practice - it does not 
often come up to scratch. Needless to say, this is a reactionary position: 
while Marx and Engels ascribed the dissolution of the patriarchal family 
to the rottenness of its structure, Dostoevsky, perceiving a sim ilar 
dissolution, blam ed it on deviation from that structure. Only by an 
appropriately holy adherence to its sacred structure - "I should like to see 
sanctities just a bit more holy" - could the crisis of the family be resolved.
This is the philosophical fram ew ork on which The Brothers 
Karamazov is erected. It argues for holy ideals in an age of chaotic 
violence.15 Dostoevsky, or his narrator, makes no bones about this: on 
the first page he admits that his 'hero', the saintly Alyosha, will represent 
the author's ideal, by rising above the chaos of the real. "One thing, 
perhaps, is rather doubtless: he is a strange man, even an odd one.... [But] 
not only is an odd man 'not always' a particular and isolated case, but, on 
the contrary, it sometimes happens that it is precisely he, perhaps, who 
bears within himself the heart of the whole, while the other people of his 
epoch have all for some reason been torn away from it for a time by some 
kind of flooding wind" [Dostoevsky, 1992: 3].
Accordingly, Alyosha is used to voice the novel's ideological 
endorsem ent of the family as an institution. "You m ust know," he 
proclaims in the novel's final scene, "that there is nothing higher, or 
stronger, or sounder, or more useful afterwards in life, than some good 
memory, especially a memory from childhood, from the parental home" 
[774] 16 But his brothers, and his father, embody the all-too-real failure of
15Andrei Bely called the novel "a highway toward heaven through madness and chaos" 
[quoted by Rice, 1985: 221].
16Alyosha's role as the main repository of Dostoevsky's ideals about the family is 
established early in the novel. As a son, Alyosha, we learn, "brought som ething 
unprecedented with him: a complete lack of contempt for him, the old man, and, on the 
contrary, an unvarying affection and a perfectly natural, single-hearted attachm ent to 
him, little though he deserved it. All of this came as a perfect surprise to the solitary old
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the modern, secular family to live up to this eternal ideal. The act of 
parricide is the culmination of their degeneracy, the definitive indication 
of the distance of the m odern family from Dostoevsky's model one. For 
Freud, parricide is perm anently latent in all family relations. For 
Dostoevsky, parricide is the very opposite: it is the ultimate expression of 
the perverse character of the m odern family. It is a thoroughly  
contemporary crime. As Rene Wellek wrote, "Parricide is for Dostoevsky 
the highest symptom of social decay, a disruption of hum an ties that 
contradicts the obligation to universal forgiveness and the prom ise of 
resu rrec tion  in the flesh w ith w hich The Brothers Karamazov 
concludes" [Wellek, 1962: 9].
Dostoevsky's faith in the family as such could be sustained only if 
the sickness of the family he saw all around him could be written off as a 
purely modern phenomenon. The same rule applies to the figure of the 
father. Dostoevsky has no wish to call the institution of patriarchy itself 
into question, and so the faults of fathers like Fyodor Karamazov m ust be 
blamed exclusively on m odern trends.17 When Fyodor's shortcomings 
are catalogued by the prosecutor, their modernity is stressed.
Look at this wretched, unbridled, and depraved old man, this 
'paterfamilias,' who has so sadly ended his existence. A nobleman 
by birth, starting out his career as a poor little sponger, who 
through an accidental and unexpected marriage grabs a small
lecher; it was quite unexpected for him, who until then had loved only 'iniquity'" 
[Dostoevsky, 1992: 94].
17Dostoevsky did not consider himself to be immune to this modem sickness. Joseph Frank 
refers to "a remark that Dostoevsky made sometime in the late 1870s, when he was most 
concerned about the breakup of the Russian family that he believed he could discern 
taking place all around him. Evidently recalling his own family life as the very opposite 
of the 'accidental families' of the present, Dostoevsky said to his brother Andrey that 
their parents had been 'outstanding people.' If they had been alive in the present rather 
than the beginning of the century, they would still, he maintained, merit the same 
designation. 'And such family men, such fathers ... we ourselves are quite incapable of 
being, brother!"' [Frank, 1976: 18].
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capital as a dowry.... above all a usurer.... Everything contrary to the 
idea of a citizen, a complete, even hostile, separation from 
society.... [H]e is a father, and one of our modern-day fathers. Shall 
I offend society if I say that he is even one of many m odern-day 
fathers? Alas, so many modern-day fathers simply do not speak 
their minds as cynically as this one did, for they are better bred, 
better educated, bu t essentially they are of alm ost the sam e 
philosophy as he. [695-696]
Fyodor K aram azov 's "complete, even hostile, separation from  
society" takes us back to the "segregation" that Dostoevsky thought of as 
the defining disease of the era. We have already considered Dostoevsky's 
conviction that such hostile separation is liable to produce m urderers 
like Raskolnikov - and Smerdyakov. Now we are informed that it also 
produces fathers like Fyodor. We can see now how economically 
Dostoevsky's anxieties are expressed by the metaphor of parricide. Social 
disintegration, also known as 'freedom ', disrupts existing hierarchies: it 
makes m urderous upstarts of the lower orders, and erodes the authority 
of the top dogs. When translated to the family, these two despicable 
trends meet, explosively, in the act of parricide.
The Brothers Karamazov is not a tale of the m urder of the father. 
It is a tale of a m urder of a particular kind of father - one who is defined, 
indeed, by his gross deviation from the norm s of fatherhood. He 
abandons, harasses, exploits, mocks, and robs his children. Of the three 
masterpieces of parricide named by Freud - Oedipus Rex, Hamlet and The 
Brothers Karamazov - Dostoevsky's novel is the only one in which the 
m urdered father is not also a king.18 Even so, he is an egregious tyrant,
18A point which the novel ironically underlines, when Fyodor utters the maxim: 
"'Punctuality is the courtesy of kings/
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and his m urder is as palpably political as any regicide. It could be argued,
I suppose, that Fyodor's tyranny was an expression of Dostoevsky's 
parricidal wishes, or else a way of rationalizing his "m urder" of his own 
father after the event. But far from affording us insight into Fyodor 
Pavlovich's tyranny, these glib claims only serve to obscure it, by ignoring 
its tactical role in the context of Dostoevsky's polemic. When a chess 
player sacrifices a pawn, we do no suppose that the player has a burning 
antipathy towards that particular piece of wood. It is nothing personal. It 
is a move contained w ithin a w ider strategy, and when considered in 
com plete isolation it cannot be understood, only m isunderstood. 
Dostoevsky's characters have far more psychological value than chess 
pieces, of course. But it is nevertheless a mistake to think of them as 
wholly independent psychological creations, when to a significant degree 
they are tokens m anipulated to a certain end. In Dostoevsky's fictional 
game, Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov is not much more than a paw n - he 
is a type, a caricature of the Modern Bad Father. Dostoevsky expends no 
more psychological energy on him than he has to. Indeed there is 
considerably less passion invested in Fyodor than there is in characters 
whom we might otherwise think of as minor - Snegiryov, for example. 
Dostoevsky's hatred of Fyodor Karamazov is a hatred of the trends he 
stands for. "I ... conside[r] my task (the defeat of anarchism) to be my civic 
duty," Dostoevsky proclaim ed during the composition of the novel 
[Magarshack, 476-477 - emphasis added]. Making Fyodor Karamazov a 
hideous tyrant was part of this civic duty. Fyodor represents anarchy, that 
specifically m odern kind of anarchy which for other writers went by the 
name of "decadence." He even calls himself a "decadent" at one point: 
while admiring his own profile, brags of his nose that it is "'a real Roman
"'Not that you're a king,' muttered Miusov, unable to restrain himself in time." 
[40]
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one.... Along with my Adam's apple, it gives me the real physiognomy of 
an ancient Roman patrician of the decadent period.' He seemed to be 
proud of it" [23]. Fyodor Pavlovich is every bit as anarchistic as the 
modern philosophies in whose service Smerdyakov kills him. There is 
an important but fleeting moment at which this point is explicitly made. 
Dmitri, in conversation with Alyosha, is agonizing over the question of 
whether morality can exist in a Godless world. He refers to a discussion 
he has had with Ivan about the death of God.
"I said to him: 'Then everything is permitted, in that case?' He 
frowned: 'Fyodor Pavlovich, our papa, was a little pig,' he said, 'but 
his thinking was right.' That's what he came back with. That's all 
he ever said. It's even neater than Rakitin." [Dostoevsky, 1992:
593]
One's understanding of this exchange is not helped by the fact that 
Mitya is in a highly agitated state, and in no mood to be scrupulously 
clear. But if I have read these lines correctly, they show us Mitya 
attempting to trick Ivan into acknowledging the existence of God by 
suggesting that the alternative - everything on earth being permitted - is 
simply too hideous to contemplate. (This, as we shall see, is effectively 
the chief argument employed by Dostoevsky himself to demonstrate 
God's existence.) Mitya has already advanced the same argument to 
Rakitin, the socialist, from whom he has received the answer that, "it's 
possible to love mankind even without God" - as well as the related 
suggestion that, rather than worry about the existence of God, "you'd do 
better to worry about extending man's civil rights" [592-593]. So for 
Rakitin, it is possible to construct a purely secular ethics in God's absence 
- not only possible, but imperative. But Ivan, the nihilist, provides Mitya
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w ith a more disturbing response, which one m ight paraphrase thus: 
"Wake up to yourself: there is no God: everything is perm itted already: 
just look at the conduct of our father." So while the doctrine that 
"everything is perm itted" is generally associated w ith Ivan - the 
perpetrator of the parricide, philosophically speaking - we have here an 
indication that the victim  of the parricide represents an even purer 
embodiment of modern nihilism than does his son - who at least has the 
decency to despair over his nihilism, and to tem per it w ith a bit of 
intellectual distinction . 19 Fyodor Pavlovich commits a kind of suicide, 
then - he is killed by the same reprehensible philosophies he has lived by.
This puts a large dent in the Freudian reading of the novel. In 
Totem and Taboo, Freud argues that parricide is the prime taboo because 
it is the prim e (male) tem ptation. Read superficially, The Brothers 
Karamazov m ight appear to provide tantalising confirm ation of that 
argum ent, since the novel apparently suggests that if "everything is 
perm itted" then the result will be parricide - thereby implying that a 
universal will to parricide snarls perm anently behind the m uzzle of 
moral law. But the lines quoted above demonstrate that the vile belief 
that "everything is perm itted" is enacted at least as egregiously by the 
abusive father as it is by the parricidal son - probably even more 
egregiously, in fact. If the transgressions of the father - epitomised by his 
abuse of his children20 - are placed on a par with the transgression of the
19A skeletal, and perhaps more clear, version of Ivan's despairing position is given in 
Dostoevsky's preliminary notes for the novel:
Is there such a law of nature that one must love humanity?
- [That is a law of God. There is no such law of nature, right?]
He (the murderer [i.e. Ivan] affirms that there is no such law, and that one loves 
only because of faith in immortality
The Elder - If you believe that, you are blessed or very unhappy.
The murderer:-Why unhappy?
The Elder:-In case you yourself do not believe in immortality.
The Murderer:-Yes, you have guessed it. [Dostoevsky, 1971: 39, 40]
20The connection between the exploitation of children and the doctrine that everything is 
permitted is also made, interestingly enough, in Les Miserables, in which Thernadier 
adduces the philosophy as an excuse for selling his own sons. "On the evening of the day
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parricide, then parricide is no longer as unique a crime as Freud would 
like it to be. Anarchy, also known as freedom, means to Dostoevsky that 
everyone will wreak violence on everyone else: a son murdering his 
father, and a father abusing his son, are merely the polar extremes of the 
wide spectrum of savage dissolution that Dostoevsky saw in secular 
modernity.
The Freudian Reading
In an article entitled "Freud and The Brothers Karamazov", the critic 
Geoffrey Carter writes the following curious sentence:
No explanation needs to be given for any conscious hatred of the 
loathsome Fyodor; but why does Ivan hate him unconsciously and 
how is that unconscious hatred reinforced, or rather mobilized, in 
the course of the novel? [Carter, 1981: 25]
When Carter says that "no explanation needs to be given for any 
conscious hatred of the loathsome Fyodor", it is not at all clear from 
internal evidence why the word "conscious" needs to be present. 
Couldn't one simply say that no explanation needs to be given of any 
hatred of the loathsome Fyodor? From external evidence, of course, one
she had delivered her two little ones to Magnon, expressing her willingness freely to 
renounce them forever, the Thenardiess had, or feigned to have, a scruple. She said to her 
husband: 'But this abandoning one's children!' Thenardier, magisterial and phlegmatic, 
cauterised the scruple with this phrase: 'Jean Jacques Rousseau did better!' From scruple 
the mother passed to anxiety: 'But suppose the police come to torment us? What we have 
done here, Monsieur Thernadier, say now, is it lawful?' Thernadier answered: 
'Everything is lawful. Nobody will see it but the sky. Moreover, with children who have 
not a sou, nobody has any interest to look closely into it'" [Hugo, 1993: 1604 - emphasis 
added].
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knows perfectly well why Carter thinks that hatred is divided into two 
kinds, conscious and unconscious. He is subjecting the novel to a 
Freudian analysis, and accordingly has made the a priori assumption that 
the unconscious exists and that its desires are determinate. The beauty of 
the Freudian approach, but also its weakness in logical terms, is that once 
you have assumed the presence of an unconscious father-complex, you 
will have little trouble detecting it and demonstrating its operation, for it 
can manifest itself in a limitless variety of ways: as a hatred of authority 
(projection), as a hatred of anything at all (displacement), as a disbelief in 
God (projection again), as a pious belief in God (projection plus guilt), as 
fear of an animal (displacement again), as a love of or failure to rebel 
against punishm ent (guilt again). Indeed the impulse need not manifest 
itself at all, since its complete invisibility would present a clear example 
of a successful repression. Yet The Brothers Karamazov, in which hatred 
for the father is entirely and flagrantly m anifest, can be viewed as 
challenge to Freudianism rather than a trium ph for it. If, as Carter freely 
adm its, Ivan consciously hates his father because of the la tte r's  
loathsomeness, and fairly openly voices his wish to see him  dead, then 
why and how does his repressed hatred of his father retain its sting, its 
potency as a motivating force? What has happened to the ambivalence, 
the resistance, the displacement and all the other psychic smokescreens 
which Freud spoke of w hen evidence of father-hatred was less easy to 
come by? "Why does Ivan hate his father unconsciously?" Carter asks. 
But a better question to ask would be, "Does he really hate his father 
unconsciously at all?" The Brothers Karamazov places the Freudian in 
an environm ent in which the very existence of unconscious hatred of 
the father cannot simply be taken for granted, but must be rigorously 
demonstrated, and scrupulously distinguished from conscious, rational, 
non-oedipal hatred of the father.
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Instead, however, we are treated to such pieces of 
analysis as this: "In Dostoevsky's great novel, The Brothers Karamazov, 
the O edipus situation stands at the focal poin t of interest. O ld 
Karamazov has m ade himself detested by his sons through heartless 
oppression; in the eyes of one of them he is, in addition, a powerful rival 
for the woman he loves" ['The Expert Opinion in the Halsm ann Case', 
SE, 21: 251-253]. These sentences come not from some hack disciple of 
Freud's, but from the pen of Fr&ud himself.
One
objects to them on grounds which are by now becoming boringly 
familiar: a father's "having made himself detested by his sons through 
heartless oppression" has nothing to do w ith the Oedipus situation as 
Freud himself defined it. Nor is Freud entitled to claim that there is 
som ething "additional" about the presence of sexual rivalry. Sexual 
rivalry is meant to be the very essence of the oedipal claim. Only by 
establishing its presence can Freud say anything about the novel that is 
not obvious to the lay reader.
If we return to "Dostoevsky and Parricide", we will find further 
moments at which Freud claims as evidence for his case things that are 
actually evidence against it, or which have at the very best an ambiguous 
value. One beautiful example is his m isappropriation of a line of 
argument taken by Mitya's defence attorney. Countering the prosecutor's 
use of "psychology" to establish M itya's guilt, the defender calls 
psychology "a stick with two ends"21 - by which he means that "one can 
draw whatever conclusions one likes from it" [727,728]. Dem onstrating 
that the subtleties of psychological analysis can be used either to prove 
M itya com prehensively guilty or com prehensively innocent, the
21A "knife that cuts both ways" is the way this phrase comes out in Strachey's 
translation of Freud.
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defender argues that psychological interpretation, while an interesting 
game, is of little use in a courtroom.
But Freud reinterprets the maxim as follows:
[I]n the speech for the defence at the trial, there is the famous joke 
at the expense of psychology - it is 'a knife that cuts both ways': a 
splendid piece of disguise, for we have only to reverse it in order to 
discover the deepest meaning of Dostoevsky's view of things. It is 
not psychology that deserves to be laughed at, but the practice of 
judicial enquiry. It is a matter of indifference who actually 
committed the crime; psychology is only concerned to know who 
desired it emotionally and who welcomed it when it was done. 
And for that reason all of the brothers, except the contrasted figure 
of Alyosha, are equally guilty, the impulsive sensualist, the 
sceptical cynic and the epileptic criminal. [Freud, 1950f: 236]
There is a rich irony here, and Freud is evidently blind to it. He quotes 
the notion that psychology makes things mean what it wants them to 
mean, and then proceeds to make it mean what he wants it to mean. The 
quip about the stick with two ends becomes, in Freud's hands, a stick with 
two ends itself.
There is a broader irony as well: just before remodelling the 
attorney's comment about the infinite flexibility of psychology, Freud has 
been attempting to make mileage out of the "remarkable" fact that the 
killer, like Dostoevsky, is an epileptic. But now we find Freud endorsing 
Dostoevsky's supposed hint that "it is a matter of indifference who 
actually committed the crime". The sons are "equally guilty" - except, 
Freud has to concede, for Alyosha.
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Why Alyosha is not as guilty as the other sons is a question that 
Freud doesn't seek to answer. Indeed it is hard to see how he could 
answer it, believing as he does that the will to parricide is primal, a rule 
to which there are no exceptions.22 But if we dispense w ith the notion 
that the them e of parricide was an expression of D ostoevsky 's 
unconscious, and read it instead as a theme of which Dostoevsky was in
22In Michael Holquist's Freudian reading of the book, contained in his Dostoevsky and 
the Novel, we find the claim that Alyosha is indeed "implicated in the other brothers' 
desire for their father's death, a point made most unambiguously when Ivan asks what 
should be done with a general who turned his Borzoi hounds on a naked little peasant boy, 
clearly a metaphoric recasting of the relations between Fyodor Pavlovich and his sons: 
"'Shoot him!" Alyosha said softly, raising his eyes to his brother with a pale, twisted 
smile'" [Holquist, 1977: 189].
"Most unambiguous" means the same thing as "least ambiguous", and all that 
means is that the novel's other indications of Alyosha's will to parricide (if indeed there 
are any) are even less impressive than this one. And this one, when probed, proves to be 
not very impressive at all. For a start, if we consider Alyosha's words in their context, 
they begin to look far less suggestive. Ivan does not simply ask Alyosha what should be 
done with the abusive general. He says:
"W ell... what to do with him? Shoot him? Shoot him  for our moral
satisfaction? Speak, Alyoshka!"
"Shoot him, " Alyosha said softly, etc. [Dostoevsky, 1992: 243]
So Alyosha's response is not as spontaneous - and therefore not as psychologically 
revealing - as Holquist seems to suggest. Moreover, Alyosha's desire for the general's 
death is quite reasonable on an objective level, so it does not necessarily give us any 
insight into his deepest counter-rational subjective wishes. (If he desired the death of 
Father Zosima, say, then we might be onto something.) Ivan is trying to prove the 
absurdity of hum an existence by citing the most grossly inhumane cases of torture he has 
ever heard of: he has deliberately manoeuvred Alyosha into a corner in which he can 
hardly, from the point of view of justice, say anything other than "Shoot him!" If the 
general's torture of the peasant boy is "clearly a metaphoric recasting" of the Karamazov 
situation, then doesn't it serve to bring out the reasonableness, the objective validity, the 
politically-conditioned nature, of the sons' desire for their father's death?
But the Freudian can yield this point without dispensing with the claim that the 
novel is eminently oedipal. From the Freudian point of view, it scarcely m atters that 
Dostoevsky gave his fictional characters a will to parricide that was rationally 
justifiable. For Dostoevsky's, the Freudian would argue, was the real, the non-fictional 
will to parricide, and that was oedipal. This is to ignore, however, the large extent to 
which these patterns in the Karamazov family call into question the very concept of the 
Oedipus complex. Many indisputably real social trends of Dostoevsky's time are visible 
in the Karamazovs. For example, Dostoevsky was not imagining things when he proposed 
that the grossly negligent and abusive Fyodor resembled certain m odern-day fathers. 
Likewise, Ivan's stories of the abuse of children by adults, including the story of the 
general and his dogs, were all too real, culled from actual Russian newspapers. If, as 
seems quite possible in light of these correspondences, the politically-conditioned will to 
parricide that we find in the novel also corresponded to a real-life phenomenon, then it 
becomes possible to suspect that the will to parricide Freud which discovered in his 
patients, and from which he deduced the existence of the Oedipus complex, was itself a 
mere instance of this historical phenomenon.
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full conscious control, then we have no trouble at all understanding why 
Alyosha alone should not desire his father's death. D ostoevsky's 
polemical mission had two main objectives: to discredit modernity, and 
to reassert Orthodox Christianity as its cure. The character of Alyosha acts 
and speaks in the service of the second objective. He was Dostoevsky's 
ideal. The rem aining brothers, on the other hand, serve the negative 
part of his project. The impulsive sensualist, the sceptical cynic and the 
epileptic criminal personified the impulsive sensuality, the sceptical 
cynicism and the criminality that, in Dostoevsky's view, characterised 
modernity. They desire their father's death because they represent the 
forces of anarchy. Alyosha does not desire it, because he represents the 
binding force of Christian love.
This same role is played, on a larger scale, by the character of 
Zosima. While Alyosha asserts the holy ideal in family relations, Zosima 
enacts the beneficence of Christian love on a w ider stage. If one has 
grasped this elementary point, one will have no trouble understanding 
the significance of an early scene which Freud thinks of as a profound 
mystery, insoluble without the aid of psychoanalysis:
In The Brothers Karamazov there is one particu larly  
revealing scene. In the course of his talk w ith Dmitri, Father 
Zosima recognises that Dmitri is prepared to commit parricide, and 
he bows down at his feet. It is impossible that this can be meant as 
an expression of admiration; it m ust mean that the holy m an is 
rejecting the tem ptation to despise or detest the m urderer and for 
that reason humbles himself before him. Dostoevsky's sympathy 
for the criminal is, in fact, boundless; it goes far beyond the pity 
which the unhappy wretch might claim, and rem inds us of the 
'holy awe' with which epileptics and lunatics were regarded in the
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past. A criminal is to him almost a Redeemer, who has taken on 
himself the guilt which m ust else have been borne by others. 
There is no longer any need for one to m urder, since he has 
already murdered; and one must be grateful to him, for, except for 
him, one would have been obliged oneself to m urder. This is not 
just kindly pity, it is identification on the basis of a similar 
murderous impulse - in fact, a slightly displaced narcissism.... This 
may perhaps be quite generally the mechanism of kindly sympathy 
w ith other people, a mechanism which one can discern w ith 
especial ease in the extreme case of the guilt-ridden novelist. 
[Freud, 1950f: 236, 237]
I apologise for quoting material which I have quoted before in 
another context, but this passage must be considered in its entirety. Freud 
appears to be saying that Zosima, standing in for Dostoevsky, executes a 
gesture of unconscious gratitude to the would-be parricide - "for, except 
for him, one w ould have been obliged oneself to m urder." Freud's 
reading of the bow is right, I think, only in one very lim ited sense. 
Zosima is indeed acting as an authorial emissary in this scene. But the 
kneeling holy m an is not represen ting  D ostoevsky 's parric idal 
unconscious. On the contrary, he is acting in the service of Dostoevsky's 
conscious philosophies. His bow is a thoroughly intentional piece of 
authorial propaganda. It comes as the conclusion to an argum ent about 
Christian love which has been set up during a two-chapter interlude in 
which Zosima, prior to the entrance of Mitya, has adjourned from the 
cell to meet w ith some visiting constituents. In the second of these 
chapters, "A Lady of Little Faith", Zosima receives Madame Khokhlakov, 
who complains of her desire for "proof" of hum an im m ortality. She 
confesses to modern-style doubts; she even quotes the atheistic doctrine
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of the Nihilist Bazarov from Turgenev's Fathers and Sons [Pevear and 
Volokhonsky, 1990: 781]. The Elder replies that while proof is tricky, "it is 
possible to be convinced ... [b]y the experience of active love.... The more 
you succeed in loving, the more you'll be convinced of the existence of 
God and the immortality of your soul" [56 - emphasis added]. Is Zosima's 
impending bow before Dmitri Karamazov perhaps an example of this 
"active" Christian love, a physical version of his verbal affirmation of the 
existence of God?
To explore this possibility further, let us move back into the first 
chapter of this Zosima-based interlude, which is entitled "Women of 
Faith". One of these women has a dreadful confession to make to 
Zosima:
T'm three years a widow,' she began in a half-whisper, 
with a sort of shudder. 'My married life was hard, he was old, he 
beat me badly. Once he was sick in bed; 1 was looking at him and 
I thought: what if he recovers, gets up on his feet again, what 
then? And then the thought came to me ...'
'Wait/ said the elder, and put his ear right to her lips. The 
woman continued in a soft whisper, almost inaudibly. She soon 
finished. [Dostoevsky, 1992: 52]
One thing this chapter tells us, then, is that the brothers Karamazov are 
not alone: here is another victim of patriarchy who has been driven into 
desiring the death of the patriarch. Dostoevsky subtly shows that the 
drama going on in the cell is by no means an anomaly, but is sadly 
representative of a general malaise.
But the really significant thing about this woman's confession is 
Zosima's reply to it:
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There is not and cannot be in the whole world such a sin that the 
Lord will not forgive one who truly repents of it. A man even 
cannot commit so great a sin as would exhaust God's boundless 
love. How could there be a sin that exceeds God's love?...
Believe that God loves you so as you cannot conceive of it; even 
with your sin and in your sin he loves you.' [52]
This speech, I w ould suggest, functions as an exact verbal 
correlative of the bow that Zosima will shortly execute before the 
parricidal Dmitri Karamazov. When Zosima has finished speaking with 
the women of faith, he "blesse[s] them all and bow[s] deeply to them" - a 
gesture which reinforces the boundlessness of his forgiving love [52]. But 
to love and forgive a repentant woman of faith is one thing; to love and 
forgive a parricide quite another. Indeed if we read the above speech as a 
comment on the situation in the cell, we yield the suggestion that 
parricide is the greatest possible sin, and therefore the most exacting test 
of the proposition that "m an ... cannot commit a sin so great a sin as 
w ould exhaust G od's boundless love". So w hen Zosima, G od's 
representative, abases himself before the parricide, God's love passes the 
ultimate test. While modernity shuns God, God can face, and forgive, 
the worst that modern anarchy has to offer. So the submissive posture is 
m isleading: w hat Zosima is dem onstrating is C hristianity 's ethical 
superior i ty  to all those unsavoury  m odern i sms  tha t parric ide  
symbolises.
At the conclusion of Ivan's fable of Grand Inquisitor, the figure of 
Jesus himself performs a parallel manoeuvre.
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"The old man would have liked [Christ] to say something, even 
something bitter, terrible. But suddenly he approaches the old 
man in silence and gently kisses him on his bloodless, ninety-year- 
old lips. That is the whole answer. The old man shudders."
[262]
Notice that Christ's gesture is construed as an answer. It is a way of 
refuting the arguments of the atheist, containing them, transcending 
them. Given that the gesture comes in a narrative concocted by Ivan, one 
might think that that crafty Nihilist is condemning it as an inadequate 
answer - yet it is very similar to Zosima's answer to parricide, and 
identical to the response favoured by Alyosha when Ivan concludes the 
Grand Inquisitor story. Ivan says: "The formula, 'everything is
permitted,' I will not renounce, and what then? Will you renounce me 
for that? Will you?"
Alyosha stood up, went over to him in silence, and gently 
kissed him on the lips.
"Literary theft!" Ivan cried, suddenly going into some kind 
of rapture. "You stole that from my poem." [263]
Ivan's arguments cannot be answered rationally but they can be 
trumped by an answer which Dostoevsky seems to consider better than 
rational. To kiss the nihilist (or to bow to the parricide) is to go one better 
than to renounce him - it is to accept and transcend him, to convert his 
challenge to God into a proof of God's existence. "Dostoevsky, granting 
almost everything to the enemy [atheism] in order to defeat him with the 
ultimate weapon, bets everything on one last card, religion," wrote Hans 
Urs von Balthasar [quoted by Wellek, 1962: 9]. In other words,
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Dostoevsky can afford to state Ivan's arguments with all the rhetorical 
force he can muster, because he is going to top them with a Christian 
conclusion, Alyosha's kiss.23 Ivan's is not an argument Dostoevsky 
opposes, it is an argument he considers incomplete: a premise for the 
Christian attitude rather than a refutation of it. Yes, suffering on earth is 
irrefutable, yes it is appalling; but don't these things give us all the more 
reason to believe in the healing power of God's love? Dostoevsky 
appropriates contemporary chaos and makes it the central part of his 
religious argument.
In order to illuminate this point, it is worth requoting 
Dostoevsky's preliminary notes on the cell scene:
tell the old man the theme: Is there anything on earth that would 
force man to love humanity?
Or:
Is there such a law of nature that one must love humanity?
- [That is a law of God. There is no such law of nature, right?]
He (the murderer [i.e. Ivan]) affirms that there is no such law, 
and that one loves only because of faith in immortality
The Elder - If you believe that, you are blessed or very unhappy.
The murderer:-Why unhappy?
The Elder:-In case you yourself do not believe in immortality.
The Mur derer :-Yes, you have guessed it. [Dostoevsky, 1971: 39, 40]
So Dostoevsky's is a peculiarly modern Christianity, conceived in, 
and asserted against, a peculiarly modern atmosphere. He has taken on
23In this respect, Dostoevsky's faith is reminiscent of psychoanalytic theory, which also 
has an answer for everything, and therefore always has the last word. But at least 
Dostoevsky's outlook has the excuse of being unashamedly a religious faith.
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board the Enlightenment's demystifications of moral law; he apprehends, 
vividly, the nihilism they imply. When Ivan excuses the crime of 
parricide with the dictum that "One viper devours another", he sees an 
anarchy in godlessness which Dostoevsky detects just as strongly. The 
difference is that Ivan believes only in the secular world; Dostoevsky 
believes in an additional world whose love can reunite hum anity. 
Dostoevsky believes, with Ivan, that if God is dead, then everything is 
permitted. But he considers that the most pressing reason of all to think 
that God is not d ead .24 "It is not as a child that I believe in Christ and 
profess His teaching," Dostoevsky wrote in his notebook; "my hosanna 
has burst through a purging flame of doubts" [quoted by Zenkovsky, 1962: 
130].
Barbey d'Aurevilly told Huysmans that after writing a novel like Ä  
Rebours, he would have to choose between "the muzzle of a pistol and 
the foot of the Cross" [Baldick, 1987: 12].25 When Dostoevsky wrote The 
Brothers Karamazov, he was at the foot of the cross already - but in other 
respects he was as resolutely modern as Huysmans. He can look modern 
anarchy square in the face, and use the Karamazov family to rub our nose 
in it, because he has the antidote, or thinks he does. The m odern 
condition becomes an argument in favour of the existence of God.
24Alyosha is Dostoevsky's ideal picture of piety, but one finds a faith more akin to 
Dostoevsky's own in the tortured Dmitri, who says: "Rakitin's lying: if God is driven from 
the earth, we'll meet him underground! It's impossible for a convict to be without God, 
even more impossible than for a non-convict!... What if he doesn't exist? What if Rakitin 
is right, that it's an artificial idea of mankind? So then, if he doesn't exist, man is the 
chief of the earth, of the universe. Splendid! Only how is he going to be virtuous without 
God? ... Because what is virtue? - answer me that, Alexei. I have one virtue and a Chinese 
has another - so it's a relative thing" [593]. Therefore, Mitya seems to be saying, God must 
exist.
25D'Aurevilly was proved right, of course: Huysmans "became a fervent Catholic, and 
regarded Ä Rebours as an important stage in that process" [Hough, 1961: 197].
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The Death of Dostoevsky's Father
In order to give the Freudian reading of The Brothers Karamazov a fair 
hearing, we need to look into the death of Dostoevsky's father. Here, on 
the face of it, is a piece of evidence which gives Freud an indisputable 
right to think of parricide as a theme of tremendous subjective 
significance for Dostoevsky. Freud says:
The unmistakable connection between the murder of the father in 
The Brothers Karamazov and the fate of Dostoevsky's own 
father has struck more than one of his biographers, and has led 
them to refer to 'a certain modern school of psychology'. From the 
standpoint of psycho-analysis (for that is what is meant), we are 
tempted to see in that event the severest trauma and to regard 
Dostoevsky's reaction to it as the turning-point of his neurosis. 
[Freud, 1950f: 228].
What, we should first ask, is so 'unmistakable' about the 
connection between the murders? Was the real-life murder similar in 
nature to the fictional crime? Or does the sole connection between the 
crimes reside in the fact that both occurred? And if that is the extent of 
the connection, how excited by it should we be?
Mikhail Andreyevich Dostoevsky died at the hands of a gang of his 
oppressed peasants. The crime was coldly premeditated, the outcome of a 
conspiracy. The action began, as two witnesses later recalled, when four 
of the peasants declared that they were too ill to work.
The master was carrying a big stick with him that day, so he 
pointed to it and said, 'All right, I shall cure them!' ... [T]he
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master arrived in Chermoshnya. The peasants were standing 
about in the street. 'Why haven't you gone out to work?' 'W e're 
ill, s ir/ they said. 'Oh?' said the master. 'Well, in that case I'm  
going to cure you!' And he raised his stick. The peasants fled 
from him into the yard, but he ran after them. As soon as he ran 
into the yard, Vassily Nikitin, a tall, strong, healthy fellow, seized 
him from behind by the arms, but the others stood still, looking 
frightened. Vassily shouted to them: 'W hat are you standing 
there for? Forgotten what w e'd planned to do, have you?' The 
peasants then rushed at the master, caught him by his private parts 
and twisted them. They did not beat him for fear of being heard. 
They unclenched the master's teeth, poured the entire contents of 
a bottle of spirits down his throat and thrust a rag into his mouth. 
That's how the master got suffocated. [Magarshack, 1962: 21]26
W hen we consider its nature , we see that the m urder of 
Dostoevsky's father is not entirely helpful to the Freudian case. For it is 
hard to imagine how any m urder, outside of an actual assassination, 
could be more overtly political than this one, more intimately connected 
with the shifting power relations of its time. The oppressive tyrant Dr 
Dostoevsky was the victim, as it were, of a m ini-revolution.27 His son 
would have been left in even less doubt than Oscar Wilde was that all 
authority was precarious, and that true force lay on the side of the 
governed. Even after the attack the m urderous peasants retained a
26Joseph Frank [1976: 86, n.2] discusses recently unearthed evidence suggesting that Dr 
Dostoevsky's death might not have been a murder at all. What matters in the present 
context, however, is that as far as Dostoevsky himself was aware, his father was 
murdered by his peasants in the fashion described above.
27The twisting of the private parts, which might well not even have occurred (on this 
question see Frank, 1976: 86 n.l), ought not to be seized on, so to speak, as evidence that the 
attack was sexually rather than politically motivated. On the contrary, it demonstrates 
that oppressive power and masculinity were so intertwined that it is folly to consider 
either one of them in isolation.
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perverse and sinister hold over their m asters, for the m urdered m an's 
heirs found themselves powerless to challenge the official verdict of 
heart attack. "The fam ily/' says Magarshack, drawing on the account 
given in the memoirs of Dostoevsky's brother Aleksey, "were reluctant to 
contest this verdict, because if the true state of affairs had been disclosed, 
almost the whole male population of Chermoshnya w ould have been 
sent to Siberia and his father's heirs would have faced ruin" [Magarshack: 
20]. If that is true, then financial considerations forced Dostoevsky into a 
kind of collusion with his father's killers, and thus favoured him with 
painful first-hand knowledge of the will to parricide that was inscribed in 
patrilineal economics.
If the death of Dostoevsky's father is to influence our thinking 
about the novel, then surely it can only encourage the kind of counter- 
F reudian reading we have been proposing. I have argued that 
Dostoevsky used the m urder of Fyodor Karamazov to render social 
turbulence palpable, and this argument only looks stronger in light of the 
fact that the novelist's own father had met his death at the coalface, as it 
were, of the class struggle. The murder of a patriarch as an expression of 
social discontent - to other artists of the period this w as m erely a 
metaphor deducible from the Zeitgeist; to the young Dostoevsky, it was a 
reality he had experienced with traumatic force. So this may, after all, be 
a case in which the subject's social attitudes - his rage against revolution, 
his distaste for the upw ard mobility of the oppressed, his reverence for 
the existing power structure - can legitimately be traced to his feelings 
about his father. Those feelings were not determined by infantile wishes, 
however. They were determined by the fact that the father's life had been 
claimed, in effect, by social forces.
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Smerdyakov
Like the m urderers of Dostoevsky's father, the m urderer in The Brothers 
Karamazov is a disgruntled servant .28 Over the parricidal bastard  
Sm erdyakov, Fyodor Karamazov exercises two separate b rands of 
officially-endorsed tyranny: that of the father over the son, and that of the 
m aster over the servant. But there is more than a hint of the master- 
slave relationship in Fyodor's dealings with his other sons, too. In this 
respect Smerdyakov serves to bring out patterns latent in all father-son 
relations, just as he will do when he commits parricide - a parricide 
which is not merely a parricide, because its victim is not merely his 
father. Fyodor Karamazov is also Smerdyakov's boss, his oppressor, and 
so the crime is at least partially, and perhaps prim arily, an act of 
revolution. Again, these mitigating factors must also obtain, albeit in a 
subtler way, in the case of the parricide who is not literally his father's 
servant.
"He's a lackey and a boor," Ivan says to his father of Smerdyakov. 
"Prime cannon fodder, however, when the time comes.... There will be 
others and better ones, but there will be his kind as well" [Dostoevsky,
28Even before Smerdyakov murders, a connection between servants and murder is made 
during the confessions of Zosima's Mysterious Visitor. In order to commit murder and get 
away with it, the Visitor relies on two lamentable qualities of the modern servant: 
incompetence and irreverence. First, he is able to gain entry to his victim's home because 
he knows that "because of the servants' negligence, the door at the foot of the stairway 
was not always locked. He hoped for such carelessness this time, and was not 
disappointed" [Dostoevsky, 1992: 305]. Having conducted the slaying, he proceeds to 
frame the servants, a task again facilitated by certain shortcomings of the modem lackey: 
"with infernal and criminal calculation, he arranged things so that the blame would fall 
on the servants: he did not scruple to take her purse; with her keys, taken from under her 
pillow, he opened her bureau and took certain things from it, precisely as an ignorant 
servant would have done, leaving the valuable papers and taking only money.... Her serf 
Pyotr was the immediate suspect, and circumstances all came together just then to confirm 
the suspicion, for this servant knew, and the dead woman had made no secret of it, that 
she intended to send him to the army, to fulfil her quota of peasant recruits.... He had 
been heard, angry and drunk, in a tavern, threatening to kill her" [305-306 - emphasis 
added]. The servant dies during his trial, and the case is closed. So here is a hint that a 
rebellious servant's economic murder of a master is a more plausible, a more natural 
occurrence than the crime of passion.
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1992: 132 - emphasis added]. To Ivan's horror, this prediction proves 
correct: in murdering the tyrant, Smerdyakov is effectively acting as 
cannon fodder for at least two revolutionary theses: the nihilist notion 
that everything is permitted, and the liberal idea that servants are as good 
as their masters. In that very significant sense at least, his crime is a 
political one. And there is arguably an even deeper sense in which this is 
a political parricide: although Dostoevsky would like us to think that the 
ideologies which Smerdyakov enacts are half-baked and despicable (not 
least because they lead to murder), we see more than enough heartless 
maltreatment of Smerdyakov to suspect that the left might be right, and 
that the servile should not be forced to live with their oppression.
It is in relation to Smerdyakov that Freud makes what is surely the 
most bizarre assertion in his Dostoevsky essay. He is speaking of the 
various ways in which literature's three masterpieces of parricide deviate, 
supposedly through self-censorship, from the core oedipal narrative 
devised by himself.
The Russian novel goes a step further in the same direction [as 
Hamlet]. There also the murder is committed by someone else 
[i.e. someone other than the hero]. This other person, however, 
stands to the murdered man in the same filial relation as the hero, 
Dmitri; in this other person's case the motive of sexual rivalry is 
openly admitted; he is a brother of the hero's, and it is a 
remarkable fact that Dostoevsky has attributed to him his own 
illness, the alleged epilepsy, as though he were seeking to confess 
that the epileptic, the neurotic, in himself was a parricide.
[Freud, 1950f: 236]
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This awkward passage is rife with rubbery claims. Is Dmitri really 
the 'hero' of the novel? If Freud thinks so, it is probably because Dmitri is 
the only brother who has a skerrick of a sexual reason for wanting his 
father dead. The claim that Smerdyakov and Dmitri stand "in the same 
filial relation" to their father is likewise a tendentious one, which can be 
sustained only by ignoring every single social aspect of those relations, 
and focussing entirely on their biology. But it is Freud's casual assertion 
that in the case of Smerdyakov "the motive of sexual rivalry is openly 
admitted" which is the most breathtaking feature of the passage. Sexual 
rivalry? Smerdyakov? What scene or passage can Freud possibly be 
referring to? Openly admitted? Even if we employ that phrase with the 
looseness which psychoanalysis has perhaps forever imparted to it, it 
remains impossible to justify. If Freud can perceive the motive of sexual 
rivalry in Smerdyakov, then he is capable of finding it anywhere.
For it is difficult to conceive of a less sexual character than the 
cold, passionless, grotesque Smerdyakov. If he represents desire for the 
mother in disguise, then it is a very good disguise indeed. His crime 
seems to be the very opposite of a crime of passion. "For pity's sake, sir," 
he says to Ivan, "how could I have thought it all up in such a flurry? It 
was all thought out beforehand" [631].
When Smerdyakov's sexuality is referred to at all, it is always in 
negative terms: he has none. He looks "like a eunuch", we are told [125]; 
"he seemed to despise the female sex as much as the male, and behaved 
solemnly, almost inaccessibly, with it" [126]. When Fyodor suggests that 
Smerdyakov get married, the lackey turns "pale with vexation at such 
talk" [126]. And perhaps he does not merely look like a eunuch: Richard 
Peace, in his Dostoevsky , identifies several moments of arcane 
symbolism in the book whereby Smerdyakov is "strongly associated with 
the sect of the castrates" [Peace, 1971: 261-262, 327]. If Smerdyakov is
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literally a castrate, this can be related, as Peace himself points out, to the 
fact that "Freud in his article 'Dostoevsky and Parricide' stresses that 
castration is the punishment meted out for the Oedipal crime" [327, n.23]. 
This takes us even further away from the possibility that "sexual rivalry 
is openly admitted" in Smerdyakov's case, but nevertheless it is another 
way of incorporating the into a Freudian reading. One could respond to
A
it by suggesting that Smerdyakov is a eunuch because Dostoevsky is 
engaging in a Dickensian ploy, using Smerdyakov's physical features to 
body forth his political status. As a bastard and a lackey, after all, 
Smerdyakov is a kind of social eunuch, condem ned by his father to 
cultural im potence. To which the Freudian could reply that the 
innum erable ways in which his father oppresses Sm erdyakov are all 
mere echoes of the paradigmatic sexual deprivation. We here reach a 
kind of stalem ate, induced by the incom patibility of our a priori 
assum ptions: the Freudian perspective privileges sexuality  above 
everything else, whereas the non-Freudian perspective doesn't.
Perhaps that stalemate can never be broken, or can be broken only 
by a philosopher. From a literary point of view, the best one can do is to 
test both perspectives against a novel like Dostoesvky's, and see how 
effectively they illuminate the text, or w hether they illuminate it at all. 
One aspect of the Freudian reading which one is surely entitled to deem a 
defect is the fact that there is not a great deal of reading involved in it. 
From a vast novel Freud seizes only on a handful of lines and scenes, 
like a kidnapper collecting snippings for a ransom note. The Freudian 
will respond that this relative lack of textual contact points is more than 
compensated for by the searing intensity of the light throw n on them. 
That is a matter of opinion, but it remains objectively true to say that the 
principal fuel of the Freudian reading is not quotations of Dostoevsky, 
but quotations of Freud. On the other hand, the historical approach has
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at least one objective virtue: there is no sentence in the novel's 700-odd 
pages that it needs to be afraid of.
Consider the chapter "Smerdyakov w ith a G uitar", in which 
Smerdyakov converses w ith the amorous Maria Kondratievna. Freud 
does not mention this chapter. One could imagine a Freudian perhaps 
devoting a few facile words to the symbolic qualities of the musical 
instrument in Smerdyakov's hands, but as far as the oedipal view of the 
novel is concerned, this is on the whole a chapter which Dostoevsky may 
as well not have w ritten. But he did write it, and on inspection it 
contains in form ation  highly pertinen t to the 'm ystery ' of w hy 
Sm erdyakov com m its parricide. A lyosha, eavesdropping on the 
conversation, perceives that Smerdyakov speaks somewhat politely, but 
"above all with firm and insistent dignity. Apparently the man had the 
upper hand and the wom an was flirting w ith him " [224]. As the 
conversation progresses, we see that it is the upper hand, rather than the 
flirtation, which excites Smerdyakov. Is that because he is physically a 
eunuch? Or is it rather because he is a social eunuch, to whom dignity 
and the upper hand are so rarely available that when he gets them he 
wants to make as much mileage out of them as he can, by condescending 
to the lady as thoroughly as everybody else condescends to him? The 
possibility that these political considerations determine Sm erdyakov's 
behaviour is enhanced by the fragments of self-pitying social analysis 
with which he favours the lady. "I could have done even better, miss, 
and I'd know a lot more, if it w asn't for my destiny ever since childhood. 
I'd  have killed a m an in a duel with a pistol for calling me low-born, 
because I came from Stinking Lizaveta without a father..." [224]. There, in 
a nutshell, is Sm erdyakov's political motive for parricide: his aching 
desire to advance, to do better, to know more; his bitter awareness that he 
never will, thanks to his birth, for which his father is to blame. If he is
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willing to kill a man for calling him  low-born, should we be surprised 
when he kills the man w ho made him  low-born?
Smerdyakov's eunuch-like appearance ties in, of course, with the 
generally repulsive nature  of his physical presence. Sm erdyakov's 
appearance is not as superficial a m atter as it sounds, because it is clearly 
connected with what Dostoevsky considered to be the repulsive nature of 
Sm erdyakov's politics. Ailing tow ards the novel's end, Smerdyakov 
looks "thin and yellow.... His dry eunuch's face seemed to have become 
very small, his side-whiskers were dishevelled, and instead of a tuft, only 
a thin little wisp of hair stood up on his head" [605]. Reading that 
description, one is rem inded of another physical description for which 
Dostoevsky pulls out all the stops: that of Smerdyakov's father, Fyodor 
Pavlovich Karamazov, he of the hooked decadent nose and the fleshy 
goitre. Smerdyakov and Fyodor, the characters who meet in the act of 
parricide, are the book's two most vividly repellent presences.29 By no 
Coincidence, they also represent the two most egregious affronts to 
Dostoevsky's vision of w hat the family ought to be ("in a word, holy"). 
Their physical g ro tesquerie  im plies an ethical judgem ent: their 
disgusting fleshiness points to their disgusting m aterialism .30 From his 
contem pt for these tw o characters, one can deduce D ostoevsky 's 
psychological distance from the act of parricide in which they come 
hideously together. The act is his horrified caricature of m odern 
tendencies. It is a repugnant clash of m aterialistic anim als which 
Dostoevsky views with grimacing disdain. He does not participate in it 
psychologically, either w ith fevered approval or with fervent guilt. He 
stands far above it, not so much paring his nails as holding his nose.
29There is a third character who belongs in this gallery of grotesque caricatures: the 
egregious Captain Snegiryov. I will be discussing the interesting relation between him 
and his son, Ilyusha, in due course.
30By contrast, Alyosha, the character representing Dostoevsky's antidote to the 
materialist malady, is surely the book's least vivid major character.
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In these two hideous characters the contradictions of Dostoevsky's 
politics are again evident. In feeling repelled by Fyodor Karamazov, 
Dostoevsky displays the taste of a revolutionary, or at least a progressive - 
Ivan, for example, is also disgusted by the old man. But the novelist's 
contempt for Smerdyakov, the upw ardly mobile bastard and lackey, is 
less politically correct. To despise both the oppressive master and the 
oppressed servant is in terms of earthly politics somewhat paradoxical. 
But these apparently conflicting attitudes stand revealed as two parts of 
the same attitude, once we remember that Dostoevsky's politics lay 
beyond this world. Dostoevsky held an ideal conception of The Family 
which allowed him to condemn the transgressions of the abusive father 
and the revolutionary son with equal vehemence, and freed him of the 
obligation to decide which was the lesser of these two evils.
But reality seems to complicate D ostoevsky's project in the 
follow ing way. Fyodor K aram azov can be m ade to s tan d , 
unproblematically enough, for one kind of familial unholiness - namely, 
abusive parenting . There is noth ing  to stop us from sharing  
D ostoevsky's com plete contem pt for him. But the character of 
Smerdyakov is not so clear-cut. Dostoevsky w ould like him to stand 
purely for the other kind of familial unholiness, the impiety of children. 
But Smerdyakov does not end up representing this kind of unholiness 
alone. To some extent - and arguably to a very large extent - Smerdyakov 
represents abusive parenting too, by being a victim of it, a function of it. 
If one condemns Fyodor Karamazov's misbehaviour outright, isn 't one 
obliged to direct some sym pathy towards Smerdyakov, its most salient 
victim ?
Dostoevsky thinks not, and as a result Smerdyakov comes across as 
a surreally inhuman character, a monster from birth. As a young child,
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for example, Smerdyakov interrupts a Scripture lesson from his acting 
father Grigory, in order to ask, with the impertinence of the materialist:
T he Lord God created light on the first day, and the sun, moon 
and stars on the fourth day. Where did the light shine from on the 
first day?' Grigory was dumbfounded. The boy looked derisively 
at his teacher; there was even something supercilious in his look. 
Grigory could not help himself. 'I'll show you where!' he shouted, 
and gave his pupil a violent blow on the cheek. The boy suffered 
the slap without a word, but again hid in the corner for a few days. 
A week later, as it happened, they discovered that he had the 
falling sickness, which never left him for the rest of his life. [124]
It is im portant to notice that Smerdyakov's insurrection precedes 
his being struck. This typifies D ostoevsky's apparen t refusal to 
countenance any earth ly  connection be tw een  the tw o fam ilial 
phenom ena he m ost hates, the abuse of fatherly authority  and the 
insubordination of children. To Dostoevsky there can be no possibility 
that the bastard 's upbringing m ight explain, let alone legitimate, his 
repellent persona and his perpetration of parricide. For if such a 
connection is m ade, then all the problems of m odernity - problem s 
which Dostoevsky wants us to think of as insoluble except by a return to 
Christian love - are opened to a simple secular solution: be a better father, 
and the rest will follow.
As a consequence of this tangled way of thinking on the part of his 
creator, there is som ething deeply absurd about Smerdyakov. His 
discourse, his behaviour, are consistent only inasmuch as they embody 
everything that Dostoevsky opposes. Sm erdyakov is even m ade to 
advocate (and thereby to discredit) the beating of servants, even though
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as a servant himself he will be on the receiving end of such violence. He 
says to Ivan:
'you, being your parent's son, ought first of all to have reported me 
to the police and given me a thrashing, sir ... at least slapped me in 
the mug right there ..."
'Yes, it's a pity I d idn 't slap you in the mug," [Ivan] grinned 
bitterly. '... it's a pity it d idn 't occur to me; though beating is 
forbidden, I'd have made hash out of your ugly snout."
Smerdyakov looked at him almost with delight. 'In the ordinary 
occasions of life," he spoke in that complacently doctrinaire tone in 
which he used to argue about religion w ith Grigory Vasilievich 
and tease him while they were standing at Fyodor Pavlovich's 
table, 'in  the ordinary occasions of life, m ug-slapping is indeed 
forbidden by law nowadays, and everyone has stopped such 
beatings, sir, but in distinctive cases of life, not only among us but 
all over the world, be it even the most complete French republic, 
beatings do go on all the sam e....' [616]
Dostoevsky w ants Sm erdyakov to be the ultim ate upstart, a 
freethinking lackey who will oppose his m aster in everything, even if 
that means arguing in favour of his own thrashing. There is an earlier 
point in the novel at which Smerdyakov effectively argues for his own 
beating. He says to Maria Kondratievna: "The Russian people need 
thrashing, miss, as Fyodor Pavlovich rightly said yesterday, though he's a 
m adman, he and all his children, miss" [225]. This is not Smerdyakov 
the insubordinate speaking, bu t Sm erdyakov the representative of 
another modern vice: namely, the parroting of defective social theories. 
Smerdyakov, we are supposed to think, is such a mixed-up fool that any
337
practice or notion he adopts is instantly discredited.31 This principle 
applies chiefly, of course, to the atheistic ideas in whose service 
Smerdyakov commits parricide. "You killed h im /' Smerdyakov informs 
Ivan; "you are the main killer, and I was just your minion, your faithful 
servant Licharda, and I performed the deed according to your word.... You 
used to be brave once, sir, you used to say "Everything is perm itted / sir, 
and now you've got so frightened" [623, 625].
When Smerdyakov adduces Ivan 's political philosophy as his 
m otivation for the crime, and then shortly afterwards suggests that he 
killed for the money, in order to "begin a life on such money in Moscow" 
[632], he appears to be engaging in double talk. But on inspection these 
stories might not be so inconsistent after all. If poverty has ground 
Smerdyakov down so far that he will consider m urdering because of it, 
then he has every right to embrace, and even to implement, theories 
which challenge the existing social order. Sm erdyakov's personal 
experience proves that Ivan is right to condemn the utter injustice of the 
system. Indeed the lackey does not have to get his radical social theories 
entirely from Ivan: he can come up w ith similar theories of his own 
simply by looking around him.
"Dmitri Fyodorovich is worse than any lackey, in his behaviour, 
and in his intelligence, and in his poverty, miss, and he's not fit for 
anything, but, on the contrary, he gets honour from everybody. I 
may be only a broth-maker, but if I'm  lucky I can open a cafe- 
restaurant in Moscow, on the Petrovka. Because I cook specialties, 
and no one in Moscow except foreigners can serve specialties.
31In their 'Notes' to The Brothers Karamazov, Richard Pevear and Laura Volokhonsky 
point out that Dostoevsky uses the jejune Madame Khokhlakov and the immature Kolya 
Krasotkin in the same way - to articulate, and thereby to discredit, certain liberal notions 
he detests [see Pevear and Volokhonsky: 789, 792].
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Dmitri Fyodorovich is a ragamuffin, but if he were to challenge the 
biggest count's son to a duel, he would accept, miss, and how is he 
any better than me? Because he's a lot stupider than me. He's 
blown so much money, and for nothing, miss." [225]
It is hard to fault this speech. We can scarcely disagree that Dmitri 
Karamazov is stupid, has blown his money, is unworthy of respect. Why 
should a mere accident of birth allow him to enjoy superior social status? 
W hat about ability and merit? In the work of a more liberal w riter - 
perhaps Dickens - the above speech would no doubt carry the author's 
endorsem ent. But Dostoevsky considers such ideas to be profoundly 
dangerous. Indeed they come perilously close to being a theoretical 
endorsement of parricide: for isn't Fyodor Pavlovich, too, worse than any 
lackey in his conduct? Why should he enjoy financial and political 
hegemony over his much m aturer sons?
How does D ostoevsky go about rebu tting  this ideological 
justification of parricide? He can scarcely dispute the premise that Dmitri 
Karamazov is a figure unw orthy of honour and respect. Nor can he 
fairly dismiss Smerdyakov's unrest as a naive im portation of European 
claptrap, since Smerdyakov has clearly derived it straight from his own 
social reality. The tru th  is that Dostoevsky w ants us to think of 
Sm erdyakov's revolutionary sentim ents as invalid - bastard ized32 - 
simply because they proceed from the lips of a bastard and a lackey. 
Taking the concept of illegitimacy at its face value, he wants us to think
32Strictly speaking, Smerdyakov's function is not so much to bastardize these ideas as to 
demonstrate that they are bastardized - illegitimate - to begin with. Likewise, the fact 
that Smerdyakov is a lackey brings out Dostoevsky's belief that these ideas are 
inherently "lackeyish". In Demons, Shatov declares that N ihilism  "comes from 
lackeyishness of thinking" [Dostoevsky, 1994: 137 - emphasis added]. In the preliminary 
notes for Crime and Punishment, Dostoevsky had w ritten: "N. B. : N ihilism  is 
lackeyishness of thought. A nihilist is a lackey of thought" [Pevear and Volokhonsky, 
1994: 720].
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of Smerdyakov the bastard as illegitimate to the bone. When Ivan finds 
the bastard wearing spectacles, he feels a disgust which one suspects 
Dostoevsky of sharing.
He was sitting in a gaily coloured quilted dressing gown, which, 
however, was rather worn and quite ragged. On his nose he had 
a pair of spectacles, which Ivan Fyodorovich had never seen on 
him before. This most trifling circumstance suddenly made Ivan 
Fyodorovich even doubly angry, as it were: 'Such a creature, and 
in spectacles to boot!' Smerdyakov slowly raised his head and 
peered intently through the spectacles at his visitor; then he 
slowly removed them and raised himself a little from the bench, 
but somehow not altogether respectfully, somehow even lazily ... 
All of this instantly flashed through Ivan, and he at once grasped 
and noted it all, and most of all the look in Smerdyakov's eyes, 
decidedly malicious, unfriendly, and even haughty: 'Why are you 
hanging about here/ it seemed to say, 'didn't we already settle 
everything before? Why have you come again?' Ivan 
Fyodorovich could barely contain himself.... [613]
Later in the same conversation, Ivan turns his attention to the 
reading matter of the bespectacled bastard:
'What are you doing studying French vocables?' Ivan nodded 
towards the notebook on the table.
'And why shouldn't I be studying them, sir, so as to further my 
education thereby, supposing that some day I myself may chance 
to be in those happy parts of Europe.'
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'Listen, m onster/ Ivan's eyes started flashing, and he was 
shaking all over. [616-617]
Smerdyakov has already committed the m urder by this time, 
which is part of the reason why Ivan is in a rage. But his anger is 
distinctly heightened by the spectacles, the French vocables, the 
disrespectful demeanour - expressions of the same obnoxious desire to 
improve social standing that lay behind the parricide. Parricide is the end 
point of the m odern madness that begins when a lackey dons a pair of 
glasses. The problem  of suffering was not to be solved by such 
disruptions of the social order. The thing to do was to become reconciled 
to your position with the aid of Christian love.
If Dostoevsky is to dem onstrate that this is the only possible 
answ er, he m ust depict Sm erdyakov's revo lu tion  as a failure. 
Accordingly, Smerdyakov swiftly finds that the crime does nothing to 
improve his standing in Ivan's eyes, and the thw arted lackey rapidly 
succumbs to a mysterious sense of despair. He surrenders the crime's 
financial proceeds, which are a hollow prize w ithout the power he had 
also expected to gain.
"Take the money with you, sir, take it away," Smerdyakov 
sighed.
"Of course I shall take it away! But why are you giving it back to 
me, if you killed because of it?" Ivan looked at him  in great 
surprise.
"I've got no use at all for it, sir," Smerdyakov said in a 
trembling voice, waving his hand. "There was such a former 
thought, sir, that I could begin a life on such money in Moscow, 
or even more so abroad, I did have such a dream, sir, and even 
more so as 'everything is permitted.'" [632]
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When, shortly thereafter, Smerdyakov hangs himself, the futility 
of his deed is finally confirmed. The prophecy of Zosima, the holy man, 
is worth repeating, for the abject demise of Smerdyakov has resoundingly 
endorsed it.
'T he world has proclaimed freedom, especially of late, but w hat do 
we see in this freedom of theirs: only slavery and suicide! For the 
world says: 'You have needs, therefore satisfy them, for you have 
the same rights as the noblest and richest men. Do not be afraid to 
satisfy them, but even increase them ' - this is the current teaching 
of the world. And in this they see freedom. But w hat comes of 
this right to increase one's needs? For the rich, isolation and 
spiritual suicide; for the poor, envy and murder." [313]
Dostoevsky's radical unconscious
On a superficial level, then, the character of Sm erdyakov serves to 
discredit certain revolutionary ideas by giving illiterate voice to them and 
ultim ately pu tting  them  into practice in the act of parricide. But 
Smerdyakov ends up exceeding and thereby betraying  his official 
mission, by having experiences which raise the possibility that his politics 
are legitimate. In this respect, one might say that the novel bears traces of 
an intelligence w hich lies beneath  or beyond the au thor's  narrow  
conscious intentions. But it is emphatically an unconscious of a political, 
rather than a sexual, kind.
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One can further observe the operation of this radical unconscious, 
this repressed liberalism, in another of the novel's servant characters: old 
Grigory, Fyodor's other retainer. On the face of it, Grigory looks like 
Dostoevsky's ideal servant. He lives by the creed he voices during 
Dm itri's trial: "I am a subordinate man.... If the authorities see fit to 
deride me, then I must endure it" [666]. Grigory is a far better servant 
than Smerdyakov. He is also a far better father than Fyodor Pavlovich: 
he lavishly m ourns the death of his only biological child, he is 
appropriately firm and God-fearing in his upbringing of Smerdyakov, 
and he plays a substantial and loving role in the rearing of the legitimate 
brothers as well. [14, 95]
So the character of Grigory comes in handy to underscore the point 
that the godless Fyodor Karamazov is a father in name only. But on the 
whole, Dostoevsky somewhat unfairly withholds his sym pathies from 
the faithful old servant. Early in the novel, the narrator sees fit to 
characterise Grigory as "a gloomy, stupid, and obstinate pedant" [13]. 
One's suspicion that the novelist himself might share this view firms 
after an interesting exchange. Mitya, during the course of a physical 
attack on his blood father, casually assaults old Grigory, w ho voices a 
grievance which looks perfectly legitimate: '"I used to wash him in a tub 
... Me he dared [to hit] ...!' Grigory kept repeating" [140]. But Ivan, of all 
people, is quick to put Grigory in his place: "He 'dared ' father, too, not 
just you!" he says, "twisting his mouth" [ibid.]. In other words, the fact 
that Grigory washed the young Mitya in a tub, while the boy's blood 
father was out carousing somewhere, is useful in so far as it discredits the 
godless Fyodor; but one should not bother to consider its bearing on the 
irrelevant question of Grigory's humanity. When push comes to shove, 
Fyodor Pavlovich is still the more worthy man of the pair - the only 
worthy man. Grigory is only a servant, an unperson, whose suffering is
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by definition of a lower order than his master's. Even through the radical 
Ivan, Dostoevsky cannot perceive that kicking Grigory is the worse crime.
This discomforting motif is repeated on the night of the m urder, 
when Mitya again attacks Grigory, this time so brutally that he believes 
the old man has died. "That old man," Mitya laments, " - he carried me 
in his arms, gentlemen, he washed me in a tub when I was a three-year- 
old child and abandoned by everyone, he was my own father ...!" [486]. 
Reading this, we might think that Mitya is fully alive to the enorm ity of 
killing a man who has been, to all intents and purposes, a father to him. 
But it soon emerges that Mitya still thinks of this deed as small potatoes 
in comparison to the m urder of a blood father, even if that father is 
Fyodor Karamazov. "Would I be talking like this," he protests, "w ould I 
be moving like this, would I look at you and at the world like this, if I 
really were a parricide, when even the inadvertent killing of Grigory 
gave me no rest all night..." [486 - emphasis added].
These d istu rb ing  passages reproduce the con trad ictions of 
Dostoevsky's politics. On the one hand, there are certain points where 
his thinking seems to coincide with that of the decadents. The criterion 
of social rank m ight tell us that Fyodor is superior to Grigory, but 
Dostoevsky makes Grigory an infinitely better person than  Fyodor. 
Therefore the division of hum ans into classes is wholly arbitrary. But 
this is w here the resem blance to radical thinking stops. W hat 
Dostoevsky means is that the class system looks frighteningly arbitrary at 
the moment, because there is no strong religious belief to shore it up - 
which is precisely why strong religious belief should make a swift return. 
Fie is not suggesting that anarchy is the true nature of things, bu t that 
anarchy is what things degenerate into in the absence of God. Dostoevsky 
wants Fyodor to be better than Grigory. He wants the master and blood 
father restored to his rightful role of pre-eminence. And so parricide
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rem ains an unspeakable crime even w hen its victim is unspeakable 
himself. It is a violation of the ideal father-son relationship, which is the 
cornerstone of the ideal power structure.
Another telling difference between Fyodor Pavlovich and Grigory 
em erges in their respective responses w hen Dm itri attacks them . 
Grigory, as we have seen, takes deep personal umbrage, and has a right to. 
Fyodor, on the other hand, takes a more abstract kind of offence, and in 
doing so situates parricidal violence in its broader, political, context.
Of course, in these fashionable times it's customary to count 
fathers and mothers as a prejudice,33 but the law, it seems, even in 
our time, does not allow people to pull their old fathers by the 
hair and kick them in the m ug with their heels, on the floor, in 
their own house, and boast about coming back and killing them 
completely.... [174]
It is grossly audacious of Fyodor to say this: how could one honour 
a man like him out of anything except prejudice? But that audacity only 
echoes Dostoevsky's view of things. It is the duty of the Christian son to 
honour his father, no m atter how dishonourably the father behaves. 
Hence when Mitya's attorney, Fetyukovich, adduces old K aram azov's 
appalling record in mitigation of his client's supposed crime, Dostoevsky 
is scornful - even though the lawyer's dim view of the delinquent father 
is in almost complete accord with the novelist's own. "One m ust treat 
words honestly," insists Fetyukovich,
33In M agarshack's translation: "it's  the fashion to regard honouring your father and 
mother as a prejudice..." [1982: 202 - emphasis added].
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and I shall allow myself to name a thing by the proper word, the 
proper appellation: such a father as the m urdered old Karamazov 
cannot and does not deserve to be called a father. Love for the 
father that is not justified by the father is an absurdity , an 
impossibility. Love cannot be created out of nothing.... 'Fathers, 
provoke not your children/ writes the apostle.... I quote these holy 
words now not for the sake of my client, but as a rem inder to all 
fathers.... I speak not only to fathers here, but to all fathers I cry out: 
'Fathers, provoke not your children!' ... Otherwise we are not 
fathers but enemies of our children, and they are not our children 
but our enemies, and we ourselves have made them our enemies. 
[744]
Thus far Fetyukovich's argum ent seems consistent enough w ith 
the Dostoevskean view, right dow n to the quotation from the Old 
Testament. Modern fathers should clean up their acts. But Dostoevsky 
only w ants to explain the act of parricide, to demonstrate that it is a 
product of m odern tendencies - tendencies which m ust therefore stand 
condemned. Fetyukovich not only wants to explain the act, he wants to 
excuse it. So on the basis of their shared condemnation of the m odern 
father, Fetyukovich erects a superstructure which Dostoevsky finds 
profoundly objectionable.
Let us be brave, gentlemen of the jury, let us even be bold, it is 
even our duty to be so in the present moment and not to be afraid 
of certain words and ideas, like Moscow merchants' wives who are 
afraid of 'metal' and 'brimstone.' No, let us prove, on the contrary, 
that the progress of the past few years has touched our 
development as well, and let us say straight out: he who begets is
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not yet a father; a father is he who begets and proves worthy of it. 
Of course, there is another meaning, another interpretation of the 
w ord 'father,' which insists that my father, though a m onster, 
though a villain to his children, is still my father simply because 
he begot me. But this meaning is, so to speak, a mystical one, 
which I do not understand with my reason, but can only accept by 
my faith, or, more precisely, on faith, like many other things that I 
do not understand, but that religion nonetheless tells me to 
believe. [744-745]
Fetyukovich condemns the modern father, but is happy to appeal 
to other elements of modernity - to progress, to reason, to the m odern 
lack of faith in faith itself - in order to bolster his abhorrent conclusion 
that, if such a father was not a father, then
Such a m urder is not a murder. Such a m urder is not a parricide, 
either. No, the m urder of such a father cannot be called parricide. 
Such a m urder can be considered parricide only out of prejudice! 
[747]
Dostoevsky, while he is happy w ith the notion that Fyodor 
Karamazov is not an adequate father, plainly believes that his m urder 
still deserves the chilling name of parricide. On Fetyukovich's terms, 
this belief means that Dostoevsky is prejudiced. How right is that 
suggestion? Certainly, Dostoevsky's replies to Fetyukovich's argum ent 
tend more to the prejudicial than the substantial. For a start, he gives 
Fetyukovich a ridiculous name: a fetyuk  is a "ninny" [Peace, 1971: 281]. 
Moreover, he gives the chapter in which Fetyukovich's speech occurs a 
prejudicial title: 'An Adulterer of Thought'. But behind that prejudicial
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title lurks the solidest of Dostoevsky's grievances against Fetyukovich. 
"Fetyukovich 'a d u lte rs '/ ' Pevear and Volokhonsky explain in their 
'Notes', "by w hat he omits" [1992: 795]. Specifically, he fails to qualify his 
quotation of Colossians 3:21 ("Fathers provoke not your children to 
anger, lest they be discouraged") w ith a quotation of the preceding verse 
("Children, obey your parents in all things: for this is well pleasing unto 
the Lord").
Why, though, should Fetyukovich feel obliged to allude to a verse 
which not only contradicts his own argument, but also makes a nonsense 
of the verse beside it? For although these two verses can happily co-exist 
in the w orld of ideals, it is hard to see how they can be reconciled in a 
serious discussion about the real world. If one is to condemn fathers for 
provoking their children to anger, then it seems illogical, if not 
dow nright hypocritical, to also condem n children for becoming angry 
when provoked. In the real world, one has to choose: either one m ust 
excuse (or at the very least understand) filial disobedience w hen the 
parent is blatantly wrong, or else one should abandon all inspection of 
the parent's ethics - what is the point, if Big Brother is Always Right? On 
the other hand, the two main points of Fetyukovich's argum ent (such a 
father cannot be called father; therefore, such a parricide cannot be called 
a parricide) at least have the v irtue of being logically consistent. 
Dostoevsky condemns society according to a set of unexamined ideals by 
which any reality will be found wanting - isn 't that the very essence of 
prejudice? "Eloquence aside, gentlemen," says an anonymous observer 
of the trial, "people can't be allowed to go breaking their fathers' heads 
w ith steelyards. O therw ise w here will we end up?" [752].34 One's
34The Prosecutor offers an almost identical argument: "But if parricide is a prejudice, and 
if every child ought to ask his father, 'Father, why should I love you?' - w hat will 
become of us, w hat will become of the foundations of society, where will the family end 
up?" [749].
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inclination is to suppose that this person is being held up as an example 
of the complacent philistinism of the average Russian. Yet isn 't this 
precisely w hat Dostoevsky's own position, putting its eloquence aside, 
amounts to? He opens up contemporary society; shows us how diseased 
its heart is; and then sews the ailing patient back up again w ithout any 
further surgery.35
The verses of Colossians adjacent to those I have already quoted 
contain some further none-too-subtle endorsem ents of patriarchy. 
"Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as it is fit in the 
Lord," runs 3:18. "Servants, obey in all things your masters according to 
the flesh; not with eyeservice, as menpleasers; but in singleness of heart, 
fearing God," says 3:22. These verses read like a stripped-down version of 
Dostoevsky's belief in the sacredness of the political and economic 
structures of his age - of which Sm erdyakov's crime is the suprem e 
violation. Like an advocate of trickle-down economics, Dostoevsky 
urged the underprivileged - wives, children, servants - to be patient, since 
the answer to their problems could only be bestowed by the m an at the 
top of the heap. "Fathers, provoke not your children to anger." 
"Husbands, love your wives and be not bitter against them" (3:19).36
Colossians contains no parallel verse urging masters to do the 
right thing by their servants. But Dostoevsky, via Zosima, provides his
35Or, as Elisio Vivas puts it: "From Dostoesvky's novels ... one can neither abstract an 
ethical imperative nor a systematic philosophy capable of doing justice to the dramatic 
tensions to be found in life as he grasped it" [1962: 88].
36In discussing Dostoevsky's extremely reactionary politics, we must understand what 
they were a reaction to: namely, a Russia which was, as Eric Hobsbawm explains, 
"organized in a way which to all educated Europeans appeared positively prehistoric by 
the later nineteenth century, namely as a bureaucratized autocracy. This very fact made 
revolution the only method of changing state policy other than catching the Tsar's ear 
and moving the machinery of state into action from above.... Since change of one sort or 
another was almost universally felt to be needed, virtually everybody from what in the 
west would have been moderate conservatives to the extreme left was obliged to be a 
revolutionary. The only question was, of what kind" [Hobsbawm, 1987: 292]. There is a 
corollary to Hobsbawm's observation: any Russian who, like Dostoevsky, opposed social 
change, was obliged to be an extreme reactionary, a friend of tyranny.
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own: "The world cannot do without servants, but see to it that your 
servant is freer in spirit than if he were not a servant. And why can I not 
be the servant of my servant...?" [Dostoevsky, 1992: 317]. The message is 
familiar: there must be no radical alteration of the social structure; things 
can only be fixed by more love. Dostoevsky is simply unable to see how 
things could function without servants.
But once again the political myopia co-exists with a frightening 
sharpness of artistic vision, for Zosima's platitudinous solution to the 
master-servant problem comes just after a speech in which he has 
delineated that problem in vivid and moving detail. He has recounted 
an incident from his youth when, "ferocious and ugly" on the eve of a 
duel, he had taken things out on his servant:
I got angry with my orderly Alfansy and struck him twice in the 
face with all my might, so that his face was all bloody. He had 
not been long m my service, and 1 had had occasion to strike him 
before, yet never with such beastly cruelty.... He is standing 
before me, and I strike him in the face with all my might, and he 
keeps his arms at his sides, head erect, eyes staring straight ahead 
as if he were at attention; he winces at each blow, and does not 
even dare raise a hand to shield himself - this is what a man can 
be brought to, a man beating his fellow man! What a crime! It 
was as if a sharp needle went through my soul. [297-298]
The next day he was moved to apologize:
"'Alfansy/ I said, 'yesterday I struck you twice in the face.
Forgive me/ I said. He started as if he were afraid, and I saw 
that it was not enough, not enough; and suddenly, just as I was,
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epaulettes and all, I threw myself at his feet with my forehead to 
the ground: 'Forgive me!' I said. At that he was completely 
astounded: 'Your honour, my dear master, but how can you ...
I'm  not worthy and he suddenly began weeping himself, 
just as I had done shortly before...." [298]
At the gut level of symbolism, Dostoevsky seems all in favour of 
social equality: the master, epaulettes and all, descends to the level of the 
servant, and they weep together, united  by their hum anity. But 
Dostoevsky the social theorist is wholly unable to concede that this 
terrible beating of a servant by a m aster, and the servant's abject 
acceptance of it, might have something to do with the structure of the 
m aster-servant relationship, and that the surest way of stopping the 
violence is to dismantle the structure.
Nor is Zosima's beating of Alfansy an anomalous moment in the 
novel. On the contrary, oppressive violence is presented as a general 
problem. "Generally speaking," declares Fyodor Pavlovich, in reference 
to Smerdyakov, "the Russian peasant should be whipped. I have always 
maintained that. Our peasants are cheats, they're not worth our pity, and 
it's good that they're still sometimes given a birching. The strength of the 
Russian land is in its birches. If the forests were destroyed, it would be 
the end of the Russian land" [132]. Being a patriarch, Fyodor is in a 
position to inflict this philosophy not just on his peasants, but on his 
children and his wife - or, in his case, wives. He succeeds, for example, in 
turning his second wife, Sofia Ivanovna, into an hysteric or "shrieker",37
37A 'shrieker', the narrator explains, is the victim of "a terrible women's disease that 
seems to occur predominantly in our Russia, that it is a testimony to the hard lot of our 
peasant women, caused by exhausting work too soon after difficult, improper birth-giving 
without any medical help, and, besides that, by desperate grief, beatings, and so on, 
which the nature of many women, after all, as the general examples show, cannot endure" 
[47] .
351
by subjecting her to various forms of exploitation and oppression, such as 
staging orgies in her presence. And he rapes and effectively m urders 
poor Stinking Lizaveta, who dies while giving birth to Smerdyakov - 
who will in turn suffer the consequences of that foul act for his whole 
life. Smerdyakov is, according to Mitya, "N ot just a coward, but a 
conjunction of all cowardice in the world taken together, walking on two 
legs. He was born of a chicken. Every time he talked w ith me, he 
trembled for fear I might kill him, though I never even raised my hand" 
[475].
The point is that the master doesn 't have to raise his hand - the 
victimisation of the servant has already occurred at a structural level. 
Sm erdyakov's cowering in the presence of Mitya recalls A lfansy's 
"starting as if afraid" when his m aster merely speaks to him. It also 
brings to mind the conduct of a certain real-life victim of violence: the 
Rat Man, victim of savage childhood beatings at the hands of his father. 
When in Freud's office, the Rat Man
avoid[ed] my proximity for fear of my giving him a beating. If he 
stayed on the sofa he behaved like some one in desperate terror 
trying to save himself from castigations of terrific violence; he 
w ould bury his head in his hands, cover his face with his arm, 
jump up suddenly and run away, his features distorted with pain, 
and so on. He remembered that his father had had a passionate 
temper, and sometimes in his violence had not known where to 
stop. [Freud, 1991a: 89-90]
In the previous chapter, I pointed out that the Rat M an's 
behaviour - which Freud of course ascribes to an oedipal fear of the father 
- is fairly intelligible as a purely physical fear. If such a fear pointed to a
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broader truth than the fact that his father regularly bashed him, perhaps 
what it pointed to was the political structure that underlay the violence. 
In The Brothers Karamazov, physical violence, and the fear of it, quite 
clearly harbours political implications of this kind. Here, for example, is 
the abject Captain Snegiryov, evincing Rat Man-like cowardice when 
meeting with Alyosha.
His face expressed a sort of extreme insolence, and at the same 
time - which was strange - an obvious cowardice. He looked like 
a man who had been submissive for a long time and suffered 
much, but had suddenly jumped up and tried to assert himself.
Or, better still, like a man who wants terribly to hit you, but is 
terribly afraid that you are going to hit him. [Dostoevsky, 1992:
198]
Why should Snegiryov exhibit this fear of violence in the presence 
of the infinitely meek Alyosha? The fact that he does so strongly suggests 
that it is not really physical fear, or physical threat, we are dealing with 
here, but a translation of social tensions into physical terms. Snegiryov is 
socially downtrodden; knows it; and resents it, although not quite 
enough to do something about it. Alyosha confirms this reading when 
he explains Snegiryov's behaviour to the child Krasotkin. "There are 
people who feel deeply but are beaten down," he says. "Their buffoonery 
is something like a spiteful irony against those to whom they dare not 
speak the truth directly because of a long-standing, humiliating timidity 
before them" [537]. Alyosha uses the phrase "beaten down" in a 
metaphorical sense, of course, but it is a metaphor which comes very 
close to, and quite often coincides with, the literal truth. (Snegiryov is 
beaten down both physically and socially when Dmitri publicly pulls his
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beard.) The desire to hit one's superiors, and the even greater fear of 
being hit by them, is a far from arbitrary symbol for the aspiration and 
suppression of the lower classes. The artist in Dostoevsky sees that 
violence is inscribed in the structure, that social power relations quiver 
on the edge of physical assault.
Smerdyakov's crime makes power relations spill over that edge. 
On the face of it, as we have seen, Dostoevsky uses the act of parricide as 
the clinching argum ent for the preservation of the oppressive social 
order: it is m eant to demonstrate the recklessness of putting dangerous 
ideas about liberty into the heads of the lower orders. But the act of 
parricide can also be read as a subversion of Dostoevsky's reactionary 
position - as a radical warning about the consequences of oppression. 
When Mitya calls Smerdyakov a "chicken born of a chicken", he literally 
dehumanises Smerdyakov, and indicates that his subhum an status goes 
back to his very birth. "You think you're a hum an being?" the young 
Smerdyakov is asked by Grigory. "You are not a hum an being, you were 
begotten of bathhouse slime, that's  who you are...." The narra to r 
ominously adds: "Smerdyakov, it turned out later, never could forgive 
him these words" [124]. More often than not, Smerdyakov is referred to 
simply as the "lackey", but there are frequent occasions w hen he is more 
literally dehumanised: he is referred to, variously, as a "Balaam's Ass" 
[123], a fly [632], a dog [661, 686], a "stinking dog" [591], a chicken [475] and a 
rat [707].
Dostoevsky him self, as we have seen, is not innocent of 
dehum anising Smerdyakov. And yet he knows that such oppression 
ramifies, has consequences. When the young Smerdyakov is oppressed, 
there are fatal consequences for those unfortunate creatures even lower
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on the scale than himself - actual animals.38 "As a child he was fond of 
hanging cats and then burying them with ceremony" [124]. As an adult,
38In January 1876, in The Diary of a Writer, Dostoevsky recalls a scene from his youth 
which shows us that he was acutely aware of this principle at a conscious level. "The 
incident happened long ago in my, so to speak, pre-historical times - in 1837 - when I was 
about fifteen years old and was en route from Moscow to Petersburg.... One evening we were 
stopping at a station, an inn.... Across the street, directly opposite the inn, was the station 
building. Suddenly a courier's troika speedily drove up to the station's platform; a courier 
jumped out of the carriage.... He ran into the station house and there, surely, must have 
'swallowed' a glass of vodka.... Meanwhile, a fresh, spirited, substitute troika drove up 
to the postal station, and the yamschik, a young lad of about twenty ... jum ped into the 
coachman's seat. Forthwith, the courier came running down the staircase and seated 
himself in the carriage. The yamschik stirred on, but hardly had he started to move than 
the courier rose up and silently raised hiShardy right fist and, from above, painfully 
brought it down on the back of the yamschik's head. He jolted forward, lifted his whip 
and, with all his strength, lashed the wheel horse. The horses dashed forward but this 
in no way appeased the courier. Here there was method and not m ere irritation - 
something preconceived and tested by long years of experience - and the dreadful fist 
soared again and again and struck blows on the back of the head. And then, again and 
again, and thus it continued until the troika disappeared out of sight. Of course, the 
yamschik, who could hardly keep his balance, incessantly, every second, like a madman, 
lashed the horses and, finally, he had w hipped them up to the point where they started 
dashing at top speed, as if possessed. Our coachman explained to me that virtually all 
couriers are riding in approxim ately the same manner, but that this one is particularly 
notorious and everybody knows him.... '[Ojn approaching a station, he invariably gets up 
on his feet: he starts at a distance of approximately one verst and he keeps swinging his 
fist up and down, in the same manner, until he reaches the station, so that everybody m 
the village should gaze at him with amazement. Well, after that one's neck hurts for a 
whole m onth.' Upon the return  of the lad, people laugh at him: 'See, the courier 
cudgelled your neck!' And that same day he may beat his wife: 'At least, you'll pay for 
it!'... No doubt, it is inhum an on the part of the yamschik to lash the horses so 
ferociously: of course, they reach the station all out of breath and quite exhausted. Still, 
who among the personnel of the Society for the Protection of Animals w ould venture to 
bring a charge against the peasant lad for his inhuman treatment of his little horses? Am 
I right?
"This disgusting scene has remained in my memory all my life.... This little scene 
appeared to me, so to speak, as an emblem, as som ething which very graphically 
demonstrated the link between cause and effect. Here every blow dealt at the animal 
leaped out of every blow dealt at the man" [Dostoevsky, 1949: 185-186].
In a Notebook of the same period, Dostoevsky writes, in connection with the same 
memory: "The courier. Right here is where hum aneness should be preached. The main 
thing is that this is not a picture, but actually a symbol. In fact: he is a barbarian for 
having lashed his horses like that, but then his every lash was caused by a blow on his 
own back, without these blows he would not have whipped the horses. I repeat: this is 
not a picture from my reminiscences, but a symbol, a symbol to be engraved in print for 
society, that the picture is real, I swear. Teach first how to be humane with humans, and 
then the Russian man will understand that he has to be hum ane with beasts too" [Proffer, 
1975: 111].
Significantly, in his Diary discussion of the incident Dostoevsky goes on to apply 
his analysis of cause and effect in cruelty to the case of an oppressive patriarch: "Oh, no 
doubt, today the situation is not as it used to be forty years ago.... There is no courier but 
there is poison liquor. Well, in what way is 'green liquor' comparable with the courier? 
-It certainly is in that it also m ay make m an bestial and cattle-like; it makes him cruel 
and detracts him  from serene thoughts.... A drunken man has no compassion tow ard
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he does not wholly abandon such hobbies: one of his favourite //tricks,/ is 
to feed dogs bread with pins in it - a trick he teaches the young Ilyusha 
Snegiryov, thereby contributing to that child's prem ature death [535].
But when Smerdyakov graduates to parricide, he takes out his 
resentments, rather more justly, on their only begetter. The unconscious 
suggestion that Smerdyakov is driven to parricide because he is treated 
like an animal is most tellingly made w hen Ivan calls Smerdyakov a 
"viper". "Tell all, viper!" he cries, seizing the parricide by the shoulders 
[623]. On the surface, this is no more significant than any of the other 
numerous occasions on which Smerdyakov is treated as an animal. But 
the word "viper" occurs in a phrase which Ivan deploys on no fewer than 
three separate occasions to illustrate the inevitability of the crime of 
parricide: one viper will devour another. His most forcible statement of 
this formula comes during the trial: "Who doesn't wish for his father's 
death.... A m urdered father, and they pretend to be frightened.... They 
pull faces to each other. Liars! Everyone wants his father dead. Viper 
devours viper.... If there were no parricide, they'd all get angry and go 
home in a foul temper.... Circuses! 'Bread and circuses!'" [686 - see also 
143, 611].
What the text seems to tell us at a symbolic level is that if you treat 
your servant or your son like an animal, then he 'll react like one. 
Covertly, then, the book suggests that the parricide might more justly be 
blamed on Smerdyakov's dehumanisers than on Smerdyakov himself. 
Dostoevsky the novelist holds the patriarch responsible for his own
animals; he deserts his wife and his children. A drunken husband came to his wife, whom 
he had deserted and whom, along with her children, he had failed to support for many 
months, and demanded vodka from her; then she, that galley-slave working-woman 
(please think of how, thus far, woman's labor has been rated!), who did not know how she 
could manage to feed her children, seized a knife and thrust it into him. This happened 
recently and she is going to be tried. But there is no point in my speaking about her; such 
cases may be counted by the hundreds and the thousands - one has merely to open the 
papers" [Dostoevsky, 1949:186-187].
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demise to a far greater degree than Dostoevsky the polemicist does. The 
story seems thoroughly to bear out, indeed, an interpretation of parricide 
which the conscious Dostoevsky raises only in order to mock: the 
socialist reading advanced by Rakitin. "The whole tragedy of the crime 
on trial [Rakitin] portrayed as resulting from the ingrained habits of 
serfdom and a Russia immersed in disorder and suffering from a lack of 
proper institutions" [667]. This explanation does look somewhat arbitrary 
if one supposes that the killer is the man on trial; but in reference to the 
actual killer it is not unreasonable.39 Likewise, the thesis of Rakitin's 
radical new spaper article on the crime looks valid enough w hen we 
remember that the real killer is Smerdyakov. As Mitya explains, Rakitin 
wants to write "som ething with a tendency: Tt was impossible for him 
not to kill,40 he was a victim of his env ironm ent/ and so on, he 
explained it to me. It will have a tinge of socialism, he says. So, devil 
take him, let it have a tinge, it's all the same to me" [588].
Against Dostoevsky's will, his narrative has a similar 'tendency'. 
Indeed Smerdyakov's deed can be construed as a critique not only of the 
oppression he personally suffers, but also of the general dehumanisation
39The defence attorney, likewise, advances an argum ent justifying the (hypothetical) 
crime of Mitya which is even more valid as a defence of the son who really did commit 
the parricide, Smerdyakov. "Yes, it is a horrible thing to shed a father's blood - his 
blood who begot me, his blood who loved me, his life's blood who did not spare himself 
for me, who from childhood ached with all my aches, who all his life suffered for my 
happiness and lived only in my joys, my successes! Oh, to kill such a father - who could 
even dream of it! Gentlemen of the jury, what is a father, a real father, what does this 
great word mean, what terribly great idea is contained in this appellation? We have just 
indicated something of w hat a true father is and ought to be. In the present case ... the 
father, the late Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov, in no way fitted the idea of a father that 
has just spoken to our hearts. That is a calamity. Yes, indeed, some fathers are like a 
calamity.... W hat did my client meet w hen he came home to his father.... [W]ho is 
responsible for his destiny, who is responsible that for all his good inclinations, his noble, 
sensitive heart, he received such an absurd upbringing? Did anyone teach him any sense 
at all, has he been enlightened by learning, did anyone give him at least a little love in 
his childhood? My client grew up in God's keeping - that is, like a wild beast " [724-743 - 
emphasis added].
40Or, as G arnett's translation has it, "He couldn't help murdering his father, he was 
corrupted by his environment..." [Dostoevsky, 1974: 622 - italics added]. The word 'father' 
does not occur in the Russian text: but Garnett's insertion of it does not violate the novel's 
subtext, which consistently argues that parricide is a socially-conditioned crime.
357
of the two social classes he represents: servants and sons. A parallel 
between the suffering of children and the suffering of servants is draw n 
during an almost surreal encounter between a peasant and the schoolboy 
Krasotkin. The peasant greets him:
"Well, I declare. You must be one of them schoolboys."
"One of them schoolboys."
"And what, do they whip you?"
"Not really, so-so."
"Does it hurt?"
"It can."
"E-eh, that's life!" the peasant sighed from the bottom of his 
heart. [528]
Krasotkin, as it happens, is lying to hum our the peasant. But on a 
general level, the peasant is not mistaken in supposing that children are 
as abused as he is. As we have seen, the real-life cases of child abuse 
recorded in the Diary of a Writer helped  to shape D ostoevsky 's 
ph ilosoph ical position  on the fam ily, and his novel has the 
m altreatment of children as one of its most persistent motifs. All of the 
book's key philosophical voices take the pain  of children as the 
paradigmatic form of suffering. "Woe to him who offends a child," says 
Zosima [319]. Condem ning the use of child labour in factories and 
workshops, he counsels: "Let there be none of that, monks, let there be 
no torture of children..." [315]. Ivan considers the suffering of children to 
be the limit case of unnecessary evil, and runs through some newspaper- 
derived cases of child abuse as a prelude to his Legend of the Grand 
Inquisitor. "I took children only so as to make it more obvious," he tells 
Alyosha. "I've purposely narrow ed down my theme.... [T]here are hosts
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of questions, but I've taken only the children, because here w hat I need to 
say is irrefutably clear. Listen: if everyone must suffer, in order to buy 
eternal harm ony w ith their suffering, pray tell me w hat have children 
got to do with it?" [243-244].
This is a recurrence of a paradox that I have spoken of before: the 
paradox that Ivan bases his atheism  on the same social data that 
Dostoevsky uses as a prem ise for his furious religiosity.41 In a letter 
written during the novel's composition, Dostoevsky spoke of this shared 
perspective:
the ideas expressed in that part by Ivan Karam azov are the 
synthesis of modern Russian anarchism: a denial not of God but of 
the purport of His creation. The whole of socialism began with the 
denial of the purport of historic reality and reached the point of 
complete destruction and anarchy. My hero takes a theme which, 
in my opinion, is simply irrefutable: the senselessness of the 
suffering of children, and deduces from it the absurdity of the 
entire historic reality...." [Quoted by M agarshack, 1962: 476 - 
emphasis added]
It is highly significant that Dostoevsky conflates socialism and 
anarchism . He th inks of Russian leftism  solely in term s of its 
metaphysics, its opposition to God, and therefore believes it is wholly 
destructive. By overlooking the left's positive com m itm ent to the 
righting of social wrongs, Dostoevsky skates around the argum ent that 
the suffering of children might be ameliorated by means of social reform. 
Instead, he writes as if there were only two possible responses to the
^Alyosha's response to Ivan's Inquisitor story places this paradox in a nutshell: "Your 
poem praises Jesus, it doesn't revile him ... as you meant it to" [260].
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suffering of children: the purely nihilistic one, as adopted by Ivan, which 
says that the suffering of children is senseless, and therefore everything is 
senseless; and his own, which agrees that the suffering of children is 
indeed senseless when viewed in secular terms, but insists that it can be 
made sense of - rationalised, legitimated - by reference to the existence of 
a higher power.
This somewhat obscene glorification of oppression is expressed 
most vividly by Mitya, the falsely accused parricide who has nightmares 
in which the problem of unjust suffering is personified by a starving, 
freezing, crying, poverty-stricken  child - the 'w ee one ', as the 
Pevear/Volokhonsky translation has it. "It is for the 'wee one' that I will 
go [to the mines]," says Mitya, deciding to accept condem nation for the 
crime he hasn 't committed. "Because everyone is guilty for everyone 
else. For all the 'w ee ones', because there are little children and big 
children. All people are 'wee ones'. And I'll go for all of them, because 
there must be someone who will go for all of them.... Oh, yes, we'll be in 
chains, and there will be no freedom, but then, in our great grief, we will 
arise once more into joy, w ithout which it's not possible for m an to live, 
or for God to be, for God gives joy..." [591-592].
This injunction to sing in one's chains, to embrace the joys of 
incarceration, is to say the least a conservative response to social 
injustice. But the case of Mitya offers an em barrassingly succinct 
reminder that Dostoevsky, when it comes to the crunch, is not merely 
complacent about oppression on earth - he is actually in favour of it, 
because it brings the sufferer closer to God. "I accept the torm ent of 
accusation and of my disgrace before all," says Mitya, "I want to suffer and 
be purified by suffering" [509]. Dostoevsky's faith is firmly predicated on 
pain, poverty, slavery. In Mitya's words: "It's impossible for a convict to
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be w ithout God, even more impossible than for a non-convict" [592 - 
emphasis added].
Dostoevsky thinks of the socialist position - or at any rate 
represents it - as consisting of his own bleak views on the inevitability of 
suffering and injustice, m inus the consoling belief in God. The 
argument he presents us with, then, does not really pit the actual merits 
of socialism against those of Christianity. It is more of a wrestle between 
the doubter in Dostoevsky and the believer - w ith the odds heavily 
weighted in the latter's favour.42 This is why the politics of the Grand 
Inquisitor, which supposedly constitute the apotheosis of evil, look on 
examination so strikingly similar to Dostoevsky's own. The Inquisitor, 
too, takes the suffering of children as emblematic of the general hum an 
condition; and he too argues, only m arginally more b lun tly  than 
Dostoevsky does, that such oppression is to be encouraged. In a society 
made up of a few masters and a lot of slaves, at least one knows where 
one stands. The oppressed should rejoice in their lack of freedom, says 
the Inquisitor. "Oh, we shall finally convince them not to be proud, for 
you [i.e. Christ] raised them up and thereby taught them pride; we shall 
prove to them that they are feeble, that they are only pitiful children, but 
that a child's happiness is sweeter than any other" [259].
The Inquisitor, of course, is nominally condem ning a different 
type of freedom from that which frightens Dostoevsky. It is the freedom 
promised by Christ that the Inquisitor detests, whereas Dostoevsky fears 
the freedom  prom ised by various new-fangled European isms. But 
otherwise it could quite easily be Dostoevsky, rather than the Inquisitor, 
who declares: "mankind ... are slaves, though they were created rebels....
42In a letter written shortly after his release from prison, Dostoevksy had this to say 
about his faith. "I will tell you regarding myself that I am a child of the age, a child of 
nonbelief and doubt up till now and even (I know it) until my coffin closes. What terrible 
torments this thirst to believe has cost me and still costs me, becoming stronger in my soul, 
the more there is in me of contrary reasonings" [Pevear, 1990: xiii].
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They are little children, who rebel in class and drive out the teacher.... 
But finally the foolish children will understand that although they are 
rebels, they are feeble rebels, who cannot endure their own rebellion" 
[256],
The Inquisitor's contempt for the feeble rebellion of the 
underclasses reminds one of Dostoevsky's contempt for the aspirations of 
the rebellious slave Smerdyakov, whose foolish uprising is proved futile 
by his subsequent suicide. Both Dostoevsky and the Inquisitor want us to 
embrace lack of freedom, so that we might enjoy the subordinate but 
snug status of a child. For Dostoevsky, the oppressed ought to stop their 
whining and look instead to God; for the Inquisitor, salvation lies with a 
group of secular tyrants whom the people will look upon as gods:
forever incapable of being free, because they are feeble, 
depraved, nonentities and rebels.... [The weak] are depraved 
and rebels, but in the end it is they who will become obedient.
They will marvel at us, and look upon us as gods, because we, 
standing at their head, have agreed to suffer freedom and to rule 
over them - so terrible will it become for them in the end to be 
free! ... There is no more ceaseless or tormenting care for man, as 
long as he remains free, than to find someone to bow down to as 
soon as possible. [253-254]
If one were to update the Inquisitor's views on freedom to the 
political scene of Dostoevsky's day, one would get something very like 
Nietzsche's suggestion in Beyond Good and Evil that "the democratic 
movement in Europe" will lead to
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a levelling and mediocritizing of man ... the total impression 
produced by such future Europeans will probably be that of 
multifarious, garrulous, weak-willed and highly employable 
workers who need a master, a commander, as they need their 
daily bread; while, therefore, the democratization of Europe will 
lead to the production of a type prepared for slavery in the 
subtlest sense.... What I mean to say is that the democratization of 
Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the 
breeding of tyrants.... " [Nietzsche, 1990: 172-173].
D ostoevsky advances an analogous p roposition  abou t the 
authority of God: remove Him from the world, and look w hat happens: 
you end up needing Him back all the more urgently. But a Nietzschean 
social position - that is to say, an appreciation of the virtues of tyranny on 
earth - is contained in Dostoevsky's religious stance. So Freud is not 
w rong w hen he perceives a connection betw een  D ostoevsky 's 
"veneration both for the Tsar and for the God of the Christians" [Freud, 
1950f: 223]. Nor can one argue with Freud's contention that "Dostoevsky 
threw away the chance of becoming a teacher and liberator of hum anity 
and made himself one with their gaolers" [223]: this point looks entirely 
valid w hen one compares the revolutionary artistic insights of The 
Brothers Karamazov w ith its myopic reactionary politics. But when 
Freud suggests that these politics were a mere echo of the novelist's 
attitude to his father, one is obliged to part company from him. He says: 
"If on the whole he did not achieve freedom and became a reactionary, 
that was because the filial guilt, which is present in hum an beings 
generally and on which religious feeling is built, had attained in him a 
super-individual intensity..." [234].
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According to Freud, Dostoevsky's politics had nothing to do with 
the fact that he was Russian, nor with the fact that he lived in an age of 
declining faith and of im pending revolution. These are problem atic 
claims, but let us leave them aside and examine another curious aspect of 
Freud's analysis: his assumption that Dostoevsky's politics entailed a lack 
of freedom for himself, and might therefore be construed as a masochistic 
manifestation of his guilt. The authorial politics I have extracted from 
The Brothers Karamazov do not match this description. D ostoevsky's 
theory about the joy of suffering tended to focus on the suffering of 
classes to which he did not belong: he was not a child, not a wife, not a 
servant, and his celebration of the subservience of these classes looks 
decidedly more sadistic than masochistic. Like most reactionaries, 
Dostoevsky occupied a position comfortably close to the top of the heap.
On the other hand, there was one underclass to which Dostoevsky 
had once belonged: that of political prisoner. Freud says: "Dostoevsky's 
condem nation as a political prisoner was unjust and he m ust have 
known it, but he accepted the undeserved punishm ent at the hands of 
the Little Father, the Tsar, as a substitute for the punishm ent he deserved 
for his sin against his real father" [233]. It is this consideration alone 
which makes it possible to impute masochistic motives to Dostoevsky's 
defence of the political status quo. And if we return to the novel, we see 
that the fact of Dostoevsky's unjust im prisonm ent is congenial to the 
Freudian project in another way. It provides ammunition for a Freudian 
reading of Mitya, the falsely accused parricide who elects to embrace his 
punishment. Having found that the main protagonists of the parricide - 
Fyodor, its victim; Smerdyakov, its perpetrator; and Ivan, its ideological 
puppet-m aster - stubbornly refuse to act in accordance w ith Freudian 
doctrine, we m ust now turn  to the character of Dmitri, and see w hether 
he can come to the rescue of the theory of the Oedipus complex.
364
Dmitri and the Financial Motive
The fact about Dmitri which most vigorously encourages the Freudian 
reading of him is this: he and his father have a sexual rivalry. Freud does 
not need to apply any analysis to extract this fact: it is there, in black and 
white. The useful question to ask is how important this sexual rivalry is. 
Is it of central significance to their antagonism , or is it a m erely 
peripheral component of a struggle whose essence lies elsewhere? Such 
questions were not likely to occur to Freud - why would he w ant to 
subject a sexual rivalry between a father and son to any further analysis, 
given his belief that sex was the fundamental issue behind all father-son 
conflict? But in the pages that follow, I will argue that the sexual rivalry 
between Mitya and his father is indeed susceptible to further analysis, 
which will reveal it to be a mere token of a deeper struggle. In other 
words, their sexual struggle can be shown to have that merely symbolic 
status that Freud ascribed to every father-son dispute that was not sexual. 
The matter at the root of their struggle, I will argue, is money.
"First of all," the narrator tells us very early in the novel, "this 
Dmitri Fyodorovich was the only one of Fyodor Pavlovich's three sons 
who grew up in the conviction that he, at any rate, had some property 
and w ould be independent when he came of age" [11]. Dmitri will be 
rudely disabused of this conviction, of course. Does his subsequent 
sexual rivalry with his father have some connection with his fiduciary 
grievance? Michael Holquist effectively concedes this poin t when, 
during his Freudian reading of the novel, he says: "Dmitry's case fits the
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Freudian paradigm most neatly, as his father's power is dram atized in the 
property  and the w om an he denies the son" [Holquist, 1977: 180]. 
Holquist is evidently trying to say something about the m erits of the 
psychoanalytical reading, but he inadvertently points to its poverty. If the 
neatest fit it can find is a son whose sexual grudge against his father is 
irretrievably w rapped up in a w ider grudge about property, then the 
Freudian paradigm would seem to be in trouble in this novel. Even the 
brother who comes closest to fulfilling Freudian expectations still has the 
effect of problematising them, and exposing their crude reductivism. It 
follows that the other brothers embarrass the Freudian paradigm  still 
further. In the ultra-political atm osphere of The Brothers Karamazov, 
Freud's practice of treating sexuality as something pure, detachable from 
culture, seems especially indefensible. Dostoevsky shows us no romance 
that is uncontam inated by problem s of power or money. M itya, 
condemning Rakitin's desire for the rich widow Khokhlakov, says that 
"he had such nasty, sensual drool on his lips - drooling not over 
Khokhlakov, but over the hundred and fifty thousand [roubles]" [590]. 
As we shall see, this potent image of a sensual lust driven by latent 
financial motives could be applied to nearly every other case of desire in 
the novel - including, most critically, the lust of the father and of the son 
for the same woman.
Sex is not the only mode of social interaction which the novel 
seems to consider to be fundam entally about money. It is w orth  
repeating the point that when Smerdyakov commits parricide, he also 
robs his victim of three thousand roubles, which he then tries to give 
away to Ivan in the following scene:
"Take the money with you, sir, take it away," Smerdyakov
sighed.
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"Of course I shall take it away! But why are you giving it back to 
me, if you killed because of it?" Ivan looked at him in great 
surprise.
"I've got no use at all for it, sir," Smerdyakov said in a 
trembling voice, waving his hand. "There was such a former 
thought, sir, that I could begin a life on such money in Moscow, 
or even more so abroad, I did have such a dream, sir, and even 
more so as 'everything is perm itted/" [623]
One is inclined to suspect that robbery was not the fundam ental 
m otive of his crime, given that Smerdyakov yields the m oney so 
casually, and given that he also claims to have murdered in the service of 
Ivan's seductive ideology. But as I have already pointed out, w hen one 
examines Smerdyakov's apparently conflicting explanations of his crime 
it becomes possible to organise them into a coherent story, to which the 
problem  of his poverty is in fact central. Earlier in the novel, 
Smerdyakov complains that Ivan "m ade reference to me that I'm  a 
stinking lackey. He considers me as maybe rebelling, but he's mistaken, 
miss. If I had just so much in my pocket, I'd have left long ago" [225]. So 
w an t of money keeps Sm erdyakov in the same undesirable place, 
geographically and socially. Poverty confounds his ambitions, forcing 
them  to fester. A person in such a position has more right than Ivan to 
em brace anti-social ideologies, be they progressive or dow nrigh t 
nihilistic. So Smerdyakov is not necessarily lying when he claims that 
his crime was motivated both by his poverty and by the doctrine that 
"everything is perm itted." Interestingly, Dostoevsky's earlier killer 
Raskolnikov was also m otivated by a blend of poverty and ideology. 
Dostoevsky outlined the plot of Crime and Punishment in a letter of 1865 
thus: "A young man, an expelled university student, petit bourgeois in
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origin, is living in extrem e poverty. Through the shallow ness and 
instability of his thought he has surrendered himself to certain strange 
and half-baked ideas which are in the air, and has decided to extricate 
himself at a stroke from his terrible position" [quoted by Peace, 1971: 25]. 
Notice, however, that in Dostoevsky's m ind Raskolnikov surrenders 
him self to these theories through the shallowness of his thought: 
Dostoevsky does not entertain the possibility that the extremely poor 
have a deep reason to be interested in these theories. That would raise 
the frightening possibility that such notions had a certain validity. Hence 
we have the surreal scene in which Smerdyakov, having successfully 
redressed his poverty by the crime of parricide, is m ade to abjectly 
surrender the fruits of his crime. Dostoevsky wants to prove that the 
problems of the poor cannot be solved by revolutionary violence.
There is a further point about the financial profit that Smerdyakov 
(temporarily) derives from the parricide. By robbing his dead father, the 
illegitimate son makes an illegitimate financial gain. This is a perverse 
parody of the process of patrilineal inheritance, by which the legitimate 
sons will enjoy a legitimate financial gain from their father's demise.43 
Every son, therefore, has a motive for parricide: a point m ade with 
characteristic bluntness by Smerdyakov, in conversation with Ivan:
"As for killing - you, personally, could never have done it, sir, 
and you didn 't w ant to do it either; but as for wanting someone 
else to kill - that you did want."
" ... But why should I want it, why in hell should I have wanted 
it?"
43In keeping with his general desire to be legitimate, Smerdyakov hopes to share in that 
legitimate gain, as he tells Ivan: "the inheritance, when you got it, you m ight even 
rew ard me some time later ... because, after all, you 'd  have had the pleasure of getting 
that inheritance through me, otherwise, what w ith m arrying Agrafena Alexandrovna, 
all you'd get is a fig ..." [627].
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"What do you mean, why in hell, sir? What about the 
inheritance, sir?" Smerdyakov picked up venomously and even 
somehow vindictively. "After your parent, you, each of you 
three good brothers, would then get nearly forty thousand, and 
maybe even more, sir, but if Fyodor Pavlovich was to marry that 
same lady, Agrafena Alexandrovna, she would surely transfer all 
the capital to herself, right after the wedding, because she's not at 
all stupid, sir, so that your parent wouldn't even leave you two 
roubles, for all three of you good brothers. And was marriage so 
far off, sir? Only a hair's breath, sir..." [615]
Smerdyakov here confirms a suggestion I advanced earlier, 
namely the suggestion that Dmitri's "sexual" rivalry with his father over 
Agrafena Alexandrovna - also known as Grushenka - is but one battle in 
a war whose essence is financial. This is a point to which we shall return. 
What we must appreciate at the moment is the related point that the text 
is consistent with Freudian theory only insofar as it discovers the will to 
parricide even among the sons who do not commit the crime. It diverges 
crucially from psychoanalysis by finding money, not sexuality, at the root 
of that murderous will.
A Freudian reading is satisfied with the suggestion that Ivan is 
repulsed by Smerdyakov because he sees in him a grotesque reflection of 
his own desire to kill his father. But again the text goes further than 
psychoanalysis would like it to: it demonstrates that Ivan recognises the 
financial nature of that desire. When Smerdyakov hands him the 
proceeds of the crime, Ivan's response is extremely suggestive: "Ivan 
stepped to the table, took the bundle, and began to unwrap it, but 
suddenly jerked back as if he had touched some loathsome, horrible 
viper.... Under the wrapping were found three packets of iridescent
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hundred-rouble bills'7 [624]. The word "viper" takes us back, of course, to 
Ivan's contemptuous formula about parricide - "viper will devour viper" 
- in which the term "viper" signifies the hideous baseness of both the 
m urderer and his victim. Now, crucially, m oney is sym bolically 
identified as the third key participant in the crime, a fundamental part of 
the vile materialism of which parricide was the ultimate expression.
While the nexus between parricide and money seems to put Ivan 
psychologically closer to the crime, it undoubtedly takes Dostoevsky 
further away from it. To Dostoevsky, the presence of money tended to 
mean the absence of God. One can see this most clearly when he has 
Alyosha condemn the Grand Inquisitor and his fellow tyrants on the 
grounds that their ideal is "Simply the lust for power, for filthy earthly 
lucre ,44 enslavem ent ... a sort of future serfdom w ith them  as the 
landowners ... that's all they have" [260 - emphasis added]. As we have 
already seen, the politics of the G rand Inquisitor do not differ 
substantially from Dostoevsky's own, except in the sense that the former 
are strictly earth-bound and the latter assume the existence of God. But to 
Dostoevsky, of course, this difference was all: it is the very reason why
^Cf. Titus 1:7. "For a bishop must be blameless, as the steward of God; not selfwilled, not 
soon angry, not given to wine, no striker, not given to filthy lucre." The phrase "filthy 
lucre" also points to an issue which must be mentioned while we are on the subject of cash - 
namely Freud's equation of money with faeces. (Norman O. Brown has 'Filthy Lucre' as 
the title of the chapter in which he deals with this sub-theme of psychoanalysis in his 
book Life Against Death.) At this stage of my argument, a Freudian counterargument of 
the following kind becomes possible: "Perhaps the novel is about money: but money is only 
faeces anyway, and so in the end the novel can be reclaimed by Freud." But I would be 
more inclined to welcome this objection than to combat it. For it would amount to an 
concession that Freud's principal argument - the argument that the parricide is motivated 
by repressed sexuality - has been effectively bettered by the argument that the parricide 
is motivated by an unGodly materialism of which money is the chief manifestation. 
Psychoanalysis can reclaim the book only by resorting to a relatively obscure subthesis. 
This tells us far less about the novel than it tells us about Freudian theory, and its infinite 
resilience in the face of any argument. I have never disputed the fact that the novel can 
be read along Freudian lines. Anything can be read along Freudian lines. The question is 
whether one should read it along those lines, whether any genuine enlightenment can be 
gained by doing so. And on this question, Freud's unflagging ability to explain everything 
- also known as his evasion of the test of falsification - can hardly be said to count entirely 
in his favour.
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the Inquisitor m ust be judged abhorrent. It seems significant that lucre 
should be one of the key words Alyosha uses to identify, and condemn, 
the Inquisitor's gross materialism.
Another salient feature of A lyosha's verdict is its equation of 
money with power. Smerdyakov, from the perspective of somebody who 
lacks both, also knows these things to be synonymous. He shrew dly 
guesses that Ivan will not reveal what he knows to the court because
"You're too intelligent, sir. You love money, that I know, sir, you 
also love respect, because you're very proud, you love w om en's 
charm s exceedingly, and most of all you love living in peaceful 
prosperity, without bowing to anyone.... Y ou're like Fyodor 
Pavlovich most of all, it's you of all his children who came out 
resembling him most, having the same soul as him, sir." [632 - 
emphasis added]
So prosperity is the essence of dignity, of pride, of living life 
without having to bow down. Smerdyakov has learned this principle the 
hard way, by living with lack of money and a consequent lack of dignity. 
Fyodor Pavlovich, on the other hand, has enjoyed the benefits of it: he 
has money and therefore rank, even though morally he is worthless. But 
the materialist values he lives by end up killing him. He dies because he 
trusts the parricide, Smerdyakov, and he trusts him because of money. 
"Sm erdyakov, ages ago, had found [some] m oney his m aster had  
dropped, and instead of keeping it had brought it to his master, who 'gave 
him a gold piece' as a reward, and thereafter began trusting him in all 
things" [664]. Ever the m aterialist, Fyodor Pavlovich thinks of this 
financial sacrifice as the ultimate sign of loyalty. "[A] Balaam's ass like 
him thinks and thinks, and the devil knows what he's going to think up
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for him self/7 he says of Smerdyakov. 7/I for one know that he can't stand 
me, or anybody else.... Yet he doesn't steal, that's the thing..." [132].
This is all profoundly ironic: what Smerdyakov is in the process of 
thinking up for him self is a crime which will roundly punish  the 
materialist Fyodor for using money as the ultimate measure of loyalty. 
Fyodor knows that the lackey "can 't stand him", bu t owing to his 
perverse conviction that Smerdyakov's financial honesty is "the thing", 
he trusts him  to an absurd and fatal extent. He transfers his three 
thousand roubles to a new hiding place suggested by the lackey, and 
teaches him a secret pattern of knocks designed to allow Grushenka entry 
to his hom e w hile denying it to the violent Dmitri. Sm erdyakov 
promptly divulges the code to the latter, in the hope that he will use it to 
gain entry and slaughter his father, leaving Smerdyakov free to make off 
with the cash. But w hen that plot fails, Smerdyakov simply uses the 
knocks himself, in full view of the master.
I went up to the master's window again and said: 'She's here, she's 
come, Agrafena Alexandrovna is here, she wants to get in.' He got 
all startled , just like a baby.... He looked at me through the 
window, believing it and not believing it, but he was afraid to open 
the door - it's me he's afraid of, I thought. And here's a funny 
thing: I suddenly  decided to knock those same signals on the 
window, right in front of his eyes, meaning Grushenka was there: 
he d id n 't seem to believe words, but as soon as I knocked the 
signals, he ran at once to open the door. He opened it. [628]
This bizarre scene shows us both the master's intense fear of his lackey - a 
fear which proves well-grounded - and the absurdly irrational nature of 
his faith in him. Both of these emotions have financial roots.
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In order to see the ideal attitude to money, we have to look to 
Alyosha. Even as a young child, "he seemed not to know the value of 
money at all - not, of course, in the literal sense. When he was given 
pocket money, which he himself never asked for, he either did not know 
what to do with it for weeks on end, or was so terribly careless of it that it 
disappeared in a moment" [21]. At the opposite pole stands his father, 
who declares: "with money one only needs to want, Alexei Fyodorovich, 
sir, and one gets everything" [173].45 Fyodor's grotesque materialism is 
allowed to pollute his family ties: his relations with his sons are acutely, 
almost essentially, financial, and his oppression of them has m onetary 
denial at its core. This is most obvious in the case of Dmitri. All the 
sorry events in Dostoevsky's tale proceed from Dmitri's belief that his 
father has financially cheated him. "Listen," declares Dmitri early in the 
novel:
"legally he owes me nothing. I've already gotten everything out of 
him, everything, I know that. But morally he owes me something, 
doesn 't he? He started w ith my m other's twenty-eight thousand 
and m ade a hundred thousand out of it. Let him give me only 
three of those twenty-eight thousands, only three, and bring up my 
life from the Pit.... And I'll stop at those three thousands, I give you 
my solid w ord on it, and he'll never hear of me again. For the last 
time I give him a chance to be my father." [120 - emphasis added]
To be a father means to give money to one's children.46 One can 
scarcely blame Dmitri for holding this narrow, earth-bound conception of
45The Godlessness of this philosophy is underlined when Fyodor says, in the same speech, 
"I don't want your paradise, Alexei Fyodorovich, let it be known to you; it's even unfitting 
for a decent man to go to your paradise, if there really is such a place" [1731 
46It is no doubt significant that Dostoevsky's last letter to his father was a request for 
money. Dostoevsky received the sum requested, together with a letter outlining his
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fatherly responsibility, for he has inherited it from his reprehensible 
father. When Ivan arrives in town, the narrator notes that
It was strange that so learned, so proud, and seemingly so prudent 
a young man should suddenly appear in such a scandalous house 
before such a father, who had ignored him all his life, who did 
not know or remember him, and who, though if his son had 
asked, he would certainly not have given any money for anything 
in the world or under any circumstances, nonetheless was afraid 
all his life that his sons Ivan and Alexei, too, would one day come 
and ask for money. [17]
One would think that the question of money was irrelevant next 
to the terrible facts that the father has ignored his son all his life and 
doesn 't even remember him. But instead, Fyodor's financial greed is 
nam ed as the culminating term of his unworthiness, as though it were 
taken for granted that giving loans is the central part of a father's duty. 
Money is again allocated a surreal pre-eminence when Fyodor disowns 
his second son thus: "I refuse to acknowledge Ivan. Where did he come 
from? He's not our kind at all. Why should I leave him anything? I 
w on 't even leave a will, let that be known to you" [175]. So central is 
money to Karamazovian ethics that Dmitri is for a long time happier to 
be thought guilty of the blasphemy of parricide than to confess to his 
dishonourable theft of Katerina Ivanovna's fifteen-hundred roubles.
Dostoevsky wants to use the Karamazovs to condemn the lack of 
Christian love in the m odern family. His way of showing us the absence 
of the spiritual is to show us the overwhelming presence of the material:
father's impending financial ruin. This "despairing communication to his son was, 
literally, his last testam ent," explains Joseph Frank, "and Dostoevsky m ust have 
received it almost simultaneously with the news of his father's death" [Frank, 1976: 85].
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sex, violence, goitres, blood - and above all money.47 An ideal relation 
betw een father and son seems to be impossible so long as m oney is 
around to corrupt it. It is im portant to note that this rule does not only 
apply to the Karam azovs, in w hich the father scandalously flouts 
capitalistic convention. It also applies to the briefly-glimpsed Samsonov 
family, whose patriarch - a grotesque old m erchant, w idow er and 
"patron" of Grushenka - fulfils his obligations as a capitalist to the letter. 
"[W]ho else is a capitalist in this little town if not you ..." Mitya asks him 
[371]. When he dies, Samsonov wills everything to his sons, as a proper 
capitalist must. He is a model capitalist in life, too: but hardly a model 
father. The family is as devoid of love as the Karamazovs. Samsonov is 
"a tyrant over his two grown sons ... wTiom he had kept about him all his 
life on the level of servants" [344 - 345]. (Samsonov has a daughter, too, 
but his keeping her on the level of a servant does not, apparently, 
w arrant a special mention. Nor, naturally, does his daughter feature in 
his will. In respect of matters of power and money, the daughter is as far 
out of the picture as her dead mother. The intergenerational struggle is 
essentially a struggle between fathers and sons.)
The patriarchal structure of the Samsonov family is reified by the 
layout of their house:
On the ground floor lived Samsonov's two married sons with 
their families, his elderly sister, and one unm arried daughter ...
47Schopenhauer said that m oney is hum an happiness in the abstract, bu t for the 
Karamazovs and their kind money is animal debauchery in the abstract. When Dmitri is 
entrusted with the task of taking Katerina Ivanovna's money to Moscow, he swiftly 
converts the cash into base sensual pleasure. "[I]n my beggar's pocket, three thousand 
roubles turned up.... I got some gypsies to join us, gypsy women, champagne, got all the 
peasants drunk on champagne, all the village women and girls, thousands were flying 
around. In three days I was broke, but a hero" [118]. Ashamed afterwards, he begs 
Alyosha to transm it his apologies to Katerina. "You could tell her: 'H e 's  a base 
sensualist, a mean creature with irrepressible passions. He did not send your money that 
time, he spent it, because he couldn't help himself, like an anim al'" [119].
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Both his children and his clerks were cramped in their quarters, 
but the old man occupied the upper floor by himself and would 
not even share it with his daughter, who looked after him....
The 'upstairs ' consisted of a number of large formal rooms, 
furnished in the merchant style of old, with long, dull rows of 
clumsy mahogany armchairs and sidechairs along the walls, with 
crystal chandeliers in dust covers, and sullen mirrors between the 
windows. All these rooms stood completely empty and 
uninhabited, because the sick old man huddled himself in one 
little room, his remote and tiny bedroom.... Because of his 
swollen legs, the old man was almost entirely unable to walk, and 
only rarely got up from his leather chair.... [368-369]
Despite old Sam sonov's handicap, his strapping sons "trembl[e] before 
their father" [369] - vividly underscoring the point that his power has 
nothing rem otely to do with physical authority . His hegem ony is 
exclusively financial. And it m ust be kept in m ind that this grotesque 
situation is not an anomaly: the Samsonovs adhere strictly to the rules of 
patriarchy and capitalism.
Samsonov is im portant in another respect: in his capacity as the 
patron of Grushenka. Although Grushenka receives nothing in his will, 
Sam sonov
helped Grushenka a great deal with advice on how to manage 
'her own m oney' and brought 'business' her way. When Fyodor 
Pavlovich Karamazov, who originally was connected with 
Grushenka with regard to some chance 'gescheft/  ended quite 
unexpectedly to himself by falling head over heels in love with 
her and nearly losing his reason, old Samsonov, who by then
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already had one foot in the grave, chuckled greatly. It is 
remarkable that Grushenka, throughout their acquaintance, was 
fully and even, as it were, cordially frank with her old man, and 
apparently with no one else in the whole world. More recently, 
when Dmitri Fyodorovich had also appeared suddenly with his 
love, the old man had stopped chuckling. On the contrary, one 
day he seriously and sternly advised Grushenka: 'If you must 
choose between the two of them, father and son, choose the old 
man, only in such a way, however, that the old scoundrel is 
certain to marry you, and makes over at least some of his money 
in advance...' ... I will also note in passing [adds the narrator] that 
although many in our town knew about the absurd and ugly 
rivalry at that time between the Karamazovs, father and son, the 
object of which was Grushenka, few then understood the true 
meaning of her relations with the two of them, the old man and 
the son. [345 - emphasis added]
So to discover the true meaning of Grushenka's relations with the 
father and the son, one has to look beyond the sexual.48 One then finds 
that the real object of desire, and of contention, is money. Dostoevsky's 
narra tor therefore issues a pre-em ptive strike against the Freudian 
reading, and indeed against the whole notion of the Oedipus complex. 
Financial conditions, he warns us, were capable of producing tensions 
which could look a lot like sexual ones. It is surely significant that both 
of Fyodor Karamazov's marriages have monetary origins: his first wife
48M agarshack's translation (and Garnett's translation agrees with it) makes it clear that 
this point about economic determinacy is being made specifically about Grushenka's 
feelings for the men: "Let me also observe in passing that though many people in our town 
were aware of the absurd and monstrous rivalry of the Karamazovs, father and son, the 
object of which was Grushenka, hardly anyone understood what was really behind her 
attitude to them" [Dostoevsky: 1982 - emphasis added]. But as I am arguing, money lurks 
just as decisively behind their attitude to her.
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he marries for her dowry; his second he meets in a province "where he 
happened to have gone for a bit of contracting business in the company of 
some little Jew" [12].
The economic origins of Mitya's infatuation with Grushenka are 
also spelled out:
"First of all I went to give her a beating. I had heard, and now 
know for certain, that this Grushenka had gotten from this 
captain, father's agent, a promissory note in my name, so that she 
could demand payment and that would stop me and shut me up. 
They wanted to frighten me. So I set out to give Grushenka a 
beating. I'd seen her before around town. Nothing striking. I 
knew about the old merchant, who on top of everything else is 
lying sick now, paralyzed, but still will leave her a nice sum. I 
also knew that she likes making money, that she does make it, 
loans it out at wicked rates of interest, a sly fox, a rogue, 
merciless. I went to give her a beating, and stayed." [118]
Present from the start, money plays a critical role in Dmitri's continuing 
affair with Grushenka:
if [Grushenka] should say to him: 'I'm yours, take me away,' how 
was he to take her away? Where would he get the means, the 
money to do it? Just at that time he had exhausted all his income 
from Fyodor Pavlovich's handouts, which until then had 
continued nonstop for so many years. Of course Grushenka had 
money, but on this point Mitya suddenly turned out to be terribly 
proud: he wanted to take her away himself, to start the new life 
with her on his own money, not on hers; he could not even
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imagine himself taking money from her and suffered at the 
thought to the point of painful revulsion.... All of this might 
well have proceeded indirectly and unwittingly, as it were, from 
the secret suffering of his conscience over Katerina Ivanovna's 
money, which he had thievishly appropriated: 'I am a scoundrel 
before one woman, and I'll prove at once to be a scoundrel before 
the other/ he thought then, as he himself confessed later, 'and 
Grushenka, if she finds out, will not want such a scoundrel.' And 
so, where to find the means, where to find this fatal money? 
Otherwise all was lost, and nothing would happen, 'for the sole 
reason that there wasn't enough money - oh, shame!'
To anticipate: the thing was that he perhaps knew where to get 
the money, he perhaps knew where it lay. [366]
The fatal money plays the role that Freud thinks is played by sexuality: it 
underlies social relations, governs emotions like shame and love, and 
provokes the crime of parricide.
If there is any remaining doubt that it is money, rather than 
sexuality, that is the ultimate cause of the rivalry between Fyodor and 
Dmitri, surely it is dispelled when Fyodor toys with the notion of bribing 
Dmitri for Grushenka's hand - and then rejects it, on the grounds that he 
loves the money more than the woman!
"Some foolishness almost came into my head yesterday, when I 
told you to come today: I wanted to find out through you about 
Mitka - what if I counted him out a thousand, or maybe two, right 
now: would he agree, beggar and scoundrel that he is, to clear out 
altogether, for about five years, or better thirty-five, without 
Grushka, and give her up completely, eh, what?"
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"I ... I'll ask h im /' Alyosha murmured. "If it were all three 
thousand, then maybe he ..."
"Lies! There's no need to ask him now, no need at all! ... I've 
changed my mind ... I'll give him nothing, not a jot, I need my 
dear money myself." [175]
So much for the notion that financial relations are a mere shadow  of 
sexual ones.
"Papa, Dear Papa": Captain Snegiryov and Ilyusha
As a coda to this discussion of money in the novel, I want to consider a 
family which, like the Samsonovs, throws much light on the relations of 
the Karamazovs, but does so from another angle. 1 refer to the Snegiryov 
family, in which our attention is once again drawn almost exclusively to 
the males: the abject Captain Snegiryov and his dying - and ultimately 
dead - son, Ilyusha.
Vladim ir Nabokov, in his Lectures on Russian Literature, asserts 
that the Ilyusha subplot stands "quite independently, sticking quite 
obviously out of the general scheme of the book" [Nabokov, 1982: 135]. I 
want to argue that the opposite is the case, and that the general scheme of 
the book (if we u n d ers tan d  that phrase to refer to the book 's 
philosophical message, its ideology - a usage that Nabokov w ould no 
doubt have found objectionable) can be found in concentrated form in 
the relationship between Ilyusha and his father.
The significance of the Ilyusha character is hinted at after his death: 
"strangely, there was almost no smell from the corpse" [Dostoevsky, 1992:
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769]. This strange circumstance seems to be connected to an even 
stranger one which occurs earlier in the novel: the great stench produced 
by the corpse of Zosima. Considered in isolation, Zosima's malodorous 
decomposition is something of a mystery: why would Dostoevsky want 
to malign, symbolically, a character whose philosophy he so strongly 
agrees with? When one considers Zosim a's stench in relation to 
Ilyusha's odourless decay, though, one can construct a possible meaning. 
Even the ideal father - Zosima - stinks, suggesting that at some deep level 
Dostoevsky felt the institution of fatherhood to be inherently corrupt; 
whereas the ideal, loving son is pure, saintly, and consequently free of 
the reek of decay.49 The purity of young Ilyusha, and his love of his 
father despite the father's buffoonery, comes as an example to us all, as 
Alyosha stresses in the novel's very last speech: "Gentlemen, my dear 
gentlemen, let us all be as generous and brave as Ilyusheska..." [775].
One can cast some further light on the Ilyusha subplot by thinking 
of the personal tragedy suffered by Dostoevsky as he was embarking on 
the novel. In 1878, his three-year-old son Alyosha died of a massive 
epileptic fit. "I've never been so sad," wrote Dostoevsky to his brother. 
"What depressed him particularly," wrote Dostoevsky's wife, "was the 
fact that the child died of epilepsy, an illness he had inherited from his 
father" [both quoted by Magarshack, 1962: 473]. This evidence entitles us 
to believe that Dostoevsky was suffering from a irrational sense of guilt 
when he wrote his novel.50 But that guilt related to the death of his son, 
not his father.
If we search the novel for manifestations of this authorial guilt, we 
will probably think of the fact that the wicked father is named Fyodor,
49Of course the novel's major portrait of an ideal son is Alyosha - but Dostoevsky could 
hardly kill him off, for he was supposed to be the hero of the novel's sequel.
50"The earliest manuscript notes for The Brothers Karamazov date from mid-April 
1878.... The death of Dostoevsky's son Liosha, attributed to epilepsy, occurred on May 16, 
1878" [Rice, 1985: 253].
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and his saintly son Alyosha.51 Or we might think of Grigory, mortified 
by horror and shame over the brief life of his six-fingered baby son. But 
perhaps the most intense figuring of Dostoevsky's guilt-ridden grief 
comes in the shape of the shattered Snegiryov, weeping "If I forget thee, 
O Jerusalem ..." as his son slowly dies [562].
The relationship between Snegiryov and his son is at once the 
novel's most ideal and its most corrupted father-son relation. This 
apparent paradox is in fact a concise statement of the book's principal 
argument, which is that the family is a holy institution in the process of 
being ripped apart by materialist forces. When Dostoevsky focuses on the 
Karamazovs, one can almost forget the first half of that proposition - for 
Alyosha is the sole member of that clan who embodies the eternal holy 
ideal. The rest of them stand entirely for dissolution. In the Snegiryov 
family, both halves of the argument are intensely present: the father-son 
bond is holy and strong, but under unholy attack from foul contemporary 
forces.
Snegiryov, of course, is a buffoon. But Dostoevsky meticulously 
shows how he has become a buffoon - through social deprivation. 
Indeed Alyosha himself, as we have seen (on page 353 above), excuses 
Snegiryov's buffoonery on the grounds that he has been "beaten down". 
That beating down has been done by social forces, chiefly poverty. We 
have already seen how that abstract beating is echoed by the literal beating 
adm inistered by Dm itri,52 who hum iliates Snegiryov in the street by
51 Did Hamlet's intense love for his late father spring from a similar sense of fatherly 
guilt on the part of his creator? Shakespeare's only son, Hamnet (or Hamlet - the names 
seem to have been interchangeable) died at the age of eleven in 1596, four years before the 
composition of the play. And legend has it, of course, that Shakespeare himself played 
the ghost of Hamlet's father [see Elton, 1904: 223].
5 2Who could be a more appropriate emissary of ugly material forces than a Karamazov? 
Indeed two of the Karamazovs are effectively responsible for the beating, for Dmitri has 
come to the Captain seeking a promissory note sold by his Fyodor Karamazov. In effect, 
then, the beating incident involves one (thoroughly corrupted) father-son relationship 
assaulting another one which is still sacred, and which manages to remain so thanks to 
the premature death of the son.
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pulling his beard in front of a large audience. But the size of the audience 
m atters less than the crucial fact that Snegiryov's son is one of its 
members. As Snegiryov bitterly recalls:
'"P apa/ he cried, "papa!7 He caught hold of me, hugged me, tried to 
pull me away, crying to my offender: 'Let go, let go, it's my papa, 
my papa, forgive him 7 - that was what he cried: 'Forgive him!' 
And he took hold of him, too, with his little hands, and kissed his 
hand, that very hand, sir ... I remember his face at that moment, I 
have not forgotten it, sir, and I will not forget it.... this genealogical 
family picture forever imprinted itself in the memory of Ilyusha's 
soul. No, it's not for us to stay gentry, sir." [204]
Snegiryov sees this incident as he sees everything: through the 
eyes of his son. One can't help feeling that Mitya has committed a form 
of spiritual parricide here, by irrevocably blighting the son's image of his 
father. Dm itri's intervention perm anently comprom ises Snegiryov's 
natural authority over his son: their pow er relationship is effectively 
inverted, so that it is the father who refers to the son as "Dear old 
fellow!" [768] - and the son who conducts himself like an adult, and has 
the m aturity to utter, on his deathbed, this final wish: "Papa will cry, be 
with papa" [768]. Dmitri kills the son's respect - but not his love - for his 
father, and in a round-about way might even be said to kill the son 
himself: for it is as a direct result of Mitya's humiliation of the Captain 
that Ilyusha becomes involved in the rock fight in which he is struck on 
the heart - the injury which apparently precipitates the boy's fatal illness 
[205]. And it is another Karamazov, Smerdyakov, w ho has taught 
Ilyusha to feed pins to dogs, thus saddling the boy with a horrible sense of 
guilt which stifles his chances of recovery.
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By publicly robbing Snegiryov of his dignity, Mitya is only 
dramatically re-enacting what poverty has already achieved. Snegiryov 
himself, speaking to Alyosha, acknowledges this - and note that he again 
sees the shame of his son as the ultimate barometer of his indignity.
"An ordinary boy, a weak son, would have given in, would 
have felt ashamed of his father, but this one stood up for his 
father, alone against everyone. For his father, and for the truth, 
sir, for justice, sir. Because what he suffered then, as he kissed 
your brother's hand and cried to him: 'Forgive my papa, forgive 
my papa' - that alone God knows, and I, sir. And that is how our 
children - I mean, not yours but ours, sir, the children of the 
despised but noble poor - learn the truth on earth when they are 
just nine years old, sir. The rich ones - what do they know? In 
their whole lives they never sound such depths, and my Ilyushka, 
at that very moment in the square, sir, when he kissed his hand, 
at that very moment he went through the whole truth, sir." 
[205-206: emphasis added]
Poverty cost Snegiryov his dignity, and he literally cannot afford to 
get it back. If he challenges Mitya, and is crippled or killed, then "who 
will feed them all sir? Or should I then send Ilyusha out daily to beg 
instead of going to school?" [204]. This might or might not be a 
rationalisation of Snegiryov's cowardice - but it is rational. Honour is a 
luxury which the poor can't afford. Once again this is a truth which is at 
its most touching when it is reflected in the eyes of the son.
'Papa,' he said, 'papa!' 'What?' I said to him, and I could see that 
his eyes were flashing. 'Papa, the way he treated you, papa!' 'It can't
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be helped, Ilyusha/ I said. 'D on't make peace with him, papa, don't 
make peace. The boys say he gave you ten roubles for i t /  'No, 
Ilyusha,' I said, T w on't take money from him, not for anything.' 
Then he started shaking all over, seized my hand in both his 
hands, and kissed it again. 'Papa,' he said, 'papa, challenge him to a 
duel; they tease me at school, they say you're a coward and w on't 
challenge him to a duel, but you'll take his ten roubles.' 'It's not 
possible for me to challenge him to a duel, Ilyusha,' I answered, 
and explained to him briefly all that I just explained to you about 
that. He listened. 'Papa,' he said, 'papa, even so, don't make peace 
w ith him: I'll grow up, I'll challenge him myself, and I'll kill 
h im ! '53 And his eyes were flashing and shining. Well, I'm  still
5 3 Freud makes no m ention of the Ilyusha subplot. But there is a remarkable similarity 
between it and a scene from Freud's childhood recounted in The Interpretation of Dreams. 
As  a child, Freud explains, his favourite hero had been Hannibal, "the Semitic 
commander". This identification had arisen out of the following childhood experience.
I might have been ten or twelve years old when my father began to take me on his 
walks, and in his conversation to reveal his views on the things of this world. 
Thus it was that he once told me the following incident, in order to show me that I 
had been bom  into happier times than he: "When I was a young man, I was 
walking one Saturday along the street in the village where you were bom; I was 
well-dressed, with a new fur cap on my head. Up comes a Christian, who knocks 
my cap into the m ud, and shouts, 'Jew, get off the pavement!'" - "And what did 
you do?" - "I went into the street and picked up my hat," he calmly replied. That 
did not seem heroic on the part of the big, strong man who was leading me, a little 
fellow, by the hand. I contrasted this situation, which did not please me, with 
another, more in harm ony with my sentiments - the scene in which Hannibal's 
father, Hamilcar Barcas, made his son swear before the household altar to take 
vengeance on the Romans. Ever since then Hannibal has had a place in my 
phantasies. [Freud, 1938: 260]
Like Snegiryov, Freud's father knows that the in adult world, taking revenge is generally 
more difficult than not taking revenge. And like Ilyusha, the young Sigmund dreams of 
exacting vengeance on his father's behalf - a fantasy motivated, one w ould think, by 
extreme love of his father, and therefore a fantasy which scarcely conforms to the classic 
oedipal model. Had the young Freud been a proper Freudian, he would surely have given 
a psychological thum bs-up to the Christian's assault on his father - perhaps he w ould 
even have grown up to become a Christian himself out of psychological sympathy. One 
must remember, of course, that Freud does, via the concept of ambivalence, stress that one's 
oedipal hatred of one's father will be accompanied by a loving reverence of him. But since 
this love is not unconscious (there being no call to repress it), it is not entirely clear how it 
can be potent enough to engineer a dream or a fantasy - mental products which Freud 
tended to think of as granting fulfilment to unconscious wishes.
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his father for all that, I had to tell him the right thing. "It's sinful to 
k ill/ I said, 'even in a due l/ 'P apa / he said, 'papa, I'll throw  him 
down when I'm  big, I'll knock the sword out of his hand w ith my 
sword, I'll rush at him, throw him down, hold my sword over him 
and say: I could kill you now, but I forgive you, so there!' You see, 
sir, what a process went on in his little head for these two days!... 
Again we went for a walk. 'P apa/ he asked, 'papa, is it true that the 
rich are stronger than anybody in the world?' 'Yes, Ilyusha,' I said, 
'no one in the world is stronger than the rich.' 'P apa/ he said, 'I'll 
get rich, I'll become an officer, and I'll beat everybody, and the tsar 
will reward me. Then I'll come back, and nobody will dare....' [206- 
207]
For Dostoevsky, the fantasies of the son are m otivated not by 
hatred of the father, but by love of him - and the father's dream s are 
m otivated by an equally intense love of his son. But neither kind of 
dream can be satisfied w ithout money: as we are vividly show n in the 
extraordinary  scene w hen Alyosha offers Snegiryov, on behalf of 
Katerina Ivanovna, a gift to atone for Mitya's disgracing him: "two new, 
iridescent hundred-rouble bills" [209]. The money is the miracle that will 
finally perm it Snegiryov to fulfil his pa triarchal responsibilities, 
particularly in regard to his son. He raves:
"Listen, Alexei Fyodorovich, listen to me, sir, because the moment 
has now come for you to listen, sir, because you cannot even 
understand w hat these two hundred  roubles can m ean for me 
now.... I can now get treatm ent for mama and N inichka - my 
hunchbacked angel, my daughter ... I can undertake treatm ent for 
my dear ones, sir, send the student to Petersburg, sir, and buy beef,
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and introduce a new diet, sir. Lord, but this is a dream.... [PJerhaps 
now Ilyushka and I will indeed realize our dream: we'll buy a 
horse and a covered cart, and the horse will be black, he asked that 
it be black, and we'll set off as we were picturing it two days ago." 
[210]
It is embarrassingly undignified of Smerdyakov to gush all this in 
front of a relative stranger. But he is only articulating the embarrassing 
indignity that is already inherent in the situation: his family life is a 
fiasco which no amount of will in the world can fix, but which can be 
remedied at a stroke by a couple of bits of coloured paper. Patriarchy is 
meant to endow him with power; but it is in these flimsy pieces of cash 
that the real power resides. Realising this, Snegiryov salvages his dignity 
in the only way that the situation allows. "[HJolding up both iridescent 
bills" he crumples them, throws them to the ground, and asserts his 
superiority to them by crushing them under his foot. "His whole figure 
presented a picture of inexplicable pride. 'Report to those who sent you 
that the whiskbroom does not sell his honour,' he called out, raising his 
arm in the air" [211-212].54 Having done this, the whiskbroom turns to 
go; but he has one last, crucial, thing to say:
he turned around again, this time for the last time, and now there 
was no twisted laugh on his face, but, on the contrary, it was all 
shaken with tears. In a weeping, faltering, spluttering patter, he 
cried out:
'And what would I tell my boy, if I took money from you for 
our disgrace?' And having said this, he broke into a run, this
54'W hiskbroom ' is the nickname, inspired by the visual qualities of his facial hair, 
which Snegiryov has received from certain schoolmates of Ilyusha who witnessed the 
beard-pulling at the hands of Dmitri Karamazov.
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time without turning around. Alyosha looked after him with 
inexpressible sadness. [212]
Again, it all ultimately comes down to his relations with his son. 
To this point, his son's fierce love for him has survived, perhaps even 
been reinforced by, Snegiryov's public hum iliations. But those 
hum iliations were inflicted by the world. To accept Katerina's money 
would be to participate, wilfully, in his own degradation - to accept that 
his honour, his dignity, his love for his family and theirs for him, are all 
less im portant things than money. Rejecting the offer is therefore a 
suprem e moment for Snegiryov. He knows, he admits, that his family's 
health, perhaps their very lives, depend on these notes. (This point is 
subsequently brought home pitilessly by Dostoevsky during the fatal 
illness of Ilyusha.55) So effectively, Snegiryov is obliged at this critical 
juncture to decide between preserving his son's respect for him, and 
preserving his son's life. He opts to preserve the former, and there can be 
no doubt that Dostoevsky applauds this choice. Snegiryov elects to 
embrace the holy ideal of family relations rather than succumb to the 
base reality, the materialist contamination of father-son relations which 
points the way to parricide. Lack of money strips the father of his dignity, 
and the son of his life: but not even death can destroy the holy bond 
between father and son. After all, what is a father w ithout the respect of 
his son: he is Fyodor Karamazov, who maintains that "w ith money one 
can get almost everything", but who inspires so little love in his sons that 
one of them m urders him, and the others, w ith only one exception,
55The doctor tells Snegiryov that there is only one way of saving his son's life: a course of 
treatment that involves taking the boy to Syracuse, then the Caucasus, then Paris. The 
poverty-stricken father responds:
"'Doctor, doctor! But don't you see!' the captain again waved his hands, pointing 
in despair at the bare log walls of the entryway.
"'Ah, that is not my business,' the doctor grinned, T have merely said what sci­
ence can say to your questions about last measures. As for the rest... to my regret...'" [560].
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mentally applaud the deed. The Snegiryovs have love but no money, but 
to Dostoevsky - and who would dare to disagree with him? - they are 
infinitely richer than the Karamazovs.
"He rushed to me suddenly, threw his little arms around my 
neck, and hugged me. You know, when children are silent and 
proud, and have been holding back their tears for a long time, 
when they suddenly burst out, if a great grief comes, the tears just 
don't flow, sir, they pour out in streams. With these warm  
streams he suddenly wet my whole face. He suddenly sobbed as if 
he were in convulsions, and began shaking and pressing me to 
him as I sat there on the stone. 'P apa/ he cried, 'papa, dear papa, 
how he humiliated you!' Then I began weeping too, sir. We 
were sitting, holding each other, and sobbing. 'Papa,' he said,
'dear papa!' 'Ilyusha/ I said, 'dear Ilyusha!' No one saw us then, 
sir, only God saw us - let's hope he'll enter it into my record, 
sir." [208]
There, in a nutshell, is Dostoevsky's ideal family - the father and 
son whipped and pum melled by the evil materialism of the world, but 
refusing to submit to it, taking refuge instead in their sacred love. One 
hardly needs to point out that Ilyusha's heart is entirely free of parricidal 
desires. This is because Dostoevsky views parricide as a sym ptom  of a 
disease which the Snegiryovs have refused to contract. The parricidal 
Karamazovs represent the corruption of the contem porary family by 
contemporary values. The Snegiryovs reminds us that nothing could be 
further from Dostoevsky's idea of the norm  in family relations than the 
will to parricide.
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Freud is sometimes referred to, by critics who have perceived the 
fictional nature of his central claims, bu t who remain unw illing to 
dispense with his "achievem ent", as the last of the great nineteenth- 
century novelists. In the limited sense that his antennae picked up on 
the them es tha t preoccupied the creative artists of his time, this 
proposition is valid. But when one reads it alongside a genuinely great 
novel, psychoanalysis stands revealed as a comic strip . Even
Smerdyakov and Snegiryov, both caricatures w hen com pared w ith a 
creation like Ivan, are nevertheless endow ed w ith richer and m ore 
complex motives than Freud granted to Leonardo or Shakespeare - or to 
Dostoevsky himself. Freud patronises Dostoevsky's reactionary politics, 
but the im portant thing to recognise is that Dostoevsky's cranky and 
narrow  beliefs, unlike Freud's cranky and narrow  beliefs, were not the 
whole point of his work. Dostoevsky's achievement does not stand or 
fall on the correctness of his ideas. What matters is his art, where he was 
capable of creating things that did not conform to his preconceptions. 
Freud could not even see th ings that d id  not conform  to his 
preconceptions. Dostoevsky's convictions might have been supernatural, 
but there was som ething close to the scientific method - closer to the 
scientific method than we get from Freud, anyway - in his willingness to 
measure them against the world, even if it was only a world of his own 
creation. So vigorously does Dostoevsky pu t his prejudices to the 
fictional test that he ends up dem onstrating their narrow ness himself, 
drow ning them  under a rich brew  of contradictory data , radical 
perceptions, self-doubt, negative capability. Even in a fictional w orld 
invented by the theorist himself, hum an behaviour proves too various 
to be unlocked by a single key. Fortunately for Dostoevsky, it is for the 
intensity of his imagination, and not for the quality of his theories, that 
we read him.
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In the work of Freud, on the other hand, there is never any danger 
of data swamping theory. There is, however, a constant danger that the 
theory might overwhelm and reshape the data, as it does when Freud 
says that women have no conscience, or that Dostoevsky's epilepsy was 
hysterical, or that in Sm erdyakov's parricide the m otive of "sexual 
rivalry ... is laid bare". True, there are parts of Dostoevsky's novel - a 
sentence here, a passage there, a rem ark or two rem oved from their 
context - which do not have to be reshaped in order to repay the Freudian 
reading. But they repay it in the same way that the spots on a Dalmatian 
confirm the hypothesis that Dalmatians are black. Several things can be 
said in favour of the theory that Dalmatians are black. It is original. It is 
audacious. If it is correct, it could change our way of thinking about 
Dalmatians forever. Unfortunately it is not correct. When confronted by 
an actual Dalmatian, the hypothesis m ust be abandoned. Unless of 
course the hypothesis had been advanced by Freud - in that case the 
validity of the dog would probably have to be called into question. Are 
the "white" hairs really white, or can one discover blackness at their 
roots? Is the whiteness really there, or is one merely seeing it to fulfil 
one's wish that Freud is wrong? And in light of the strong probability 
that Dalmatians are black, haven't we got good cause to suppose that this 
black-and-white specimen before us is something other than a Dalmatian 
anyway?
For Freud never seemed to see why his main hypotheses should be 
considered more malleable than the things they were about. And since 
he was hypothesising about things considerably less tangible than dogs, 
his interpretive solipsism could be indulged with relative impunity. Fie 
wielded his theories like blunt instruments, bashing the data into shape. 
When the datum  is a dream, or a lapse of memory, or a case history of a 
patient whom we cannot know except through Freud, it is hard to catch
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him in the act. But when the object of his assault is a widely-available 
novel, we have the opportunity to compare the costs and benefits of his 
reading with those of a reading unfettered by his "insights". And when 
we do, we find that Freud does not read The Brothers Karamazov at all. 
He does everything but read it. He trawls it for points of agreement; 
reduces it, traduces it, cheapens it, distorts it. He shrinks its eight- 
hundred pages to a handful of supposedly suggestive phrases, and has as 
little interest in its bulk as an ivory hunter has in the elephant's corpse. 
He makes it mean less than it meant before he came along. If he can do 
this to our understanding of one novel, then what can he do - w hat has 
he done - to our understanding of the world?
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